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Abstract 
 
 
The past three decades have seen increasing concern in the international community for the 
need to more effectively ‘do justice’ for victims of mass atrocities. At the same time, there is a 
growing recognition that such justice includes, together with the need to ensure that 
appropriate reparation is provided to victims, the criminal accountability of those responsible 
for the most serious crimes. This thesis argues that there is an intrinsic relationship between 
these two emerging values. In particular, it demonstrates that a right to justice, understood as 
the right to the determination of the individual criminal responsibility of wrongdoers, is 
emerging under international law as an imperative remedy for victims of gross human rights 
violations and international crimes, alongside more traditional forms of reparation.    
The development of victims’ right to justice invites a reconsideration of the role and 
the rights of victims in criminal proceedings. It is argued that if victims have a right to the 
prosecution of human rights offenders as an integral component of their right to remedy, it is 
legitimate to assert that they should also be granted corresponding procedural rights in the 
criminal process. Through an extensive review of international legal instruments and practice 
and a comparative analysis of domestic criminal justice systems, this study demonstrates that 
the role of victims and the rights they possess in criminal proceedings have considerably 
expanded during the past three decades. The most significant development can be found in the 
law and practice of international and internationalized criminal tribunals, where procedures 
have been introduced aimed at enabling victims to participate in the proceedings. The 
incorporation of a regime of victim redress within the framework of international criminal 
tribunals not only represents an extension of the mandate of international criminal justice but 
also confirms a shift in the way in which redress is conceptualised at the international level.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
1 THE GROWING RELEVANCE OF REDRESS FOR VICTIMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
Thirty years ago, the American criminologist William F. McDonald referred to victims of 
crime as the forgotten men.1 This definition could equally describe the position of victims 
under international law since, until very recently, little effort had been made to address the 
needs of victims. The neglect of victims of mass atrocities has its roots primarily in the fact 
that states have historically had a monopoly as the only subjects of rights under international 
law.2 Describing the traditional position of individuals harmed by violations of international 
law, Dionisio Anzilotti wrote that ‘[l]a conduite d’un Etat, toute contraire qu’elle soit au droit 
international ne saurait jamais donner naissance à un droit de l’individu à la rèparation du 
dommage souffert’.3 Accordingly, since the commission of wrongful acts and the granting of 
reparation were considered purely a matter of inter-state relations and inter-state 
responsibility,4 individual victims were left entirely at the mercy of the discretionary 
intermediation of their nation state to take up their claim for reparation on their behalf.  
Over the course of the past three decades, however, the focus of the international 
community has increasingly shifted to victims’ needs and concerns, leading to a considerable 
expansion of the scope of redress available to individuals who have suffered harm as a 
consequence of an international wrongful act.5 The latest and most widely discussed 
development in this respect is the creation of redress regimes within recently established 
international and internationalized criminal tribunals, namely the International Criminal Court 
(‘ICC’), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’) and the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’).  Although utilising different modalities, these courts entitle 
victims to participate in proceedings in their own right in cases against the alleged 
                                                 
1 W.F. McDonald, ‘Toward a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim’, 13 
American Criminal Law Review (1976) 649-673, at 650. 
2 A. Randelzhofer, ‘The Legal Position of the Individual under Present International Law’, in A. Randelzhofer 
and C. Tomuschat (eds), State Responsibility and the Individual: Reparations in Instances of Grave Violations of 
Human Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999) 231-242. 
3 D. Anzilotti, ‘La responsabilité internationale des Etats à raison des dommages soufferts par des étrangers’, 13 
Revue générale de droit international public (1906) 5-29; see contra H. Lauterpacht, International Law and 
Human Rights (London: Steven and Sons, 1950) 27-47. 
4 For a thorough review of the law and practice of reparations in the law of state responsibility, see D. Shelton, 
Remedies in International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 50-103. 
5 See infra Section 2.1. 
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perpetrators of the crimes from which they have suffered.6 The ICC and the ECCC may also 
award reparation to the victims of international crimes.7  
The recognition of victims’ rights before international criminal tribunals is not an 
isolated phenomenon, although the considerable literature on this subject has tended to 
analyse it in a compartmentalised manner.8 It is, in fact, in keeping with a number of 
significant developments that have occurred throughout the last few decades, mainly under 
the regime of international human rights law, with respect to redress for victims of serious 
violations of human rights. In particular, while affirming the existence of an individual right 
to remedy, a substantial number of international legal instruments and practice have 
challenged the traditional categories of restitution and monetary compensation as appropriate 
remedies in cases of gross human rights breaches. Instead, these legal instruments and 
relevant practice have taken the position that ‘the accountability of individual perpetrators of 
grave human rights violations is one of the central elements of any effective remedy for 
victims of human rights violations.’9 
Today a growing body of literature on impunity for gross violations of human rights, 
both from a psychological and a legal perspective, supports the view that the prosecution of 
perpetrators would in some way alleviate the suffering of victims. Whilst courts cannot 
provide individual rehabilitation as such, they may aid the rehabilitation of society10 and, in 
addition, certain aspects of the criminal process and outcome may provide victims with 
closure.11 A number of legal scholars have also contended that justice can alleviate a victim’s 
desire for revenge and foster respect for democratic institutions. For instance, Antonio 
Cassese, the then President of the ICTY, observed: 
                                                 
6 See Art. 68(3) ICC Statute (‘ICCSt.’); Art. 17 STL Statute (‘STLSt.’); Rule 23 ECCC Internal Rules (Rev.8), 
as revised on 3 August 2011 (‘ECCC IR’). 
7 Art. 75 ICCSt.; Rule 23 quinquies ECCC IR. 
8 These works mainly focus on how these regimes will operate in practice, considering the practical and legal 
obstacles they will face and exploring emergent practice. Recent publications on the topic include: B. 
McGonigle Leyh, Procedural justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings (Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2011); J.C. Ochoa S., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings for Serious Human 
Rights Violations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013); H. Olásolo, ‘Victims’ Participation According to 
the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court’, in Idem, Essays on International Criminal Justice 
(Oxford: Hart, 2012); C. Van Den Wyngaert, ‘Victims Before International Criminal Courts: Some Views and 
Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge’, 44 Case Western Reserve University School of Law (2012) 475-496. 
9 UN General Assembly (‘UN GA’, Khmer Rouge Trials, UN Doc. A/Res/57/228, 27 February 2003, at 1. 
10 See e.g. M. Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction 
Publishers, 1997), at 69. 
11 J. O’Connell, ‘Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their 
Victims?’, 46 Harvard International Law Journal (2005) 295-345. 
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[J]ustice dissipates the call for revenge, because when the Court metes out the perpetrator his just deserts, then 
the victims’ calls for retribution are met; by dint of dispensation of justice, victims are prepared to be reconciled 
with their erstwhile tormentors, because they know that the latter have now paid for their crimes.12 
It can be argued that the growing awareness of victims’ rights, and with it the idea that 
victims have a legitimate interest in the prosecution of human rights offenders, has influenced 
the development of human rights instruments and their interpretation. In particular, an 
overview of human rights treaties and their interpretation by the competent courts and 
institutions at the international and regional level indicates that criminal measures are 
increasingly considered as essential in the context of human rights protection.13 However, 
theories about the role of victims in this context are still emerging. More precisely, it is still 
unclear to what extent a right to justice,14 understood as the right to have alleged human rights 
offenders prosecuted, is embraced as an integral element of remedy for serious human rights 
violations.  
On the whole, recent years have seen increasing concern in the international 
community regarding the need to more effectively ‘do justice’ for victims and a growing 
recognition that this includes, along with the need to ensure that appropriate reparation is 
provided to them, the rapid development of a global norm in support of criminal 
accountability for the most serious crimes. The question that arises out of such increasing 
concern is whether there is there any link between these two emerging trends. In other words, 
is there any relationship between redress for victims and the prosecution of those responsible 
for serious violations of human rights? And does this relationship have any impact on the role 
that victims should play in criminal proceedings? With these questions in mind, this thesis 
seeks to understand whether a distinct redress regime exists with regard to gross violations of 
human rights and, if so, what the main features of this regime are.  
This subject remains virtually unexplored in the literature to date. Indeed, the wealth 
of scholarly contributions that have been published on the development of victims’ right to 
reparation under international law rarely refer to the practice of international criminal 
                                                 
12 A. Cassese, ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’, 61 Modern Law Review (1998) 1-10, at 6. 
13 See A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
at 206-227, and the case law cited therein. 
14 The ‘right to justice’ is explicitly provided for only in two UN declarative instruments. See Commission on 
Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Question of the 
Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political), Revised Final Report Prepared by 
Mr. Joinet Pursuant to Sub-Commission Decision 1996/119, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, 2 October 
1997, § 27; Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to 
Combat Impunity, Diane Orentlicher; Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, 
Principles 19-30. 
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tribunals which have incorporated victims’ redress regimes.15  Furthermore, publications on 
the issue of victims’ rights in international criminal proceedings fail to grasp the intrinsic 
relationship between these rights and the development of the right of access to justice and to 
remedy for the victims of gross violations of human rights.16 Finally, studies on accountability 
for human rights atrocities and international crimes have only tangentially dealt with the 
position of victims, most often rejecting the claim that victims’ rights and legitimate interests 
should be incorporated into criminal trials.17 
This thesis aims, therefore, to fill this scientific gap — which is no longer justified in 
light of the groundbreaking developments of the last few decades — by analysing the 
emerging right to criminal justice for victims of gross violations of human rights and 
international crimes, linking the concept of victims’ redress and the fight against impunity. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Publications on this topic mainly focus on the practice of human rights supervisory bodies. See e.g., D. 
Shelton, supra note no. 4; F. Francioni (ed.), Access to Justice as a Human Right (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
16 See supra note no. 8. 
17 A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations, supra note no. 13. 
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2 MAIN THEMES OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
Four main themes will be treated in this dissertation. As will be argued throughout the thesis, 
these themes have substantially evolved in recent years in an interconnected manner.  
 
2.1 Victims’ Right to Remedy  
 
The obligation to provide reparation as a consequence of an international wrongful act is a 
well-established principle under international law. As early as 1928, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) held that it is a fundamental principle of general international law 
that the breach of an international obligation ‘involves an obligation to make reparation in an 
adequate form.’18 However, as observed above, a state-centric approach has been traditionally 
adopted with regard to the access of individuals to reparation measures.  
This state-centric approach was dramatically transformed in the period after World 
War II, which brought an increasing concern with the role and the rights of individuals under 
international law. On the one hand, the individual criminal responsibility of perpetrators was 
established at the international level19 and on the other, international law governing the rights 
of victims developed rapidly. Indeed, the individual has increasingly become a direct holder 
of certain rights and can no longer be considered as a mere beneficiary under international 
law.  
This trend is most evident in the field of international human rights law where a 
variety of legal instruments at the international and regional level,20 as well as a number of 
soft law texts including declarations21 and general comments of treaty bodies,22 either impose 
                                                 
18 PCIJ, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Jurisdiction, Series A No. 9, 26 July 
1927, at 21. 
19 An oft-cited quotation by the Nuremberg Tribunal asserts: ‘[C]rimes against international law are committed 
by men, not by abstract entities and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced’. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947), at 223. 
20 At the universal level, for instance: Art. 2(3) of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(‘ICCPR’); Art. 11 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Art. 14 of the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CAT’); Art. 6 of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD’). At the regional level: Art. 13 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’); Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; 
Art. 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights (‘ACHR’); Art. 7 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (although it does not mention the right to remedy, but rather refers to ‘the right to have his cause 
heard’) (‘AfrCHPR’). 
21 E.g., Art. 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Art. XVIII of the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man; Art. 3 Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation. 
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a duty on states to provide individuals with an effective remedy,23 or establish an individual 
right to an effective remedy.24 A number of instruments also provide individuals with an 
enforceable right to seek and obtain redress under the treaty-based framework of human rights 
protection and promotion.25  
A review of the judicial and quasi-judicial practice of human rights supervisory bodies 
with the power to award (or, at the very least, to recommend) reparation to individuals whose 
rights have been violated indicates that restitution and monetary compensation have long been 
the most common remedies granted to victims.26 Nevertheless, more recently these bodies 
have increasingly acknowledged that restitution or compensation alone is an inadequate form 
of redress considering the gravity of the harm suffered and, most importantly, that in the 
majority of cases the injury sustained as a consequence of these violations cannot be repaired 
by way of restitution or compensation.  
As such, the assumption that the most obvious need for victims is for compensation 
has been increasingly challenged and a ‘return to a symbolic dimension’27 has been 
recommended instead (particularly in view of the fact that most victims of serious human 
rights breaches rate their need to know what happened to them, or to their beloved ones, and 
why more highly than compensation). Accordingly, human rights courts have directed states 
to take specific action besides restitution or compensation to remedy human rights violations. 
In particular, a review of the case law of human rights supervisory bodies highlights that for 
victims of violations of the right to life and personal integrity, such as in cases involving 
arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, torture and extrajudicial executions, prosecution 
of the offenders is necessary to make the remedy effective.28 In other words, a right to 
                                                                                                                                                        
22 E.g., Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’), General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004. 
23 Art. 2(3) ICCPR.  
24 Art. 13 ECHR; Art. 25 ACHR. 
25 Art. 5(4) First Optional Protocol ICCPR; Art. 41 ECHR; Art. 63 ACHR; Art. 27(1) AfrCHPR. 
26 For instance, in the influential Velázquez Rodríguez case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(‘IACtHR’) awarded compensatory damages to the family of Manfredo Velázquez Rodríguez, but did not order 
the prosecution and punishment of those responsible which was requested by the family as moral reparation 
(Velázquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 21 July 1989, §§ 9 and 60); likewise, a 
review of the European Court of Human Rights’ (‘ECtHR’) case law reveals that the Court’s remedial power 
under Article 41 ECHR was initially regarded as limited to monetary compensation and declarative relief only, 
and the Court has repeatedly ruled that it lacks authority to issue explicit directions on remedial matters (e.g., 
Mehemi v. France (App. No. 25017/94), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 26 September 1967, §§ 41 and 
43).   
27 M. Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1998). 
28 I expand on this ideas in V. Spiga, ‘No Redress without Justice: Victims and International Criminal Law’, 10 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012) 1377-1394, at 1381-1384.  
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criminal justice is being affirmed as an integral component of the right to remedy for victims 
of gross violations of human rights.  
 
 
2.2 Confronting Gross Human Rights Violations with Prosecutions: A Duty and a 
Right?   
 
Gross human rights violations have occurred throughout the last century in all parts of the 
world in times of peace and in times of war. Clearly, confronting gross human rights 
violations is a much more difficult endeavour than confronting ordinary crimes due to the 
high number of perpetrators and victims as well as the complex task of initially identifying 
and categorising wrongful conduct and later determining responsibility for it. The instruments 
employed to deal with gross human rights violations have been various, ranging from the 
creation of international tribunals (when these violations amount to international crimes) to 
the initiation of domestic trials, administrative proceedings and general amnesties. 
In this regard, however, it has been rightly observed that ‘[s]ilence and impunity have 
been the norm rather than the exception’.29 It is submitted that the prevalence of impunity 
over accountability in the aftermath of gross violations of human rights may be attributed to 
two main distinct but interrelated factors. The first is that traditionally accountability for 
human rights violations fell under the ‘domaine réservé’ of the state concerned. According to 
the traditional Grotian model of public international law, the sovereignty of states covered the 
acts against of a state against its own citizens, regardless of the lawfulness of such acts.30 
Secondly, in the absence of a specific obligation to prosecute and punish those responsible for 
gross human rights violations, states have often opted for alternative solutions to criminal 
trials with a view to stopping the violations (if these are still ongoing) or avoiding the risk of 
provoking further violence.31  
Nonetheless, since the end of World War II, in the wake of widespread revulsion 
against the crimes committed during the conflict, states finally began to accept limits on their 
sovereignty in relation to the human rights of those individuals subject to their jurisdiction.  
Since then, the duty of states to prosecute certain serious crimes has gradually become settled 
law. Over the last three decades, international law and policy have shown growing support for 
                                                 
29 C. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), at 3. 
30 On this issue, see K. Ambos, ‘Judicial Accountability of Perpetrators of Perpetrators of Human Rights 
Violations and the Role of Victims’, International Peacekeeping (March 2000 – June 2000), 67-77, at 67. 
31 For a global perspective on the use of criminal prosecution in the aftermath of gross violations, see C. Nino, 
supra note no. 29, at 3-40. 
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the principle ‘that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole must not go unpunished’.32 Two elements, in particular, signal the increasing support 
for a state’s obligation to investigate and prosecute violations of personal integrity and take 
action against those responsible, namely (i) the adoption of treaties explicitly providing for 
the obligation of states to prosecute and punish perpetrators of acts defined as crimes under 
international law;33 and (ii) the interpretation by human rights supervisory bodies of the 
obligation to ‘respect and ensure’ rights as entailing the duty to prosecute those responsible 
for gross violations of human rights.34  
The duty to prosecute has therefore been traditionally framed as an objective duty of 
general human rights protection. The main argument for criminal prosecution is that it is the 
most effective insurance against future violations: the failure to prosecute and punish human 
rights violations may result in a lack of protection against further abuses.35 Furthermore, 
impunity of perpetrators is perceived as a retroactive acceptance of the violations committed.  
At the same time, as observed above, the traditional concept of prosecution and 
punishment as a measure of general human rights protection is gradually becoming broader in 
scope. Notably, the decisions of treaty-based human rights bodies and the provisions of 
binding and non-binding international human rights documents have evolved to consider 
effective prosecutions as an essential component of the remedy that states must guarantee 
victims of right to life or inhumane treatment violations. States not only have a duty to the 
public but also to the victims to prosecute grave human rights abuses. The development of 
this practice seems to justify the emergence of a victim’s right to justice for serious human 
rights violations, which coexists with the relevant state’s duty to prosecute.  
The framing of criminal justice as a victim’s right raises a number of theoretical 
questions that will be addressed throughout this thesis. In particular, three issues deserve 
                                                 
32 Preamble, ICCSt.  
33 D. Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’, 100 
Yale Journal of International Law (1991) 2537-2615. Examples of universal treaties demanding the 
criminalisation and punishment of certain gross human rights offenses are the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (arts. 4 and 5), the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Art. 49), the Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Art. 50), 
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Art. 146), the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Art. 129), the CAT (Art. 2), the Convention to 
Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (Art. 6), the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and 
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (Art. 1), and the International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (Art. 4).    
34 See e.g., IACtHR, Velázquez Rodríguez, supra note no. 26, § 4; ECtHR, LCB v. United Kingdom (App. No. 
23413/94), Judgment (Merits), 9 June 1998, § 36. 
35 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, in Idem (ed.), Post-
Conflict Justice (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2002) 3-54, at 52. 
  
9 
special attention. First, the relationship between the duty to prosecute and victims’ right to 
justice needs to be clarified. For instance, since criminal prosecution is conceived as a 
component of victims’ right to remedy, one may argue that victims could forfeit such right by 
asking that no action be taken against the offenders. Nonetheless, victims’ right to justice 
coexists with the state’s duty to prosecute. This point has been addressed by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, which stated that the duty to conduct an effective criminal 
trial is separate from the state’s duty to repair the harm suffered by victims.36 Therefore, even 
if the victim asks to leave the violations unpunished, the state is not exempted from the duty 
to prosecute such violations, in order to ‘respect and ensure’ the rights of persons under its 
jurisdiction. 
A second issue which will be taken into consideration is the impact of the affirmation 
of victims’ right to justice on the scope of the duty to prosecute. It could be argued that if the 
idea of a right to justice were pursued, a fundamental change would occur in relation to the 
scope of the duty to prosecute and punish. Conceiving the duty to prosecute and punish in the 
general pursuit of the overall protection of human rights, as was the case traditionally, 
potentially subjects the duty itself to an inherent limitation, which is especially relevant in 
post-conflict situations.  This limitation is that the duty to punish should not be read as an 
obstacle to the restoration of peace and social security in the community affected by serious 
violations of human rights.  
Accordingly, while the state remains under the obligation to criminalise serious 
violations of human rights, as well as to establish effective law-enforcement machinery, 
deviation from the duty to prosecute and punish should be allowed if this would better serve 
the general enjoyment of human rights. On the contrary, if the criminal accountability of 
human rights offenders is also considered as a remedial measure for victims, there is no room 
to argue that it can be compromised in favour of the general protection of human rights.  As 
such, the possibility of utilising alternative mechanisms of redress (such as truth and 
reconciliation commissions) and the option to perform a balancing act (accountability versus 
peace) are precluded. It is argued that the emergence of remedy as a rationale for prosecution 
and punishment potentially offers a better contribution in the fight against impunity. 
Finally, conceiving criminal prosecution as an integral component of victims’ right to 
remedy may be at odds with the way in which the concept of reparation has been used in 
                                                 
36 IACtHR, Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 26 May 2001, § 99. 
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international law, where it is considered to be non-punitive in character.37 Does this emerging 
trend imply a shift in character in the way we conceive reparation? In order to answer to this 
question, an extensive analysis has to be conducted of the relationship between reparation and 
criminal prosecution as construed in the law of state responsibility. Interestingly, judicial 
bodies have linked the state’s failure to prosecute to the so-called ‘denial of justice’, a concept 
comparable to the right to remedy as it has emerged in modern human rights. This link is well 
exemplified in the famous dictum by Max Huber in the Spanish Moroccan case, in which he 
affirmed that the responsibility of a state can be invoked in relation to the denial of justice 
when it does not carry out due diligence in the pursuit of criminals.38 The existence of a link 
between the obligation to prosecute and punish human rights offenders and the right to 
reparation also became apparent in the early conceptualisation of the law of state 
responsibility.39 However, doubts have been expressed regarding whether the obligation to 
criminally prosecute wrongdoers is an element of a primary obligation imposed on the State 
or whether it is a secondary obligation arising from the commission of an international 
wrongful act.40 
 
 
2.3 Victims and Criminal Justice  
 
Reading criminal justice into victims’ rights also necessitates a reconsideration of the role of 
victims in criminal proceedings and the rights they possess. Indeed, if victims have a right to 
the prosecution of human rights offenders as an integral component of their right to remedy, it 
                                                 
37 C.J. Tams, ‘Do Serious Breaches Give Rise to Any Specific Obligations of the Responsible State?’, 13 
European Journal of International Law (‘EJIL’) (2002) 1161-1180, at 1166-1170; but see contra F.V. García-
Amador, The Changing Law of International Claims, vol. 2 (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1984), at 575. 
38 Affaires des biens britanniques au Maroc Espagnol (Espagne c. Royaume-Uni), 1 March 1925, Recueil de 
sentences arbitrales, vol. II, 615-742, at 645 (‘[L]a responsabilité de l'état peut  être engagée dans les situations 
en question, non seulement par un manque de vigilance dans la prévention des actes dommageables, mais aussi 
par un manque de diligence dans la poursuite pénale des fauteurs, ainsi que dans l’application des sanctions 
civiles voulues.’). 
39 For instance, the punishment of individual perpetrators was recognised as an element of satisfaction in the 
work of the Preparatory Committee of the League of Nations Codification Conference in 1930. The Basis of 
Discussion Draft 29 established that ‘[r]esponsibility involves for the State concerned an obligation to make 
good the damage suffered … It may also, according to the circumstances, and when this consequence follows 
from the general principles of international law, involve the obligation to afford satisfaction to the State which 
has been injured … in the shape of an apology (given with the appropriate solemnity) and (in proper cases) the 
punishment of the guilty persons’ (emphasis added). See also International Law Commission (‘ILC’), Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility with Commentaries Thereto Adopted by the International Law Commission on 
First Reading, Art. 45 (January 1997). 
40 ILC, Third Report on State Responsibility by Mr James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN-
4/507/Add.4, 15 March 2000, §§ 40 and 57-59. 
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would seem legitimate to assert that they should be granted corresponding procedural rights in 
the criminal process.  
In contrast to the development of human rights norms protecting the rights of the 
defendant, traditionally little attention has been paid to the rights of victims in criminal 
proceedings. The vast majority of international treaties do not make any explicit reference to 
the right of victims to standing or to be heard in criminal proceedings. This is probably due to 
the fact that, in order to secure the support of a significant number of states, these documents 
have been drafted with a view to not interfering with the margin of appreciation for the 
domestic practices of states. As a matter of fact, the position of victims in national criminal 
justice systems varies significantly between states and depends primarily on the criminal 
model adopted and to the legal tradition to which the state belongs. Whereas victims’ rights in 
criminal proceedings have traditionally been recognised in civil law countries,
41
 it is a largely 
unfamiliar concept to common law countries like the United States where victims may be 
called to testify as witnesses but generally play no further role in the proceedings.  If a victim 
wishes to claim compensation or seek any other remedy in a common law jurisdiction they 
are compelled to bring a separate civil action.
42
  
Despite the significant differences between these two models, in recent years it would 
seem that the gap between them, at least with respect to the recognition victims’ rights in 
criminal proceedings, has been narrowing.  This narrowing of the gap can be attributed in part 
to the influence of emerging international legal standards on the rights of victims of crime.43  
In the last two decades, a number of documents have been adopted at the international 
and regional level acknowledging the importance of considering victims’ concerns in the 
criminal process. Starting with the UN Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power in 1985,44 and a Council of Europe Recommendation of the same period,45 
international legal norms began to recognise that victims need to be treated with compassion 
and respect for their dignity and that they are entitled to redress for their suffering in terms of 
                                                 
41 M. Chiavario, ‘Private Parties: The Rights of the Defendant and the Victim’, in M. Delmas-Marty and J. R. 
Spencer (eds), European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 541-593, at 542-
547. 
42 See generally D.E. Beloof, P.G. Cassel, and S.J. Twist, Victims in Criminal Procedure, 2nd ed. (Durham: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2006); G.P. Fletcher, With Justice for Some: Protecting Victims’ Rights in Criminal 
Trials (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1996); but see also W.T. Pizzi, ‘Victims’ Rights: Rethinking Our Adversarial 
System’, Utah Law Review (1999) 349-368. 
43 See in this respect R. Aldana-Pindell, ‘In Vindication of Justiciable Victims’ Right to Truth and Justice for 
State-sponsored Crimes’, 35 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law (2002) 1399-1502. 
44 UN GA, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, UN Doc. 
A/RES/40/34, 29 November 1985.  
45 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (87) 21 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on Assistance to Victims and the Prevention of Victimization, 17 September 1987. 
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access to justice and reparation. Furthermore, a number of international instruments,46 as well 
as the practice of human rights supervisory bodies,47 have consistently supported the view 
that victims should be granted some participatory rights in criminal proceedings in order to 
promote and protect their right to justice. Nonetheless, these documents and decisions have 
not established that the right to justice demands the recognition of victims as parties of the 
proceedings having full participatory rights. Rather, they have acknowledged that victims’ 
participation may vary considerably according to the criminal model adopted.   
It is argued that affirming that a victim has a right to justice is not only a question of 
providing him or her with the faculty to report a crime, as this faculty normally belongs to 
every individual. Nor is it sufficient to recognise that a victim’s complaint is a prerequisite for 
opening criminal proceedings, if the initiative and the conduct of such proceedings depend on 
other actors (such as the public prosecutor). In order to ensure that victims effectively 
exercise their right to justice, it is necessary that the victim play some role in criminal cases 
analogous to that of a person entitled to bring a civil case, being able to initiate a criminal 
action either as complementary to, or instead of the public prosecutor.  
It goes without saying that if the decision is taken not to initiate proceedings or to 
terminate the prosecution of an alleged offender, victims potentially lose their chance of 
obtaining justice. As such, although human rights bodies remain reluctant to elaborate a 
victim’s right to participate in criminal proceedings corresponding to the increasingly 
developed right to justice, some recent instruments adopted at the international and regional 
have established that victims should be have certain procedural rights in order to protect such 
a right. In particular, some of these instruments have set out the right of victims to challenge 
                                                 
46 Documents setting forth victims’ rights in criminal proceedings include: Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice, supra note no. 44 (Art. 6(b)); Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, GA Res. 55/25, 15 
November 2000 (Art. 25(3)); European Union (‘EU’), Council Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims 
in Criminal Proceedings, 2001/220/JHA, 15 March 2001 (Art. 3); EU, Directive 2012/29/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Establishing Minimum Standards on the Rights, Support and Protection of 
Victims of Crime, 25 October 2012 (Art. 20); African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(‘AfrComHPR’), Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, 2001 
(Principle P(f)(ii)). 
47 See e.g., ECtHR: Kaya v. Turkey (App. No. 22729/93), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 19 February 
1998, § 107; McKerr v. United Kingdom (App. No. 28883/95), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 4 May 
2001, §§ 111-115; Paul and Audrey Edwards v. United Kingdom (App. No. 46477/99), Judgment (Merits and 
Just Satisfaction), 14 March 2002, §§ 69-73; Bitiyeva and x. v. Russia (App. Nos 57953/00 and 37392/03), 
Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 21 June 2007, § 156, with references included therein. IACtHR: 
Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Judgment (Merits), 16 August 2000, § 129; El Caracazo v. Venezuela, Judgment 
(Reparations and Costs), 29 August 2002, § 118; Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs), 11 May 2007, § 195. 
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the decision of public prosecutors not to prosecute, either by way of judicial review or by 
authorising parties to engage in private prosecutions.48 
With a view to assessing whether common standards are emerging in this respect, this 
work will provide an overview of how victims’ rights have been implemented in domestic 
criminal systems, with a particular emphasis placed on the right to bring a private prosecution 
and the right to challenge decisions not to prosecute.  After analysing the implementation of 
these two rights at the domestic level, the progressive development of victims’ participatory 
rights in criminal proceedings of various criminal systems, including those where victims 
have not been traditionally considered as parties, will be discussed. Although, as stated above, 
victims’ participation cannot be considered a component of the right to justice, the 
progressive introduction of victims’ participatory rights in criminal proceedings represents an 
acknowledgement of the need to take into account the views of victims and, at the very least, 
that victims have legitimate interests in the outcome of the proceedings.  
In the long term, it is equally conceivable that some form of participatory rights may 
be developed as an integral component of victims’ right to justice. This is so for two main 
reasons: first, some of the international instruments affirming victims’ participatory rights in 
criminal proceedings are binding on states parties, such as the Framework decisions adopted 
by the European Union.49 Second, the current approach of human rights supervisory bodies is 
inconsistent with their practice of affirming a right to justice as a component of the right to 
remedy for victims of gross violations of human rights. To elaborate, whereas these bodies 
have argued that victims may have a right to see perpetrators prosecuted and punished, they 
have been reluctant to recognise victims’ corresponding procedural rights in the criminal 
process — an inconsistency which may raise an issue under the provisions on the right to an 
effective remedy.  As such, it can be expected that in the coming years human rights 
supervisory bodies will attempt to address this inconsistency, perhaps by recognising victim’s 
participatory rights in proceedings in conformity with emerging international legal 
standards.50 
 
                                                 
48 Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations, supra note no. 14, § 27; Council of 
Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R. (2000) 19 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States 
on the Role of Public Prosecution in the Criminal Justice System, 6 October 2000, § 34. 
49 E.g., Council Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings, supra note no. 46. In 
the Pupino case, the European Court of Justice held that even though the EU Framework Decisions have no 
direct effect (pursuant to Art. 34(2)(b) sentence 2 of the Maastricht Treaty), they may indirectly influence the 
criminal process, since national courts are under an obligation to interpret criminal procedural law in conformity 
with them. Maria Pupino, Case C-105/03, 16 June 2005, § 34. 
50 S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 37. 
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2.4 The Role of Victims and Their Rights before International and Internationalized 
Criminal Tribunals  
 
The legal position of victims in international criminal law has been significantly transformed 
in the last few decades. Until recently, victims were not granted an independent role in the 
procedure of international criminal tribunals, that is the possibility to participate in their own 
right in the proceedings. As stated above, victims were largely excluded from the proceedings 
before the international military tribunals established in the aftermath of World War II as a 
result of the mainly adversarial procedure adopted by these tribunals and because the majority 
of the cases brought before these tribunals were made out almost entirely on the basis of 
documentary evidence.51  
Similarly, the ad hoc Tribunals established in the early nineties, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’), adopted a largely adversarial approach to their procedure with 
the prosecutor being entrusted with the mandate of representing the interests of the 
international community including those of the victims.52 Consequently, despite the 
developments that have occurred in the meantime in relation to the rights of victims in 
domestic criminal proceedings,53 no independent role in the proceedings was assigned to 
those harmed by the crimes under the scrutiny of the ad hoc Tribunals, other than that of 
witnesses. Similarly, in conformity with the judicial model adopted, victims could not seek 
reparation for the harm they had suffered before the Tribunals.54  
It was only in the late nineties, with the adoption of the Rome Statute which 
established the ICC, that mechanisms for victims’ redress began to be incorporated into the 
framework of international criminal justice. The introduction of a victims’ participation and 
reparation scheme within the ICC, followed by similar initiatives by the ECCC and the STL 
                                                 
51 Y. Danieli, ‘Reappraising the Nuremberg Trials and Their Legacy: The Role of Victims in International Law’, 
27 Cardozo Law Review (2006) 1633-1649, at 1641. 
52 For a critical appraisal of the representation of victims’ concerns by the ICTY prosecutor, see e.g. M.-B. 
Dembour and E. Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials’, 15 EJIL (2004) 151-
177. 
53 See supra Section 2.3. 
54 The Tribunals may, however, order restitution of property ‘acquired by criminal conduct’ (see Arts 24(1) and 
23(1) of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively). On the implementation of the ad hoc Tribunals restitution 
provisions, see I. Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of Crimes under International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2004) at 202-209. In 2000, upon request of the Office of the Prosecutor, the proposal of entrusting 
the Tribunal with the mandate of awarding compensation to victims was considered by the ICTY judges, but it 
was ultimately rejected. See Victims’ Compensation and Participation, Appendix to UN Doc. S/2000/1063, 
Judges’ Report of 13 September 2000. 
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has been hailed as unprecedented instruments designed to give victims of gross violations of 
human rights and humanitarian law a voice and to promote reconciliation.55  
It has rightly been observed that the creation of a regime of victims’ redress in 
international criminal law to deal with the harm suffered by individual victims is not an 
obvious extension of the mandate of international criminal tribunals.56 It is argued that the 
rationale for the creation of such regimes is to be found in a significant shift in the notion of 
victims’ right to remedy, as observed above, demanding prosecution and punishment of 
offenders as integral elements of such right. 
Indeed, a close inspection of the legal rationale associated with victims’ participation 
reveals that international and internationalized criminal courts have read the exercise of this 
right as linked to the effective realisation of other victims’ rights such as the right to justice 
and the right to truth,57 consistently with emerging human rights standards. The recent 
decision by the ICC Trial Chamber on the principles and procedures of reparation in the 
Lubanga case,58 for example, seems to suggest that the prosecution and punishment of 
perpetrators is not simply a legitimate interest of the victims, but also their right. More 
precisely, the Chamber affirmed: ‘The conviction and the sentence of the Court are examples 
of reparations, given that they are likely to have significance for the victims, their families 
and communities.’59  
Therefore, these courts appear to confirm what has been increasingly developed in the 
regime of international human rights law, that is the existence of a victim’s right to justice. As 
such, one may argue that the procedure of international criminal trials – originally based on 
the ‘duel’ between the prosecution and the defence – has been transformed, introducing 
victims as parties or participants in the proceedings with the aim of taking into account the 
development of a victim’s right to justice in cases of gross violations of human rights and 
international crimes. This logically entails the need to incorporate victims’ voices in the 
criminal process through some form of participation.  And indeed providing for participation 
                                                 
55 E. Haslam, ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of Hope Over Experience?’, 
in D. McGoldrick, P. Rowe and E. Donnelly (eds), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and 
Policy Issues (Oxford; Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004) 315-334, at 315. 
56 C. McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), at 36-48. 
57 See e.g., ICC, Decision on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, 
VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’) (ICC-01/04-
101/tEN-Corr), Pre-Trial Chamber (‘PTC’) I, 17 January 2006, § 63; ECCC, Directions on Unrepresented Civil 
Parties’ Rights to Address the Pre-Trial Chamber in Person, Ieng Sary (C22-I-69), PTC, 29 August 2009, § 8 
58 ICC, Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to Be Applied to Reparations, Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo (‘Lubanga’) (ICC-01/04-01/06-2904), Trial Chamber (‘TC’) I, 7 August 2012. 
59 Ibid., § 237. 
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of victims has emerged as a component of international and internationalized criminal courts’ 
mandate alongside ensuring the criminal accountability of wrongdoers.   
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3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH TOPIC AND ITS FOCUS ON VICTIM’S 
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
The central question I shall answer in this thesis reads as follows: Is a right to justice 
emerging as an integral component of victims’ reparation for gross violations of human 
rights? This question can be divided into two sub-questions: (i) is the criminal accountability 
of wrongdoers an integral element of reparation for victims of gross violations of human 
rights?, and (ii) are victims entitled to exercise procedural rights in criminal proceedings in 
order to enforce their right to justice? 
The proposed research question offers the chance to analyse a number of significant 
developments that have occurred in the few last decades in relation to victim’s rights in 
different branches of public international law including international human rights law, 
international humanitarian law and international criminal law. In particular, as mentioned 
above, it will be argued that these developments are interconnected and reflect the emergence 
of a victim’s right to justice as an integral component of reparation in cases of gross human 
rights violations. Consequently, the choice has been made to focus on the impact of the 
emergence of a right to justice on the role and the rights of victims in the proceedings before 
recently established international and internationalized criminal tribunals. This choice was 
made for three main reasons. 
First, as also indicated above, the introduction of a victim’s participation schemes in 
the procedure of recently established international and internationalized criminal tribunals 
represents the most recent and significant development that has occurred in relation to the 
rights of victims of mass atrocities and, as such, it may be considered as the capstone of a 
series of developments that have occurred throughout the last few decades on that matter.  
Second, notwithstanding the fact that it is primarily for states to implement the rights 
of victims, including in the area of investigation and prosecution of human rights offenders, 
often international criminal courts and tribunals are the only forum where victims can make 
their voice heard. This is so because in situation of mass atrocities, domestic courts often 
suffer from systemic failures that impede them from effectively investigating and prosecuting 
international crimes. In other cases, states may be simply unwilling to initiate a criminal 
action against those allegedly responsible for the crimes. From this perspective, the 
establishment of international or hybrid criminal tribunals become a means not only to fight 
impunity of international crimes but also to provide justice to victims of atrocities. Arguably, 
the inclusion of justice for victims in the mandate of international criminal tribunals may also 
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contribute to fostering the legitimacy of these bodies, as will be argued throughout the thesis. 
Finally, the introduction of victim’s participation schemes in the procedure of recently 
established international and internationalized criminal tribunals may contribute to the 
emergence of international legal standards on the role victims ought to play in criminal 
proceedings and the rights they should be granted. From this perspective, victim’s 
participatory rights at the international criminal law level may also influence, in the long run, 
the advancement and the quality of justice provided at the national level. Indeed, in affirming 
that international criminal courts will not only focus on the accountability of offenders, but 
will also take care of victims’ interests, the message has been sent to other fora, including 
domestic criminal courts, to adopt new procedures that depart from strictly retributive theories 
on the nature of criminal offences and on the objectives of criminal trials.   
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4 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In order to answer to the research question discussed above, this thesis adopts an integrated 
approach, analysing all the relevant primary sources addressing the issue of victims’ right to 
remedy in cases of gross human rights violations (including treaties and resolutions, 
judgments, decisions, reports, travaux préparatoires) as well legal doctrine on the topic. The 
purpose is not to argue in favour of victims’ rights generally but to take stock of existing 
standards and to consider whether and to what extent criminal justice is considered as an 
element of victims’ right to remedy. Accordingly, this thesis does not start from a normative 
position, but from a de lege lata perspective. 
Existing standards on victims’ right to remedy are elaborated from a detailed 
representation of the relevant provisions and the jurisprudence of human rights supervisory 
bodies, in particular the Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. This is so despite the fact only a few international legal instruments deal specifically 
with the right to remedy for victims of gross human rights violations and those existing have 
no binding value upon states.  Nevertheless, the practice of human rights supervisory bodies 
has frequently dealt with claims of these types of violations and with the remedies that are 
owed to victims. A comparative analysis of the case law of these bodies will consequently be 
provided with a view to ascertaining whether common standards in relation to victims’ right 
to remedy can be identified when similar circumstances (such as gross violations) are at stake. 
Furthermore, the choice has been made to present the relevant case law in chronological 
order, so as to assess whether certain trends are emerging and, in particular, whether certain 
legal rationales have been progressively abandoned or adopted by other fora. 
Once standards on victims’ right to remedy in cases of gross violations of human 
rights have been identified, this thesis will question whether such standards have an impact on 
the role and the rights of victims in criminal proceedings, both at the domestic and at the 
international level. As far as domestic criminal proceedings are concerned, human rights 
standards will be compared with criminal procedures of several domestic systems. It must be 
noted that the purpose of this comparison is not to provide a complete comparative analysis of 
victims’ rights in domestic criminal proceedings. Rather, the purpose of the comparison is 
limited to assessing whether there is, at the least, a tendency in domestic systems to adopt 
procedures that enable victims to exercise their right to justice in conformity with human 
  
20 
rights standards. To this end, it will be particularly important to take into consideration the 
legislative developments that have occurred in procedural systems that have not traditionally 
granted victims any right in criminal proceedings.  
Finally, human rights standards regarding redress for victims of gross human rights 
violations will be contrasted with the procedure adopted by international and internationalized 
criminal tribunals. Such a comparison aims at assessing whether the creation of a regime of 
victims’ participation and redress within international and internationalized criminal tribunals 
is consistent with the principle of a right to justice that has emerged under international law 
for victims of gross human rights violations. To this end, a comprehensive interpretation and 
evaluation of the relevant legal framework and case law of international and internationalized 
criminal tribunals will be offered. As with the practice of human rights bodies, a comparative 
approach will be adopted to analyse the practice of international and internationalized 
criminal tribunals. The reason for this comparative analysis is the number of similarities 
between the victim participation schemes adopted by international and internationalized 
criminal tribunals and the way in which they are implemented by the courts. As such, the 
ultimate aim is to understand the extent to which, notwithstanding the distinct procedural 
characteristics, these similarities reflect the emergence of a set of core rights to which victims 
are entitled in the context of international criminal proceedings and which indicate the 
development of a victim’s right to justice at the international level.  
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5 ROADMAP 
 
 
The present thesis is divided into six chapters together with an introduction and a conclusion.  
Chapter I seeks to understand whether a distinct regime for redress exists with regard 
to victims of gross violations of human rights and international crimes and, if so, what the 
main features of this regime are. More specifically, through an examination of the 
international normative framework, as well as of the judicial and quasi-judicial practice of 
human rights supervisory bodies, this Chapter addresses two main questions. First, it 
addresses the question of how individuals have been gradually considered not only as the 
ultimate beneficiaries of the obligation to provide reparation, but also as the direct holders of 
a corresponding right will be assessed. After providing, as a preliminary matter, an overview 
of the traditional position of individuals with regard to the invocation of the responsibility of a 
state in respect of a wrongful act, this Chapter will examine how the legal and institutional 
framework of international human rights law has expanded the scope of redress available to 
individuals, setting forth an individual right to an effective remedy. Second, it will analyse 
how provisions on redress have been interpreted in cases of gross human violations, with a 
view to establishing whether distinct characteristics can be identified and ultimately whether a 
distinct redress regime has emerged in relation to these types of violations.  
Chapter II provides a general framework on how the concept of the victim has 
developed in international law, with particular reference to victims of gross violations of 
human rights and international crimes. In situations characterised by systematic and gross 
human rights violations, a large number of human beings may potentially be affected and all 
of them would in principle be entitled to be recognised as victims. A tension may, however, 
arise when the recognition of victim status is associated with certain procedural rights, such as 
the right to participate in criminal proceedings or the right to claim reparation.  Before 
analysing in greater detail how victims’ rights have emerged in international law, it is 
necessary to clarify exactly who the subjects entitled to these rights are and whether different 
categories of victims can be identified.  To this end, after considering the principal scholarly 
works in victimology that have conceptualised victimhood,60 an extensive analysis of how the 
victim is defined in existing victims’ rights instruments will be offered, with particular 
attention paid to those instruments addressing the rights of victims of gross violations of 
                                                 
60 E.g., K. McEvoy and K. McConnachie, ‘Victimology in Transitional Justice: Victimhood, Innocence and 
Hierarchy’, 9 European Journal of Criminology (2012) 527-538; J. Dignan, Understanding Victims and 
Restorative Justice (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2005). 
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human rights and international humanitarian law.61 Furthermore, a review of the relevant 
judicial and quasi-judicial practice of human rights supervisory bodies, international and 
internationalized criminal tribunals, and other competent fora which have dealt with victims’ 
redress (such as the UN Compensation Commission (‘UNCC’), and the Ethiopia-Eritrea 
Claims Commission (‘EECC’)) will be provided.  
Chapter III will determine whether a right to justice, understood as the right to have 
human rights offenders prosecuted and, if found guilty, punished, is now being developed as a 
necessary element of the right to remedy for victims of gross human rights violations. Two 
elements will be considered in this regard: first, whether the international legal instruments 
and the practice of international human rights bodies have affirmed the prosecution and 
punishment of offenders as an individual right; second, whether the relevant legal and 
institutional practice have found that the adoption of measures impeding the criminal 
prosecution or punishment of offenders (such as amnesties, pardons, statutes of limitation) are 
not only in violation of a state’s obligation but also of an individual right.  
Chapter IV analyses the main obstacles to the prosecution of perpetrators of 
international crimes, namely immunities of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdictions, 
amnesties, statutory limitations, and the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law. Plainly, 
these obstacles to prosecution may ultimately hinder the effective exercise of victim’s right to 
justice. It is hence worthwhile questioning whether the validity of the obstacles to 
prosecutions has been progressively reduced, both in order to comply with international 
obligations of states and to allow victims to effectively exercise their right to justice. To this 
purpose, this Chapter will present the main obstacles to national and international 
prosecutions of international crimes and for each of them it will question: (i) whether rules of 
international law exist or are emerging reducing the validity of these obstacles, and (ii) 
whether this evolution has been influenced by the progressive affirmation of a victim’s right 
to justice in cases of international crimes and gross violations of human rights.  
Chapter V questions the emergence of an international norm granting victims standing 
in criminal proceedings as a means to enforce their right to justice.  In particular, the 
emergence of such a norm will be considered by analysing: (i) the international instruments 
and case law affirming the inherent value of victims’ participation in criminal proceedings, 
                                                 
61 E.g., UN GA, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation, 
for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, UN 
Doc. A/RES/60/147, 16 December 2005, § 8: ‘[V]ictims are persons who individually or collectively suffered 
harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their 
fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, 
or serious violations of international humanitarian law.’ 
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particularly in cases of gross violations of human rights, and (ii) the role and rights of victims 
in criminal procedure in the law and practice of several domestic jurisdictions. Special 
attention will be devoted to the impact of emerging international legal standards on victims’ 
rights in criminal proceedings. 
Finally, Chapter VI offers an analysis of the practice of international and 
internationalized criminal tribunals in relation to victims’ rights. After having reviewed the 
developments that have occurred during the last few decades in relation to the position of 
victims in international criminal justice, this Chapter aims to clarify whether the procedure of 
international criminal trials – originally based on a ‘duel’ between the prosecution and the 
defence – has developed, entrusting victims with the right to participate in the proceedings 
(with the aim of taking into account the affirmation of a victims’ right to justice in cases of 
gross violations of human rights law). This entails that, alongside the criminal accountability 
of wrongdoers, the need to incorporate victims’ voices in the criminal process through some 
forms of participation has emerged as a component of these courts’ mandate.  
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Chapter I 
 
A Distinct Redress Regime for Victims of Gross Violations of 
Human Rights and International Crimes 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Despite the widespread abuses of rights of recent history, very little effort has been made to 
address the needs of victims and to provide redress for the harm they have suffered. The 
neglect of victims of mass atrocities has its roots primarily in the fact that states have 
historically had a monopoly as the only subjects of rights under international law.1 
Accordingly, as wrongful acts were committed and reparation programmes instituted this was 
considered as a matter of inter-state relations and inter-state responsibility;2 hence, individuals 
were left entirely at the mercy of the discretionary intermediation of their nation state for their 
protection. Moreover, especially in the aftermath of a conflict, provisions of remedy or 
reparation have often been understood by the violating regime as well as the wronged state as 
‘a bargaining chip rather than an affirmative duty’.3 
Nevertheless, the law and practice of the last few decades show a gradual affirmation 
of a norm in support of victims’ redress for violations of their rights in various fields of 
international law, particularly in the regime of international human rights law.  
At the same time, however, as pointed out by Theo van Boven, it is increasingly 
acknowledged that ‘gross violations of human rights are by their very nature irreparable and 
any remedy would fail to repair the grave injury inflicted to the victims, especially when the 
violations have been committed on a massive scale.’4 Arguably, the aim of this contention is 
                                                 
1 The positivist definition of international law has had a considerable impact on the qualification of individuals 
as subjects of international law. For instance, Brierly wrote: ‘The Law of Nations, or International Law, may be 
defined as the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized States in their relation with 
one other.’ J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, revised by A. 
Waldock, 6th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), at 1.  
2 For a thorough review of the traditional approach to reparation for international wrongful acts, see R.M. 
Buxbaum, ‘A Legal History of International Reparations’, 23 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2005) 314-
346.   
3 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, in Idem (ed.), Post-
Conflict Justice (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, 2002) 3-54, at 38. 
4 Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross 
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not to nullify the basic legal principle of the redress of wrongs; rather, it suggests that 
remedies for this type of violation should be found outside the traditional categories of 
reparation. In this regard, a trend can be detected in the law and practice of international 
human rights law where principles and standards on redress for victims of particularly serious 
human rights violations have emerged. Indeed, recent international human rights 
adjudications on serious violations have clarified the content and the scope of victims’ right to 
redress signalling, in particular, a gradual expansion beyond traditional forms of reparation 
(typically monetary compensation) to encompass, where appropriate, symbolic measures of 
reparation.  
In order to appreciate the current status of victims’ redress, particularly in the context 
of gross human rights violations, this Chapter explores two main issues. First, it will assess 
how individuals have been gradually considered not only the ultimate beneficiaries of the 
obligation to provide reparation but also the direct holders of a corresponding right under 
international law. Second, it will analyse how provisions on redress have been interpreted in 
cases of gross human violations with a view to establishing whether distinct characteristics 
can be identified and thus whether ultimately a distinct redress regime has emerged in relation 
to violations of this kind. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Final report submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, 2 July 1993, § 131. 
 
  
27 
2 THE BROADER LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF REDRESS FOR VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
WRONGFUL ACTS  
 
 
Redress of wrongs is a fundamental legal principle that is recognised and applied in almost all 
legal systems.5 Nonetheless, until recently, individual reparation for damages suffered as a 
consequence of an international wrongful act was not considered a proper concern of 
international law. The centrality of states as major subjects of international law, attributable to 
the substantial affirmation of positivist theories, has in fact had major impact on access to 
reparation measures for individuals.6  In short, the responsibility for internationally wrongful 
acts committed and the remedies sought were considered a matter for states alone. The 
prevalence of the positivist doctrine according to which individuals and subjects other than 
states have no rights under international law7 has remained unchallenged until relatively 
recently.8  
However, principles and standards emerging from recent domestic and international 
practice on remedies show a clear trend developing in many areas of international law, 
particularly in international human rights law, that places individuals in a more central 
position; a process that has been referred to as the ‘humanization of international law.’9 More 
precisely, it would appear that the international community is moving beyond the traditional 
framework of inter-state reparations and increasingly recognising that the obligations assumed 
by a state under international human rights law or international humanitarian law entail 
consequences not only vis-à-vis other states but also with respect to individuals. International 
                                                 
5 For an overview of the right to remedy in national legal systems, see D. Shelton, Remedies in International 
Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 23-49. For an historical reconstruction of the 
right to remedy, see I. Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of Crimes Under International Law (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), at 13-38. 
6 F. Francioni, ‘The Rights of Access to Justice Under Customary International Law’, in Idem (ed.), Access to 
Justice as a Human Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 1-55, 5-8. 
7 D. Anzilotti, ‘La responsabilité internationale des Etats à raison des dommages soufferts par des étrangers’, 13 
Revue générale de droit international public (1906) 5-28; G. Morelli, Nozioni di diritto internazionale, 7th ed. 
(Padua: CEDAM,  1967), at 116 ff.; G. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘L’individuo e il diritto internazionale’ (1971) Rivista di 
diritto internazionale 563, at 590 ff.; A. McNair, The Law of Treaties, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 
at 322 ff.; R. Quadri, Diritto internazionale pubblico, 5th ed. (Napoli: Liguori editore, 1989), at 398 ff.. In favour 
of a greater role of individuals in international law: G. Balladore Pallieri, Diritto internazionale pubblico, 8th ed. 
(Milano: Giuffrè, 1962), at 215 ff.; G. Sperduti, L’individuo nel diritto internazionale (Milano: Giuffrè, 1950), at 
101 ff.. In favour of the international personality of individuals: N. Politis, Les nouvelles tendances du droit 
international (Paris: Hachette, 1927), at 44 ss.; G. Scelle, Précis de droits des gens (Paris: Sirey, 1932), at 7 ss.; 
P.C. Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1948), at 15 ss.; H. Lauterpacht, International 
Law and Human Rights (London: Steven and Sons, 1950), at 27 ss. 
8 A. Randelzhofer, ‘The Legal Position of the Individual under Present International Law’, in A. Randelzhofer 
and C. Tomuschat (eds), State Responsibility and the Individual: Reparations in Instances of Grave Violations of 
Human Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999) 231-242. 
9 T. Meron, The Humanization of International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006). 
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legal scholars debate, however, whether individuals have a corresponding legal right to claim 
reparation under international law.10 In order to understand whether and, in the case of an 
affirmative answer, how exactly an individual right to reparation under international law has 
emerged an introductory overview of the traditional approach towards reparation for 
international wrongful acts is necessary.  
 
2.1 The Traditional Approach of International Law to Victims’ Redress 
 
The obligation to make reparation as a consequence of the commission of an international 
wrongful act is a well-established principle of international law. As early as 1928 the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (‘PCIJ’) held that it is a fundamental principle of 
general international law that the breach of an international obligation ‘involves an obligation 
to make reparation in an adequate form.’11 The Court added that ‘reparation must, as far as 
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which 
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed’.12  
Traditionally, however, a state-centric approach has been adopted with regards to the 
access of individuals to reparation measures. Summarising the classical position of 
individuals who suffered injury through a violation of international law Dionisio Anzilotti 
wrote that ‘[l]a conduite d’un Etat, toute contraire qu’elle soit au droit international ne saurait 
jamais donner naissance à un droit de l’individu à la rèparation du dommage souffert’.13 
Within the traditional framework of international law it was for the state to protect the 
interests of its citizens when they suffered harm as a result of an international wrongful act. 
As such, although individuals may receive protection under international law, generally only a 
state may invoke the responsibility of another state for violations of this body of law.14 Even 
                                                 
10 In this sense, Theo van Boven observed: ‘[I]f states have a responsibility to make reparations to individuals, 
then individuals have a corresponding right to claim such reparations. It must be assumed that the obligations 
resulting from state responsibility for breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law entail 
corresponding rights on the part of individual persons and groups of persons who are under the jurisdiction of 
the offending State and who are victims of those breaches’. T. van Boven, ‘The Perspective of the Victim’, in Y. 
Danieli, E. Stamatopoulou and C. Dias (eds), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Fifty Years and 
Beyond (Amityville, New York: Baywood Publishing Company Inc., 1999) 13-26, at 18. See contra A. 
Randelzhofer, ‘The Legal Position of the Individual under Present International Law’, supra note no. 8.  
11 PCIJ, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Jurisdiction, Series A No. 9, 26 July 
1927, at 21. 
12 PCIJ, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Merits, Series A No. 17, 13 September 
1928, at 29 and 47-48. 
13 D. Anzilotti, ‘La responsabilité internationale des Etats’, supra note no. 7, at 5.  
14 See International Law Commission (‘ILC’) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries (‘ILC Draft Articles’), UN Doc. A/RES/56/83, 22 January 2002, Art. 42. But 
see Art. 33(2) of the ILC Draft Articles, further analysed in Section 2.2 of this Chapter. See also F. Francioni, 
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today, the common position is that when an individual suffers an injury as a result of a 
violation of the rules of international law, it is for the state to espouse his or her claim on the 
international plane.15  
In espousing the claim of its citizens the state is in fact asserting its own rights and not 
those of the individuals at issue. This doctrine was first expressed in the classic case of the 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions where the PCIJ ruled that ‘by taking up the case of one 
of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on 
his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right – its right to ensure in the person of its 
subjects, respect for the rules of international law.’16 A consequence of this approach is that 
the state of nationality of the alien can dispose of its right to espouse the claim for reparation, 
presumably on the basis of political, financial or strategic considerations, a point to which we 
shall return in the next subsection.  In other words, the alien’s state of nationality is never 
under the obligation to espouse the claim; likewise, it does not have an obligation under 
international law to distribute any compensation it receives from a responsible state to the 
harmed individuals.17   
Two examples can be provided in order to better illustrate the traditional approach, 
firstly to the treatment of aliens, and secondly the protection of individuals vis-à-vis the 
conduct of states in the context of armed conflicts.  
 
2.1.1 The Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens  
 
As is well known, under the law of state responsibility for injuries to aliens, an individual 
who claims to be a victim of a wrongful act abroad, in the event of lack or inadequacy of local 
remedies, can ask for the protection of his state.  The state, in turn, may take up its national’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘Reparation for Indigenous Peoples: Is International Law Ready to Ensure Redress for Historical Injustices?’, in 
F. Lenzerini (ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International & Comparative Perspectives (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008) 27-45. 
15 See ILC, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, UN Doc. A/61/10, 6 December 2007, Art. 2. For a 
comprehensive examination of the law and practice of diplomatic protection, see C.F. Amerasinghe, Diplomatic 
Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
16 PCIJ, The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Series A No. 2, 30 August 1924, at 12. 
17 For instance, the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) in the Germany v. Italy case, held that: ‘Where the State 
receiving funds as part of what was intended as a comprehensive settlement in the aftermath of an armed conflict 
has elected to use those funds to rebuild its national economy and infrastructure, rather than distributing them to 
individual victims amongst its nationals, it is difficult to see why the fact that those individuals had not received 
a share in the money should be a reason for entitling them to claim against the State that had transferred money 
to their State of nationality.’ ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), 
3 February 2012, § 102. Cf. Article 19(c), Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, supra note no. 15, indicating 
the disbursement of compensation by an injured state to persons harmed by the internationally wrongful act as a 
recommended practice.  
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claim through diplomatic protection on the basis of an alleged denial of justice.18 As observed 
above, it is generally agreed that the claim of the state of nationality is not based on the injury 
suffered by the individual victim but on the violation of the international duty to respect 
certain rights of aliens owed to the state of nationality of the alien by the host state.19  
The protection of aliens by their states was first theorised in terms of diplomatic 
protection by Emer de Vattel. His famous quote, dating back to 1758, reads: ‘Quiconque 
maltraite un citoyen offense indirectement l’Etat, qui doit protéger ce citoyen’.20 A review of 
the arbitrations from the early creation of a body of international rules on the treatment of 
aliens until the end of the last century indicates that the majority of international legal claims 
concerned the treatment of aliens.21 Furthermore, a number of arbitrations and claims 
commissions have been established following injury to nationals of the United States of 
America or of other European states in countries such as Venezuela,22 Mexico23 and El 
Salvador.24  
In recent years, international claims based on violations of the rules on the treatment 
of aliens have become less common,25 mainly as a result of the emergence of other branches 
of international law better suited to deal with these cases such as international human rights 
law.26 In general terms, the extent to which the law on the treatment of aliens deals with 
victims of serious breaches rights is today rather limited for two main reasons. First, the right 
to diplomatic protection principally aims at safeguarding and promoting the general interest of 
the state and not those of the direct victims. The existence of a paramount interest of the state 
as the legal basis for international claims is confirmed by the full control exercised by the 
victim’s state of nationality over the claim and by the discretionary nature of the power the 
state possesses in espousing the international claim. Consequently, individual interests can be 
protected and promoted in the international legal order only through the action in diplomatic 
                                                 
18 C.F. Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection, supra note 15, at 21-27.  
19 Ibid., at 23-25. 
20 E. de Vattel, Le Droit des gens: Principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des 
Nations et des Souverains, vol. 2 (London: 1758), section 71. 
21 A. Stuyt, Survey of International Arbitrations 1794-1970 (Leiden, Oceana Publications, 1972).  
22 Protocol Between the United States of America and Venezuela for Arbitration of All Unsettled Claims, 17 
February 1903, 9 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 115.  
23 Special Claims Convention for the Settlement of Claims of American Citizens Arising from Revolutionary Acts 
on Mexico, 10 September 1923, 4 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 773. 
24 Protocol between the United States and the Republic of Salvador for the Arbitration of Certain Claims, 19 
December 1901, 15 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 459. 
25 This branch of law remains important in affording protection to legal persons in respect of their property, 
including foreign investments. See J. Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005).  
26 C.F. Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection, supra note 15, at 75-78. 
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protection of their state of nationality and insofar as they correspond with the state interests.27 
Second, the limited role of state responsibility for injuries to aliens is also due to the fact that, 
by definition, this body of law is only concerned with the ill-treatment of a citizen by a 
foreign state and not with that carried out by the individual’s state of nationality. 
 
2.1.2 Victims’ Reparation under International Humanitarian Law 
 
An explicit reference to the principle that a violation of international humanitarian law 
(‘IHL’) entails the obligation to make reparation was made in 1907 in Article 3 of the Hague 
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.  This provision obliges 
belligerent parties violating the provisions of the regulations annexed to the Convention to 
pay compensation on an inter-state basis, and further provides that a belligerent party is 
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces. The substance 
of Article 3, which is generally accepted as customary international law,28 has also been 
included in Article 91 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.29  
In spite of the fact that the primary objective of IHL is indisputably the protection of 
individuals, the standing of individuals as holders of a right to reparation for war damages, 
pursuant to the provisions mentioned above, has traditionally been rather weak.30  In keeping 
with the law of diplomatic protection, for individuals to receive compensation for violations 
of international humanitarian law it is necessary for their state of nationality to invoke the 
responsibility of the wrongful state on their behalf. Plainly, the injured state could also forfeit 
its right to claim reparation or accept less than the full reparation. This explains both the 
                                                 
27 On the relationship between state and individual interests in the law of diplomatic protection see G. Strozzi, 
Interessi statali e interessi privati nell’ordinamento internazionale. La funzione del previo esaurimento dei 
ricorsi interni (Milano: Giuffrè, 1977), at 260-266. 
28 Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987), 
‘Commentary on Article 91’, at 1053, § 3645. Note should also be taken of articles 51, 52, 131 and 148 of the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 which state: ‘No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or 
any other High Contracting Part of any liability incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party in 
respect of breaches referred to in the preceding Article’ [referring to grave breaches]. 
29 Art. 91 of Additional Protocol I reads: ‘A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the 
Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible 
for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces’. 
30 Individuals were granted the right to claim property rights against a foreign state before the International Prize 
Court, established by Hague Convention No. XII of 1907, which never entered into force. However, individuals 
were prevented from bringing claims if the state of nationality decided to take over the claim (arts. 4 and 5 of the 
Hague Convention). In the Treaty of Versailles, individuals of the Allied and Associated Powers could bring 
claims against Germany through a mixed arbitral tribunal (Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919, art. 304(b) of 
Section VI). For a reconstruction of the early practice on individual access to international remedies, see F. 
Francioni, ‘The Rights of Access to Justice Under Customary International Law’, supra note no. 6, at 15-19.  On 
the access of individuals to remedies for violations of IHL, see L. Zegveld, ‘Remedies for Victims of Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law’, 85 International Review of the Red Cross (2003) 497-526. 
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practice of lump-sum agreements at the end of a conflict,31 and of those peace settlements 
pursuant to which the vanquished state renounces its right per se, as well as its citizens, to any 
reparation or claim against the victor for the damages suffered during wartime.32 
Furthermore, the majority of cases brought before domestic courts relating to claims 
for compensation for harm suffered during the Second World War show that those claims 
were most often rejected, either on the basis that the right to seek compensation was waived 
by peace treaties concluded between states33 or that the right to seek compensation could not 
be exercised directly by individuals.34 
Nonetheless, as discussed in the next sub-section, in the past two decades the position 
of individuals under IHL has undergone impressive development with evident consequences 
for the access of individuals to reparation measures.  
 
2.2 Recent Developments in Reparation for Victims of International Wrongful Acts 
and Violations of IHL: Towards the Affirmation of an Individual Right to 
Reparation? 
 
The conception of reparation as a purely inter-state matter has been substantially challenged 
in the post-Second World War era. As the next sections will further examine, the advent of 
international human rights law has greatly contributed to the emergence of individuals as the 
holders of rights under international law and has progressively eroded the primacy of state 
interests and prerogatives in many respects. This has also had an impact on the consequences 
of international wrongful acts and, more precisely, it has considerably broadened the range of 
beneficiaries of the state obligation to make reparation in case of a breach of an international 
obligation.  
This recent trend is evidenced, inter alia, by the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for International Wrongful Acts, adopted by the UN International Law Commission in 
                                                 
31 For numerous examples of such agreements, see J.-M. Henckaerts, L. Doswald-Beck and C. Alvermann, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 539. 
32 For example, the Treaty of Peace with Japan states at Art. 14(b): ‘Except as otherwise provided in the present 
Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers 
and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of 
the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation’. Treaty of Peace with Japan, 3 
U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S., 8 September 1951, at 64.  
33 E.g., Tokyo District Court, Shimoda, 7 December 1963, reprinted in 8 The Japanese Annual of International 
Law (1964) 212-252. 
34 This approach is reflected in a number of judgments by Japanese courts which have consistently rejected 
compensation claims by Chinese nationals for atrocities suffered during the Second World War. For example, on 
27 July 1995, the Tokyo District Court concluded that ‘neither the general practice nor the conviction (opinio 
juris) that the state has a duty to pay damages to each individual when that State infringes its obligations under 
international human rights or international humanitarian law can be said to exist.’ See Tokyo District Court, X et 
al. v. the State, 27 July 1995, reprinted in 39 The Japanese Annual of International Law (1996) 265-266. 
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2001. Despite the fact that the Articles were designed in the context of inter-state relations 
and therefore focus on the responsibility of a state vis-à-vis another state, they do not rule out 
that individuals, or other entities different from a state may be the holders of rights under 
international law.  
Paragraph 2 of Article 33 of the ILC Draft Articles, which deals with the scope of the 
obligation to make reparation affirms that: ‘This Part is without prejudice to any rights, 
arising from the international responsibility of a state, which may accrue directly to any 
person or entity other than a state.’35 As specified by the ILC in the Commentary to the Draft 
Articles, this wording recognises the possibility that state responsibility may arise from the 
breach of a primary obligation owed to a non-state entity, including individuals.36 This is the 
case, as the Commentary explains, with regard to treaties for the protection of human rights 
but it is not limited to them. Although the Draft Articles do not deal explicitly with the 
possibility of non-state entities invoking state responsibility37 it is nonetheless remarkable that 
the Commentary to the Draft Articles specifies that individuals may potentially be considered 
holders of rights, including the right to invoke state responsibility (and hence, to claim 
reparation), where there is a procedure available to that effect.38  
In the past two decades, the position of individuals under IHL has also undergone 
impressive development. As briefly examined above, since the rules of this body of law were 
conceived as applicable between states only, traditionally individuals have not been 
recognised as having rights, including the right to reparation. Nevertheless it has been noted 
that some of the decisions which have rejected individual claims for reparation grounded their 
reasoning in rules of general international law as they existed at the time of the events of the 
particular case.  As such, this leaves open the possibility that a different approach could be 
adopted were a case to be brought in relation to events occurred in present times, given the 
development in the law39 Furthermore, recently some domestic courts have started to accept 
                                                 
35 Recognition that beneficiaries may be subjects other than states can also be found in Art. 48(2)(B) of the ILC 
Draft Articles. 
36 Commentary to Art. 33 of the ILC Draft Articles, § 4, annexed to the ILC Draft Articles, at 95. 
37 In this respect, it has been observed that ‘the Draft Articles were already born old’, see R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, 
‘The Marginal Role of the Individual in the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility’, 14 Italian Yearbook of 
International Law (2004) 39-52, at 39. On this issue, see also G. Gaja, ‘The Position of Individuals in 
International Law: An ILC Perspective’, 21 EJIL (2010) 11-14. 
38 Certain authors have nonetheless called not to overemphasise this provision. In particular, it has been observed 
that ‘paragraph 2 of Article 33 is a mere saving clause (in a document that is just a draft by a non-state body that 
has not been formally endorsed but only put to the attention of states for their consideration)’. See N. Ronzitti, 
‘Access to Justice and Compensation for Violations of the Law of War’, in F. Francioni (ed.), Access to Justice 
as a Human Right, supra note no. 6, 95-134, at 111-112. 
39 M. Frulli, ‘When Are States Liable Towards Individuals for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law?  The Marković Case’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice  (‘JICJ’) (2003) 406-427, at 420. 
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individual claims against a state for violations of the laws of war, such as in the decision of 
the Italian Court of Cassation in the Ferrini case40 and in a series of other cases41 as well as in 
the Distomo case of the Greek Supreme Court.42  
Several experts have increasingly taken the view that the ultimate objective of this 
body of law is to confer rights directly on individuals.43  This view is supported, according to 
these authors, by the preparatory works of Art. 3 of the Hague Convention IV.44 This 
approach has also been upheld by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which in its 
Commentary to Article 91 stated that ‘[t]hose entitled to compensation will normally be 
Parties to the conflict or their nationals … However, since 1945 a tendency has emerged to 
recognise the exercises of rights by individuals’.45  
The existence of an individual right to reparation under international law remains, 
however, contentious. In this respect, Seibert-Fohr noted that ‘although recent developments 
under the international human rights treaties… all provide evidence that there are emerging 
principles, in the absence of further State practice it is too early to speak of a rule of general 
international law providing the individual with a right to claim compensation for human rights 
violations.’46 On the other hand, for instance, Hofmann, Co-Rapporteur of the International 
Law Association (‘ILA’) Committee on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, found 
that:  
[I]n view of the relevant state practice and taking note of a strong majority among scholars, the Committee came 
to the conclusion that, until most recently, international law did not provide for any right to reparation for 
victims of armed conflict. The Committee submits, however, that the situation is changing: there are increasing 
                                                 
40 Italian Court of Cassation (Sezioni Unite civili), Ferrini c. Repubblica Federale di Germania, Decision No. 
5044/2004, 11 March 2004, reprinted in 87 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2004) 539-551. 
41 See cases cited in ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note no. 17, §§ 27-29. 
42 Greek Supreme Court (Areios Pagos), Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case No. 
11/2000, 4 May 2000, reprinted in 129 International Law Reports (2007) 513-524. 
43 See e.g., F. Kalshoven, ‘State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed Forces: From Article 3 of The 
Hague Convention IV of 1907 to Article 91 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 and Beyond’, 40 The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly (1991) 827-858, at 847; T. Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as 
Customary Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), at 224. See also expert opinions by F. Kalshoven, E. 
David and C. Greenwood, in H. Fujita, I. Suzuki and K. Nagano (eds), War and the Rights of Individuals 
(Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron-sha Co, 1999) 
44 For a reconstruction of the preparatory works of Art. 3, see M. Frulli, ‘When Are States Liable Towards 
Individuals for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law?  The Marković Case’, supra note no. 39, 
at 416-418. The view that the preparatory works of Article 3 support an individual right to reparation has been 
adopted by F. Kalshoven, ‘Article 3 of the Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907’, in H. Fujita, I. Suzuki and K. Nagano (eds), War and the Rights of 
Individuals, supra note no. 43, at 34-36; see contra A. Gattini, ‘To What Extent Are State Immunity and Non-
Justiciability Major Hurdles to Individuals’ Claims for War Damages?’, 1 JICJ (2003) 348-367, at 350-351. 
45 International Committee of the Red Cross (‘ICRC’), ‘Commentary to Protocol I’, §§ 3656-3657, available 
online at www.icrc.org.  
46 A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 
246. 
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examples of international bodies proposing, or even recognising, the existence of, or the need to establish, such a 
right.47 
Significant examples supporting an emerging consensus towards an individual right to 
reparation under international law can be found the practice of UN organs. An important 
example is provided by the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (‘Principles on Reparation’), adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in 2005.48 Article 15 of the Principles on Reparation sets forth the duty 
of States to provide for reparation to victims as follows:  
In accordance with its domestic laws and international legal obligations, a State shall provide reparation to 
victims for acts or omissions which can be attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of international 
human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law.49  
In commenting on this provision, Van Boven — the then UN Special Rapporteur who, 
after Bassiouni, was in charge of drafting the Principles — noted that, despite the fact that the 
Principles were based on the law of state responsibility, it is no longer acceptable to argue that 
they do not apply to relations between states and individuals. To do so would be to ignore: 
[T]he historic evolution since the Second World War of human rights … [and] that the duty of affording 
remedies for governmental misconduct was so widely acknowledged that the right to an effective remedy for 
violations of human rights and a fortiori of gross human rights violations, may be regarded as forming part of 
customary international law.’50  
Other landmark documents in the UN practice are the final report prepared in 1998 by 
the Special Rapporteur on ‘Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices 
during Armed Conflict’51 and the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
                                                 
47 ILA, ‘Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict’, The Hague Conference (2010), at 2. 
48 UN GA, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation, for 
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, UN 
Doc. A/RES/60/147, 16 December 2005. 
49 After a long heated debate, the scope of the Principle was restricted to serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, suggesting that it is only to victims of violations of a certain gravity (i.e. which constitute 
crimes under international law) that the right to reparation is recognised. See D. Shelton, Remedies in 
International Human Rights Law, supra note no. 5, at 151. 
50 T. Van Boven, Comment to the Basic Principles, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, 
pp. 1-2. 
51 Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict, Final Report 
Submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 22 June 1998. This 
document also refers to the liability of Japan for ‘comfort women stations’ established during the Second World 
War (at 38-55). 
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Darfur submitted to the UN Secretary-General in 2005.52 After asserting that gross violations 
of human rights and international humanitarian law ‘can entail not only the individual 
criminal liability of the perpetrator but also the international responsibility of the State (or 
State-like entity) on whose behalf the perpetrator was acting’,53 the Commission on Darfur 
held that such international responsibility requires that that ‘the State (or the State-like entity) 
must pay compensation to the victim’.54 More specifically, the 2005 Report found that, as a 
result of the influence of international human rights law on the domain of state responsibility, 
in contemporary international law there is ‘a strong tendency towards providing compensation 
not only to States but also to individuals based on State responsibility’.55 The Commission on 
Darfur then concluded that:  
[T]he proposition is warranted that at present, whenever a gross breach of human rights is committed which also 
amounts to an international crime, customary international law not only provides for the criminal liability of the 
individuals who have committed that breach, but also imposes an obligation on States of which the perpetrators 
are nationals, or for which they acted as de jure or de facto organs, to make reparation (including compensation) 
for the damage made.56 
Reference should also be made to the jurisprudence of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) that, although not having jurisdiction on individual claims, has found that states 
are responsible for affording reparation to victims of international wrongful acts.  After 
concluding in the Advisory Opinion on the Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory that Israel 
had violated a number of human rights and IHL obligations, the ICJ held that: 
Israel has the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned. 
[…] The Court considers that Israel also has an obligation to compensate, in accordance with the applicable rules 
of international law, all natural or legal persons having suffered any form of material damage as a result of the 
wall’s construction.57  
More recently in the Diallo case, concerning the arrest, detention and expulsion from 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo of a Guinean businessman, the Court went one step 
                                                 
52 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, UN 
Doc. S/2005/60, 25 January 2005. 
53 Ibid., § 593. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., at 151, footnote no. 217. 
56 Ibid., § 598. 
57 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, 9 July 2004, §152 ff. But see R. O’Keefe, ‘Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: A Commentary’, 37 Revue Belge de droit 
international (2004) 92-154, at 136-140, arguing that the Court’s finding was justified by the fact that the case 
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further by considering the issue of reparation for international wrongful acts as a ‘human 
right’ and not (only) as a state right. At first glance, the case appeared to fall within the 
traditional framework of diplomatic protection (Guinea acting to protect its own citizen), and 
as such the Court could have limited itself to finding that Guinea’s rights had been violated 
and ordered that certain actions be undertaken to remedy the violation.  
However the Court did not follow the traditional approach of the law of diplomatic 
protection, discussed in the previous sections, but rather focused on the rights of Mr Diallo as 
an individual. Following the judgment on the merits,58 finding that the treatment of Mr Diallo 
by Guinea had violated certain provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the Court issued a decision on compensation for the first time in its history.59  
Importantly, in order to determine the heads of damage and the quantum of compensation, it 
extensively reviewed the practice of human rights supervisory bodies on individual 
complaints (including the Human Rights Committee, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the European Court of Human Rights).60 Arguably, reference to such 
practice illustrates that reparation is increasingly considered a right enjoyed by individuals 
even before bodies which have traditionally dealt with reparation from an exclusively inter-
state perspective and in cases, such as that of diplomatic protection, which have been 
generally settled through inter-state arrangements.  
Technically, Diallo was not himself awarded reparation. Rather, the responsible state, 
Guinea, was ordered to pay reparation to the Congo which had brought the case before the 
ICJ in exercising its right of diplomatic protection. However, as remarked by Judge Cançado-
Trindade in his separate opinion, the decision on reparation signals a significant departure 
from the traditional inter-state perspective. Judge Cançado-Trindade stated: 
In effect, in the present case A.S. Diallo, the Court’s Judgments on the merits (2010) and now on reparations 
clearly show that its findings and reasoning have rightly gone well beyond the straight-jacket of the strict inter-
State dimension. There are circumstances wherein the Court is bound to do so, in the faithful exercise of its 
judicial function, in cases concerning distinct aspects of the condition of individuals. After all, breaches of 
international law are perpetrated not only to the detriment of States, but also to the detriment of human beings, 
                                                 
58 ICJ, Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), 
Judgment, 30 November 2010, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 639. For a comment on this decision, see S. Ghandhi, 
‘Human Rights and the International Court of Justice: The Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Case’ 11 Human Rights Law 
Review (2011) 527-555; M. Andenas, ‘International Court of Justice: Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo 
(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) Judgement of 30 November 2010’ 60 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2011) 810-819. 
59 ICJ, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment 
(Compensation owed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Republic of Guinea), 19 June 2012.  
60 Ibid., §§ 24, 33, 40, 49, 56.  
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subjects of rights — and bearers of obligations — emanating directly from international law itself. States have 
lost the monopoly of international legal personality a long time ago. 
He continued: 
As disclosed by the present case of A.S. Diallo, one is, in sum, faced with a damage done to an individual. He 
(and not his State of origin) is the subject of the rights breached, he suffered unlawful detention and arbitrary 
expulsion (from the State of residence), he is the subject of the corresponding right to reparation, and the 
beneficiary thereof. His case was originally brought before this Court by his State of nationality (in the exercise 
of diplomatic protection), but, in its decision on the merits (Judgment of 30.11.2010), the Court made clear that 
the applicable law was the International Law of Human Rights, concerned with the rights of human beings and 
not at all of States.61 
In recent years, a number of commissions have been established with the aim of 
providing remedies to victims of violations of IHL that have occurred as a result of 
international or internal armed conflicts. Two well-known examples are the United Nations 
Compensation Commission (‘UNCC’) and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission 
(‘EECC’), which are both competent to adjudicate claims by victims of violations of IHL.  
Established in 1991 by the UN Security Council,62 the UNCC was meant to act as a 
subsidiary organ of the Compensation Fund, to process claims and pay monetary 
compensation ‘for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion 
of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result 
of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait’.63 In establishing the UNCC the UN 
Security Council departed from the traditional inter-state reparation framework whilst 
incorporating innovative elements into the UNCC procedure, the most notable being the 
quasi-independent role of individuals in accessing the compensation scheme.64  
                                                 
61 ICJ, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment 
(Compensation owed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Republic of Guinea), supra note no. 59, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado-Trindade, § 48. 
62 See UN Security Council (‘UN SC’) Res. 687, UN Doc. S/Res/687 (1991), 3 April 1991 and UN SC Res. 692, 
UN Doc. S/Res/692 (1991), 20 May 1991. On the UNCC generally, see J.R. Crook, ‘Current Development: The 
United Nations Compensation Commission – A New Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 The American 
Journal of International Law (1993) 144-157; M. Frigessi di Rattalma and T. Treves (eds), The United Nations 
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63 SC Res. 687, supra note no. 62, at § 16. 
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Rules for Claims Procedure, art. 5(1)(a)). Although governments make an initial evaluation of the claims, 
individual and corporate claimants remain the legitimate holders of the reparation claims. The UNCC also allows 
governments to present claims coming not only from their nationals, but also from individuals who are resident 
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protection (see e.g., ICJ, Nottebohm Case (Liechstein v. Guatemala), ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4, 6 April 1955). On 
the departure of the UCCC regime from the traditional framework of diplomatic protection, see P. Malanczuk, 
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The EECC was established in 2000 by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Peace Agreement.65 
Pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Agreement between the Governments of the State of Eritrea 
and of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia the Commission was set up in order: 
[T]o decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one Government against the 
other, and by nationals (including both natural and juridical persons) of one party against the Government of the 
other party or entities owned or controlled by the other party that are (a) related to the conflict (…), and (b) result 
from violations of IHL, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or other violations of international law.66 
It should be noted that before both the UNCC and the EECC individuals do not have 
legal standing, instead having to submit their claims to their government which in turn 
presents the claims to the competent commission. However, it has been rightly observed that 
the initial evaluation of claims by the government is a purely administrative process with the 
individual and corporate claimants as the legitimate holder of reparation claims.67  
Finally, it is worth mentioning a number of soft-law documents which have been 
adopted throughout the last decade affirming the right to an effective remedy, the right to 
compensation for damages and the right to access to justice for victims of violations of 
international humanitarian law. These documents include the Chicago Principles on Post-
Conflict Justice (‘Chicago Principles’)68 and the ILA’s Declaration of International Law 
Principles of Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict.69 The Chicago Principles were 
prepared over a period of seven years by a group of leading scholars, jurists and members of 
the civil society to provide ‘basic guidelines for designing and implementing policies to 
address past atrocities’.70 Principle 3 deals with victims’ right to remedy and reparation in a 
detailed manner and provides that ‘states shall acknowledge the special status of victims, 
ensure access to justice, and develop remedies and reparation’. Similarly, the ILA Principles 
on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, at Article 6, sets out that ‘victims of armed 
conflicts have a right to reparation from the responsible parties’. Despite the fact that these 
instruments are not legally binding and are not as authoritative as the practice of the UN 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘International Business and New Rules of State Responsibility? The Law Applied by the United Nations 
(Security Council) Compensation Commission for Claims Against Iraq’, in K.H. Böckstiegel (ed.), Perspectives 
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65 Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of 
the State of Eritrea, 12 December 2000, reproduced in 40 International Legal Materials (2001) 260-264. 
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67 See, for example, UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the UNCC, 
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68 International Human Rights Law Institute, The Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice, 2008. 
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organs they nonetheless indicate the increasing attention paid by international civil society to 
the issue of victims’ right to reparation. 
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3 VICTIMS’ REDRESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE RIGHT TO AN 
EFFECTIVE REMEDY 
 
The scope of redress potentially available to victims who suffered harm at the hands of a state 
has been substantially expanded by the legal and institutional framework of international 
human rights law. Generally speaking, reference to the obligation to provide reparation to 
victims of human rights violations is not always included in the international instruments for 
the protection of human rights. Rather, an explicit reference to such an obligation is 
contemplated only in specific cases, such as unlawful arrest or detention and wrongful 
conviction.71 However, it is generally agreed that the existence of a general duty to provide – 
and a corresponding right to obtain – reparation for human rights violations can be derived 
from a norm that can be found in all general human rights instruments requiring states to 
provide victims with effective domestic remedies.72 As will be discussed further in this 
section this norm has been generally interpreted as having two elements: on the one hand, the 
procedural right of access to justice, and on the other hand the right to reparation for the harm 
suffered as a consequence of the violation.  
The emergence of international concern regarding victims’ redress dates back to 1948 
when the basic right to an effective remedy was included in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Article 8 of the Declaration provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to an 
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights 
granted him by the constitution or the law.’73 
Although the Universal Declaration is included in a resolution of the UN General 
Assembly and, as such, is not a binding instrument it has significantly influenced the 
development of international human rights law. The right to effective remedy itself, as 
included in more recent human rights instruments, has in fact been formulated in a very 
similar manner to Article 8 - that is, by delegating the implementation of the right to domestic 
judicial systems rather than providing a priori mechanisms designed to compensate victims.74   
                                                 
71 See e.g., arts 9(5) and 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’). 
72 H. Rombouts, P. Sardaro and S. Vandegiste, ‘The Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic 
Violations of Human Rights’, in K. de Feyter, S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt, and P. Lemmens (eds), Out of the 
Ashes: Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations (Antwerpen: Intersentia & 
Institute for Human Rights, 2006) 345-503, at 367. 
73 UN GA, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), 10 
December 1948. 
74 On this point, Nowak observed that it is a general principle of law that ‘not only the statutory implementation 
and structuring of international norms of human rights but also the specific protection of the individual against 
violations of these rights are primarily domestic concerns’. M. Novak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: CCPR Commentary (Köhl: N.P. Engel Publisher, 1993), at 57. 
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As stated above, victims’ right to an effective remedy can be found in almost all 
global and regional human rights treaties75 as well as in a number of soft law texts including 
declarations,76 general comments of treaty bodies77 and resolutions.78 It is interesting to note 
that most of the provisions relating to remedy limit their scope to affirming the principle and 
that in only a few cases have the modalities of victims’ redress been regulated in detail.79 The 
reason for this is essentially twofold and will be further analysed in the following subsections: 
first, these instruments allow states to exercise discretion in choosing the types of remedies, 
and second, the requirements for an effective remedy depend on the type of violation 
involved.80 In this respect the practice of human rights bodies has substantially contributed to 
the progressive interpretation of the concept of remedy. 
                                                 
75 At the universal level: Art. 2(3) of the ICCPR; Art. 11 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Art. 14 of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (‘CAT’); Art. 6 of 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD’); Art. 39 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; Art. 20 of the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of 
Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions; Arts. 9, 13 and 19 of the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. At the regional level: Art. 13 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’); Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; 
Art. 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights (‘ACHR’); Art. 9 of the Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture; Art. 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (although it does not 
mention the right to remedy, but rather refers to ‘the right to have his cause heard’) (‘AfrCHPR’). 
76 E.g., Art. 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Art. XVIII of the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man; Art. 3 Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation. 
77 See e.g. Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’), General Comment no. 31, The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004; 
Committee on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’), General Comment no. 3, The Nature of 
States Parties Obligations, UN Doc. E/1991/23, 14 December 1990; CESCR, General Comment no. 9, The 
Domestic Application of the Covenant, UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/24, 3 December 1998; Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, General Comment no. 5: General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, UN Doc. CRG/GC/2003/5, 3 October 2003; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, General Recommendation No. 19, Violence against Women, UN Doc. A/47/38, 1992; Committee on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 26, Article 6 of the 
Convention, UN Doc. A/55/18, annex V, 24 March 2000.  
78 UN GA, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, UN Doc. 
A/RES/40/34, 29 November 1985; Principles on Reparation, supra note no. 48. 
79  Principle VIII of the Principles on Reparation establishes: ‘Remedies for gross violations of international 
human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law include the victim’s right to the 
following as provided for under international law: (a) Equal and effective access to justice; (b) Adequate, 
effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered; (c) Access to relevant information concerning violations and 
reparation mechanisms. See also arts. VIII, IX, and X, regulating in detail the three components of the right to 
remedy.’ 
80 ECtHR, Aksoy v. Turkey (App. No. 21987/93), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 18 December 1996, at 
§ 95: ‘The Court observes that Article 13 guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the 
substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the 
domestic legal order. The effect of this Article is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the 
competent national authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant 
appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they 
conform to their obligations under this provision. The scope of the obligation under Article 13 varies depending 
on the nature of the applicant’s complaint under the Convention.’ 
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3.1 The Development of the Right to an Effective Remedy by Human Rights 
Supervisory Bodies 
 
A considerable body of jurisprudence has been developed, both at the international and 
regional level, in relation to the meaning of the right to remedy. This is due to the fact that the 
exercise of jurisdiction by all human rights supervisory bodies is subject to the rule of 
exhaustion of local remedies.81Accordingly, recourse to international bodies is only possible 
when the state has failed to afford the required relief.82 This rule is based on the rationale that 
states must be afforded full opportunity to give effect to their international law obligations 
and hence should have an opportunity to remedy a violation by its own means prior to being 
called before an international body.83  
As such, the practice of human rights bodies has established that the remedy provided 
to victims should, at a minimum, meet the following requirements. First of all, victims should 
have a right to access an independent and impartial body, with a view to obtaining recognition 
of the violation, its cessation (if the violation is continuing) and reparation for the harm 
suffered.84 The European Court of Human Rights, for instance has held that there should be 
no obstacle in law or in fact to the ability to open proceedings; in general terms, an applicant 
‘should have a remedy before a national authority in order both to have his claim decided and, 
if appropriate, to obtain redress’.85 
                                                 
81 Art. 2 Optional Protocol to ICCPR, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), UN Doc. A/63/6 (1996), 23 March 1976; Art. 35 
ECHR; Art. 56(5) AfrCHPR; Article 46(1)(a) ACHR. 
82 Nonetheless, where no adequate or effective remedies are available, human rights supervisory bodies have 
established that there is no obligation to recourse to such remedies and have absolved the applicants from 
exhausting domestic remedies where special circumstances occur. These special circumstances include: (i) the 
passivity of national authorities following serious violations of human rights by their agents; (ii) the domestic 
legislation does not afford adequate or effective remedy; (iii) access to remedies has been denied or prevented; 
and (iv) an unjustified delay in rendering a final judgment. See e.g. ECtHR, Akdivar v. Turkey (App. No. 
21893/93), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 16 September 1996, §§ 65-69; see D. Shelton, Remedies in 
International Human Rights Law, supra note no. 5, at 141. 
83 This was already recognised in the early case law of the European Commission on Human Rights 
(‘EComHR’) in the following terms: ‘The rule requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition of 
the presentation of an international claim is founded upon the principle that the respondent state must first have 
an opportunity to redress by its own means within the framework of its own domestic legal system the wrong 
alleged to have been done to the individual’. EComHR, Austria v. Italy (App. No. 788/60), Decision, 23 October 
1963, at p. 43.On the rule of exhaustion of local remedies, see generally R. Pisillo Mazzeschi, Esaurimento dei 
ricorsi interni e diritti umani (Torino: Giappichelli editore, 2004); C.F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in 
International Law, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), at 64-83.  
84 See e.g., IACtHR, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, 6 October 1987, § 
24; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘AfrComHPR’), Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, 2001, Principle C; AfrComHPR, The Social and Economic 
Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria (Comm. No. 155/96), 27 
October 2001, § 61; ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland (App. No. 6289/73), Judgment (Merits), 9 October 1979, § 33. 
85 ECtHR, Leander v. Sweden (App. No. 9248/81), Judgment (Merits), 26 March 1987, § 77. 
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An effective remedy must be accessible to victims. In this respect, the Human Rights 
Committee has emphasised that this requires that the needs of vulnerable victims are taken 
into account and that claimants should be able to obtain legal aid.86 The Inter-American Court 
has stressed that the remedy must be simple and expeditious.87 The European Court of Human 
Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights have held that the remedy 
must be prompt and that the victim must be guaranteed legal representation and legal aid if 
necessary.88 
Some international treaties explicitly require states to develop judicial remedies,89 that 
is remedies capable of being enforced by a court of law, but for certain violations (generally 
speaking, those of a less serious nature) it is also accepted that non-judicial bodies may 
provide remedies. For example, General Comment No. 31 on the Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant by Article 2 of the ICCPR adopted by 
the Human Rights Committee states that ‘the Committee attaches importance to State Parties’ 
establishing appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of 
rights violations under domestic law.’90 
The body examining the complaint must be independent from the authorities allegedly 
responsible for the violation91 and must be capable of providing redress.92  A necessary 
corollary is that this also means that the body responsible for redress must be able to enforce 
its decisions against other authorities.93 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, for instance, observed that ‘any remedy granted shall be enforced by competent 
authorities’, and that ‘any state body against which a judicial order or other remedy has been 
granted shall comply fully with such an order or remedy.’94 Similarly, the ECtHR has held 
that judgments must be enforceable.95  Human rights bodies concur that the right to an 
                                                 
86 HRC, Concluding observations on Poland, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/82/POL, 2 December 2004, § 14. 
87 IACtHR, Castillo Páez v. Peru, Judgment (Merits), 3 November 1997, § 82; Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 31 August 2001, § 112. 
88 ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, supra note no. 84, § 33; AfrComHPR, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, supra note no. 84, Principle H. See also Art. 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
89 E.g., Art. 25 ACHR. 
90 Supra note no. 77, at § 15. 
91 Ibid.; ECtHR, Keenan v. the United Kingdom (App. No. 27229/95), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 3 
April 2001, § 122; IACtHR, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, supra note no. 84, § 24. 
92 HRC, General Comment No. 31, supra note no. 77, § 15; ECtHR, Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom ( 
App. Nos. 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75, 7136/75), Judgment (Merits), 25 March 
1983, § 113; AfrComHPR, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in 
Africa, supra note  no. 84, Principle C(a). 
93 IACtHR, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, supra note no. 84, § 24. 
94 AfrComHR, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, supra note 
no. 84, Principle C. 
95 ECtHR, Hornsby v. Greece (App. No. 18357/91), Judgment (Merits), 19 March 1997, § 40. 
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effective remedy is comprised of, besides access to justice and reparation, the right to a 
prompt, thorough, independent and impartial investigation.96  
Finally, it is generally agreed that any limitation of this right must pursue a legitimate 
aim and be proportionate to it;97 most importantly, any restriction must not serve to impair the 
very essence of the right itself.98  
Despite thorough examination of the procedural requirements of the effective remedy 
until relatively recently international and regional bodies had not assessed the substantial 
adequacy of the remedies themselves to any meaningful extent. It was only in the late 1980s 
when human rights supervisory bodies started receiving a considerable number of cases 
alleging serious violations of human rights (including torture, arbitrary killings and forced 
disappearances) that these bodies first considered the nature of the violation as an element 
directly impinging on the remedies that a state must provide. In such cases human rights 
bodies have found that gross violations ‘have implications’99 for the right to remedy; in 
particular, that such violations ‘cannot be remedied exclusively through an award of 
compensation to the relatives of the victim.’100   
As will be illustrated in the following sections of this Chapter, these findings lie at the 
basis of the emergence of a distinct redress regime for gross human rights violations. Before 
analysing the main characteristics of this regime, a brief digression on the remedial 
jurisdiction of human rights supervisory bodies is necessary since it is mostly through this 
power that international bodies have been able to elaborate on the notion of remedy in cases 
of gross human rights violations. 
 
 
                                                 
96 HRC, General Comment No. 31, supra note no. 77, at § 15; Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (‘CERD Committee’), L.K. v. the Netherlands (Comm. No. 4/1991), UN Doc. 
CERD/C/42/D/4/1991, 16 March 1993, § 6.9; CERD Committee, Ziad Ben Ahmed Habassi v. Denmark (Comm. 
No. 10/1997), UN Doc. CERD/C/54/D/10/1997, 6 April 1999, §§ 9.3-10; IACtHR, Blake v. Guatemala, 
Judgment (Merits), 24 January 1998, § 97; Villagrán Morales et al v. Guatemala, Judgment (Merits), 19 
November 1999, § 225; Castillo Páez v. Peru, supra note no. 87, § 90; IACHR, Case 10.247 et al., Extrajudicial 
Executions and Forced Disappearances of Persons (Peru), 11 October 2001, § 243; see also Case 11.654, 
Riofrío Massacre (Colombia), 6 April 2001, § 74; ECtHR: Aksoy v. Turkey, supra note no. 80, §§ 95-100. This 
right is discussed with reference to criminal justice in Chapter III.  
97 ECtHR, Fayed v. United Kingdom (App. No. 17101/90), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 21 
September 1990, § 65; Bellet v. France (App. No. 23805/94), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 4 
December 1995, § 31. 
98 ECtHR, Ashingdane v. United Kingdom (App. No. 8225/78), Judgment (Merits), 28 May 1985, § 57; HRC, 
General Comment No. 29 on Derogations during a State of Emergency, 31 August 2001, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, § 14. 
99 ECtHR, Aksoy v. Turkey, supra note no. 80, § 98. 
100 ECtHR, Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria (App. No. 7888/03), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 
20 December 2007, at § 55. See also IACtHR, Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Judgment (Merits), 16 August 2000, 
§ 130. 
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3.2 The Remedial Powers of International Human Rights Supervisory Bodies 
 
Under almost all international instruments protecting human rights states are responsible for 
providing victims of human rights violations with adequate remedies.  However, in practice 
not all states may be willing or able to offer to victims a remedy for the violations suffered. In 
order to avoid that harm suffered by victims remains ‘unremedied’ a number of human rights 
bodies offer a ‘safety net’101 for victims through the exercise of their power to award, or at the 
very least recommend, reparations for victims (referred to as their ‘remedial jurisdiction’).  
Despite its subsidiary nature the remedial jurisdiction of international bodies is 
extremely important to the protection of human rights, especially in cases of gross human 
rights violations as will be discussed subsequently in this Chapter. It should be noted that 
most human rights treaties do not make explicit reference to the competence of a supervisory 
body to afford remedies for human rights violations, but a number of human rights institutions 
which hear individual complaints have nevertheless regularly expressed their views on 
remedies as part of their compliance monitoring powers.  In this respect, Shelton has referred 
to the remedial powers of international bodies as ‘implied powers’ which may be inferred 
from the fundamental character of the duty to provide reparation as an automatic consequence 
arising from an international wrongful act.102  The practice of four human rights supervisory 
bodies can be examined in this regard: the Human Rights Committee, being the only quasi-
judicial body of universal character with a general human rights competence, and of the three 
human rights regional systems (European, Inter-American and African).  
 
3.2.1 The Remedial Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee 
 
The Human Rights Committee is a body of independent experts which monitors the 
implementation of the ICCPR by states parties. Among other functions103 the Committee may 
consider individual petitions submitted against states party to the first Optional Protocol.104 
Upon finding that a state party has violated the Covenant the Committee transmits its ‘views’ 
                                                 
101 I. Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of Crimes, supra note no. 5, at 152. 
102 In the LaGrand case, the ICJ held: ‘Where jurisdiction exists over a dispute on a particular matter, no 
separate basis for jurisdiction is required by the Court to consider the remedies a party has requested for the 
breach of the obligation’. ICJ, LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 2001, p. 466, 
27 June 2001, § 48. 
103 In addition to the competence to examine individual complaints, the Committee analyses the annual reports 
submitted by the states parties to the Covenant and issues recommendations in the form of ‘concluding 
observations’. Furthermore, Art. 41 of the ICCPR provides for the Committee to consider inter-state complaints. 
The Committee also publishes its interpretation of the content of human rights provisions, known as general 
comments on thematic issues or its methods of work. 
104 Art. 1 Optional Protocol ICCPR.  
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to the state pursuant to Article 5(4) of the Protocol. Since the HRC is not a judicial body its 
final views under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol are not strictly binding on a state. 
However, the HRC is the authoritative interpreter of the ICCPR, which is binding on states 
and as such it goes without saying that non-compliance with Committee views can be seen as 
evidence of bad faith with regard to state obligations under the Covenant.105 Furthermore, the 
fact that the Protocol does not explicitly mention the jurisdiction of the Committee to rule on 
remedies has not prevented it from determining the consequences entailed by the violation set 
out in its views.106 Since the first views adopted in 1979 the Committee has consistently 
stressed that the finding of a violation entails an obligation on the state to provide redress to 
the victim which derives from Article 2(3) of the Covenant.107  
In 2004, the Human Rights Committee clarified the scope and content of the right to 
remedy in its General Comment No. 31. In the General Comment, the Committee explicitly 
links the concepts of remedy and reparation, affirming that: 
Article 2, paragraph 3 requires that States Parties make reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have 
been violated. Without reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, the obligation to 
provide an effective remedy, which is central to the efficacy of article 2, paragraph 3, is not discharged. In 
addition to the explicit reparation required by articles 9, paragraph 5, and 14, paragraph 6, the Committee 
considers that the Covenant generally entails appropriate compensation. The Committee notes that, where 
appropriate, reparation can involve restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public 
apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as 
bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.108 
Despite the fact that the Committee initially adopted a narrow interpretation of Article 
2(3), a review of more recent practice in relation to individual petitions shows that the 
Committee’s attitude to remedies has developed in line with the position set out in General 
Comment no. 31. In recent years the Committee’s views have become more specific about the 
appropriate remedy in each case brought to its attention.  
                                                 
105 S. Josef, J. Schultz and M. Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, 
Materials and Commentary, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), at 24. 
106 On the remedial competence of the HRC, see E. Klein, ‘Individual Reparation Claims under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Practice of the Human Rights Committee’, in A. Randelzhofer and 
C. Tomuschat (eds), State Responsibility and the Individual: Reparations in Instances of Grave Violations of 
Human Rights, supra note no. 8, 27-42; H. J. Steiner, ‘Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: 
What Role for the Human Rights Committee?’, in P. Alston and J. Crawford (eds), The Future of UN Human 
Rights Treaty Monitoring (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 15-53. 
107 HRC, Edgardo Dante Santullo Valcada v. Uruguay (Comm. No. 9/1977), UN Doc. CCPR/C/8/D/9/1977, 26 
October 1979. 
108 HRC, General Comment no. 31, supra note no. 77, § 16. 
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Whilst the Committee lacks a mandate to order monetary compensation, since 2000 it 
has indicated the exact amount which is due to the victims.  To illustrate, whereas in 
Rodríguez v. Uruguay, a case of torture and arbitrary detention during the military 
dictatorship, the Committee had limited itself to recommending that compensation be paid to 
the victim and his next of kin,109 in Laptsevich v. Belarus, a case concerning the violation of 
the freedom of expression and opinion, the Committee recommended the state to pay 
compensation to the victim ‘amounting to a sum not less than the present value of the fine and 
any legal costs paid’.110  
The Committee has also recommended reparation in the forms of restitution, including 
restitution of liberty in cases of unduly prolonged detentions without trial111 or restitution of 
property in cases where property was wrongfully reassigned.112 In certain cases the 
Committee has also recommended amending a law found to be in violation of individual 
rights such as the right to equality before the law and to be free from discrimination,113 and 
the obligation on the state to ensure non-repetition of the violation.114   
As will be explored later in this Chapter, it is in cases of gross human rights violations 
that the Human Rights Committee has considerably expanded its remedial powers by 
elaborating specific remedies which go beyond the traditional categories of reparation, such 
as restitution and compensation. Whilst the Committee has generally found that human rights 
violations can be remedied through both judicial and administrative measures,115 as 
acknowledged in the General Comment No. 31, the Committee has progressively moved 
away from this view in cases of serious violations.  
In such cases the Committee has stated that the right to an effective remedy entails that 
allegations of human rights violations be investigated promptly and impartially by competent 
                                                 
109 HRC, Hugo Rodríguez v. Uruguay, Comm. (No. 322/188), UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, 19 July 1994, 
§ 14. 
110 HRC, Vladimir Petrovich Laptsevich v. Belarus (Comm. No. 790/1997), UN Doc. CCPR/C/68/D/780/1997 
(2000), 13 April 2000; see also Müller and Engelhard v. Namibia (Comm. No. 919/2000), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/74/D/919/2000, 26 March 2002.    
111 Cagas et al. v. The Philippines (Comm. No. 788/1997), UN Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/788/1997, 23 October 2001 
(after more than 9 years in detention without trial, the Committee urged the state either to promptly try the 
recurrent or to release him).  
112 Brok v. Czech Republic (Comm. No. 774/1997), UN Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/774/1997, 31 October 2001 
(restitution was required for discrimination in property restitution) 
113 Karakurt v. Austria (Comm. No. 965/2000), UN Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/965/2000, 4 April 2002. 
114 For example, the Committee found that Colombia had not prevented the disappearance and the death of the 
parents of the complainant and held that the state had the duty to take measures to ensure that similar violations 
did not occur in the future, see Joaquín David Herrera Rubio et al. v. Colombia (Comm. No. 161/1983), UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 192 (1990), 2 November 1987, at § 12. See also Frances et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago 
(Comm. No. 899/1999), UN Doc. CCPR/C/75/D/899/1999 (2002), 25 July 2002, § 7. 
115 General Comment No. 31, supra note no. 77, § 15. 
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authorities.116 Similarly, the Committee held in the case of Bautista v. Colombia, concerning 
the disappearance, torture and killing of a member of a left-wing group, that disciplinary 
measures against the military officials responsible for the violations were an insufficient 
remedy. From that case onwards the Committee insisted that in cases of gross human rights 
violations the state party should open criminal proceedings against those responsible ‘because 
purely disciplinary and administrative remedies cannot be deemed to constitute adequate and 
effective remedies within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Covenant’.117 
In cases of disappearance, such as in Jegatheeswara v. Sri Lanka, a case concerning 
the disappearance of an alleged Tamil Tiger sympathiser, the Committee added a further 
element of reparation: the right to receive ‘adequate information’ on the results of the 
investigation of the violations.118 In a similar vein, in the case of Sankara v. Burkina Faso, the 
Committee recommended the state to inform the relatives of the victim about the burial place 
of Mr Sankara.119  
It has been observed that, despite the broadening scope of the Committee’s remedial 
jurisdiction, it maintains a rather narrow approach to the forms of reparation that are 
eventually recommended.120 In particular, in cases of torture, the Committee has only 
recommended that victims be provided with medical assistance and rehabilitation in a few 
cases.121 The absence of certain forms of reparation from the Committee’s case law has been 
attributed to the lack of consultations with the victims about remedies.122 At the time of 
writing the possibility of developing more precise remedies is being considered by the 
Committee although no consensus has yet been reached.123  
 
 
                                                 
116 HRC, Rodríguez v. Uruguay, supra note no. 109, § 14; Blanco v. Nicaragua (Comm. No. 328/188), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/51/D/328/ 1988, 18 August 1994, § 12. 
117 HRC, Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia (Comm. No. 563/1993), UN Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, 27 
October 1995, § 8.2.  
118 HRC, Jegatheeswara Sarma v. Sri Lanka (Comm. No. 950/2000), UN Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000 (2003), 
16 July 2003, § 11; see also El Hassy v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Comm. No. 1422/2005), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/91/D/1422/2005, 24 October 2007, § 8, and Sharma v. Nepal (Comm. No. 1469/2006), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/94/D/1469/2006, 28 October 2008, § 9. 
119 HRC, Sankara et al. v. Burkina Faso (Comm. No. 1159/2003), UN Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1159/2003, 9 March 
2004,  § 14. 
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3.2.2 The Remedial Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
 
The European Court of Human Rights is the first human rights supervisory body with the 
power to deliver legally binding judgments on remedies. With the entry into force of Protocol 
11 in 1998, individuals who have exhausted domestic remedies have the right to submit a 
complaint directly to the Court and states ‘undertake not to hinder in any way the effective 
exercise of this right’.124 Upon finding a violation, pursuant to Article 41 of the Convention 
the Court ‘shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.’ 
Despite being widely recognised as the most advanced system of human rights 
adjudication with respect to individual standing,125 the ECtHR has long interpreted its 
remedial powers pursuant to Article 41 of the ECHR in a rather cautious manner. In 
particular, for decades the Court took the position that it lacked authority to issue explicit 
directions on remedial matters, that the award of just satisfaction is optional and that a 
judgment may in itself afford satisfaction for victims.126 This position has been much 
criticised both by legal scholars127 and by certain ECtHR judges.  For instance, Judge Bonello 
noted in a dissenting opinion that ‘it [is] wholly inadequate and unacceptable that a court of 
justice should “satisfy” the victim of a breach of fundamental rights with a mere handout of 
legal idiom’.128 
This restrictive approach to remedial powers has been partly explained by the fact that 
redress of individual wrongs was not seen as the primary objective of the European system, at 
least at the beginning of its activities.129 As is well known the Convention regime was created 
with the intention of ‘providing a collective, inter-state guarantee’,130 that would benefit 
individuals only as a second objective. Accordingly, individual petitions were conceived as a 
mechanism for bringing to light an international wrongful act and not as a means for seeking 
                                                 
124 Art. 34 ECHR, as amended after Protocol 11 entered into force in 1998.  
125 A. Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe’, 54 
International Organization (2000) 217-252, at 217. 
126 For example, in Mehemi v. France, the Court held that the finding of a violation in the judgment constituted 
itself just satisfaction and that it did not have the jurisdiction to order the state to permit the applicant to return to 
France and issue him a residence permit. ECtHR, Mehemi v. France (App. No. 25017/94), Judgment (Merits and 
Just Satisfaction), 26 September 1967, §§ 41 and 43. 
127 R. Higgings, ‘Damages for Violation of One’s Human Rights’, in N.A. Sims (ed), Explorations in Ethics and 
International Relations, cited in D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, supra note no. 5, at 
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128 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bonello, in Nikolova v. Bulgaria (App. No. 31195/96), Judgment (Merits and 
Just Satisfaction), 25 March 1999. 
129 D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, supra note no. 5, at 200. 
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a remedy for individual victims.131 Moreover, in contrast to other regional human rights 
systems the European Court did not, at least in the initial phase of its activities, receive many 
applications concerning serious violations of human rights.  
Nevertheless, in the last two decades significant changes have occurred in relation to 
the interpretation of the remedial powers of the Court pursuant to Article 41.  These changes 
have been influenced by the reform of the Court in 1998, giving individuals direct access to it, 
the expansion of the number of state parties and the corresponding increasing number of cases 
filed (in particular concerning serious violations of human rights with many occurring during 
armed conflicts).  In short, the Court has progressively moved away from its traditional 
resistance to awarding compensation and the idea that the judgment constitutes satisfaction in 
itself.  
The Court now regularly awards compensation for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
damages as well as for legal costs. In 1998, in response to a request of the Committee of 
Ministers calling on the Court to identify cases of systematic violations of human rights and 
the necessary remedial measures132 the Court began to give more guidance on the measures 
necessary to remedy violations. In certain cases the Court has indicated non-monetary relief 
for applicants. Prior to the reform of the Court non-monetary remedies such as restitution 
were limited to property cases.133 More recently the Court has extended its indication of 
restitution to violations of other rights, such as deprivation of liberty.134  
However, to date the Court has not awarded other types of non-monetary remedies for 
victims of violations such as the annulment of national measures violating conventional rights 
or the initiation of investigations into the violations. This approach proves inadequate 
especially in cases of gross human rights violations. For instance, in cases of torture, the 
Court has never ordered reparation in the form of rehabilitation. A modest step forward has 
been introduced by the Court in 2010 in the case of Danev v. Bulgaria in which the Court 
stressed that the negative effects of unlawful detention on an individual’s psychological 
condition may remain after release and criticised the state for not having provided 
rehabilitation.135 
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See also Broniowski v. Poland (App. No. 31443/96), Judgment (Merits), 22 June 2004. 
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The fact that victims of human rights violations enjoy easier access to the Court 
following the adoption of Protocol 11 in 1998 ought to prompt the Court to reconsider its 
unwillingness to order measures other than compensation even though the nature of the 
remedial jurisdiction of the Court remains subsidiary.136 Arguably, the adoption of a broader 
interpretation of the Court’s remedial powers pursuant to Article 41 would greatly improve 
the protection of human rights within the European system, particularly in those cases 
involving serious violations of human rights. Indeed, in such cases, the Court itself has 
recognised, as will be discussed later in this Chapter, that compensation alone is not an 
adequate form of redress. A broad remedial jurisdiction would help ensure that adequate 
forms remedies are ultimately granted by the responsible state.  Moving towards more 
specific orders of redress would also bring the European Court in line with the practice of 
universal bodies, such as the Human Rights Committee seen above, and of other regional 
human rights supervisory bodies.  
 
3.2.3 The Remedial Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
 
The most significant example on the proactive development of the question of victim’s 
redress by human rights supervisory bodies is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
which is explicitly vested with broad remedial powers. Pursuant to Article 63(1) of the 
ACHR, when a violation is found the Court: 
[S]hall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also 
rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or 
freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.  
Compared to Article 41 of the ECHR, which only refers to just satisfaction, Article 63 
of the ACHR is more explicit and contains reference to remedies as separate from 
compensation. This language indicates that the Court’s remedial powers are not limited to 
compensation, which is therefore only one of the measures that can be ordered.  
A review of the Court’s case law reveals how this body has made broad use of its 
remedial jurisdiction, awarding both monetary and non-monetary remedies. In particular, the 
                                                 
136 ECtHR, Z. and Others v. United Kingdom (App. No. 29392/95), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 10 
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Court has paid significant attention to awarding specific reparation measures according to the 
international obligation violated. This was clearly expressed in the La Cantuta case:  
Reparations are measures aimed at removing the effects of the violation and the damage inflicted at both the 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary level. These measures may neither enrich nor impoverish the victim or the victim’s 
beneficiaries, and they must bear proportion to the breaches declared as such in the judgment.137  
The rationale behind adopting a broad interpretation of its remedial jurisdiction stems 
from the nature of the violations that tend to occur in the region. Indeed, individuals of states 
parties to the Inter-American Court have often been afflicted by serious violations of human 
rights including torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions. Several cases brought 
before the Court have dealt with massacres.138 In such cases, restitution has often been 
unrealisable. Moreover, relatives of the victims or survivors have generally preferred, besides 
compensation for material and non-material damage, non-monetary forms of reparation to 
compensation with a view to restoring the dignity of the victims, knowing the truth, and 
ensuring the accountability of those responsible for the violations.139  
Since its inception, the Court has adopted a creative approach to reparation and 
interpreted the concept in a broad manner. In particular, it has often specified concrete 
reparation measures stressing aspects of satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. For 
instance, in the Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, a case concerning the killing by the army of 
members of a Maroon tribe, in addition to monetary compensation the Court also awarded 
measures of collective reparation such as the setting up of a school and a medical centre140 
In the Loayza Tamayo v. Peru case, concerning the unlawful detention and torture of a 
university professor, the Court awarded a broad array of reparations apart from monetary 
compensation including restitution by reinstating the victim in her teaching position, medical 
rehabilitation, public apologies in the newspapers and the amendment of anti-terrorist 
legislation in conformity with the Convention.141  
                                                 
137 IACtHR, La Cantuta v. Peru, Judgment (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 29 November 2006, § 202. 
138  E.g., IACtHR, Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment (Merits), 29 April 2004; Mapiripán 
Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 15 September 2005; Pueblo Bello Massacre 
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Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), 1 July 2006.  
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victims (§ 292). 
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In more recent cases, the Court has dealt with the challenge of issuing reparation in 
cases of massacres involving a large number of victims. In the case Massacre Plan de 
Sánchez v. Guatemala, concerning the execution of about 280 members of a Mayan 
indigenous community, the Court set an important precedent according to which communities 
may be recognised as beneficiaries of collective reparations. In addition to monetary 
compensation the Court ordered a series of symbolic measures aimed at providing fair 
reparation to victims of the massacre, including restitution, by ensuring survivors a decent 
standard of living as well as the investigation, prosecution and punishment of those 
responsible for the violations, a public acceptance of responsibility for the violations, the 
establishment of a housing programme, medical and psychological treatment for all surviving 
victims and the implementation of cultural and educational programs.142 Similarly, in another 
case concerning a massacre, Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, the Court ordered the state 
party to provide victims with reparation, in addition to financial compensation, including the 
proper identification of the victims, medical and psychological assistance to the families of 
the victims, a public apology and a remembrance monument as well as human rights training 
for the members of the army.143 
All in all, the Inter-American Court has provided an important contribution to the 
development of the concept of remedy, particularly in cases of large-scale violations, taking 
into account the nature of the violations, the socio-economic and cultural background of the 
victimised communities as well as the peculiar vulnerabilities of minorities and indigenous 
peoples.144 In so doing the IACtHR case law has paved the way for the emergence of a 
comprehensive notion of reparation which has only recently been recognised at the universal 
level. 
 
 
3.2.4 The Remedial Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The African human rights system is the most recently established of the regional mechanisms, 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights only becoming operational in 2009. 
                                                 
142 IACtHR, Plan de Sánchez v. Colombia, supra note no. 138, §§ 93-111. 
143 IACtHR, Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, supra note no. 138, §§ 295-318. 
144 For a detailed review of the remedial mandate of the Inter-American Court, see T.M. Antkowiak, ‘Remedial 
Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond’ 46 Columbia 
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Although at present no relevant case law has been delivered, the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights is also likely to make an important contribution to the development of the 
practice of human rights supervisory bodies’ remedial powers. This is so since the Court is 
explicitly vested with broad powers to award victims’ redress in various forms similar to 
those of the Inter-American Court.145 Article 27(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights establishes that ‘[i]f the Court finds that there has been a violation of a human 
or peoples’ right, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the 
payment of fair compensation or reparation.’ The broad wording of this provision allows the 
Court considerable discretion when choosing an appropriate remedy.  While the formulation 
of Article 27 is similar to Article 63(1) of the ACHR it has been observed that the African 
Court’s remedial jurisdiction is probably ‘broader than all the current mandates to afford 
remedies to victims of human rights abuses.’146  
In this respect, the Court is likely to follow the practice of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, with which it shares the mandate of promoting and ensuring 
protection of human rights in Africa, and that of monitoring state compliance with the 
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Due to its relatively recent 
institution the African Commission is still in the process of defining the scope of its powers; 
nonetheless, by the end of its first decade of activities it has recognised that the main aim of 
the communications procedure is ‘to initiate a positive dialogue, resulting in an amicable 
resolution … which remedies the prejudice complained of.’147 It has therefore been observed 
that, in so doing, the Commission ‘recognizes that the ultimate objective of communications 
is ‘the redress of the violations complained of’.148  
However, the Commission has attracted much criticism, especially for its initial 
hesitance in exercising and developing its powers.149  The main criticism which has been 
raised relates to the inability of the Commission to award the injured parties adequate 
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remedies. In its early stages, the Commission was mostly silent on the issue of reparations.150 
This might have been the case because neither the African Charter nor the Rules of Procedure 
provide for victims’ right to remedy.151  This might also be explained by the parties not 
having had the opportunity, in an initial phase, to present arguments on the matter.152 In cases 
where the Commission found ‘serious or massive violations’ the absence of a remedy in most 
cases was justified in light of the Assembly’s anticipated ‘request to undertake an in-depth 
study’ on such violations.153 Essentially, the initial thinking was that a remedial order in 
individual communications lay outside the mandate of the Commission and had to be 
addressed at the political level by the Assembly.154 More often the Commission’s role has 
been limited to negotiating so-called ‘friendly settlements’155 between the state and the 
complainants.  
Subsequently the Commission has gradually moved away from this practice as it 
started recommending that states take ‘necessary measures’ to comply with the Charter 
(although without specifying what exactly these measures were)156 Specifically, the 
Commission has recently started adopting more targeted remedial orders, although not always 
in a consistent manner.157 Two approaches have emerged so far with respect to the scope of 
the Commission’s remedial powers.  
The first approach consists of issuing an ‘open-ended’ remedy where, for example, the 
Commission urges the state ‘to bring its laws in conformity with the provisions of the African 
Charter’,158 or ‘in conformity with’ its decision.159 The second approach consists of issuing 
recommendations for specific conduct as targeted remedies; these include (i) executive 
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conduct, such as the release of detainees,160 (ii) legislative measures,161 or (iii) compensation 
be paid to victims.162 A clear example of the latter approach is the Mauritania cases 
concerning serious violations of human rights (extra-judicial executions, torture, 
disappearances and slavery).163 In these cases the Commission has recommended a detailed 
list of reparation measures including the establishment of an inquiry to investigate the fate of 
disappeared persons, the identification and prosecution of the perpetrators, the replacement of 
identity cards and reparation to people forcibly expelled, the payment of compensation to 
widows and other beneficiaries of the victims, the development of a strategy to eradicate the 
causes of violence and to enforce the abolition of slavery.164 
Therefore, despite initially taking a conservative approach to the issue of reparation, 
the African Commission when faced with cases of serious violations of human rights has 
adopted a creative approach recommending policy-oriented and collective measures of 
reparation. However, it has been reported that, compared to the other regional and universal 
human rights systems, challenges remain with regard to the implementation of the reparation 
measures recommended.165 It remains to be seen, therefore, whether and, if so, how the 
relationship between the Commission and the Court will influence the access of individuals 
and groups of individuals to fair and effective reparation for the violations suffered. 
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4 REPARATION FOR GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A DISTINCT REDRESS 
REGIME 
 
 
As discussed in the previous sections the existence of a state’s duty to provide a remedy to 
victims of violations of human rights is now well grounded in several international and 
regional conventions.  In this regard, monetary compensation has long been viewed as the 
principal remedy for victims of human rights abuses.166 However, this Chapter argues that an 
emerging legal principle demands that victims of gross violations of human rights have a right 
to a distinct redress regime since traditional forms of reparation are inadequate to repair the 
injuries suffered by the victims of this type of violation.  
In order to justify this claim it is necessary to understand the theoretical and legal basis 
for a distinct redress regime. While a thorough analysis of what victims think and want in the 
aftermath of gross violations of human rights falls outside the scope of this thesis, the 
following section will first identify some common features of this type of violation as well as 
its effect on society and on victims’ needs and expectations. Secondly, the legal framework 
characterising this distinct redress regime, focusing on international instruments dealing with 
gross violations of human rights as well as on the practice of human rights supervisory bodies 
will be examined.  
 
 
4.1 The Need for a Distinct Redress Regime 
 
4.1.1 Why Traditional Forms of Reparation Are Inadequate in Cases of Gross Human 
Rights Violations 
 
When assessing what form of reparation should be awarded in the context of gross human 
rights violations, reference to criteria used for individual violations of human rights may raise 
some problems. As we have seen, courts mainly resort to ‘restitutio in integrum’ and to 
material compensation as preferred remedies in individual cases. Restitutio in integrum has 
the aim of re-establishing, as far as possible, the situation that existed prior to the violation.167 
When restoration of the situation prior to the violation is not possible, this fundamental 
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principle influences the mechanism of compensation,168 which will be measured in relation to 
the condition of the victim before the harm took place.169 
In cases of gross human rights violations, some problems may arise when considering 
these principles. Arguably, gross and systematic violations and individual cases differ both 
qualitatively and quantitatively and this may affect the scope and nature of remedies that 
should be afforded to victims. Three problems, in particular, can be pointed out.  
First, gross and systematic human rights violations may cause injuries that, due to their 
gravity, cannot be repaired by means of restitution or compensation. The loss of a family 
member and the moral damage linked to it, for instance, can never be entirely reparable. 
Second, gross and systematic violations often occur in the context of armed conflicts where 
the high number of victims and perpetrators may prevent any attempt to provide individual 
redress. Moreover, the overall social context in which the remedies for gross and systematic 
violations must be afforded differs from the individual case. Where there have been 
widespread human rights abuses, or serious violations of human rights, the entire society 
often has suffered together with the direct victims. Although it is unlikely that healing can 
occur without redress of individual victims wrongs, remedies may also have to be adjusted to 
achieve other goals including deterrence of individual wrongdoing, rehabilitation of society 
and reconciliation of individuals and groups.170  
Third, in the context of gross human rights violations, it has been argued that restitutio 
in integrum is not possible, because a return to the status quo ante is not only unrealisable but 
also undesirable because the victims may have never been in a normal or ideal position. A 
classical example related to this argument is the South African case, where people were born 
under the oppressive regime of apartheid never enjoying a preferable status quo ante.171  
Restoring the situation prior to the violation is thus not a valid option and inventing the 
hypothetical pre-violation situation would be an arduous, and perhaps futile, task.  
In light of the above it is apparent that in cases of gross human rights violations, 
standards of reparation may not be determined by referring to the traditional categories of 
reparation. Rather, a reasoned understanding of reparation which takes into account specific 
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violations, the gravity of harm suffered by the victims, the high number of victims and the 
overall context of the society in question is necessary. This means, inter alia, that different 
forms of reparation may be suitable to deal with this type of violations and that, for instance, 
collective reparation measures are more suitable than individual reparation measures. In order 
to better identify these forms of reparation, consideration should be given to victims’ needs 
and expectations in the aftermath of gross human rights violations.  
This was well expressed by Judge Cançado-Trindade, who recommended the adoption 
of a different approach for reparation of human rights violations: 
The criteria of determination of reparations, of an essentially patrimonial content (civil law analogies), do not 
appear to us entirely adequate or sufficient when transposed into the domain of the International Law of Human 
Rights, endowed with a specificity of its own. There is pressing need, in our days, in the ambit of International 
Human Rights Law, to develop the forms of reparations as from the perspective of the victims themselves, of 
their needs, aspirations and claims. The whole chapter of reparations for violations of human rights is… to be 
constantly reassessed as from the perspective of the integrality of the personality of the victims themselves, 
bearing in mind the fulfilment of their aspirations as human beings and the restoration of their dignity.172 
In a number of separate and dissenting opinions before the IACtHR as well as before the 
International Court of Justice, Judge Cançado-Trindade repeatedly challenged ‘the “logic” – 
or rather, the lack of logic – of the homo economicus of our days, to whom, amidst the new 
idolatry of the god-market, everything is reduced to the fixing of compensation’.173 The 
position of Judge Cançado-Trindade — confirmed by the most recent case law of human 
rights supervisory bodies, as will be explored in the next subsections — that the concept of 
reparation for human rights violations, particularly those of a serious character, must be based 
‘on the consideration of the victim as an integral human being’.174 Therefore, reparation 
cannot consist only of compensation for material and moral damages but must also include, 
important non-pecuniary forms of reparation that are better suited to addressing the needs and 
expectations of victims in the aftermath of serious violations of their rights. This is because 
the monetary value of harm suffered as a consequence of this type of violations cannot always 
be assessed:  
                                                 
172 A.A. Cançado Trindade, ‘The International Law of Human Rights at the Dawn of the XXIst Century’, in J. 
Cardona Lloréns (ed.), Bancaja Euromediterranean Courses of International Law (Pamplona: Aranzadi: 2000) 
145-221, at 171-172. 
173 IACtHR, Separate Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, Villagrán Morales et al v. Guatemala, 
Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 26 May 2001, § 35. 
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What is the price of a human life? What is the price of the integrity of the human person? What is the price of the 
liberty of conscience, or of the protection of the honour and of the dignity? What is the price of the human pain 
or suffering? If the indemnizations are paid, would the “problem” be “resolved”?175 
As such, before analysing the legal framework and the case law relating to reparation for 
victims of gross violations of human rights, it is necessary to briefly address the issue of 
victim’s needs and expectations from a theoretical perspective.  
4.1.2 Victims’ Needs and Expectations in the Aftermath of Gross Human Rights 
Violations 
 
 
The needs and expectations of victims of gross human rights violations may vary significantly 
on the basis of the nature and consequences of the violations, as well as in relation to the 
cultural differences and the degree of education and information of victims. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to identify some common features regarding victims’ needs in the aftermath of gross 
violations. As observed above, it may be helpful to consider these common features when 
elaborating on forms of reparation for victims of gross violations of human rights. 
One of the first needs of victims is to obtain knowledge and clarification of the facts 
leading to gross violations of human. This is, for instance, the case for any disappearance, be 
it for a kidnapping, a war, or any other reason. Relatives of disappeared persons continue to 
look for them in the hope that they will find a trace of them. Searching for truth is not only 
about knowing the whereabouts of a disappeared person, rather, victims feel the need to know 
the details of the violation as a precondition before becoming reconciled with the reality of 
the crime and, eventually, in order to start the healing process.176 This is the case for people 
who are indirect victims whose relatives have been killed or have disappeared as well as for 
direct victims who survived a violation and need to understand why this happened to them 
and also who did this to them.  
It has been submitted that not all victims want to know the truth about the violations 
suffered; rather, some victims would simply want to ‘turn the page’ and forget.177 
Nonetheless, it may be argued that the general willingness to forget is not at odds with the 
                                                 
175 Ibid., § 36. 
176 For a thorough evaluation of the debate among transitional justice scholars and psychologist on the restorative 
value of truth, see P.B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011), at 145-162. 
177 M. Schotsmans, ‘Victims’ Expectations, Needs and Perspectives after Gross and Systematic Human Rights 
Violations’, in K. de Feyter, S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt, and P. Lemmens (eds), Out of the Ashes: Reparation for 
Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations, supra note no. 72, 105-133, at 123, referring to 
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need to know what happened. An important victims’ organization in Rwanda called ‘Ibuka’ 
(meaning ‘remember’) has as its slogan: ‘Before you can turn the page you have to read it’.178 
Indeed, victims cannot simply forget, even if they sometimes tend to remove memories as a 
psychological mechanism of self-protection.179 History reveals that the need to find the truth 
is one of the most prevalent desire of victims: the Pinochet case, the Habré case and the case 
of the Stolen Generations of aboriginals are only some examples of gross human rights 
violations committed in the past, but not wanting to be forgotten nor being forgotten by the 
victims. This is also confirmed by the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
as observed above, which has often included the obligation to ‘memorialize’ as a form of 
reparation for gross violations of human rights.180 
It remains unclear, however, whether it is sufficient for victims to obtain the truth 
about the violations through a truth commission, or whether criminal proceedings are 
considered as the most suitable means. On the one hand, some victims prefer criminal trials 
because the establishment of the truth is linked to individual accountability of the 
offenders.181 On the other hand other victims may prefer truth commissions because they 
generally allow them more space to tell their stories than before criminal courts.182  
However, in general terms, both mechanisms are recognised as having a reparative 
function and need not be considered as alternatives.183 This is especially because victims do 
not only want to know the truth about the violations suffered but also want acknowledgment 
of the causes of their suffering and of the wrongful nature of the acts they suffered from and 
the condemnation of such acts and of those responsible.184 Such acknowledgment indicates to 
victims that what occurred was wrong and that it was a breach of the norms and values 
protected by the society, thereby restoring victims’ trust in the state, society or in their fellow 
citizens. Acknowledgments may come from different sources: (i) the perpetrators themselves, 
although this possibility is only rarely realised in practice, as most often perpetrators are 
                                                 
178 Ibid.  
179 C. Sedikides and J.D. Green, ‘Memory as a self-protective mechanism’, 3 Social and Personality Psychology 
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180 See below Section 4.2.2.B (iii).  
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182 P.B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, supra note 
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unwilling to acknowledge the violations committed by them, or may be untouchable due to 
immunities or amnesty (in any case, even if the offender is brought to justice, this does not 
mean that he or she is willing to acknowledge the violation he or she is responsible for); (ii) 
the person bearing responsibility over the actual perpetrator; and (iii) an official body, such as 
a court of justice, a truth commission or a commission of inquiry.  
Finally, victims may want some kind of reparation, although not necessarily material 
compensation. As observed above, financial compensation cannot compensate the loss of a 
family member, since there is no price for such suffering. Furthermore, monetary 
compensation produces ambivalence among many victims and is often considered peripheral 
to the healing process. In this respect, material reparation, in the absence of forms of public 
recognition of the harm suffered by the victims, has been considered as ‘buying silence or 
“blood money”’.185 The assumption that the most obvious need for victims is for 
compensation has been thus increasingly challenged and a ‘return to a symbolic dimension’186 
has been introduced instead. As will be further illustrated in this Chapter, the symbolic 
dimension of reparation is the main characteristic of the distinct redress regime for victims of 
gross human rights violations.  
  
4.2 The Legal Framework for a Distinct Redress Regime for Victims of Gross 
Human Rights Violations  
 
4.2.1 International Legal Instruments Specifically Dealing with Reparation for Gross 
Violations of Human Rights 
 
As observed above, in instances of gross human rights violations some measures of reparation 
may be more suitable than others to repair the harm suffered by victims. Specific examples of 
those measures that are particularly relevant in cases of serious violations of human rights can 
be found in two documents recently adopted in the context of the UN, namely the UN 
Principles on Reparation187 and the Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (‘Principles on Impunity’).188  
                                                 
185 N. Roth Arriaza, ‘Punishment, Redress and Pardon: Theoretical and Psychological Approaches’, in Idem 
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(Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), at 110. 
187 Supra note no. 48.  
188 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat 
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The Principles on Reparation, after indicating the various forms of reparation 
(restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and satisfaction), sets out a detailed list of measures 
of satisfaction, including:  
a) Effective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations; (b) Verification of the facts and full and 
public disclosure of the truth to the extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or threaten the safety 
and interests of the victim, the victim’s relatives, witnesses, or persons who have intervened to assist the victim 
or prevent the occurrence of further violations; (c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the 
identities of the children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed, and assistance in the recovery, 
identification and reburial of the bodies in accordance with the expressed or presumed wish of the victims, or the 
cultural practices of the families and communities; (d) An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the 
dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim; (e) Public 
apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility; (f) Judicial and 
administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations; (g) Commemorations and tributes to the 
victims; (h) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred in international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law training and in educational material at all levels.’189 
Arguably, the detailed list of satisfaction measures indicates how important this form 
of reparation is in the context of gross human rights violations. In particular, special emphasis 
is put on those measures which, as indicated in Section 4 of this Chapter, offer a significant 
contribution to victims’ healing and closure; namely the search for and the acknowledgment 
of the truth and of responsibility. In this sense, the right to reparation is closely linked to the 
right to truth and the right to justice which will be the object of a separate analysis in Chapter 
III. 
In this respect, the UN Principles on Impunity recognise, for instance, that the final 
report of truth commissions should be made public and ‘be disseminated as widely as 
possible’190 and that ‘[i]n the case of forced disappearance, the family of the direct victim has 
an imprescriptible right to be informed of the fate and/or whereabouts of the disappeared 
person’.191 Moreover, the Principles on Impunity recognise that victims have a right to 
justice192 corresponding to the state’s obligation to ensure ‘that those responsible for serious 
crimes under international law are prosecuted, tried and duly punished.’193 Finally, these 
Principles also acknowledge that an important aspect of reparation that can provide a measure 
                                                 
189 UN Principles on Reparation, Principle 9, § 22.  
190 UN Principles on Impunity, Principle 13.  
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193 Ibid., Principle 1. 
  
65 
of satisfaction to victims is public commemoration.194 Such a measure is particularly 
important in cases of violation of rights of a group or a large community or in cases of 
historical violations. 
Neither the Principles on Reparation nor the Principles on Impunity are legally 
binding instruments. Nonetheless, they both provide a crucial benchmark on the issue of 
victims’ reparation in cases of gross human rights violations. The Principles on Reparation, 
which were developed during a fifteen-year period,195 explicitly state in the preamble that 
they ‘identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of 
existing legal obligations under international human rights and international humanitarian 
law, which are complementary though different as to their norms.’196 Even when still in draft 
form the Principles on Reparation were cited in the practice of human rights bodies. 
Furthermore, the fact that they were adopted by consensus at the General Assembly 
strengthened their status under international law. Similarly, the Principles on Impunity were 
elaborated over eight years and eventually endorsed by the Human Rights Commission. In the 
first version, then mandate-holder Joinet pointed out that the principles were not to be 
considered as legal standards but rather as guiding principles.197 Similarly, the preamble of 
the final version refers to the principles as ‘guidelines to assist States in developing effective 
measures for combating impunity’.198  
It is clear, therefore, that principles set out in these documents cannot be read as rules, 
but rather as standards.199  However, this does not make them irrelevant. Although formally 
not binding, both these documents make an important contribution in defining remedies for 
gross human rights violations. The fact that a growing number of decisions by human rights 
bodies refer to them is likely to strengthen their force and influence domestic practice, 
possibly leading to the progressive affirmation of these standards as rules of general 
international law. 
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4.2.2 The Practice of Human Rights Supervisory Bodies on Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Human Rights Violations: Main Characteristics 
 
Since there are not many instruments dealing specifically with the right to reparation for 
victims of gross human rights violations, and those existing instruments have no binding 
value upon states, the practice of human rights supervisory bodies has been decisive for the 
affirmation of a distinct redress regime for this category of victims. As observed above, a 
review of the judicial and quasi-judicial practice of human rights supervisory bodies with the 
power to award (or, at the very least, to recommend) reparation to individuals whose rights 
have been violated indicates that restitution and monetary compensation have long been the 
most common remedies granted to victims. Nonetheless, more recently, these bodies have 
increasingly acknowledged that restitution or compensation alone, in cases of gross human 
rights violations, are an inadequate form of redress, considering the gravity of the harm 
suffered and, most importantly, the fact that most of the time injury sustained as a 
consequence of these violations cannot be repaired by way of restitution or compensation. 
Furthermore, these bodies have increasingly recognised that reparation for gross violations of 
human rights not only needs to take into account the material damage suffered, but also 
immaterial damage, such as harm to reputation, dignity and other harm the monetary value of 
which is difficult to quantify in exact terms. 
This is not to say that, in cases of gross human rights violations, victims should be 
granted only symbolic reparation. Rather, monetary compensation and other measures of 
reparation are usually awarded cumulatively. As also clarified by the ILC in its Commentary 
to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, in particular cases, reparation may only be 
achieved by the combination of different measures.200 Accordingly, human rights supervisory 
bodies have increasingly directed states to take specific action to remedy human rights 
violations. The following section will consider those measures that are representative of the 
redress regime for victims of gross human rights violations. In particular, the practice of 
human rights supervisory bodies in relation to reparation for immaterial damage through: (i) 
compensation, and (ii) satisfaction will be examined. 
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A. COMPENSATION FOR IMMATERIAL DAMAGE 
 
Reparation for immaterial damage is particularly relevant in cases of gross human rights 
violations since victims of these violations often suffer serious physical harm and 
psychological traumas. These damages are generally assessed on the basis of the costs of 
medical and psychological treatments necessary to recover from the harm sustained; however, 
when such figures are not available, immaterial damages are assessed on the basis of ‘equity’, 
a method which has often been used to assess harm resulting from pain, suffering and distress 
and for harm to the dignity of persons.201  
The right to compensation for immaterial damage has been long recognised in the 
practice of international law. In the Janes case, an arbitration tribunal held that ‘the individual 
grief of the claims should be taken into account’.202  Similarly, in the Lusitania arbitration, the 
tribunal held:  
Mental suffering is a fact just as real as physical suffering, and susceptible of measurement by the same 
standards. … there can be no doubt of the reality of mental suffering, of sickness of mind as well as sickness of 
body, and of its detrimental and injurious effect on the individual and on his capacity to produce. Why, then, 
should he be remediless for this injury?203 
Compensation for immaterial damage was considered in accordance with ‘applicable 
principles of international law’ in the case of Letelier and Moffitt, which was settled in 
arbitration proceedings between US and Chile in 1992.204 In that case, concerning the 
assassination of the Chilean economist and politician Orlando Letelier and his assistant Ronni 
Moffit by Pinochet’s DINA agents, the arbitral commission set out the monetary 
compensation for moral damage owed to the families of the two victims on the basis of 
similar pronouncements by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and other arbitral 
tribunals. As noted by Professor Vicuña in his Separate Opinion, a distinct set of principles 
applies to damages for deaths and physical injuries. In that case, he affirmed, ‘[c]ompensation 
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for moral damages is clearly included among the important principles of international law in 
the matter.’205 
The right to compensation for physical and mental damage is also well established in 
the practice of human rights supervisory bodies. The Human Rights Committee, for instance, 
has recommended compensation for the relatives of disappeared people, recognising that 
these persons have suffered harm amounting to a violation of Art. 7 ICCPR due to the anguish 
caused by the disappearance of their beloved ones.206  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has awarded ‘moral damage’ to victims 
since its very first judgment on reparation and has based its assessment on equity.207 Since 
this judgment, the jurisprudence of the Court has further elaborated on the issue of immaterial 
damages and two main principles can be discerned: firstly, moral damages are awarded to the 
direct victim and to his or her family, not only in cases where the direct victim is deceased as 
a result of an unlawful killing or is disappeared, but also in cases in which the victim has been 
tortured.208 Secondly, close family members are awarded moral damage without having to 
prove having suffered actual damage. In this respect, the Court held that ‘it can be presumed 
that the parents have suffered morally as a result of the cruel death of their offspring, for it is 
essentially human for all persons to feel pain at the torment of their child.’209 
The European Court of Human Rights has also ordered compensation to victims for 
immaterial damage when it has found that they have suffered anguish, psychological pain or 
other mental or physical harm. Where the victim has been disappeared or is deceased, the 
Court has awarded non-pecuniary damages to the victims’ next of kin.210 Mental harm need 
not necessarily be demonstrated but may be presumed on the basis of the gravity of the 
violations. For instance, in Orhan v. Turkey, a case concerning acts of torture, the European 
Court of Human Rights awarded non-pecuniary damages on account of the simple finding of 
the violation and on the ‘gravity of the breaches on question’.211 Like its Inter-American 
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counterpart, the Court has awarded non-pecuniary damages to relatives of the victims in view 
of the extremely serious violations suffered by the victims that undoubtedly caused their 
relatives anxiety and distress. In other cases, the Court considered that the relatives of victims 
suffered ‘feeling of frustration, distress and anxiety’212 from the lack or inefficient of an 
investigation over the facts that caused the violation.  
A recent development in relation to reparation for immaterial damage in cases of gross 
human rights violations concerns compensation for damages to the ‘life plan’ of the victim, 
that is the full self-actualization of the victim both from a personal and a professional 
perspective. Awards for damage to the life plan, in particular, take into account the difficulties 
that a victim of gross violations of human rights may experience in finding a place in the 
society and in restoring his or her dignity. At present, this practice is limited to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights which in a number of cases ordered the state responsible to 
cover the costs of education and professional training in order to compensate damage to the 
life plan (proyecto de vida).213  
The human rights jurisprudence has also influenced the recent decision by the 
International Court of Justice in the Diallo case, in which, as noted above, the Court ruled for 
the first time on compensation for human rights violations. In that case, the Court awarded the 
wronged state a considerable sum for immaterial damage suffered by the individual victim. 
Relying on the case law of human rights supervisory bodies, the Court found that there is no 
need to prove immaterial damage, since it ‘is is an inevitable consequence of the wrongful 
acts … already ascertained by the Court’.214 Moreover, the Court stated that determination of 
the quantum owed for immaterial damage ‘necessarily rests on equitable considerations’,215 in 
accordance with the human rights jurisprudence analysed above.  
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B. SATISFACTION 
 
Satisfaction is a non-monetary form of reparation for immaterial damage. In many cases, 
international tribunals have decided that condemnatory judgment may constitute satisfaction 
per se, since it provides victims with an official and binding decision as to the fact the victim 
has suffered a violation of his or her rights.216 Human rights bodies, however, have 
increasingly considered that in cases of gross human rights violations a judgment alone does 
not provide adequate reparation to victims: such violations demand compensation. Moreover, 
these bodies have required states to undertake specific measures to provide victims with 
satisfaction for the moral harm suffered. These actions may be grouped into three large 
categories according to their ultimate aim: (i) disclosure of the truth; (ii) apology and public 
acknowledgment of responsibility; (iii) accountability of those responsible for the violations.  
 
i. Disclosure of the Truth 
 
As observed above, one of the most important forms of reparation for victims of gross 
violations of human rights is the search for the truth. In the interpretation of human rights 
supervisory bodies, the truth as a measure of remedy is conceived as the right to a judicial 
search for truth and investigation. The affirmation of investigation into the facts surrounding 
the alleged violation as an element of victims’ right to remedy in instances of gross human 
rights violations is well-established in the practice of UN treaty bodies,217 the European Court 
of Human Rights218 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.219 The right to an 
investigation has been espoused by these bodies as an indispensable precondition for 
prosecuting those allegedly responsible for the violations, which, as will be illustrated in 
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Chapter III, is also emerging as an integral element of victims’ right to remedy. For instance, 
in a case concerning an alleged unlawful killing, the ECtHR found that 
[T]he notion of an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 entails, in addition to the payment of 
compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification 
and punishment of those responsible and including effective access for the relatives to the investigatory 
procedure.220 
Notably, in a number of cases, these organs have held that non-judicial bodies, such as truth 
commissions, cannot act as a substitute for this right, as they ‘cannot be considered as a 
suitable substitute for proper judicial procedures as a method for arriving at the truth’.221 
The importance of full disclosure of the truth as a form of remedy for victims is also 
illustrated by the fact that, in instances of gross human rights violations, some human rights 
bodies have used their remedial jurisdiction to order measures to that end. In cases of serious 
breaches of human rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has often directed states 
to ensure a full and public disclosure of the truth222 and, for instance, the identification of a 
deceased or disappeared person’s remains.223 Similarly, in a number of occasions, the African 
Commission of Human Rights, upon finding violations of human rights, has recommended 
the respondent state to investigate the circumstances of the violations with a view of 
identifying the persons responsible for them. For instance, in a disappearance case, the 
African Commission recommended the state to ‘arrange for the commencement of an 
independent enquiry in order to clarify the fate of the persons considered as disappeared, 
identify and bring to book the authors of the violations perpetrated at the time of the facts 
arraigned.’224  
In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights remains reluctant in indicating non-
monetary relief for applicants under Article 41. Even when it has done so, it has limited itself 
                                                 
220 ECtHR, Kaya v. Turkey, supra note no. 218, § 107; see also Keenan v. United Kingdom, supra note no. 91, § 
122; Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria (App. No. 90/1997/874/1086), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 28 
October 1998, § 117; Kurt v. Turkey (App. No. 23164/09), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 25 May 
1998, § 40. 
221 IAComHR, Case 10.488, Ignacio Ellacuría S.J. et al (El Salvador), 22 December 1999, § 229. 
222 IACtHR, Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala, supra note no. 96, § 253.8; Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, 
supra note no. 100, § 39.c; Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, supra note no. 213, §§ 69-70; Bámaca Velásquez v. 
Guatemala, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 22 February 2002, §§ 74-76; Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment 
(Merits), 14 March 2001, §§ 47-49. 
223 IACtHR, El Caracazo v. Venezuela, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 29 August 2002, §§ 121-125; 
Castillo Páez v. Peru, supra note no. 87, § 90; Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 27 
February 2002, § 91.a; Caballero-Delgado and Santana v. Colombia, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 29 
January 1997, § 66.4.  
224 AfrComHPR, Amnesty International v. Mauritania, supra note no. 163, 11 May 2000, recommendations, lit. 
1. 
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to ordering restitution,225 a measure that, as has been shown, is not adequate to deal with 
certain gross violations of human rights.  
 
ii. Apology and Public Acknowledgment 
 
Beyond the finding of facts, apology and public acknowledgment of the wrongful nature of 
the facts is also an essential part of victims’ reparation for gross violations of human rights. 
Thus far, however, only the Inter-American Court has ordered responsible states to issue 
official statements accepting responsibility and apologising.226 The responsible state, for 
instance, has been required to provide reparation to victims of gross human rights violations  
[B]y the execution of acts or works of a public nature or repercussion, which have effects such as recovering the 
memory of the victims, re-establishing their reputation, consoling their next of kin or transmitting a message of 
official condemnation of the human rights violations in question and commitment to the efforts to ensure that 
they do not happen again.’227 
Besides statements of acceptance of responsibility and expressions of regret by the 
responsible state, the Court has also ordered that its judgment be published in the local 
media228 or that public ceremonies be held, where victims officially receive awards of 
compensation and the state accepts responsibility and ‘make amends’ to the victims.229  
 
iii. Memorialisation 
 
Another important measure of acknowledging the wrongful conduct and the injuries suffered 
by victims is public commemoration. To this end, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
has determined that the state should construct monuments or name streets, schools, plazas, 
memorials or commemorative scholarships in honour of the victims’ memory. 
                                                 
225 ECtHR, Assanidze v. Georgia, supra note no. 134, 8 April 2004, § 203 (urging the respondent state to ‘secure 
the applicant’s release at the earliest date possible’). 
226 IACtHR, Durand and Ugarte, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 3 December 2001, § 39.b; Bámaca 
Velásquez v. Guatemala, supra note no. 222, § 106.3; Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 
30 November 2001, at § 44.  
227 IACtHR, Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala, supra note no. 173, § 84. 
228 IACtHR, Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia, supra note no. 223, § 119; Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note no. 226, § 44 
(d) and operative paragraph 5 d); Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, supra note no. 213, § 79; Durand and Ugarte v. 
Peru, supra note no. 226, § 39 a) and operative paragraph 3 a); Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, supra note no. 
222, § 84; El Caracazo v. Venezuela, supra note no. 223, § 128; Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, supra 
note no. 219, § 188.  
229 IACtHR, Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 
12 August 2008, § 249. 
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For instance, in the case of the Street Children, where five children were extra-
judicially executed, the Court ordered ‘to designate an educational center with a name allusive 
to the young victims in this case and to place in this center a plaque with the names’.230 In 
Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, a social activist was unlawfully killed and the Court 
ordered as a measure of reparation to ‘name a well-known street or square in Guatemala City 
in honor of Myrna Mack-Chang, and place a prominent plaque in her memory at the place 
where she died or nearby, with a reference to the activities she carried out’.231 In certain cases, 
the Court commended the state for undertaking efforts to memorialise the victims and gave 
specific directions as to how to better repair the harm suffered by the victims. For example, in 
Goiborù et al. v. Paraguay, after commending the Paraguayan government for dedicating a 
public square in honour of the victims of a series of forced disappearances, the Court 
observed that, to serve as a reparation, the State had to erect another monument including a 
plaque listing the victims’ names and the circumstances that led to their disappearances.232 
 
iv. Accountability of Individual Perpetrators 
 
Human rights bodies have increasingly indicated that states must prosecute those allegedly 
responsible of the violations as part of victims’ right to an effective remedy in cases of gross 
violations of human rights, such as in the case of violations of the right to life and to personal 
integrity. This issue will be the object of a separate analysis in Chapter III. 
 
                                                 
230 IACtHR, Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala, supra note no. 173, § 103. 
231 IACtHR, Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 25 November 2003, 
§ 286. See also La Cantuta v. Peru, supra note no. 137, § 236 (‘the State must ensure that, within the term of one 
year, the 10 individuals declared executed or forcefully disappeared victims in the instant case shall be 
represented in said memorial if they are not represented so far and provided their relatives so desire’); The 
Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 11 May 2007, § 277 (the Court 
ordered that a photographic gallery representing the victims of the massacre be installed in a ‘visible and 
dignified place’ in a courthouse); Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and 
Costs), 1 March 2005, §  196 (the Court ordered that the State to ‘designate a day dedicated to the children who, 
for different reasons, disappeared during the internal armed conflict’) 
232 IACtHR, Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 22 September 2006, §§ 174-
177. 
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
This Chapter has explored the gradual recognition of victim’s right to reparation in 
international law. As laid out at the beginning of this Chapter, international law traditionally 
considered the issue of reparation as an inter-state measure. Nonetheless, in the preceding 
decades a number of developments in different branches of international law have produced 
important changes in relation to the position of individuals as holders of a right to reparation 
for international wrongful acts.  
Specific provisions recognising an individual right to reparation have been included in 
all major human rights treaties, which have been widely ratified by states. Likewise, the 
creation of human rights supervisory bodies, both at the international and at the regional level, 
signals a broad acceptance of states obligations towards individuals. The jurisprudence of the 
International Court of Justice and the ILC Articles on State Responsibility support this trend. 
As discussed in this Chapter, in the recent judgment on reparation in the Diallo case, the ICJ 
determined the heads of damage and the quantum of compensation by referring to the 
jurisprudence of human rights bodies and focussed on the position of the injured individual, 
rather than on the wronged state. As Judge Cançado-Trindade observed in his Separate 
Opinion to judgment, ‘[t]he subject of the rights violated in the cas d’esp ce was a human 
being, Mr. A.S. Diallo, not a State. Likewise, the subject of the corresponding right to 
reparation is a human being, Mr. A.S. Diallo, not a State.’233 
It remains true, however, that whereas individuals enjoy an enforceable right to claim 
and obtain redress in the treaty-based framework of international human rights law, whether 
individuals also hold this right outside that framework remains questionable. In particular, 
whether individuals have a right to reparation for violations of the laws and customs of war 
remains much contested among legal scholars and in domestic practice, whereby the duty to 
compensate as expressed in international humanitarian law treaties has been often interpreted, 
although with certain exceptions, as an inter-state obligation to be settled between states that 
does not give rise to any subsequent obligation of the wronged state to distribute damages to 
individual victims. This interpretation has also been confirmed by the recent decision of the 
ICJ in the Germany v. Italy case, whereby the majority of the Court found that: 
                                                 
233 ICJ, Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, Compensation Judgment, supra 
note no. 59, § 5. 
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Where the State receiving funds as part of what was intended as a comprehensive settlement in the aftermath of 
an armed conflict has elected to use those funds to rebuild its national economy and infrastructure, rather than 
distributing them to individual victims amongst its nationals, it is difficult to see why the fact that those 
individuals had not received a share in the money should be a reason for entitling them to claim against the State 
that had transferred money to their State of nationality.234 
Therefore, at this stage, the access of individuals to state reparation outside the treaty-
based framework of human rights does not seem to be entrenched in a rule of general 
international law, although certain scholars235 and judicial bodies have supported such 
view.236  Given the rapidly evolving legal framework and case law on the right to reparation, 
however, it is not unrealistic to expect that an individual right to reparation under general 
international law is likely to emerge in the coming years under the auspices of a growing 
number of legal documents asserting such a right, such as the 2005 UN Basic Principles on 
the Right to Reparation and the case law of judicial bodies, both at the national and 
international level. 
Apart from the progressive affirmation of a right to reparation for individuals and 
groups victims of international wrongful acts under general international law, this Chapter has 
also discussed the emergence of a distinct redress regime for victims of serious violations of 
human rights. Indeed, the case law of human rights supervisory bodies indicates that there is 
an emerging consensus in relation to the elements of reparation for victims of serious 
violations of human rights. Despite the differences in the formulation of the relevant redress 
provisions, judicial and quasi-judicial bodies are developing a similar practice with regard to 
the contents of the duty of states to provide victims with an effective remedy. Furthermore, 
these bodies have also been able to further elaborate the content of victims’ reparation 
through their remedial jurisdiction, which gives them the power to award (or at least to 
recommend) reparation to individuals where they find a violation of a convention right.  
The remedial jurisdiction of human rights supervisory bodies is particularly important 
in cases of gross human rights violations; indeed, in such cases, human rights bodies have 
used this power to direct states to undertake specific measures to repair the harm suffered by 
victims. As discussed in this Chapter, the contents of the right to reparation vary according to 
                                                 
234 ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, supra note no. 17, § 102. 
235 C. Evans, The Right to Reparation in International Law for Victims of Armed Conflict, supra note no. 120, at 
125-128. 
236 According to the IACtHR, Art. 63(1) ACHR codifies a rule of customary law. See Aloeboetoe et al. v. 
Suriname, supra note no. 140, § 43; Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Order Assigning Matter to the Pre-Trial 
Judge, El Sayed, President, 15 April 2010, § 20, affirming that ‘The right of access to justice (and the 
consequential right to be afforded judicial remedy) for the protection of one’s rights is part of international 
customary law.’ 
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the circumstances of the violation. Although the principle of restitutio in integrum acts as a 
reference, in the context of gross and systematic violations it may often be impossible to undo 
the harm suffered by victims, or restitution may even produce undesirable results; 
furthermore, compensation alone has often been considered inadequate to repair the harm 
suffered. For this reason, it has been argued that a distinct redress regime is emerging for this 
type of violations.  
This regime distinguishes itself from the traditional approaches to reparation for the 
particular emphasis which is placed upon pecuniary (compensation) and non-pecuniary 
(satisfaction) reparation for immaterial damage. Immaterial damage is especially relevant in 
cases of gross violations of human rights, which may cause both serious physical and mental 
harm of victims and their relatives, as well as harm to the dignity and reputation of the 
victims.237  
In relation to physical and mental harm, human rights bodies have found that states are 
under the duty to provide victims and their relatives with monetary compensation, often 
calculated on the basis of equity. Moreover, in such cases, harm suffered by victims’ next of 
kin is presumed on the basis of the gravity of the violation suffered and need not to be proven 
by the claimants. Injuries to the dignity of victims are instead repaired through the 
performance of other obligations which satisfy the needs and expectations of victims in the 
aftermath of gross violations, including the establishment of the truth, the public 
acknowledgment of the wrongfulness character of the fact, the memorialisation of the victims 
and, as Chapter III will discuss in detail, the criminal accountability of those responsible for 
the violations.  
As noted above, the remedial jurisdiction of human rights supervisory bodies has been 
essential for the affirmation of this distinct redress regime. In this framework, the cautious 
approach maintained by the European Court of Human Rights with regard to its remedial 
jurisdiction under Article 41 of the ECHR appears today not only inadequate to properly 
address gross human rights violations, but also inconsistent with its practice on the right to 
effective remedy. Whereas the Court has indicated that compensation alone does not 
constitute a sufficient remedy for gross violations of human rights under Article 13, it has 
often limited itself to ordering only this form of reparation pursuant to Article 41. In other 
                                                 
237 The fundamental nature of reparation for immaterial damage was recently expressed by Judge Cançado 
Trindade, in his Separate Opinion in the Diallo case cited above: ‘On the basis of my own experience of 
magistrate serving successively two international jurisdictions, that of the IACtHR and then of the ICJ, I 
attribute particular importance to reparations for moral damages. In some cases, of particular gravity, I dare to 
say that they prove to be even more significant or meaningful to the victims than those for pecuniary damages, or 
indemnizations.’ (supra note no. 233, § 80). 
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words, the Court has never used its remedial jurisdiction to order reparation other than in the 
form of compensation, declaratory relief and restitution, measures that, as the Court itself has 
recognised, can only partially repair the harm suffered by victims of gross human rights 
violations.  
Arguably, the progressive affirmation of a ‘symbolic’ dimension of reparation is likely 
to influence the future interpretation of the Court’s remedial power. A broader interpretation 
of the Court’s remedial jurisdiction will not only bring this body in line with its universal and 
regional counterparts, but will also ensure that victims of gross human rights violations 
ultimately receive adequate reparation for the serious harm suffered.
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 Chapter II 
 
The Concept of Victim in Situations of Gross Human Rights 
Violations and International Crimes 
 
1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
In situations characterised by systematic and gross human rights violations or in the case of an 
armed conflict a large number of people may potentially be affected, all of whom would in 
principle be entitled to be recognised as ‘victims’. A tension may, however, arise when the 
recognition of victim status is associated with certain rights such as the right to have locus 
standi in judicial proceedings or the right to claim reparation.  In particular, the large number 
of persons involved may overwhelm the limited capacity of the competent fora. As such, 
before discussing the challenges of affording justice and reparation to victims in the context 
of gross human rights violations and international crimes, it is first necessary to clarify who 
are the subjects belonging to this category. 
The aim of this Chapter is to determine who is eligible to exercise rights as victims or 
injured persons among the often substantial number of people potentially affected by gross 
violations of human rights and international crimes. Whilst identifying those eligible to 
exercise rights in seeking reparation inevitably varies from case to case, it is submitted that it 
nonetheless possible to identify a general framework to determine the recipients of rights in 
the context of gross human rights violations and international crimes.  In other words, a 
conceptualisation of victimhood in mass victimisation can be elaborated.  
Arguably, this conceptualisation needs to be construed on the basis of how the concept 
of victim has arisen in international law and, more specifically, in those branches which are 
more relevant to mass victimisation, namely international humanitarian law (‘IHL’), 
international human rights law (‘IHRL’) and international criminal law (‘ICL’). Whereas an 
authoritative definition of victim that can be applied across the international legal order does 
not exist, these three bodies of law have contributed considerably to the development of this 
concept within their respective areas. Moreover, these three disciplines, because of the 
intrinsic similarities between the violations they deal with, have often referred to each other’s 
elaboration of the concept of victim. 
This Chapter argues that the increasing cross-pollination between these branches of 
international law with respect to the identification of the subjects entitled to rights has 
contributed to the emergence of a shared definition of victim, centred on the concept of 
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‘harm’. This view is also supported by the fact that recent international instruments on 
victims’ rights have substantially upheld this shared definition. However, since the 
recognition of victims’ rights may have a considerably different impact (for instance, on 
others’ rights, on the efficiency of the mechanisms of enforcement of those rights, and so 
forth) within the various bodies of law, the concept of victim cannot be applied in a 
procrustean way. Rather, in this Chapter, it will be argued that this concept has to be 
interpreted functionally, that is to say according to which rights are conditioned upon the 
qualification of an individual as a victim. 
With a view to identifying the main components of the emerging shared definition of 
the victim in international law this Chapter first analyses how the concept of victim has been 
conceptualised and applied in the distinct branches of international law indicated above. 
Following this analysis, it will be discussed how the emerging shared definition may be read 
as identifying different categories of victims thereby allowing a functional application of the 
definition, which is essential to effectively realise victims’ rights in cases of mass 
victimisation.  
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2 THE CONCEPT OF VICTIM IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
International humanitarian law has traditionally adopted a broad, situation-oriented approach 
towards the concept of victim. This liberal approach is grounded in the very spirit of IHL 
which aims to protect all those persons not directly participating in hostilities that are affected 
by armed conflicts, not only those who suffered harm as a result of a violation of the jus in 
bello. In other words, IHL is intended to attenuate the harmful effects of conflicts as far as 
possible: in this way the need to broaden the understanding of the concept of victim becomes 
clear. 
The history of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols describes how a 
gradually broader group of victims has obtained this particular status under international 
humanitarian law. Generally speaking, the term ‘victim’ can be understood as indicating all 
people IHL seeks to protect in the event of international or non-international armed conflict, 
regardless of their conduct and whether or not a violation of law has been committed against 
them.1 For instance, the First Geneva Convention of 1949 protects wounded enemy soldiers, 
although it is not forbidden to wound enemy soldiers. Similarly, the Third Geneva 
Convention protects captured enemy soldiers even though the capture of enemy soldiers is a 
lawful act of war. It should also be noted that under Article 81(1)-(3) of Additional Protocol I 
(‘AP I’) and Article 18(1) of Additional Protocol II (‘AP II’),2 the International Committee of 
the Red Cross acts ‘in favour of the victims of the conflict’; the latter include without 
distinction all persons caught up in a conflict, and not only those who suffered from a specific 
violation of IHL.  
                                                 
1 M. Sassòli, ‘Victims of Armed Conflicts and of Internal Strife and Tension’, in M.C Bassiouni, International 
Protection of Victims (Érès: Association Internationale de Droit Pénale, 1988) 147-180, at 151-152. 
2 Art. 81 AP I provides that: ‘The Parties to the conflict shall grant to the International Committee of the Red 
Cross all facilities, within their power so as to enable it to carry out the humanitarian functions assigned to it by 
the Conventions and this Protocol in order to ensure protection and assistance to the victims of conflicts; the 
International Committee of the Red Cross may also carry out any other humanitarian activities in favour of these 
victims, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned. 
2. The Parties to the conflict shall grant to their respective Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) 
organizations the facilities necessary for carrying out their humanitarian activities in favour of the victims of the 
conflict, in accordance with the provisions of the Conventions and this Protocol and the fundamental principles 
of the Red Cross as formulated by the International Conferences of the Red Cross. 
3. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall facilitate in every possible way the assistance 
which Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations and the League of Red Cross Societies extend 
to the victims of conflicts in accordance with the provisions of the Conventions and this Protocol and with the 
fundamental principles of the red Cross as formulated by the International Conferences of the Red Cross.’ 
(Emphasis added). 
Art. 18 AP II provides that: ‘Relief societies located in the territory of the High Contracting Party, such as Red 
Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations may offer their services for the performance of their 
traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed conflict. The civilian population may, even on its 
own initiative, offer to collect and care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.’ (Emphasis added). 
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For this reason, it has been aptly pointed out that the concept of ‘war victims’ could 
also be understood as the entire population of the countries at war.3 Such a broad definition of 
victim is not explicitly set out in any legal document, although, as observed above, it may be 
inferred from the object and purpose of this body of law: the protection of war victims (in the 
broadest sense possible). 
The category of war victims has nonetheless to be distinguished from those persons 
who have been personally harmed by a violation of IHL. Humanitarian law does not 
specifically deal with this smaller category of victims despite the fact that it is only to them 
that international legal instruments grant the right to remedy and reparation. This gap has 
been filled by the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Restitution, 
Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (‘UN Basic Principles’), which define 
victims as follows: 
[V]ictims are persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, 
emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or 
omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.4  
Accordingly, the UN Basic Principles identify four categories of victims: (i) 
individuals who have suffered direct harm as a result of a violation of human rights law or 
international humanitarian law; (ii) immediate family or dependents who suffered harm as a 
result of the primary victimisation, for example material loss as a result of the death of a next 
of kin, serious injury of the primary income earner, or emotional suffering from the death of a 
relative resulting from a primary violation; (iii) individuals who have been injured while 
intervening to prevent victimisation of others; and (iv) collective victims.5 It is remarkable 
that these Principles link the concept of victim to the entitlement to reparation. Indeed, the 
                                                 
3 L. Zegveld, ‘Remedies for Victims of Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, 85 International Review 
of the Red Cross (2003) 493-526, at 501. 
4 UN General Assembly (‘GA’), Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and 
Rehabilitation, for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, UN Doc. A/RES/60/147, 16 December 2005, § 8. Principle V goes on to state that: ‘Where 
appropriate, and in accordance with domestic law, the term “victim” also includes the immediate family or 
dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or 
to prevent victimization.’  
5 Note that this definition largely replicates the one set out in UN GA, Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, UN Doc. A/RES/40/34, 29 November 1985, Principle A(1), (2) and 
(3).   
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concept of victim set out in the Basic Principles does not abstractly define victims of human 
rights and humanitarian law violations, but seeks to define who is entitled to reparation. 
Similarly, the recently adopted ‘Declaration of International Law Principles on 
Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict’, prepared by International Law Association 
(‘ILA’), defines victims as persons who are harmed by violations of IHL.6 However, unlike 
the UN Basic Principles, which only refer to serious violations of IHL, this Declaration does 
not set such a threshold of gravity for its applicability.7   
On the whole, the concept of victim entitled to rights under IHL is characterised by 
three main elements. First, a violation of international humanitarian law must have occurred. 
Second, the victim must have suffered harm (direct or indirect). Most importantly, for the 
concept of victim to acquire legal meaning (that is, to be associated with the exercising of 
rights), international humanitarian law poses an unconditional requirement: that the harm 
suffered by the victim be causally linked to a violation of the jus in bello. 
Unfortunately, this may sometimes frustrate the search for justice of those people who 
are affected by an armed conflict but who have not been injured by a violation of IHL. 
Indeed, since IHL does not deal with the legality of the conflict, individuals cannot claim 
reparation for breaches of the jus ad bellum. Indeed, to contend that a violation of the jus ad 
bellum entails a claim to reparation would be unrealistic, since every member of the 
population affected by the armed conflict is potentially a victim. This approach has been 
adopted by certain claims commissions (such as the United Nations Compensation 
Commission) that have awarded compensation to individual claimants for losses or damages 
ensuing from violation of jus ad bellum, independently of whether a violation of the jus in 
bello had also occurred.8 Nonetheless, such an approach has not been replicated in 
international and domestic practice. We can recall, in this regard, a judgment of 29 November 
2002 by the Dutch Supreme Court in which the judges stated that rules of IHL do not protect 
                                                 
6 ILA, Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflicts, Resolution 2/2010. Art. 4 provides as follows:  
‘1. For the purposes of this Declaration, the term “victim” means natural or legal persons who have suffered 
harm as a result of a violation of the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. 
2. This provision is without prejudice to the right of other persons – in particular those in a family or civil law 
relationship to the victim – to submit a claim on behalf of victims provided that there is a legal interest therein. 
This may be the case where the victim is a minor child, incapacitated or otherwise unable to claim reparation.’ 
7 See the commentary to Art. 4, ILA, ‘Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict’, The Hague Conference 
(2010), § 2. 
8 UN Security Council, Resolution 687, UN Doc. S/Res/687, 3 April 1991, entrusted the UNCC with 
adjudicating claims against Iraq for ‘any direct loss, damage — including environmental damage and the 
depletion of natural resources — or injury to foreign governments, nationals and corporations as a result of its 
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.’ (§ 16).  
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persons against stresses and tensions that are consequences of air strikes as such and do not 
protect persons with regard to whom the rules and norms of IHL have not been violated.9 
The right to invoke the rules of IHL is therefore confined to those who personally were 
the victims of violations of IHL. This is also the case of ‘collateral damage’ resulting from 
lawful conducts undertaken during an armed conflict. For example, if in the course of an air 
strike a civilian building is accidentally destroyed while attacking a lawful military objective - 
provided that all the necessary precautions have been taken and that the destruction is 
proportional to the military advantage gained - the harm sustained by the victim does not 
necessarily amount to a violation of a rule of IHL.  As such, from a strictly legal point of 
view, victims of the attack are not entitled to remedy and reparation.  
This approach has been adopted, inter alia, by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, 
although with some exceptions. Indeed, pursuant to Article 5 of the Agreement Between the 
Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State 
of Eritrea,  
The mandate of the Commission is to decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by 
one Government against the other, and by nationals (including both natural and juridical persons) of one party 
against the Government of the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other party that …(b) result 
from violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or other violations 
of international law.10 
As observed in Chapter I, individual victims did not have the right to bring claim before the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Commission11 although both states were entitled to bring claims on behalf of 
individuals. An analysis of the partial final awards of the Commission reveals that this body 
considered the unlawful character of an act as a precondition for the award of compensation. 
More precisely, the EECC determined that Eritrea was required to compensate Ethiopia, and 
vice versa, for harm and losses suffered by individuals as a result of violations of international 
humanitarian law. For instance, the Commission determined that Eritrea was required to 
compensate Ethiopia for violations of the jus in bello in respect of the violations including the 
intentional killings, beatings, wounding by small-arms fire, abductions, disappearances, 
forced labour, and conscription of Ethiopian civilians12 or the unlawful treatment of Ethiopian 
                                                 
9 Judgment cited in L. Zegveld, ‘Remedies for Victims of International Humanitarian Law’, supra note no. 3, at 
501-502. 
10 Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of 
the State of Eritrea, 12 December 2000, reproduced in 40  International Legal Materials (2001) 260-264.  
11 Chapter 1, Section 2.2. 
12 ECCC, Final Award, Ethiopia’s Damages Claims between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and 
the State of Eritrea, 17 August 2009, § 103.  
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POWs;13 likewise, Ethiopia was required to compensate Eritrea for violations of IHL such as 
the mistreatment of Eritrean POWs14 and the detention of Eritrean civilians under harsh and 
unacceptable conditions .15  
Therefore, even if not ruling on individual claims, the Commission substantially 
confirmed that individuals eligible for awards of compensation need to have suffered harm as 
a result a violation of IHL, as indicated above. In this respect, it remains doubtful whether the 
much criticised position taken by the Commission in its final awards, where it also granted 
compensation for damages resulting from the violation of the jus ad bellum by Eritrea,16 
notwithstanding that such possibility was not explicitly foreseen in the Agreement cited 
above, is sound law.  It is true, however, that the awards for jus ad bellum damages mostly 
related to losses suffered by the government (destruction of government warehouses and other 
property resulting from an Eritrean air raid or other operations by Eritrean forces,17 the 
expenses incurred by Ethiopia to care for the many thousands of Ethiopians internally 
displaced during the war)18 whereas claims concerning losses suffered by individual victims 
were rejected,19 thereby confirming that individuals may have a right to reparation only for 
violations of the jus in bello, and not of the jus ad bellum.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Ibid., § 213. 
14 ECCC, Final Award, Eritrea’s Damages Claims between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, 17 August 2009, §§  228-233.  
15 Ibid., § 376.  
16 ECCC, Final Award, Ethiopia’s Damages Claims between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and 
the State of Eritrea, supra note no. 12, at 61-103. 
17 Ibid., §§ 410, 419-420.  
18 Ibid., §§ 470-79. 
19 Examples include claims for deaths of Ethiopian POWs (Ibid., § 431), which were awarded compensation for 
violations of the jus in bello, but not of the jus ad bellum.  
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3 THE CONCEPT OF VICTIM IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
3.1 Preliminary Remarks 
 
The concept of victim is referred to in many international treaties for the protection of human 
rights. However, most of them do not describe how this concept ought to be interpreted.20 In 
other cases, human rights treaties presuppose the concept of victim and implicitly understand 
it as referring to the person whose rights have been violated. This is for example the case of 
Article 2(3) of the International Covenant of the Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) which 
refers to ‘any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated’ as the holder 
of the right to remedy.21 
Plainly, the interpretation of the concept of victim is one of the most crucial issues in 
the jurisprudence of human rights supervisory bodies which receive complaints of alleged 
violations by individuals and may, in some cases, award reparation. However, it should be 
noted at the outset that the concept of victim proper, understood as the person who directly 
suffered from the violation at issue, does not necessarily coincide with the individuals having 
right to locus standi or to claim reparation. In some systems, persons who are not entitled to 
the victim status may nonetheless be considered as ‘injured’ by the violation at issue and 
hence be entitled to exercise certain rights.22  
For this reason, the analysis in the following sub-sections will not be limited to the 
definition of victim proper but will cover all categories of injured parties who may exercise 
rights (to locus standi and to reparation) before international human rights bodies. After 
having defined the categories of victims under international human rights law this Chapter 
will then focus on the concept of harm, which is the main requirement for the concept of 
victim in this body of law.  
 
                                                 
20 Art. 9(5) ICCPR; Art. 14(1) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (‘CAT’); Art. 5(5) European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’); Art. 9(1) Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. However, some treaties are more explicit and define more clearly 
who is entitled to reparation. For instance, Article 16(4) of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 
(No. 169) of the International Labour Organization guarantees reparation for ‘peoples removed from land’ and 
Article 16(5) of the same Convention to ‘persons relocated.’ Article 21(2) African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (‘AfrCHPR’) speaks of ‘dispossessed people’ whose wealth and natural resources have been 
spoilt. 
21 See Art. 6 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Art. 2 Optional 
Protocol to Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women; Article 13 CAT; 
Article 13 and Article 34 ECHR; Definition 33 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (‘IACtHR’). 
22 See infra Section 3.2.2.  
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3.2 Categories of Victims 
 
Important scholarly works in victimology have conceptualised victimhood by classifying 
victims into three categories: primary, secondary and tertiary victims.23 Primary victims are 
understood as those individuals who suffered harm as a direct consequence of the violation at 
issue. Secondary (or indirect) victims are generally understood as the dependants or next of 
kin of the direct victims (as also set out in the UN Basic Principles mentioned above). A 
special group of indirect victims are second-generation victims. In the context of the 
Holocaust, for example, special attention was given to second-generation victims and the 
effect the trauma suffered by their parents had on them.24 Tertiary victims include all those 
individuals not falling in the two previous categories but who nonetheless feel victimised by 
the violations. The following sub-sections will analyse how these three categories have been 
interpreted by human rights supervisory bodies and which rights are conditioned upon each 
category.  
 
3.2.1 Direct Victims  
 
 
Most human rights treaties do not require victim status as a precondition for the exercise of 
rights, including access to justice and reparation. Rather, human rights supervisory bodies that 
have jurisdiction over individual petitions generally accept that all individuals who have been 
affected by a violation may bring a complaint, have legal standing in the proceedings and may 
have a right to reparation. Direct victims are certainly part of this group which, nonetheless, 
may also include persons who have been indirectly harmed by the violation.  
In that respect these bodies accept that it is not necessary to show that the complainant 
suffered any specific prejudice or damage to exercise rights. Consequently, in certain cases 
the mere existence of laws or administrative acts putting an individual right at risk is 
sufficient to show that the complainant as a victim. Indeed, one of the essential features of the 
jurisprudence and practice of human rights bodies is the concept of ‘potential’ or 
‘prospective’ victims or, more precisely, victims claiming a potential violation of an 
individual right. Essentially, a potential victim is a person who is at risk of being directly 
affected by a violation.  
                                                 
23 R. Letschert and T. van Boven, ‘Providing Reparation in Situations of Mass Victimization. Key Challenges 
Involved’, in R. Letschert, R. Haveman, A-M de Brouwer and A. Pemberton (eds), Victimological Approaches 
to International Crimes: Africa (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2011) 153-184, at 161.  
24 See various contributions in Y. Danieli (ed.), International Handbook of Multigenerational Legacies of 
Trauma (New York: Plenum Publishers, 1998). 
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As a matter of fact, the concept of victim in human rights treaties has assumed vital 
importance, especially in cases brought by individuals complaining against legislative, 
administrative or judicial acts that have the potential to violate their rights. There is, indeed, a 
growing body of case law, albeit not uncontested,25 holding that an individual may claim to be 
a victim when the law or act has not yet been applied to him or her but will be applied in the 
near future.26 According to established case law, for example, a person’s expulsion or 
extradition may give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the ECHR where there are serious 
reasons to believe that in the receiving state he or she will subjected to treatment contrary to 
that provision.27 
In this respect, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights represents an exception, in 
that it only alleged victims or their representatives have locus standi in judicio.28 However, it 
must be observed that the Court has progressively adopted a broad interpretation of the 
concept of victim and, consequently, of those individuals having right to participation in the 
proceedings. Even though the right to participate in all the stages of the proceedings before 
the Court is not granted to indirect victims the Court has recognised that for certain violations 
victims’ next of kin may have locus standi.  
This expanded concept developed first in cases of disappearance29 and later in cases of 
arbitrary killings.30 In Blake v. Guatemala, a case involving the disappearance of two 
American journalists, the Court held that the disappearance of the journalists ‘generate[d] 
suffering and anguish [to their parents], in addition to a sense of insecurity, frustration and 
impotence in the face of the public authorities’ failure to investigate.’31 The relatives of Mr. 
Blake were also considered autonomous victims of a violation of Article 8 of the ACHR as a 
                                                 
25 For example, in Ruby Smith v. UK, a Gypsy claimed to be affected by laws that made it a criminal offence for 
Gypsies to camp in certain areas. The European Commission of Human Rights (‘EComHR’) declared the 
application inadmissible by holding that, while in principle Article 8 aims at protecting the traditional lifestyle of 
a minority, the applicant failed to establish that ‘the measure complained of has a real and direct effect on his or 
her pursuit of that lifestyle.’ EComHR, Ruby Smith v. UK (App. No. 18401/91), Decision on Admissibility, 6 
May 1993. 
26 One of the first complaints of this sort was raised in a complaint against Denmark. The two applicants 
complained that, by making sex education compulsory in public schools, the Danish government had violated 
the parents’ right to educate their children in conformity with their religious and philosophical convictions, 
pursuant to Article 2 of the 1st Protocol of the Convention. The Commission declared the complaints admissible, 
although the legislation had not yet been applied to the particular applicants or their daughter. EComHR, 
Kjeldsen et al. v. Denmark (App. Nos. 5095/71, 5920/72, 5926/72), Decision on Admissibility, 21 March 1975. 
27 E.g., ECtHR, Soering v. United Kingdom (App. No 14038/88), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 7 July 
1989. 
28 Art. 25 IACtHR Rules of Procedure.  
29 In Castillo Páez v. Peru, the IACtHR considered the next of kin as the victim of a violation of the right to 
judicial guarantees; see Castillo Páez v. Peru, Judgment (Merits), 3 November 1997, §§ 80-84. 
30 IACtHR, Villagrán Morales et al v. Guatemala, Judgment (Merits), 19 November 1999, §§ 172-177.  
31 IACtHR, Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment (Merits), 24 January 1998, §§ 114-116. 
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result of an undue delay in the administration of justice which violated their right to have the 
perpetrators of the crime against their relative investigated and prosecuted and to be 
compensated accordingly for the harm suffered.32  
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that in relation to cases of arbitrary detention or 
inhuman treatment victims’ next of kin have been recognised simply as injured parties 
entitled to claim reparations (as will be illustrated in the next sub-section) but not to locus 
standi in judicio. The rationale underpinning this distinction between violations may lie in the 
idea that whenever direct victims of a violation survive the violation itself (such as, most 
often, in cases of arbitrary detention or inhuman treatment), they have the right to access to 
justice on their own, while their next of kin may be entitled to reparations as injured parties. 
Arguably, if the direct victim is able to act as a party in the litigation before the Court there is 
no real motive for allowing his or her next of kin to take part in the proceedings. On the 
contrary, when the direct victim did not survive the violation their next of kin may be allowed 
to exercise their right of locus standi (in a way, also on behalf of direct victims), separately 
from obtaining reparations as victims for the harm suffered as a result of the primary 
victimisation inflicted on their relatives.  
 
 
3.2.2 Indirect Victims 
 
As mentioned above, human rights supervisory bodies generally permit indirect victims to 
exercise the same rights as direct victims, adopting a broad understanding of the concept of 
victim. This is a crucial issue especially in cases of gross human rights violations where the 
group of people affected may conceivably include a large number of persons other than the 
direct victims.  As such, construing an appropriate concept of victim becomes essential to 
ensure meaningful protection of those affected by violations and effective recognition of their 
rights. Accordingly, these bodies have often allowed indirect victims to exercise rights even if 
they did not suffer the violation of an individual right.   
As far back as 1970 the former European Commission on Human Rights defined the 
term ‘victim’ as including ‘not only the direct victim or victims of the alleged violation, but 
also any person who would indirectly suffer prejudice as a result of such violation or who 
would have a valid personal interest in securing the cessation of such violation.’33 The 
European Court recognises that a right of complaint, pursuant to Article 34 of the Convention, 
                                                 
32 Ibid., § 97.   
33 EComHR, X v. Federal Republic of Germany (App. No. 4185/69), Decision, 13 July 1970. 
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and a right to reparation, in the sense of Article 41, applies to indirect victims.34 Indirect 
victims have also been recognised locus standi in judicio and the right to reparation before the 
African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘AfrComHPR)’. For instance, in the 
Mauritania case, the Commission held that ‘compensatory benefit’ should be paid to the 
widows and beneficiaries of victims of disappearances and killings.35  
In general terms, indirect victims are those individuals who suffered harm as a result 
of a link with the direct victim. The most obvious examples of indirect victims are family 
members and dependants of direct victims such as the spouse of a person who has been 
disappeared. Who may be considered an indirect victim may vary considerably in relation to 
the cultural context where the violation occurred. Where in western societies indirect victims 
are mostly limited to members of the nuclear family a broader family conception may be 
applied elsewhere.36 Taking into account the developments in customary international law and 
the case-law both at the international and domestic level, the ILA Committee on Reparation 
for Victims of Armed Conflict observed that: 
It is the suffering of harm which qualifies these third persons as victims it sees no compelling reason to a priori 
restrict this group of third persons to members of the ‘immediate family’, ‘dependants’, or ‘persons who have 
suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization’ as done in the Basic 
Principles.37  
In order to illustrate the connection between the harm suffered and the violation the 
Committee further suggested that two considerations should guide the decision: [F]irst the 
need to exclude harm that is too remote (such as e.g. unrelated persons far removed from the 
conflict who are emotionally affected by news of the suffering); and second, the need not to 
unduly limit the number of victims. The two aspects should be balanced carefully.’37bis  
Likewise, the 2008 UN Report on Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States argues that 
setting out a high threshold would leave out many victims: 
                                                 
34 See e.g., ECtHR, Çakici v Turkey (App.No. 23657/94), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 8 July 1999, 
§§ 123-133. 
35 AfrComHPR, Malawi African Association, Amnesty International, Ms Sarr Diop, Union interafricaine des 
droits de l'Homme and RADDHO, Collectif des veuves et ayants-Droit, Association mauritanienne des droits de 
l'Homme v. Mauritania (Comm. Nos. 54/91-61/91-96/93-98/93-164/97-196/97-210/98), 11 May 2000, 
Recommendations. 
36 For instance, in the Aloeboetoe case, the IACtHR recognised multiple wives as being entitled to compensation. 
IACtHR, Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment (Reparations), 10 September 1993, §§ 17, 66 and 97-98. 
37 ILA, ‘Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict’, The Hague Conference (2010), at 10.  
37bis Ibid., at 11. 
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The requirements for qualifying as a beneficiary should be sensitive not just to the needs of victims ... , but also 
to their possibilities. The more demanding the evidentiary requirements, the more false claims will be excluded; 
but so will perfectly legitimate claims, preventing the programme from achieving completeness.38 
In cases of gross human rights violations human rights supervisory bodies have also 
found that indirect victims may themselves be considered victims of a violation of individual 
rights. For instance the Human Rights Committee in the Almeida de Quinteros case found that 
the mother of a disappeared person was a victim herself of torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment prohibited by in Article 7 of the ICCPR because of ‘the anguish and 
stress caused to the mother by the disappearance of her daughter and by the continuing 
uncertainty concerning her fate and whereabouts’.39 Similarly, the Committee has held that 
other gross human rights violations, like unlawful killings, cause suffering to both direct and 
indirect victims.40  
In the same vein, since the judgment in the Kurt v. Turkey case, the European Court of 
Human Rights has recognised that the relatives of a disappeared person can be considered 
victims of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment guaranteed in Article 
3 of the ECHR, provided that the harm they claim to have suffered is distinct from the 
emotional distress inevitably caused to a relative of a victim of gross human rights 
violations.41 In order to evaluate the suffering of indirect victims the Court has taken into 
account criteria such as the proximity of the family tie, the extent to which the family member 
witnessed the events in question and the involvement of the family members in the attempts 
to obtain information about the alleged violations.42 Furthermore, the Court considers that 
                                                 
38 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Reparations 
(New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2008), at 18. 
39 HRC: Almeida de Quinteros et al v. Uruguay (Comm. No. 107/1981), UN Doc. CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981, 21 
July 1983, §§14, 16; see also Laureano v. Peru (Comm. No. 540/1993), UN Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993, 25 
March 1996, § 10; Jegatheeswara Sarma v. Sri Lanka (Comm. No. 950/2000), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000, 16 July 2003, § 11; José Antonio Coronel et al. v Colombia (Comm. No. 778/1997), 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/778/1997, 24 October 2002, § 10. Similarly, the Working Group on Enforced and 
Involuntary Disappearances has stated that ‘in addition to the victims who survived the disappearance, their 
families are also entitled to compensation for the suffering during the time of the disappearance, and in the event 
of the death of the victim, his or her dependants are entitled to compensation’. Working Group on Enforced and 
Involuntary Disappearances, General Comment on Article 19 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, UN Doc. E/CN.4 /1998/43, 12 January 1998, § 72. 
40 HRC, Suárez de Guerrero v. Colombia (Comm. No. R.11/45), UN Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979, 31 March 
1982, § 15; John Khemraadi Baboeram et al. v Suriname (Comm. Nos. 146/1983 and 148 to 154/1983), UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/24/D/146/1983, 4 April 1985, § 16. 
41 ECtHR, Kurt v. Turkey (App. No. 23164/09), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 25 May 1998, §§ 71-
76. 
42 For a critical review of the criteria used by the ECtHR to identify indirect victims in cases of serious human 
rights violations, see T. Feldman, ‘Indirect Victims, Direct Injury: Recognizing Relatives As Victims Under The 
European Human Rights System’, 1 European Human Rights Law Review (2009) 50-69.  
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relatives may claim to be a direct victim of the authorities’ negligent conduct when the 
alleged violation is brought to their attention.43 
Plainly, as stated above, no difference exists (at least procedurally) between being 
recognised as the direct or indirect victim before these bodies. As such, the pronouncements 
mentioned above may eventually influence the award of reparation but not the role that 
individuals may play in the proceedings. Notably, in Aksoy v. Turkey the Court awarded just 
satisfaction to the father of the victim, not only for the suffering of his son but also on account 
of his own suffering, even though it did not consider him as a victim of any violation of 
Conventional rights.44 Similarly, in Çakici v. Turkey the Court held that, although the 
claimant, a relative of a disappeared person, was not himself victim of a violation of the 
Convention, ‘he was undoubtedly affected by the violations found by the Court and may be 
regarded as an “injured party” for the purposes of Article 41.’ Moreover, the Court ‘[h]aving 
regard to the gravity of the violations and to equitable considerations’, awarded non-
pecuniary damages to the applicant.45 
Conversely, a difference remains in the system of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights where indirect victims, defined as ‘injured parties’, may be entitled to reparation under 
Article 63 of the ACHR but not, as observed above, to locus standi in judicio. The IACtHR 
laid down the foundations for interpreting the concept of ‘injured party’ in Velásquez 
Rodríguez v. Honduras
46 where the direct victim’s wife and children were recognised as 
injured parties for the purposes of reparation. The Court did not explicitly set out the 
principles for the identification of injured parties; nevertheless, a careful reading of the 
judgment on reparations reveals that the concept of injured party adopted by the Court has 
two elements: (i) generally speaking, it includes those persons who are entitled to receive 
reparation from the Court, pursuant to Article 63(1) of ACHR; and (ii) more specifically, the 
concept refers both to victims and to those people who are not victims of the violation, but 
nonetheless suffered harm as a result of the violation on others, and are as such entitled to 
reparations (such as Manfredo Rodriguez’s next of kin).47  
The Court has also established that a ‘presumption juris tantum’ applies to the parents 
and the children of the direct victims meaning that they must always be considered indirect 
                                                 
43 ECtHR, Çakici v. Turkey, supra note no. 34, § 98. 
44 ECtHR, Aksoy v. Turkey (App. No. 21987/93), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 18 December 1996, § 
113. 
45 Çakici v. Turkey, supra note no. 34, § 130; Aktaş v. Turkey (App. No. 24351/94), Judgment (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction), 24 April 2003, § 364. 
46 See IACtHR, Velázquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (Reparation and Costs), 21 July 1989. 
47 Ibid., § 53. 
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victims. In this respect the Court has held that ‘it can be presumed that the parents have 
suffered morally as a result of the cruel death of their offspring, for it is essentially human for 
all persons to feel pain at the torment of their child.’48 Over the years, the concept of injured 
party has been interpreted broadly as the Court has deliberately avoided defining the term 
itself.  As a result of this indeterminacy the Court has afforded itself considerable room for 
manoeuvre and been able to extend its protection to all those persons who may potentially 
suffer harm as a result of a gross human rights violations who are otherwise excluded from 
the category of victims.49  
3.2.3 Collective Victims 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, in situations where gross violations of 
human rights or international crimes have occurred, a large number of individuals, besides 
direct victims and their relatives and dependants, may feel victimised by these violations. 
These individuals are known in victimology as ‘tertiary victims’50 and may potentially 
include the whole population of a society where mass atrocities have taken place. Mass 
victimisation may pose great challenges as to how to adequately address harm suffered by 
large numbers of people. In this respect, it may be helpful to resort to collective redress and 
collective forms of reparation for groups of victims or victimised communities.  
The concept of collective victims may include groups of individuals linked by bonds 
such as ethnicity, language or religion that have been victimized.51 Collective victims can also 
include a group of individuals, not linked by any bond, who have suffered a common 
violation such as in the case of gross human rights violations  
The right of groups of victims or victimised communities to present collective claims 
and to receive collective reparation has been included in a number of international legal 
documents. For instance, the Basic Principles mentioned above refer the right of groups of 
victims to have access to justice and to reparation in addition to the individual’s right to 
reparation. The Preamble of the Principles explicitly affirms that ‘contemporary forms of 
victimisation, while essentially directed against persons, may nevertheless also be directed 
                                                 
48 IACtHR, Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, supra note no. 36, § 76. See contra, La Cantuta v. Peru, Judgment 
(Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 29 November 2006, §§ 216-220; see also Concurring Opinion in the 
Interpretation of the Judgment in the case of La Cantuta v. Peru by Judge Cançado Trinidade, §§ 44, 46. 
49 As Judge Cançado Trinidade pointed out: ‘The Court arrived at an understanding of the term ‘injured party’ as 
a more ample concept than that of victim’. Concurring Opinion of Judge Cançado Trinidade, supra note no. 48, 
§ 61. 
50 R. Letschert and T. van Boven, ‘Providing Reparation in Situations of Mass Victimization. Key Challenges 
Involved’, supra note no. 23, at 162. 
51 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘The Protection of “Collective Victims” in International Law’, in Id. (ed.), International 
Protection of Victims, supra note no. 1, 181-198. 
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against groups of persons who are targeted collectively.’52 Similarly, the Updated Set of 
Principle to Protect and Promote Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity 
(‘Principles on Impunity’) refer to individuals and communities to whom reparations may be 
addressed.53  
This having been said, neither the UN Basic Principles nor the Principles on Impunity 
specify the meaning and the form of collective reparation. In this respect, the jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which, in a number of cases, has dealt with the 
issue of collective reparation proves instructive. For instance, in Moiwana v. Suriname, the 
Court held that:  
Given that the victims of the present case are members of the N’duka culture, this Tribunal considers that the 
individual reparations to be awarded must be supplemented by communal measures; said reparations will be 
granted to the community as a whole.54 
Furthermore, the Court has also established that in cases of massacres or widespread 
disappearances it is competent to adopt a flexible approach to the evaluation of the status of 
the injured party which may result in reparations being made to communities rather than to 
specific individuals. For instance, in the Massacre of Plan de Sánchez v. Guatemala case the 
Court held that the victims of the violations were not only those persons listed by the 
Commission it its application, but also ‘those that may be subsequently identified’55 and 
reserved the right to determine other forms of reparation in favour of all the members of the 
community affected by the facts of the case.  
Plainly, the forms of reparations awarded to collective victims do not, by definition, 
aim at repairing individual harm. Collective forms of reparation awarded to victimised groups 
or communities include symbolic reparations such as public apology, the accountability of the 
offenders and setting up of memorials, as will be discussed in Chapter III.   
 
 
                                                 
52 UN Basic Principles, supra note no. 4, Preamble.  
53 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat 
Impunity, Diane Orentlicher; Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, Principle 32.  
54 IACtHR, Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs), 15 June 2005, § 194. 
55 IACtHR, Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment (Merits), 29 April 2004, §§ 47-48; Plan de 
Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 19 November 2004, §§ 62, 86; see also 
Moiwana v. Suriname, supra note no. 54, § 178; Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment (Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), 28 November 2007, § 189. 
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3.3 The Concept of Harm 
 
 The idea of harm is central to the concept of victim. Indeed, as illustrated in the preceding 
sections, the exercise of rights before international human rights bodies requires that 
individuals have suffered harm either directly, indirectly or collectively. It is generally agreed 
that any violation of this body of law entails harm for the person who suffered the violation; 
in other words, the ‘substantial impairment of their [the victims] fundamental rights’56 is 
considered a category of harm per se, aside from material, physical or moral damage. This is 
consistent with the obligation to provide reparation arising out of the breach of an 
international obligation, as discussed in Chapter I. Indeed, state responsibility arises directly 
from a breach of international law, such as a breach of an obligation under international 
human rights law, and not from the consequences of such a breach.57 Nonetheless, the 
question of harm remains critical for the entitlement and the modalities of reparation.  
In international human rights law, like in many domestic systems, two broad 
categories of harm can be distinguished, namely pecuniary and non-pecuniary harm. The 
expression ‘pecuniary harm’ is generally used to refer to recoverable economic harm while 
‘non-pecuniary harm’ refers to other forms of recoverable harm that are not monetary in 
character, such as various types of physical and psychological harm.  
 
3.3.1 Pecuniary Harm 
 
Many human rights violations, particularly gross human rights violations amounting to 
international crimes, may involve the deprivation or the destruction of an individual’s 
property. There is a considerable body of jurisprudence in international human rights 
supervisory bodies concerning reparation for damage or loss of property. Two main elements 
characterise this jurisprudence. First, the notion of property is usually interpreted in a broad 
manner. For example, in the case of Ituango Massacres v. Colombia the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights stated that it had: 
[D]eveloped a broad notion of property, which encompasses, among other matters, the use and enjoyment of 
‘possessions’, defined as appropriable material objects, as well as any right that can form part of a person’s 
                                                 
56 UN Basic Principles, supra note no. 4, Principle 8  
57 International Law Commission (‘ILC’) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts with Commentaries (‘ILC Draft Articles’), UN Doc. A/Res/56/83, 22 January 2002, Art. 1.  
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patrimony. This notion includes all movables and immovables, corporeal and incorporeal elements, and any 
other immaterial object that may be of value.58 
Second, international human rights bodies have recognised that, in certain contexts, it 
is not necessary for victims to prove they have official legal titles to a piece of land to claim 
reparation for its loss. Depending on local customs, in some cases possession and occupation 
have been considered a sufficient basis for a claim to reparation. The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has established that: 
[I]n the case of indigenous communities who have occupied their ancestral lands in accordance with customary 
practices – yet who lack real title to the property – mere possession of the land should suffice to obtain official 
recognition of their communal ownership.59 
The practice of the European Court of Human Rights indicates that this approach is not 
limited to indigenous populations but may also be applied in cases where there is no formal 
practice of registering property.60  
In case of gross violations of human rights pecuniary harm may also consist of the loss 
of support as a result of the death or injury of a victim for the spouse, dependants or family 
members of the victim. The pronouncements of human rights bodies indicate that the concept 
of loss of support is not limited to financial support but may also include other contributions 
that the victim would have made, such as raising the children.61 Moreover, a flexible approach 
has been adopted with regard to the relationship between the victim and the person claiming 
reparation. Notably, in Aloeboetoe v. Suriname the Inter-American Court established a three-
tiered test: (i) reparations have to be based on payments actually made by the victim to the 
claimant, (ii) that from the relationship between the victim and the claimant it is reasonable to 
assume that the payments would have continued if the victim had survived, and (iii) the 
claimant must experience a financial need which was met by the contributions of the victim.62 
Finally, other forms of pecuniary harm that have been recognised as heads of damages by 
                                                 
58 IACtHR, Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), 
1 July 2006, § 174.  
59 IACtHR, Moiwana v. Suriname, supra note no. 54, § 131; see also Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tigni Community v. 
Nicaragua, Judgment (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 31 August 2001, § 151; Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v. Paraguay, Judgment (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 17 June 2005, § 137. 
60 ECtHR, Akdivar and others v. Turkey (App. No. 21893/93), Judgment (Just Satisfaction), 1 April 1998, §§ 16-
26; Ayder and others v. Turkey (App. No. 23656/94), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 8 January 2004, § 
143. 
61 See e.g., ECtHR: Aktas v. Turkey, supra note no. 45, §§ 349-355; IACtHR: Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, 
Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 11 May 2007, § 262. 
62 Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, supra note no. 36, § 68. 
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human rights supervisory bodies include loss of earnings, where it is sufficiently clearly 
established,63 medical funeral and various expenses.64  
 
3.3.2 Non Pecuniary Harm 
 
Many different types of injuries fall within the category of non-pecuniary harm including 
death, physical and psychological harm and emotional distress. Although these forms of harm 
are difficult to assess in economic terms, this does not mean that they are not repairable. This 
was made clear in the Lusitania arbitration, where the Commission stated that an injured 
person is:  
[U]nder the rules of international law, entitled to be compensated for an injury resulting in mental suffering, 
injury to his feelings, humiliation, shame, degradation, loss of social position, or injury to his credit or 
reputation.65 
The Commission further added that:  
[T]he mere fact that [these harms] are difficult to measure or estimate by money standards makes them none the 
less real and affords no reason why the injured person should not be compensated therefore as compensatory 
damages.66 
As will be argued in Chapter III, special forms of reparation other than monetary 
compensation are associated with this type of harm, especially when it occurs as a 
consequence of a gross violation.  
In cases of death, the European and Inter-American Court of Human Rights have held 
that the families of victims may claim both their own non-pecuniary injury, such as emotional 
suffering, as well as that of their loved ones.67 Human rights bodies have also regularly 
awarded reparation for physical injury arising from violations such as acts of torture.68 In the 
case of mental injury, international human rights bodies usually distinguish between 
                                                 
63 See e.g., ECtHR, Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom (App. Nos 7511/76; 7743/76), Judgment (Merits 
and Just Satisfaction), 22 March 1983, § 26; IACtHR, Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras, Judgment (Reparations and 
Costs), 21 July 1989, §§ 44-46. 
64 See e.g. ECtHR, Aksoy v. Turkey, supra note no. 44, §§ 111-113; IACtHR, Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. 
Peru, Judgment (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 25 November 2006, § 428. 
65
 Opinion in the Lusitania Cases, 1 November 1923, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. VII, 32-44, 
at 40.  
66 Ibid.  
67 See e.g. ECtHR, Salman v. Turkey (App. No. 21986/93), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 27 June 
2000, § 140; IACtHR, Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, supra note no. 36, § 62.  
68 See e.g. ECtHR, Z. and others v. United Kingdom (App. No. 29392/95), 10 May 2001, §§ 119-127; IACtHR, 
Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, supra note no. 64, §§ 430-433; HRC, Hugo Rodríguez v. Uruguay 
(Comm. No. 322/188), UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, 19 July 1994, § 14. 
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psychiatric injury and other less serious forms of emotional distress not amounting to a 
medical condition. While mental distress is often presumed, especially in respect of serious 
violations of human rights suffered by the applicant or his relatives,69 medical evidence is 
required as proof of the existence of psychiatric injury.70  
Finally, non-pecuniary harm may include the loss of social, educational or familial 
opportunities. For example, in Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, the European Court 
found that the violation in question had deprived the victim of ‘some opportunity to develop 
his intellectual potential.’71 Similarly, in Thlimmenos v. Greece, the Court held that that the 
violation suffered by the individual had damaged ‘the applicant’s access to a profession, 
which is a central element for the shaping of one’s life plans.’72 
As observed in Chapter I, the Inter-American Court has certainly been the most 
proactive body in ordering reparation for loss of non-pecuniary opportunities, recognising 
damage to a victim’s potential for self-realisation (proyecto de vida). In the case of Loayza 
Tamayo v. Peru, the Court explained that the damage to the victim’s proyecto de vida is 
concerned with the inability of the victim to realise ‘full self-actualisation’73 and is ‘akin to 
the concept of personal fulfilment, which in turn is based on the options that an individual 
may have for leading his life and achieving the goal that he sets for himself’.74 In a concurring 
opinion, Judges Cançado-Trindade and Abreu-Burelli further stated that reparation should 
recognise that an individual, rather than being merely an agent of ‘economic production’75 has 
‘needs and aspirations which transcend...purely economic measures or projections.’76 As will 
be further explored in Chapter III, although the Court has recognised this form of harm in a 
number of cases, it has been rather cautious in awarding monetary reparation, holding instead 
that this type of harm can be repaired through measures of satisfaction.77  
                                                 
69 See e.g., ECtHR, Öneryildiz v. Turkey (App. No. 48939/99), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 30 
November 2004, §§ 164 and 171; IACtHR, Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, Judgment (Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs), 27 November 2003, § 169. See supra Section 3.2.2. 
70 E.g., Z. and others v. United Kingdom, supra note no. 68, §§ 128-131. 
71 Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, supra note no. 63, § 26. 
72 ECtHR, Thlimmenos v. Greece (App. No. 34369/97), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 6 April 2000, § 
70.  
73 IACtHR, Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 27 November 1998, §§ 147-148. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., Joint Concurring Opinions of Judges Cançado-Trindade and Abreu-Burelli, §§ 8-9. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., §§ 153-154; see also González et al. v. Mexico, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs), 16 November 2009, § 589. 
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4 THE CONCEPT OF VICTIM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
4.1 From Direct Target to Harmed Person 
 
Due to the nature of crimes under the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals, a large 
number of people may potentially be eligible for victim status. As such, the identification of a 
reasoned definition of who can be considered a victim becomes a crucial issue, especially 
when victim status is associated with an enhanced procedural position.  In such cases a broad 
definition of the concept of victim may have a profound impact on proceedings, affecting the 
right of victims to meaningful participation and impairing the right of the accused to a fair and 
expeditious trial. More generally, allowing a large group of victims to exercise participatory 
rights risks creating a backlog in the caseload of the court, undermining the ability of the 
competent tribunal to efficiently implement its mandate.78 
In this respect it is interesting to observe that the process of gradual empowerment of 
victims before international criminal tribunals has nonetheless been accompanied by the 
emergence of a progressively broader definition of victim.  Indeed, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (‘ICTR’), which did not grant victims any right (for instance, to participation in the 
proceedings and to reparation), adopted a definition of victim which strictly focuses on the 
link between the crime and the person directly affected by it. Rule 2 of the ICTY Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (‘RPE’) defines victims as persons ‘against whom a crime over 
which the Tribunal has jurisdiction has allegedly been committed.’ Arguably, pursuant to this 
definition, only the direct targets of a crime qualify as victims.79 
The adoption of a narrow definition of victim was not, as it may be expected, the 
result of concerns of efficiency or fairness to the accused.80 Since victims were not entitled to 
exercise rights before the Tribunals the adoption of a limited definition was not in fact aimed 
at reducing the number of victims having access to the courts. Rather, the motivation for the 
                                                 
78 See C.P. Trumbull IV, ‘The Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings’, 29 
Michigan Journal of International Law (2008) 777-826, at 811-819; C. Chung, ‘Victims’ Participation at the 
International Criminal Court: Are Concessions of the Court Clouding the Promise?’, 6 Northwestern Journal of 
Human Rights (2008) 459-545. 
79 D. Donat-Cattin, ‘Article 68: Protection of Victims and Witnesses and their Participation in the Proceedings’, 
in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Note, 
Article by Article, 2nd ed. (München: Beck; Portland, Oregon: Hart; Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008) 1275-1300, at 
1287. 
80 In this respect, it has been observed that ‘there does not seem to be any evidence that such a thought has 
guided the drafters of the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals’. S. Zappalà, ‘The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of 
the Accused’, 8 Journal of International Criminal Justice (‘JICJ’) (2010) 137-164, at 138.  
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adoption of such a narrow definition has to be found in the fact that in the early nineties, when 
the governing rules of the ad hoc Tribunals were adopted, victims’ concerns were not 
considered as part of the mandate of international criminal justice.81 Moreover, it is submitted 
that awareness that persons other than the direct target of crimes may also bear the 
consequences of primary victimisation was not as widely recognised as it is today, at least in 
this body of law.  
Many criticisms have nonetheless been levelled against the ad hoc Tribunals which 
have been accused of exploiting victims, allowing them to interact with the courts only as 
witnesses and failing to address their real concerns.82 Awareness of such criticisms was 
inevitably reflected in the new system of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’). As will be 
thoroughly examined in Chapter VI, the ICC introduced an unprecedented procedure allowing 
victims to participate in their own right and to claim reparation for the harm suffered. Apart 
from the adoption of a groundbreaking victim participation and reparation scheme, the ICC 
sets out a very broad concept of victim, defined as: 
(a) (N)atural persons who suffered harm as a result of a commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and (b) organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property, which is 
dedicated to religion, education, art, or science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals 
and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes.’83  
Legal scholars and human rights activists have welcomed this formulation as providing the 
first international definition of victims centred on the concept of harm.84 In fact, this 
formulation largely replicates a definition which was previously set out in the UN Declaration 
of 198585 and, by focusing on the concept of harm, follows in the jurisprudence of human 
                                                 
81 C. Jorda and J. de Hemptinne, ‘The Status and the Role of Victims’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J.R.W.D. 
Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol. 2 (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 1387-1419, at 1389.  
82 See e.g., M-B. Dembour, E. Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crime Trials’, 15 
European Journal of International Law (‘EJIL’) (2004) 151-177;  L. Walleyn, ‘Victimes et témoins de crimes 
internationaux: du droit à une protection au droit à la parole’, 84 Revue Internationale de la Croix-Rouge (2002) 
51-77. 
83 The ICC victim definition does not make a distinction between individual and collective victims. Nonetheless, 
it has been observed that Rule 97(1) of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence (‘RPE’) provides that the 
Court can award reparations on collective basis; however, this might be seen as an introduction of certain forms 
of reparation, rather than as recognition of a category of victim. See M. Heikkilå, International Criminal 
Tribunals and Victims of Crime: A Study of the Status of Victims before International Criminal Tribunals and of 
Factors affecting this Status (Turku, Åbo: Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, 2004), at 17-18. 
84 D. Donat-Cattin, ‘Article 68: Protection of Victims and Witnesses and their Participation in the Proceedings’, 
in O. Triffterer (ed.), supra note no. 79, at 1287. 
85 See supra note no. 5, § 1. Notably, this definition did not include legal persons, although it is generally agreed 
that it should be interpreted as doing so, especially when legal entities represents collective natural persons that 
are ultimately victimized. See L.L. Lamborn, ‘The United Nations Declaration on Victims: The Scope of 
Coverage’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Protection of Victims, supra note no. 1, 105-126. 
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rights courts’ footsteps. As with the definition of victim that emerged under IHL and IHRL 
the ICC definition sets out a three-tiered test for applicants to be granted victim status: (i) 
there has been a violation of the law (an international crime); (ii) the applicant must have 
suffered harm; and (iii) the harm suffered by the victim is causally linked to the crime. The 
ICC definition specifies that the term ‘victim’ may also include organisations or institutions 
that have been directly harmed. In this respect, the definition is more expansive or at least 
more precise than the 1985 Declaration that generally speaks of ‘persons’. Some delegations 
had doubts about the inclusion of legal persons, particularly corporations.86 However, the 
inclusion of legal entities in the definition finds its legal basis in Article 8 of the Statute, 
which mentions certain objects as forbidden targets for military operations.87 It is therefore 
necessary to consider the owners of these objects as victims.88 
It may be observed that at present the ICC definition certainly reflects the consensus 
of the international community regarding the concept of victim under international criminal 
law. This is so for two main reasons. The first is that this definition was adopted as the result 
of a long and much debated negotiation between delegations belonging to very different legal 
traditions.89 Furthermore, this definition served as a model for two international (hybrid) 
criminal tribunals, which have been established some years after the ICC, the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’) 
where victims have been similarly granted broad procedural rights. The ECCC Internal Rules 
(‘IR’) define victim as ‘a natural person or legal entity that has suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the ECCC.’90 Similarly, Rule 2 of the STL 
RPE focuses on the link between the harm suffered by the victim and the crime causing it, 
although it explicitly excludes legal entities, defining victim as ‘[a] natural person who has 
suffered physical, material, or mental harm as a direct result of an attack within the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction.’ 
                                                 
86 B. Timm, ‘The Legal Position of Victims in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, in H. Fisher, C. Kress and 
S. Rolf Lüder (eds), International and National Prosecution of Crimes under International Law: Current 
Developments (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2001) 289-308, at 291. 
87 These objects include ‘buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic 
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected’ (Arts. 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv)) 
ICCSt., ‘installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ (Arts. 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii)), and ‘buildings, 
material, medical units and transport using the distinctive emblem of the Geneva Convention’ (Arts. 
8(2)(b)(xxiv) and 8(2)(e)(ii) ICCSt.). 
88 E. Baumgartner, ‘Aspects of Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the International Criminal Court’, 90 
International Review of the Red Cross (2008) 409-440, at 420. 
89 S.A. Fernández de Gurmendi, ‘Definition of Victims and General Principle’, in R.S. Lee (ed.) The 
International Criminal Court: Elements of Crime and Rules of Procedure (Ardsley, NY: Transnational 
Publishers, 2001) 427-434, at 429. 
90 Glossary, ECCC IR. 
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The wording used by these rules potentially identifies a large number of victims. 
Contrary to the definition set out by the ad hoc Tribunals the definitions of victim adopted by 
recent international criminal tribunals do not require applicants to show that they have been 
targeted by the crime at issue; rather, it is sufficient that they suffered harm as a result of the 
crime. Moreover, the governing rules of these courts do not define the constitutive elements 
of the concept of victim. In particular, the interpretation of the concept of harm and the legal 
concept of causal link between the harm suffered by the victim and an international crime are 
left to the judges’ discretion.91  
In the following sub-sections, I will analyse how the ICC, ECCC, and STL have 
interpreted the constitutive elements of the definition of the victim. Subsequently, I will 
examine how the concept of victim has been applied in order to identify victims entitled to the 
right to participation (the concept of victim-participant) and those entitled to the right of 
reparation (the concept of victim entitled to reparation).  
 
4.2 The Constitutive Elements of the Concept of Victim under International 
Criminal Law 
 
4.2.1 Direct and Indirect Victims 
 
As indicated in the previous section, recently established international and internationalized 
criminal tribunals have adopted a broad concept of victim which is not limited to the direct 
targets of an international crime, but rather include all persons who have suffered harm as a 
result of an international crime. As such, it may be argued that the concept of victim under 
international criminal law includes both direct and indirect victims.  
As noted above, however, Rule 85 of the ICC RPE makes a distinction between 
natural persons (Rule 85(a)) and legal persons (Rule 85(b)). In a notable decision on victims’ 
rights the ICC Trial Chamber I observed that whereas Rule 85(b) requires that legal persons 
‘sustained direct harm’, Rule 85(a) does not include this stipulation for natural persons.  
Consequently, ‘applying a purposive interpretation, it follows that natural persons can be the 
direct or indirect victims of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.’92 In other words, 
                                                 
91 E.g., Rule 89(2) ICC RPE states: ‘The Chamber, on its own initiative or on the application of the Prosecutor or 
the defence, may reject the application if it considers that the person is not a victim or that the criteria set forth in 
article 68, paragraph 3, are not otherwise fulfilled.’ 
92 ICC, Decision on Victims’ Participation, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), Trial Chamber I (‘TC I’), 18 
January 2008, § 91; this view has also been confirmed by the Appeals Chamber; see Judgment on the Appeals of 
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with the exception of legal persons, the Court has accepted that the category of victim may be 
broadened to all those individuals who personally and concretely suffered harm, regardless of 
whether directly or indirectly.93  
In general terms, the Court has established that indirect victims are required to show 
that they suffered harm as a result of their relationship with the victim who has suffered direct 
harm.94 The ICC Appeals Chamber determined, in particular, that a ‘close personal 
relationship’95 might be a precondition for the participation for indirect victims in the 
proceedings; in this regard, harm suffered by indirect victims may include the psychological 
suffering caused by the death of a family member, or the material deprivation caused by the 
loss of the breadwinner.96 Furthermore, the Chamber identified indirect victims as those 
individuals who intervened to prevent the commission of the crimes charged against the 
accused, provided that the direct victims suffered relevant harm.97 
Against this background the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon and the Internal Rules of the ECCC at a first sight seem to exclude indirect 
victims from being granted legal standing in the proceedings.  Indeed, pursuant to Rule 2 of 
the STL RPE, victims must have suffered harm as a direct result of an attack within the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Internal Rules of the ECCC have similar wording requiring the 
victim to demonstrate that they suffered injury ‘as a direct consequence’ of a relevant crime.98 
Although the expression ‘direct result’ does not a priori exclude indirect victims, initially this 
was the interpretation preferred by the STL Chambers as set out in an explanatory document 
on the Tribunal’s procedure.99 This interpretation, however, risks rendering the entire victims’ 
participation scheme almost meaningless. As a matter of fact, because of their special 
jurisdiction,100 most direct victims of the crimes under these courts’ review are deceased. 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 
2008, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432), Appeals Chamber (‘AC’), 11 July 2008, §§ 32, 39. 
93 Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ 
Participation of 18 January 2008, supra note no. 92, § 32. 
94  Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 ICC, Redacted version of “Decision on Indirect Victims”, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1813), TC I, 8 April 
2009, § 50. 
97 Ibid., § 51. 
98 Rule 23 bis (1)(b) ECCC IR.  
99 Reference is made here to ‘The Procedure of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A Snapshot’ (available at the 
STL website), which states as follows: ‘A “victim” is deemed to be a natural person who has suffered material or 
mental harm as a direct result of an attack within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Legal persons and those who have 
suffered indirect harm do not therefore enjoy the status of victim.’ (emphasis added) Ibid., § 92, p. 35.  See also 
J. de Hemptinne, ‘Challenges Raised by Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon’, 8 JICJ (2010) 165-179, at 169.  
100 Article 1 STLSt. defines the Tribunal’s jurisdiction as follows: ‘The Special Tribunal shall have jurisdiction 
over persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of former Lebanese Prime 
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Therefore, if the next of kin of deceased persons are not entitled to victim status, only a few 
individuals (the survivors) will be granted participatory rights in the proceedings. 
Accordingly, no chance would be offered to other persons to have access to justice.  
It is remarkable, however, that these limitations included in the concept of victim 
before the STL and the ECCC have not prevented the two tribunals allowing indirect victims 
to participate in the proceedings. In a recent judgment, the ECCC Supreme Court Chamber 
authoritatively stated that ‘the term “direct victim” [ ... ] is not coterminous with the category 
of persons who suffered injury as a “direct consequence” of the crime.’101 Indeed, indirect 
victims can also participate as civil parties so long as they ‘suffered injury as a direct 
consequence of the crimes committed against “the direct victim(s)”’.102 
A similar approach has been adopted by the STL. In a recent pronouncement, the Pre-
trial Judge clarified that the expression ‘direct result’ is ‘a limiting factor that restricts the 
recognition of victim status only where persons are closely connected to the Attack or the 
direct victim thereof.’103 Accordingly, indirect victims whose harm results from the physical 
or mental harm suffered by the direct victim need to show the direct victim’s presence at the 
scene of the crime, as well as their kinship, personal relationship or dependence on the direct 
victim. 
 
4.2.2 The Concept of Harm 
 
Although central to the concept of victim, the governing rules of the courts under examination 
do not define the concept of harm. The only indication in this respect is offered by the STL 
RPE, which indicates physical, material and mental harm as the three categories of harm 
which the Tribunal sets as a prerequisite for victim status. This is in line with what the ICC 
and the ECCC have held in their respective case law. In this regard, it is worth noting that, in 
contrast to the concept of victim that has emerged under international human rights law these 
                                                                                                                                                        
Minister Rafiq Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons.’ Article 2 of the ECCC Law, as amended in 
2004 establishes: ‘Extraordinary Chambers shall be established in the existing court structure, namely the trial 
court and the supreme court to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most 
responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian laws related to crimes, international 
humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed 
during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.’ 
101 ECCC, Appeal Judgment, Kaing Guek Eav alias ‘Duch’ (‘Duch’) (F28), AC, 3 February 2012, § 416. 
102 Ibid., § 417. 
103 STL, Decision on Victims Participating in the Proceedings, Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, 
Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad Hassan Sabra (STL-ll-O1/PT/PTJ), Pre-Trial Judge, 8 May 2012, § 46. 
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definitions, and their interpretation, do not include ‘substantial impairment of fundamental 
rights’ among the categories of harm.104 
None of the three courts examined explicitly indicates whether a certain threshold of 
harm is required for the purpose of victims’ application to participate in the proceedings. This 
issue is most likely to become particularly relevant in the reparation phase international105 and 
national case law106 have highlighted.  
However, the threshold of harm may also become an issue in the initial evaluation of 
victims’ applications. For example judges may rule that the harm suffered by applicants must 
be of certain gravity in order to grant them legal standing. Generally speaking, criminalisation 
should be reserved for the most serious invasions of interests, while less serious misconduct is 
often dealt with by the civil law.107 Accordingly, only individuals who have suffered harm 
above a certain threshold are allowed to participate in criminal proceedings while others may 
refer to alternative fora. This position is also supported by the definition of certain crimes 
within international tribunals’ jurisdiction, which explicitly requires that the harm suffered by 
victims be serious108 and, more generally, by the fact that many international crimes entail the 
most serious violations of human rights. 
 
A. PHYSICAL HARM 
 
Physical harm is usually taken to mean bodily harm.  This is the interpretation which has been 
adopted by the three international criminal courts at issue. Although the Rome Statute does 
not refer to ‘physical harm’, ICC Pre-Trial Chambers have held that ‘harm’ within the 
meaning of Rule 85(a) of the Rules includes physical injury.109 According to the ECCC 
                                                 
104 S. Fernández de Gurmendi, ‘Definition of Victims and General Principle’, supra note no. 89, at 432. 
105 See e.g. the case of Letelier and Moffitt, which was settled in arbitration proceedings between US and Chile 
in 1992. This decision is remarkable in that it provides a detailed description of the criteria that the Commission 
took into consideration to determine the amount of the ex gratia payment. Among other things, the Commission 
established different levels of compensation for each category of family members, according to the type of harm 
suffered. Dispute Concerning Responsibility for the Deaths of Letelier and Moffitt (United States, Chile), 11 
January 1992, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol XXV, 1-19, §§ 20-21, 31. 
106 For example, starting from 1990, Italy granted awards of state compensation to anyone who was injured or 
killed as a result of an act of terrorism or organised crime. However, compensation was only available where 
victim’s capacity to work was reduced by 25 per cent or more. See Law 20 October 1990, no. 302 (Norme a 
favore delle vittime del terrorismo e della criminalità organizzata). 
107 P. H. Robinson, ‘The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert’, 76 Boston University Law Review 
(1996) 201-214. 
108 E.g., Art. 6(b) of the ICCSt. includes among the acts constituting the crime of genocide ‘[c]ausing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group’. Similarly, Art. 8(2)(a)(iii) ICCSt. includes among the acts 
constituting war crimes ‘[w]ilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health’. (emphasis added) 
109 Cf., e.g., ICC:  Decision on Victims’ Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related 
Proceedings, William Samoel Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (ICC-01/09-01/11-249), Pre-
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Supreme Court Chamber, the injury suffered by an applicant must be ‘[p]hysical, material or 
psychological’ and ‘physical injury denotes biological damage, anatomical or functional. It 
may be described as a wound, mutilation, disfiguration, disease, loss or dysfunction of organs, 
or death.’110 Similarly, the Pre-Trial Judge of the STL has found that ‘“physical harm” 
encompasses substantial bodily injuries, ordinarily requiring a degree of medical treatment for 
the victim’.111 Remarkably, the STL Judge has also observed that the requirement of a certain 
threshold for physical harm included in Rule 2 of the STL RPE is ‘consistent with the spirit of 
that Rule, which is to define victims rather narrowly so as to “prevent [them] from being too 
numerous”, thereby making the proceedings “cumbersome and slow”’.112 
Although the aforementioned courts seem to agree that physical harm should 
encompass injuries which are not merely of a less serious character, no legal instrument 
defines the applicable threshold and nor have the courts under examination elaborated further 
on the categories of physical harm which may or may not be considered as meeting the 
requirement. This may be especially relevant when, for example, the victim cannot prove the 
harm suffered, or cannot show permanent sign of harm through marks on their body, for 
example (and this is unfortunately the case with victims of certain forms of torture and 
inhuman treatments). Setting a threshold of harm should not, therefore, bring to a substantial 
denial of justice for the victims of certain crimes.  
The courts have not yet engaged in this analysis, since the crimes charged in the cases 
brought thus far only refer to crimes which have caused serious harm on victims per se (such 
as, murder or rape). The issue of the threshold of harm is, however, likely to become relevant 
in the event that the courts open cases for conducts which are only criminalised if they cause 
great suffering.113 Furthermore, the evaluation of the gravity of the injury will be certainly 
considered during the proceedings for reparation. 
 
B. MENTAL HARM 
 
Mental harm includes suffering of emotional, psychological or psychiatric nature. This type 
of harm has been recognised before all the courts under examination. In the jurisprudence of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Trial Chamber (‘PTC’) II, 5 August 2011, § 50; Decision on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of 
VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(ICC-01/04-101/tEN-Corr), PTC I, 17 January 2006, §172 (containing further references to the jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American and the European Courts of Human Rights).  
110 ECCC, Appeal Judgment, Duch, supra note no. 101, §§ 416-417.  
111 STL, Decision on Victims Participating in the Proceedings, supra note no. 103, § 66. 
112 Ibid., § 65, citing Explanatory Memorandum by the Tribunal’s President, November 2010, §§ 18-19. 
113 Supra note no. 108. 
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the ECCC the injury suffered by a victim ‘may also be psychological and include mental 
disorders or psychiatric trauma, such as post-traumatic stress disorder’.114 Moreover, the 
ECCC judges have observed that ‘[i]n grave or prolonged cases, psychological injury may 
lead to physical injury by causing various ailments.’115  At the ICC, harm has been interpreted 
as comprising ‘emotional suffering’.116  Likewise, the STL Pre-Trial Judge has held that ‘the 
notion of mental harm in Rule 2 of the Rules encompasses harm of emotional, psychological 
or psychiatric nature’ and that ‘to be characterised as “harm” for the purpose of granting VPP 
[victim participating in the proceedings] status to applicants, emotional distress must be 
serious.’117 
In general terms, the courts under examination favour a strict assessment of this 
category, based on two criteria: (i) mental harm should be recognisable, meaning that it 
should correspond to a disease of psychic nature recognised by the medical profession, or (ii) 
there should be a specific relationship between the person claiming mental harm and the 
direct victim of the crime at issue.  
The first requirement, that the mental harm is recognisable, prescribes that the 
applicant provides proof that he or she suffered a mental harm which has been recognised as 
such by a professional. Accordingly, some types of emotional suffering of a lower threshold 
such as distress, sadness, disappointment or anger shall not be recognised as mental harm for 
the purposes of legal standing in a criminal trial. This view has also been supported by the 
Cambodian Tribunal in the following terms:  
 
[P]sychological harm has a dimension and character distinct from the emotional distress that may be regarded as 
inevitably caused to witnesses of crimes of this nature and their application will be rejected unless they have 
witnessed events of an exceedingly violent and shocking nature.118  
 
Such a threshold does not seem to be required for other types of victims and, in particular, for 
those victims who have a specific relationship with the direct victim of the crime. It seems 
indeed to be unanimously recognised by international case law that there should be a 
presumption of psychological harm for the members of the direct family (parents, children, 
                                                 
114 ECCC, Appeal Judgment, Duch, supra note no. 101, § 415. 
115 Ibid., § 417. 
116 ICC, Decision on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, 
VPRS 5, and VPRS 6’, supra note no. 109, § 147. 
117 STL, Decision on Victims Participating in the Proceedings, supra note no. 103, § 78. 
118 ECCC, Order on the Admissibility of Civil Party Applicants from Current Residents of Kratie Province, Nuon 
Chea (D414), Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, 9 September 2010, § 15(d). 
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spouses and siblings) of the immediate victim. In such cases, as was first elaborated by the 
IACtHR, the applicant does not need to prove that he/she has suffered specific mental 
harm.119  This approach has been also followed by the ICC; in this respect, the ICC Appeals 
Chambers in the Lubanga case, in relation to the parents of child soldiers, observed that: 
Harm suffered by one victim as a result of the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court can 
give rise to harm suffered by other victims. This is evident for instance, when there is a close personal 
relationship between the victims such as the relationship between a child soldier and the parents of that child. 
The recruitment of a child soldier may result in personal suffering of both the child concerned and the parents of 
that child. 120 
In the same vein, the STL Judge ruled that a presumption of mental harm only applies 
to first-degree relatives or ‘persons in a relationship of similar closeness’ in case of death of 
the direct victim.121 Conversely, in line with human rights case law, the relative presumption 
is only granted to extended family members (grand-parents, aunts and uncles, nieces and 
nephews, cousins, in-laws and other indirect kin) of the direct victim who may be requested to 
show ‘credible or convincing evidence demonstrating an affective relationship with the 
disappeared persons that goes beyond simple consanguinity’.122 In this respect, the STL Pre-
Trial Judge has observed that ‘the burden of proving the mental harm suffered by indirect 
victims is contingent on the gravity of the harm suffered by the direct victim and on the 
closeness of the relationship between the two.’123 In particular, if the direct victim sustained 
only minor harm, mental harm suffered by family members should not be considered as rising 
to the level of harm required for the granting of victim status.  
 
 
 
                                                 
119 IACtHR, Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, supra note no. 48. Similarly, Article 3.3 of the ECCC Practice Direction 
provides that ‘psychological harm may include the death of kin who were the victims of such crimes’. 
120 ICC, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on 
Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, supra note no. 92, § 32. See also with respect to next of kin of 
deceased victims, ICC, Corrigendum to the “Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in Connection 
with the Investigation in the Democratic Republic of Congo by a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06, 
a/0071/06 to a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 to a/0110/06, a/0188/06, a/0128/06 to a/0162/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06, 
a/0209/06, a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to a/0222/06, a/0224/06, a/0227/06 to a/0230/06, a/0234/06 to a/0236/06, 
a/0240/06, a/0225/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 to a/0233/06, a/0237/06 to a/0239/06 and a/0241/06 to a/0250/06, 
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-423), PTC I, 31 January 2008, §§ 23-25; Decision on the Applications for Participation in 
the Proceedings of Applicants a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to a/0033/07 and a/0035/07 to 
a/0038/07, Ahmad Harun et al. (ICC-2/05-111), PTC I, 6 December 2007, PTC I, § 35. 
121 STL, Decision on Victims Participating in the Proceedings, supra note no. 103, § 84. 
122 IACtHR, Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 27 August 1998, § 64. See 
on this point, e.g., ECCC, Judgment, Duch (E188), TC, 26 July 2010, § 643. 
123 STL, Decision on Victims Participating in the Proceedings, supra note no. 103, § 83. 
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C. MATERIAL HARM 
 
 Material harm generally refers to three categories of damages: (i) the destruction, damage or 
deterioration with regard to an item of property (such as a house, a car, a shop, for instance); 
(ii) the material deprivation linked to the loss of the material contribution of the breadwinner; 
and (iii) lost profits resulting from the commission of a criminal act. The case law of 
international criminal tribunals seems to accept only the first two categories as meeting the 
harm requirement for the assessment of the victim status.  
In the jurisprudence of the ICC harm within the meaning of Rule 85(a) of the ICC 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence has been interpreted, inter alia, as economic loss.124 Such 
economic loss can be claimed both by direct and indirect victims (if natural persons).125  
Similarly, in the practice of the ECCC, the notion of material injury has been understood as ‘a 
material object’s loss of value, such as complete or partial destruction of personal property, or 
loss of income.’126 In the same vein, the STL Pre-Trial Judge has considered that material 
harm refers to ‘damage to, or destruction or deterioration of property, loss of income or of 
means of subsistence and other forms of financial loss’.127 
With the exception of the STL, claims for material harm may also be submitted by 
legal persons for damages to properties dedicated to religion, education, art, or science or 
charitable purposes, which are often targets of war crimes.128 Furthermore, as observed above, 
material harm may be claimed by those persons who prove evidence of economic dependence 
from the direct victim of a crime.129  
On the other hand, contrary to human rights law, it does not seem that international 
criminal tribunals accept lost profits or opportunities as a category of material harm.130 In 
other words, only concrete losses give standing for victims’ participation in the proceedings. 
This choice has likely been dictated by logistical concerns. Most of the crimes that are 
brought before international criminal tribunals are committed in situations of political unrest, 
armed conflicts, or social disorders – situations in which almost all basic activities of the 
affected region are disrupted. It would be completely unworkable, and possibly unfair, for a 
                                                 
124 ICC, Decision on Victims’ Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related 
Proceedings, supra note no. 109, § 50 
125 See e.g., ICC, Public Redacted Version of “Decision on the 52 Applications for Participation at the Pre-Trial 
Stage of the Case”, Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-02/09-137-Red), PTC I, 9 October 2009, §§ 93-96; 
ICC, Redacted version of “Decision on ‘Indirect Victims’, supra note no. 96, §§ 49-50. 
126 ECCC, Appeal Judgment, Duch, supra note no. 101, § 415. 
127 STL, Decision on Victims Participating in the Proceedings, supra note no. 103, § 72. 
128 Rule 85, ICC RPE; ‘Glossary’, ECCC IR. 
129 ICC, Redacted version of “Decision on ‘Indirect Victims’, supra note no. 96, § 50.  
130 ‘Glossary’, ECCC IR. 
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tribunal with the mandate to adjudicate individual criminal responsibility to take into account 
all the costs of such disruption in these situations.131 
 
4.2.3 The Causal Link Requirement 
 
As indicated in the definitions of victim adopted by recently established international and 
internationalized criminal tribunals, a person claiming to be a victim must be able to establish 
that the harm he or she suffered resulted ‘as a result of’ the commission of a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal where participation is being sought. In other words, there must be a 
causal link between the harm suffered by the victim and the international crime.132  
What guides the courts in the interpretation of this requirement is the need to exclude 
harm that is too remote from the crime without unduly limiting the number of victims. 
Accordingly, the ‘causal link’ requirement has been strictly interpreted as entailing factual 
causation. In this respect, the Cambodian Chambers held that applicants for civil party status 
must establish that the harm they allegedly suffered is ‘a direct consequence of facts within 
the scope of the judicial investigation’.133 In a similar vein, the STL Pre-Trial judge specified 
that the expression ‘direct result’ in the definition of victim provided by Rule 2 of the RPE 
refers to the requirement of causation.134 
Furthermore, the courts have required applicants to show that the alleged crime was a 
direct rather than ancillary contributing factor the international crime.135 Accordingly, persons 
who suffered indirect harm may be recognised as victims provided that the harm they 
allegedly sustained arose out of the harm suffered by direct victims (which, in turn, was 
caused by the commission of the crimes charged).136 On the contrary, persons who suffered 
harm as a result of the conduct of direct victims are not entitled to victim status.  
                                                 
131  J. De Hemptinne, ‘Challenges Raised by Victims’ Participation in the Proceedings of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon’, supra note no. 99, at 170. 
132 See Rule 85(a) ICC RPE; Rule 2 STL RPE; Glossary ECCC IR.  
133 ECCC, Order on the Admissibility of Civil Party Applicants from Current Residents of Kep Province, Nuon 
Chea, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch” (D392), Office of the Co-
Investigating Judges, 25 August 2010, § 15. 
134 STL, Decision on Victims Participating in the Proceedings, supra note no. 103, § 39. 
135 For instance, the ECCC have expressed this ‘necessary’ condition as follows: ‘… [I]n order for a Civil Party 
application to be admissible, the applicant is required to demonstrate that his or her alleged harm results only 
from facts for which the judicial investigation has already been opened.’ See Order on the Admissibility of Civil 
Party Applicants from Current Residents of Kep Province, supra note no. 133, § 19. (emphasis added) 
136 ICC, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on 
Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, supra note no. 92, § 32; STL, Decision on Victims Participating in 
the Proceedings, supra note no. 103, §§ 49-50; ECCC, Appeal Judgment, Duch, supra note no. 101, §§ 417 and 
462.  
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This latter category of individuals was the subject of a much-debated decision of ICC 
Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case where it was held that applicants who suffered harm as a 
result of the crimes committed by child soldiers (the direct victims of the case) could not be 
considered as indirect victims.137 While recognising that a certain ‘factual overlap’ may 
exist,138 according to the Trial Chamber there is no causal link between the use of children in 
hostilities and the impact of their conduct on other persons. In other words, the crime charged 
against Lubanga was not a necessary cause for the conduct of child soldiers and accordingly 
the victims of such conduct may not be considered as victims of the case. 
While the reasoning of Trial Chamber’s I decision remains questionable,139 it 
nonetheless has the merits of calling attention to two critical issues concerning the assessment 
of the ‘causal link’ requirement. First, since a causal link must be established between the 
harm allegedly suffered by the applicants and the crimes which the defendant is accused of, 
the prosecutor holds a crucial role in determining who the victims of a case are, through his 
discretionary powers of specifying the charges against the accused. Second, analysis of the 
courts’ assessment of the causal link requirement may only be partial, since the courts never 
disclose detailed descriptions of the harm alleged by victims. Rather, as in the cases analysed 
above, the courts’ decisions only declare whether the harm allegedly suffered by the applicant 
is causally linked to the charges against the accused, without explaining in which terms this 
link is established (e.g., foreseeability, directness, proximate cause, and so forth).140 Thus, it is 
not possible, at least at the present time, to determine the model of causality the courts adopt 
and whether this choice is carried out in a consistent manner.  
 
4.3 A One-Size-Fits-All Concept? 
 
It has been often argued that the main pitfall of the definition of the victim in international 
criminal law is that it does not distinguish between the different rationales behind victims’ 
                                                 
137 ICC, Redacted version of “Decision on ‘Indirect Victims’, supra note no. 96. 
138 Ibid., § 52. 
139 For a critical appraisal of the decision, see V. Spiga, ‘Indirect Victims’ Participation in the Lubanga Trial’, 8 
JICJ (2010) 183-198. 
140 On the categories of causal link in international criminal law, see C. McCarthy, ‘Reparations under the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and Reparative Justice Theory’, 3 International Journal of 
Transitional Justice (2009) 250-271, at 259-260. According to the author, ‘intent’ and ‘foresight’ are more likely 
than ‘causation’ to be used by the Court in assessing whether there is a causal link permitting to attribute certain 
harm to a perpetrator. 
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rights in the proceedings.141 For example, the ICC Statute indiscriminately uses the term 
‘victim’ in Article 68, in relation to the submission of victims’ representations, views and 
concerns at various stages of the proceedings and in Article 75 with regard to the right to 
reparation. These rights may have an extremely different impact on the fairness and efficiency 
of the proceedings, especially when they are likely to be exercised by a very large amount of 
persons.  
It is submitted that victims’ rights in the proceedings cannot be conceived as absolute 
in nature and necessarily need to be counterbalanced with other primary guarantees of the 
criminal process.142 This can be done through a reading of the rules setting out the definition 
of victim seen above in conjunction with those provisions establishing victim’s rights in the 
proceedings. By doing so, it is possible to identify at least two different concepts of victims 
potentially identifying differently-sized groups of individuals: the concept of victim-
participant and the concept of victim entitled to reparations.  
 
4.3.1 The Concept of Victim Participant 
 
The concept of victim participant identifies those victims that are entitled to exercise 
participatory rights before international and internationalized criminal tribunals. Such a 
concept can be derived from a reading of the rules setting out the definition of victim seen 
above in conjunction with those provisions establishing a victim’s right to participation in the 
proceedings.  
The ICC Statute does not grant all victims an automatic right of participation in the 
criminal process. Rather, victims wishing to participate in the proceedings must file an 
application to the Registrar who transmits it to the relevant chamber and makes copies 
available to the prosecutor and the defence, who then have the opportunity to comment on 
them. It is, however, the competent chamber which retains the last word on whether the 
application shall be accepted or rejected on the basis of the legal test set by Article 68(3) of 
the ICC Statute. More precisely, victims’ applications for participation must comply with four 
cumulative requirements: (i) the applicant is a ‘victim’; (ii) ‘the personal interests’ of the 
                                                 
141 In this respect, Rule 85 of the ICC RPE has been defined ‘a catch-all provision’. H. Friman, ‘The 
International Criminal Court and Participation of Victims: A Third Party to the Proceedings?’, 22 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2009) 485-500, at 490. 
142 This is, for example, explicitly indicated in Article 68(3) of the ICCSt., which provides as follows: ‘Where 
the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented 
and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is 
not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial.’ (emphasis added)  
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victim are affected; (iii) the stage of the proceedings in which the applicant wishes to 
participate are deemed appropriate by the relevant chamber; and (iv) victims’ participation 
shall not be ‘prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial’. In considering these four conditions, whereas the second pair grants the 
judges explicit powers to rule on the timing and the modalities of victims’ participation, the 
first one explicitly determines who is entitled to the right to participate. Accordingly, a 
conjunctive reading of these two prerequisites, the victim’s status and the personal interests 
being affected identifies the applicable concept of victim participant.  
In this regard it is important to note that the current jurisprudence of the Appeals 
Chamber indicates that, whereas the ordinary meaning of Rule 85 does not per se restrict the 
concept of victim only to those persons directly affected by the crimes charged, Article 68(3) 
of the Statute confines the right of participation to those victims whose harm resulted from the 
crimes charged against the accused.143  In other words, for the purposes of participating in the 
proceedings, Rule 85 shall be interpreted as requiring applicants to establish a causal link 
between the harm they suffered and the crimes charged against the accused. Accordingly, the 
events from which the applicants claim to have suffered harm must fall within the crimes 
charged against the accused. For instance, an ICC Trial Chamber in the Bemba case held that 
persons claiming to have suffered destruction of property by fire could not be granted victim 
status since the accused was only charged with the crime of pillage.144  
The second prerequisite of the participant status of victims is that their personal 
interests are affected by the proceedings in which participation is sought. As no guidance is 
offered in this respect by the ICC legal framework,145 the interpretation of the notion of 
‘personal interest’ has been a recurrent aspect of the jurisprudence from the outset. In 
particular, one thorny issue with which the Court has had to deal with so far is how victims’ 
personal interests should be defined. A conceptual analysis of Article 68(3) reveals that a 
broad definition of the phrase victims’ ‘personal interests’, coinciding with victims’ general 
                                                 
143 ICC, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on 
Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, supra note no. 92, §§ 58, 62. The Appeals Chamber’s decision 
reversed an early jurisprudence of Trial Chamber I according to which evidence of a causal link between the 
harm allegedly suffered and any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court would suffice to grant the applicants 
the procedural status of victims; see Decision on Victims’ Participation’, supra note no. 92, § 94. 
144 ICC, Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Trial and on 86 Applications by Victims to Participate in 
the Proceedings, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08-827), TC III, 30 June 2007, §§ 89-90. 
145 No suggestion in this respect comes from the preparatory works, whereby the language does not appear to 
have given rise to any significant debate at any point in the drafting of the Statute (it appears in the ICC 
Preparatory Committee’s Draft Statute as early as its August 1997 session). See Decisions Taken by the 
Preparatory Committee at its Session Held in New York, 4 to 15 August 1997 (A/AC.249/1997/L8/Rev.1 
(1997)), 14 August 1997.  
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interests, is conceptually mistaken. The expression of ‘personal interests’ should be 
distinguished from the expression ‘interests of the victims’ which is also used in the 
Statute.146 While the first specifically refers to individual interests which are promoted by 
victims and their legal representative, and which entitle victims to participation, the latter 
more generally indicates collective interests whose respect remains an obligation of the 
Court’s organs.  
This distinction, however, has not been consistently upheld by the different chambers. 
On the one hand, Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber have strongly stressed the need 
for the notion of personal interest to be distinguished from the ‘general interests of victims’, 
requiring victims to establish ‘a real evidentiary link between the victim and the evidence 
which the Court will be considering during (the) trial, leading to the conclusion that the 
victim’s personal interests are affected’.147 On the other hand, the Pre-Trial Chambers have 
approached the notion very liberally.  Single Judge Politi exemplified this understanding, 
holding that ‘there seems to be little doubt… that [the impact on personal interests] 
requirement is met whenever a victim… applies for participation in the proceedings’,148 and 
that ‘the fact that… victims’ personal interests are ‘affected’ by criminal proceedings relating 
to the event or events in question seems incontrovertible’.149 Such a liberal approach 
ultimately nullifies any meaningful legal effect of the ‘personal interests’ requirement. This 
means, inter alia, that Article 68(3) would not include this expression with the purposes of 
somehow limiting the exercising of victims’ participatory rights in the proceedings. Doubts 
remain as to the correctness of such an approach, especially in view of the statutory 
distinction between personal interests and the interests of victims. 
                                                 
146 E.g., Rules 16(2), 69, 73(6), and 90(4) ICC RPE. 
147 ICC, Decision on Victims’ Participation, supra note no. 92, § 95. In this respect, the Trial Chamber held that 
the ‘question of whether “personal interests” are affected are necessarily fact-dependent. In this respect, 
involvement in or presence at a particular incident which the Chamber is considering, or if the victim has 
suffered identifiable harm from that incident, are examples of the factors that the Chamber will be looking for 
prior to granting the right to participate’. Ibid., § 96. The Appeals Chamber also held in this respect that Article 
68(3) requires that the Chamber establish ‘whether the interests asserted by victims do not, in fact, fall outside 
their personal interests and belong instead to the role assigned to the Prosecutor.’ See Decision of the Appeals 
Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/ and a/0105/06 Concerning the “Directions 
and Decision of the Appeals Chamber” of 2 February 2007, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-925), AC, 13 June 2007, 
§ 28.  
148 ICC, Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06,a/0081/06 to 
a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-101), PTC II, 10 August 2007, at § 9. 
See also, e.g., Decision on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, 
VPRS 4, VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, supra note no. 109, at § 63, where the Chamber held that ‘the personal interests 
of victims are affected in general at the investigation stage, since the participation of victims at this stage can 
serve to clarify the facts, to punish the perpetrators of crimes and to request reparations for the harm suffered.’ 
149 ICC, Decision on Victims' Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to 
a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, supra note no. 148, at § 9. 
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A similar concept of victim participant has also been adopted in the context of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon which has, within its legal framework, a rule specifically 
dealing with the concept of ‘victim participating in the proceedings’.  Accordingly, not all the 
victims, generally defined by Rule 2 of the RPE will necessarily be allowed to participate in 
the proceedings. In order to preserve the rights of the accused and to ensure the efficiency of 
the trials they must have been authorised to do so by a judge after a hearing with the parties. 
In particular, Rule 86(A) states that ‘a person claiming to be the victim of a crime’ may 
request the status of victim participating in the proceedings only after the Pre-Trial Judge has 
confirmed the indictment. The main consequence of this provision is that applicants will 
necessarily be required to show prima facie proof of a causal link between the harm they have 
allegedly suffered and the crimes with which the accused is charged. Although the wording of 
both Rule 86(A) and Rule 2 refers simply to ‘any crime within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction’, 
the STL will most likely follow the jurisprudence of the ICC and the ECCC on this point, 
explicitly requiring a link with the charges against the accused. This task is facilitated at the 
STL by the fact that victims may only participate when the charges have already been 
confirmed against an accused.  
Rule 86(B) of the STL RPE provides ten criteria that the judge shall take into account 
when ruling on applications for participation. The way Rule 86(B) is structured and phrased 
suggests that the first four conditions are to be considered necessarily and cumulatively, 
whereas the other six appear as optional criteria which may be resorted to at the discretion of 
the judge.150 The four prerequisites are in fact very much similar to those set out in Article 
68(3) of the ICC Statute, namely: 
 (i) [W]hether the applicant has provided prima facie evidence that he is a victim as defined in Rule 2; (ii) 
whether the applicant’s personal interests are affected; (iii) whether the applicant’s proposed participation is 
intended to express his views and concerns; and (iv) whether the applicant’s proposed participation would be 
prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. 
 It will be interesting to see to what extent the STL judges will adopt an interpretation 
similar to that of the ICC, especially in view of the fact that only a relatively small number of 
victims will be applying for participation at the STL compared to those who apply to the ICC.  
Although in a less well-elaborated form, the ECCC legal framework also indicates that 
not all the victims identified through IR 2 will be entitled to participate in the criminal 
                                                 
150 This distinction is identified by the difference in wording in Rule 86(B) STL RPE: the first four criteria are 
introduced by ‘shall consider in particular’, while the other six are introduced by ‘may also consider’ (emphasis 
added). See also STL, Decision on Victims Participating in the Proceedings, supra note no. 103, § 102. 
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proceedings. Pursuant to IR 23bis only those victims who are able to show that they suffered 
harm as a direct consequence of one of the crimes alleged against the accused may be 
admitted as a civil party.151  
 
4.3.2 The Concept of Victim Entitled to Reparation 
 
 
In contrast to the concept of victim-participant, provisions on the right to reparation do not set 
out specific conditions with the aim of limiting the number of victims to whom such a right is 
granted. Rather, what can be observed in the law and practice of international criminal 
tribunals is the adoption of an inclusive approach with respect to the concept of victims 
entitled to reparation.  
ICC Chambers have held on a number of occasions that Rule 85 of the ICC RPE 
(setting out the definition of victim) ‘must be read in context and in accordance with its object 
and purpose.’152 More specifically, the Chambers have noted that there is nothing in Rule 85 
referring to its application only in the context of the participation of victims; rather, such a 
provision has the general aim of defining victims (whatever their procedural role is).153 
However, the Appeals has Chamber determined that, while the ordinary meaning of Rule 85 
does not per se restrict the concept of victim only to those persons directly affected by the 
crimes charged, Article 68(3) of the Statute (which regulates the participation of victims in 
the proceedings) limits the right of participation to those victims whose harm resulted from 
the crimes charged.154  In so doing, the Court seems to acknowledge that there may well be 
different categories of individuals that can be granted victim status pursuant to Rule 85. 
Nevertheless, certain categories may be excluded from this status when it is associated with 
participatory rights.  
A similar argument was advanced by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor in a recent 
document entitled ‘Policy Paper on Victims’ Participation’. In this respect, the Office 
                                                 
151 In the initial hearing of the Duch case, the Court held that ‘when reviewing the civil party applications 
received in this case the Chamber must satisfy itself, from the information provided, that is it possible to 
consider whether the applicant has indeed suffered damage, and whether this damage is the direct consequence 
of an offence under the jurisdiction of the Chamber.’  See Transcripts of Proceedings, Duch, TC, 17 February 
2009, p. 33. 
152 ICC, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on 
Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, supra note no. 92, § 54.  
153 Ibid., § 58. 
154 Ibid., §§ 58, 62. See also Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge René Blattmann, Decision on Victims’ 
Participation, supra note no. 92, §§ 8, 15-17. 
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recognised that the concept of victim might be interpreted in a broader sense for the purposes 
of exercising the right to reparation: 
[Fo]r the reparations stage, the Office favours a wider approach to allow participation of victims and 
representations from or on behalf of victims and other interested persons who suffered harm as a result of crimes 
other than those included in the charges selected for prosecution. Any other approach would be overly restrictive 
and unfair, since the Prosecution must necessarily limit the incidents selected in its investigation and 
prosecution. Accordingly, the Office will support reparations applications, as appropriate, by a broader range of 
individuals and entities than those who are linked to the charges for which the accused is ultimately convicted.155 
In the recently adopted decision on the principles of reparation in the Lubanga case, the ICC 
Trial Chamber found that: 
[R]reparation may be granted to direct and indirect victims, including the family members of direct victims ... 
anyone who attempted to prevent the commission of one or more of the crimes under consideration; and those 
who suffered personal harm as a result of these offences, regardless of whether they participated in the trial 
proceedings.156  
To that end, the Court recognised, in conformity with human rights jurisprudence, that ‘the 
concept of “family” may have many cultural variations, and the Court ought to have regard to 
the applicable social and familial structures.’157 The Court also found that reparation may also 
be granted to legal entities, including: 
[N]on-governmental, charitable and non-profit organisations, statutory bodies including government 
departments, public schools, hospitals, private educational institutes, companies, telecommunication firms, 
institutions that benefit the members of the community (such as cooperative and building societies, or bodies that 
deal with micro finance), and other partnerships’.158 
It is suggested that the adoption of such a broad concept of victim for the purposes of 
reparation can be explained by the fact that, in most cases, a collective approach to reparation 
will be adopted, hence the high number of individuals recognised as victims does not risk 
jeopardizing the effective realisation of reparation programmes. This was indicated by the 
ICC in the recent decision on reparation in the following terms:  
                                                 
155 ICC, Policy Paper on Victims’ Participation, Office of the Prosecutor, April 2010, at 9 (emphasis added). 
156 ICC, Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to Be Applied to Reparations, Lubanga (ICC-
01/04-01/06-2904), TC I, 7 August 2012, at § 194. 
157 Ibid., § 195. 
158 Ibid., § 197. 
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Given the uncertainty as to the number of victims of the crimes in this case – save that a considerable number of 
people were affected ... the Court should ensure there is a collective approach that ensures reparations reach 
those victims who are currently unidentified.159 
This approach has also been confirmed by the law and practice of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Indeed, whereas only civil parties (those victims who 
satisfy the requirements for participation) have the right to reparation, Rule 23 quinquies 
establishes that reparation may only be moral and collective. Accordingly, measures ordered 
by the Chambers are likely to address a large group of persons, potentially involving not only 
the civil parties but also their families and communities. In the Duch case, for instance, the 
Chambers ordered as a measure of reparation the compilation and publication of all 
statements of apology and acknowledgments of responsibility made by the accused during the 
course of the trial.160  
Although the Special Tribunal for Lebanon does not grant victims a right to 
reparation, its legal framework indicates that the concept of victim entitled to reparation may 
be in principle broader than that of victim participants. Indeed, Article 25 of the STL Statute 
indicates that, following the conviction of the accused, the Tribunal ‘may identify victims 
who have suffered harm as a result of the commission of crimes’. Moreover, pursuant to Rule 
86(G) of the STL RPE, ‘any person identified in a final judgment as a victim, or otherwise 
considering himself or herself victim ... may request from the Registrar a certified copy of the 
judgment for the purpose of exercising his or her rights under national or other relevant law’. 
A conjunctive reading of these provisions indicates that in order to be identified in a final 
judgment (for the purpose of claiming reparation before domestic or other competent fora) 
individuals only need to be recognised as victims and do not need to meet the requirements 
for the victim-participant status. Victims identified in the final judgment for the purposes of 
reparation may in fact be a much broader group than victim-participants since fairness and 
efficiency concerns are less likely to play a role in this determination. 
 
 
                                                 
159 Ibid., § 219. 
160 ECCC, Judgment, Duch, supra note no. 122, §§ 668-669. 
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5 AN EMERGING SHARED CONCEPT OF VICTIMS FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS? 
 
5.1 The Constitutive Elements of an Emerging Shared Concept of Victim 
 
The protection of individuals from the harmful effects of internationally wrongful acts is the 
primary mission of both international humanitarian law and international human rights law. 
Protection of and redress for individuals harmed by international crimes can also be 
considered part of the mandate of recently established international criminal tribunals. From 
this perspective, a broad and comprehensive concept of victim has its merits, namely (i) 
attenuating the harmful effects of a violation, and (ii) enlarging the protection in respect to all 
those persons who may potentially suffer harm as a result of an armed conflict or gross 
human rights violations. Unfortunately, it would be completely unrealistic to imagine that all 
victims in a broad sense could be entitled to exercise the right to bring a claim before an 
international court or to obtain reparation for the harm suffered. Consequently, as has been 
argued in the previous section, these three bodies of law have set out certain prerequisites for 
the concept of victim to have legal meaning. 
Despite the specific differences singled out throughout the Chapter, the definitions of 
victim elaborated within distinct bodies of international law under examination have three 
elements in common: (i) the victim must have suffered harm; (ii) a violation of international 
law has to have occurred; and (iii) there must be a link between the harm suffered and the 
international wrongful act at issue. Only when these three requirements are cumulatively met, 
may the concept of victim acquire legal meaning, that is, the victims so identified may be 
entitled to exercise certain rights in accordance with the specific body of law applicable.  
As this Chapter has shown, harm is central to the concept of victim. The concept of 
harm has been generally interpreted in a broad manner, including material, physical and 
mental harm, as well as, for instance, the loss of the opportunity to achieve self-fulfilment. 
Moreover, focusing the concept of victim on the concept of harm and not on the link between 
the wrongful act and the victim (as was the case in relation to the definition of victim adopted 
by the ad hoc Tribunals) has allowed human rights bodies and international criminal tribunals 
to grant victim status to persons who have not been directly targeted by the violations, such as 
the relatives and dependants of direct victims.  
On the other hand, the concept of victim is always linked to the violation of a norm of 
international law. In the case of international humanitarian law, for instance, it has been 
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observed that the person claiming victim status must suffer harm as a result of a concrete 
violation of the jus in bello: this limit arises from the recognition that certain collateral 
damage caused by military operations may indeed be lawful and, as such, do not trigger the 
responsibility of the attacker towards the victims. Likewise, an individual claiming victim 
status before international criminal tribunals must have suffered harm from an international 
crime which falls into the jurisdiction of the relevant tribunal and, more precisely, from the 
crimes charged against the accused in the case where participation and/or reparation is sought. 
A broad interpretation of the concept of victim for the purposes of participation in the 
proceedings, indeed, risks undermining the courts’ mandate. For example, from the 
perspective of the accused’s right to a fair trial, it would certainly be better to clarify that only 
those persons against whom the crimes charged have been allegedly committed can 
participate in the proceedings. Furthermore, narrowing the category of victims entitled to 
participate may result in a considerable reduction of filings and interventions, eventually 
contributing to the expeditiousness of the trial itself. 
Finally, a causal nexus must exist between the harm suffered by the individual 
claiming victim status and the relevant violation of international law. In this respect, we have 
observed in this Chapter that no specific criteria of causation has been adopted and that courts 
have often opted for a broad interpretation of this requirement; whilst it is necessary to 
exclude false or preposterous claims, as well as claims of persons who have only remotely 
suffered from the violation at issue, it is in fact important not to place a too high burden on 
legitimate claims of victims. 
 
5.2 Particular Features of the Concept of Victim in Cases of Gross Violations of 
Human Rights  
 
In situations of gross and systematic violations of human rights, the identification of victims 
poses two main challenges. The first challenge relates to the quantitative aspect of this type of 
violations: the sheer number of individuals that may be potentially eligible for victim status. 
The second challenge is that victims of this type of violations are most often victimised in a 
specific way, entailing special characteristics of victimhood. In particular, as observed 
previously, it is not only individuals that can be recognised as victims but also groups may 
also become targets and victims of these violations. Furthermore, in cases of mass 
victimisation, the society at large where atrocities have occurred may be considered as 
victimised.  
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As already observed, mass victimisation poses great challenges when victim status is 
associated with the exercise of rights, such as the right to have access to justice, to participate 
in proceedings and to seek reparation. Ideally, all those who meet the terms of the definition 
of victim should be granted rights. Yet, when dealing with victims of gross human rights 
violations, such an overall recognition would render any specific right void of substance and 
would deny proper victim recognition to those harmed in a specific way by the violations at 
issue. 
In such situations, apparently opposing considerations and factors play a role. On the 
one hand the attempt to enforce rights in an inclusive way with respect to all victims and on 
the other, the policy factor where a line must be drawn in situations where there is a large 
number of victims. In this respect, it has been argued that ‘delimitations seem necessary.’161 
Nonetheless, as I will argue in the next section, delimitation does not necessarily mean 
exclusion. Rather, an interesting approach seems to be emerging from the practice of 
international human rights bodies and international criminal tribunals linking the 
interpretation of victim status to the rights which are conditioned upon the recognition of such 
a status.  In other words, a functional interpretation of the concept of victim is emerging 
particularly in cases of gross violations of human rights and international crimes.  
 
5.3 A Functional Interpretation of the Concept of Victim  
 
As observed above, the recognition of victims’ rights at the international level, especially in 
cases of gross human rights violations and international crimes where a large number of 
individuals can be recognised as victim may have a considerably different impact upon the 
effective realisation of those rights. A distinction can be drawn, for instance, between 
individual-based rights and collectivity-based rights. Individual-based rights rest on the 
principle that the violation of an individual’s right creates a corresponding individual right to 
access to justice and to reparation (as has been explored in Chapter I). This category of rights 
includes, therefore, the right of participation in proceedings before international fora (locus 
standi in judicio before human rights supervisory bodies, participation in international 
criminal proceedings).  
                                                 
161 H. Rombouts, P. Sardaro and S. Vandegiste, ‘The Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic 
Violations of Human Rights’, in K. De Feyter, S. Parmentier, M. Bossuy and P. Lemmens (eds), Out of the 
Ashes: Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Violations of Human Rights (Antwerpen: Intersentia & 
Institute for Human Rights, 2006) 345-503, at 469. 
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Conversely, collectivity based-rights reflect a symbolic, as opposed to individual, 
approach which goes beyond individual victims’ rights and interests, providing recognition to 
victims not only as injured individuals, but also as members of a community which has also 
been injured by the violations at issue. Collectivity-based rights generally belong to the 
category of satisfaction, and may include official apologies and acknowledgments of 
responsibility, commemorations and tributes as well as accountability of perpetrators. 
Plainly, individual-based rights are hard to conceive and realise in a context of mass-
victimisation.  In these circumstances a collective approach seems often more realistic. An 
effective realisation of victims’ rights may only be achieved by identifying the group of right-
holders on the basis of the specific right they are entitled to and to the impact of this right on 
the proceedings. This task is facilitated by the fact that the constitutive elements of the 
concept of victim are left undefined and the relevant bodies are largely free to develop their 
interpretation of the concept on a case-by-case basis in order to deal with potential imbalances 
and to model the procedures according to different priorities.  
The case-by-case approach, which has thus far been adopted across the international 
legal order, should not, however, lead to the complete unpredictability of the interpretation of 
the concept.  Rather, international bodies that have jurisdiction over individual claims shall 
work at the elaboration of a functional and coherent interpretation of the concept itself. This 
means that the definition of the victim should be interpreted according to the various contexts, 
and to which rights are conditioned upon the qualification as victim.  
Arguably, the concept of victim may be seen as a matryoshka doll, encompassing all 
victims of a crime, regardless of the rights granted to them. The proposed functional 
interpretation requires the judges to identify, within the criteria set out by the relevant rules, 
differently sized groups of victims (from an over-inclusive group to progressively smaller 
ones) for the purpose of exercising rights in different phases of the proceedings.  
Elements of this functional approach can be identified in the practice of both human 
rights supervisory bodies and international criminal proceedings. One may think, for instance, 
of the distinction made by the IACtHR between the ‘victims’ of a violation, and a broader 
category of individuals defined as ‘injured persons’ who also sustained harm as a result of the 
violation at issue. In this situation only a restricted category of individuals (the victims as 
narrowly defined) has a right to locus standi in judicio before the Court. This does not, 
however, deprive other persons otherwise harmed by the violation (a wider group of persons) 
from being granted the ‘injured party’ status and, in principle, being entitled to reparations. A 
functional approach has also been adopted by international and internationalized criminal 
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tribunals where, as discussed above, the concept of victim-participant is potentially narrower 
than the concept of victim entitled to reparation.  
The approach adopted so far at the international level seems, therefore, to support an 
interpretation of the concept of victim in accordance with which rights are conditioned upon 
victim status.162 Consequently, at least two definitions of victim can be distinguished (i) the 
victim as the person against whom the violation was committed, and (ii) the victim as the 
person who suffered harm as a result of the violation. The first element of the definition 
relates to those persons who directly suffered from the commission of a crime. This group 
includes the direct victims of a crime (primary victims) and their next of kin (secondary 
victims) when the direct victims are deceased or otherwise unable to apply before the Court. 
This narrow category has been generally granted individual-based rights. 
The second element of the suggested definition, broad in nature and scope, may 
instead be used to identify all those persons who have been harmed to different degrees as a 
consequence of the crime (primary, secondary and tertiary victims). It is clear that this 
expansive concept should be used only in contexts where the number of persons granted 
victim status does not encroach on others’ rights and priorities. For example, at least in 
principle, it does not seem excessively burdensome to grant this potentially large group of 
individuals access to measures of reparation, when collective forms of reparation are at stake, 
and more generally collective-based rights. 
                                                 
162 Note that during the negotiations for the Rome Statute, the Spanish delegation proposed a notion of victim 
very similar to the interpretation here suggested. The proposal, eventually rejected by the drafters, suggested that 
a larger group along the lines of the proposed definition in the UN 1985 Declaration would be considered for 
purposes of protection and assistance, as well as for claiming reparations, while a much reduced group would be 
regarded as victims for the purposes of participation in the proceedings. S. Fernández de Gurmendi, ‘Definition 
of Victims and General Principle’, supra note no. 89, at 431. 
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Despite the specific differences referred to throughout the Chapter, a broad concept of victim, 
identified as the person who has been harmed either directly, indirectly or collectively by an 
internationally unlawful act is gradually emerging in international law. However, no 
agreement seems to have been reached on how the constituent elements of the concept of 
victim, particularly the concept of harm and the causal nexus requirement have to be 
interpreted and a case-by-case approach has thus far been adopted in the case law of 
international courts and tribunals.  
A problem may arise when this definition is to be applied to identify right-holders. 
Here, a case-by-case approach may prove unfair, especially when it may lead to substantial 
disparity of treatment among victims.163 On the other hand, both broad and narrow 
interpretations of the concept have their drawbacks: a broad interpretation may prove simply 
unworkable and potentially unfair towards the accused and a restrictive interpretation may 
eventually entail a denial of justice for persons who were nevertheless harmed by the 
violations at stake, prejudicing the restorative mandate of international criminal tribunals. 
 It is undisputed that the adoption from the outset of a less ambiguous definition of 
victim within the governing rules of the courts under examination would have been more 
desirable. However, every cloud has a silver lining.  
The lack of clarity regarding the definitions of victims eventually adopted by the 
courts under examination offers the judges the opportunity, through their interpretation, to 
balance the competing objectives of human rights protection and international criminal 
justice. In order to do so, it was suggested earlier in the Chapter that the courts adopt a 
functional interpretation of the definition of victim. In other words, they should interpret it 
according to the various contexts, and to which rights are conditioned upon qualification as 
victim.  
In particular, a twofold concept of victim has been advanced, identifying two distinct 
groups of victims. On the one hand, a narrow concept, which includes those individuals 
entitled to exercise an enhanced procedural position, where fairness or efficiency concerns 
demand the reduction of the number of individuals eligible to the victim status. This is, for 
example, the case when victims are able to participate in legal proceedings in their own right 
such as before the regional human rights courts and international criminal tribunals we have 
                                                 
163 War Crimes Research Office, Washington College of Law, Victims Participation Before the International 
Criminal Court (December 2007), available online at http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/documents/12-
2007_Victim_Participation_Before_the_ICC.pdf?rd=1 (last visited on 26 June 2013), at 57-58. 
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examined. Plainly, individual participation, including the right to submit observations and 
evidence, may prove to be simply unfeasible in cases of widespread violations such as those 
resulting from an armed conflict. On the other hand, a broader concept of victim, including a 
wider community of victims, has been proposed for the exercise of collectivity-based rights 
such as collective and symbolic reparations.  All in all, when dealing with victims’ rights, 
courts should seek to elaborate a precise and regime-specific definition of the victim in 
relation to the rights and duties associated with this legal status. 
It may be claimed that the adoption of a functional interpretation of victim eventually 
frustrates victims’ concerns, addressing them only to the extent that they serve the exigencies 
of the regime where they seek rights. However, this is not necessarily the case. Prioritising the 
rights of a first circle of victims, those who most suffered from the commission of a crime, 
does not mean instrumentalizing their concerns. The rationale under the proposed method of 
interpretation is, rather, to safeguard the effective realisation of victims’ rights, as well as of 
the mandate of the international bodies which recognise such rights. 
As will be further developed in the following chapters, victims’ interests need to be 
weighed against other objectives and imperatives of human rights regimes and of international 
criminal justice. The fact that not all the victims of a violation play an active role within the 
proceedings is a limit which scholars need to accept as a sort of ‘genetic drawback’ of mass 
victimisation. Arguably, the proposed method of interpretation permits the range of 
beneficiaries which are entitled to a set of core rights to be maximized, while limiting their 
impact on the other objectives. Only by doing so will the difficult task of reconciling an 
effective recognition of a victims’ right to justice with the manageability, effectiveness and 
fairness of the proceedings be realised. 
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Chapter III 
 
No Redress without (Criminal) Justice: An Emerging Right to 
Justice for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and 
International Crimes 
 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter I illustrated how a distinct redress regime has emerged for victims of gross human 
rights violations. The assumption that the most obvious need for victims is for compensation 
has been increasingly challenged and a ‘return to a symbolic dimension’1 has been 
recommended instead. Accordingly, human rights supervisory bodies have increasingly 
directed states to take specific action other than restitution or compensation to remedy gross 
human rights violations.  
This Chapter will focus on one specific measure that is emerging as an imperative 
component of reparation for victims of gross violations of human rights, namely the 
prosecution of those responsible for the violations. The existence of a link between 
prosecution of human rights offenders and victims’ reparation was acknowledged twenty 
years ago by Theo Van Boven who observed that:  
It cannot be ignored that a clear nexus exists between the impunity of perpetrators of gross violations of human 
rights and the failure to provide just and adequate reparation to the victims and their families or dependents.2  
Likewise, the General Assembly of the United Nations emphasised that ‘the 
accountability of individual perpetrators of grave human rights violations is one of the central 
elements of any effective remedy for victims of human rights violations and a key factor in 
ensuring a fair and equitable justice system and, ultimately, reconciliation and stability within 
a State.’3  
In describing a torture victim, Chilean novelist Isabel Allende referred to a person who 
‘wants her suffering to be acknowledged, she needs an apology, she demands that the 
                                                 
1 M. Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1998), at 110. 
2 Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Final report submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, 2 July 1993, § 126. 
3 UN GA, Khmer Rouge Trials, UN Doc. A/Res/57/228, 27 February 2003. 
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criminals face trial. Otherwise, how could she start healing?’4 A growing literature on 
impunity for gross violations of human rights, both from a psychological and a legal 
perspective, supports the view that prosecuting perpetrators alleviates the suffering of 
victims.5 While criminal courts cannot provide individual rehabilitation per se, they do 
reinforce societal healing.6 Moreover, certain aspects of the judicial process, when performed 
effectively, may provide victims with closure and healing.7  
 The deleterious effects of impunity on survivors has been the object of a vast 
literature in psychiatry and psychology. The authors, mostly therapists that have provided 
support to torture victims, have often argued that the absence of trials, guilty verdicts or 
punishment was itself psychologically harmful. For instance, Inge Genefke, the Secretary 
General of the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims described impunity as 
a ‘tangible continuing injury… an impediment to the individual’s and society’s healing 
process’.8  
A number of legal scholars have also contended that justice can moderate a victims’ 
desire for revenge and foster respect for democratic institutions. For instance, Antonio 
Cassese, the first president of the ICTY observed: 
[J]ustice dissipates the call for revenge, because when the Court metes out the perpetrator his just deserts, then 
the victims’ calls for retribution are met; by dint of dispensation of justice, victims are prepared to be reconciled 
with their erstwhile tormentors, because they know that the latter have now paid for their crimes.9 
It is argued that the awareness that justice matters to victims has brought to a gradual 
reconsideration of the types of remedies that victims of certain serious violations should be 
granted. Recent human rights practice and jurisprudence appear to increasingly support the 
view that the identification, the prosecution of wrongdoers is an imperative remedy in the 
aftermath of gross violations of human rights. A crucial shift in rationale is implied in this 
emerging trend. Indeed, while the prosecution of human rights offenders has traditionally 
                                                 
4 I. Allende, ‘Impunity’, text presented at the UN International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 26 June 
1999, cited in J. O’Connell, ‘Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Offenders Console 
Their Victims?’ 46 Harvard International Law Journal (2005) 295-345, at 318.  
5 For a thorough analysis of the psychological effects on criminal prosecutions on victims, see J. O’Connell, 
‘Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Offenders Console Their Victims?’, supra note no. 
4; R. Aldana-Pindell, ‘In Vindication of Justiciable Victims’ Right to Truth and Justice for State-sponsored 
Crimes’ 35 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law (2002) 1399-1502. 
6 Y. Danieli, ‘Reappraising the Nuremberg Trials and Their Legacy: The Role of Victims in International Law’, 
27 Cardozo Law Review (2006) 1633-1649, at 1640. 
7 This aspect is explored in more depth in Chapter V in relation to victims of international crimes.  
8 I. Genefke, ‘Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture’, 26 June 1999, 
cited in E. Stover, The Witness: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), at 12. 
9 A. Cassese, ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’, 61 Modern Law Review (1998) 1-10, at 6. 
  
129 
been considered a measure of general human rights protection, it is now also called for in the 
interest of the individual victims.10  The framing of criminal justice as a victim’s right raises a 
number of theoretical questions that will need to be addressed throughout this Chapter, 
particularly in respect to the relationship between the emerging right to justice and the states’ 
duty to prosecute.  
To this end, this Chapter is divided into two parts: (i) the first part analyses the 
traditional rationales that support a duty to prosecute and punish international crimes and 
gross human rights violations; (ii) the second part considers the affirmation of a right to 
criminal justice as an integral component of the right to remedy for victims of gross human 
rights violations. 
 
                                                 
10 See e.g. A. Eide, ‘Preventing Impunity for the Violator and Ensuring Remedies for the Victim’ 69 Nordic 
Journal of International Law (2000) 1-10; T. Van Boven, ‘Accountability for International Crimes: The 
Victim’s Perspective, in C. Joyner (ed.), Reining in Impunity for International Crimes and Serious Violations of 
Fundamental Human Rights: Proceedings of the Siracusa Conference 17-21 September 1998 (Toulouse: Érès, 
1998) 349-357, at 353. 
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2 THE DUTY TO PROSECUTE AND ITS LEGAL RATIONALE 
 
 Confronting gross human rights violations is a much more difficult endeavour than 
confronting ordinary crime due to the high number of perpetrators and victims as well as the 
complexity of the task of assessing allegations of wrongful acts and determining 
responsibility for wrongdoing. The instruments designed to deal with gross human rights 
violations have been various, ranging from the creation of international tribunals (when these 
violations amount to international crimes), to the initiation of domestic trials, administrative 
proceedings and general amnesties.  
In this regard, however, it has been rightly observed that ‘[s]ilence and impunity have 
been the norm rather than the exception’.11 The prevalence of impunity over accountability in 
the aftermath of gross violations of human rights may be attributed to two main interrelated 
factors. The first is that traditionally accountability for human rights violations fell into the 
‘domaine réservé’ of the state concerned. According to the traditional Grotian model of public 
international law, the sovereignty of states covered the acts of a state against its own citizens, 
regardless of the lawfulness of such acts.12 Secondly, in the absence of a specific obligation to 
prosecute and punish those responsible for gross human rights violations, states have often 
opted for alternative solutions to criminal trials with a view to stopping the violations (if these 
are still ongoing) or avoiding the risk of provoking further violence.13  
However, since the end of World War II, in the wake of widespread revulsion against 
the crimes committed during the conflict, states finally began to accept limits on their 
sovereignty in relation to the human rights of those individuals subject to their jurisdiction.  
Since then, the duty of states to prosecute certain serious crimes has gradually become settled 
law. Over the last three decades, international law and policy have shown growing support for 
the principle ‘that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole must not go unpunished’.14 Two elements, in particular, signal the increasing support 
for a state’s obligation to investigate and prosecute violations of personal integrity and take 
action against those responsible: (i) the adoption of treaties explicitly providing for the 
obligation of states to prosecute and punish perpetrators of acts defined as crimes under 
                                                 
11 C. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), at 3. 
12 On this issue, see K. Ambos, ‘Judicial Accountability of Perpetrators of Perpetrators of Human Rights 
Violations and the Role of Victims’, International Peacekeeping (March 2000 – June 2000), 67-77, at 67. 
13 For a global perspective on the use of criminal prosecution in the aftermath of gross violations, see C. Nino, 
supra note 11, at 3-40. See also D. Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime’, 100 Yale Journal of International Law (1991) 2537-2615.  
14  Preamble, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘ICCSt.’)  
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international law; and (ii) the interpretation by human rights supervisory bodies of the 
obligation to ‘respect and ensure’ rights as entailing the duty to prosecute those responsible 
for gross violations of human rights. 
Examples of universal treaties demanding the criminalisation and punishment of 
certain gross human rights offenses are the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocol I of 
1977, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, the Convention to Suppress Slavery and Slavery Trade, the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, the 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, the 
Hostage Convention and the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation. At the regional level, mention can be made to the Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture and the Inter-American Convention on Forced 
Disappearance. 
Those instruments impose on states the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish 
those suspected or charged with the relevant crimes. It is clear that these treaties are only 
binding on states party to them and, moreover, only cover crimes of a particularly serious 
nature such as torture, genocide, slavery and apartheid. As such, the question arises as to 
whether a duty to prosecute also extends to other human rights violations, particularly the 
most serious ones, such as extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances.  
Notably, most human rights conventions are silent regarding the duty to prosecute and 
punish human rights violations. However, authoritative interpretations of broad human rights 
treaties hold that states parties fail to ‘ensure and respect’ certain individuals’ rights if they do 
not affirmatively investigate and prosecute those responsible for the violations of such rights. 
The ‘respect and ensure’ provisions can be found in a number of human rights treaties 
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), the American 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ACHR’), and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘ECHR’).15 While for a long time it was assumed that states enjoyed a certain margin of 
discretion in determining the appropriate measures on how to fulfil the obligation to respect 
and ensure human rights, a review of the practice of human rights supervisory bodies 
indicates that a set of core fundamental rights – the right to life and the right to be free from 
                                                 
15 Art. 2(1) ICCPR; Art. 1 ACHR; Art. 1 ECHR. 
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torture and inhuman and degrading treatments - demand special protection and require states 
to prosecute those allegedly responsible for those violations.16  
An analysis of the interpretation of the ‘respect and ensure’ norms by these bodies 
indicates that the rationale for conceiving the duty to prosecute as a measure of human rights 
protection is twofold: (i) on the one hand, prosecution is deemed necessary to prevent further 
violations of human rights; (ii) on the other, it has been argued that the failure to prosecute 
may be considered as a form of complicity in the crime.  As such, prosecution is necessary to 
re-establish respect for the norm violated and individual and societal trust in the rule of law.  
 
2.1 Prosecution as a Measure to Prevent Further Human Rights Abuses 
 
The idea that the prosecution of certain serious violations is required in order to effectively 
protect human rights has been supported by a large number of international institutions. In 
particular, the Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’), the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘IACtHR’) have elaborated a 
considerable jurisprudence on this issue. A separate analysis of the three bodies is thus 
necessary.  
 
2.1.1 The Human Rights Committee 
 
The Human Rights Committee has generally referred to the first two paragraphs of Article 2 
of the ICCPR as the legal basis for the duty to punish those responsible for serious human 
rights violations. Paragraph 1 of Article 2 obliges states to ‘respect and ensure’ the rights 
recognised in the Covenant. Reference to this provision is based on the idea that impunity 
threatens respect for human rights. A state of impunity, according to the Committee, 
‘encourages further violations of Covenant rights’.17 The punishment of offences is therefore 
required primarily because of its deterrent effect, with a view to preventing further human 
rights violations. From this perspective, prosecution is also deemed necessary for the re-
establishment of peace in societies emerging from conflict. This position was taken by the 
                                                 
16 D. Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’, supra 
note no. 13, at 2540-2541.  
17 HRC, Comments on Nigeria, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.65, 24 July 1996, § 32. In Hugo Rodríguez v. 
Uruguay the Committee noted with concern that impunity may give rise to further grave human rights violations. 
Hugo Rodríguez v. Uruguay (Comm. No. 322/1988), UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988, 19 July 1994, § 2.4.   
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Committee in a comment on Burundi, for instance, in which it defined impunity as an 
‘obstacle to the restoration of lasting peace.’18  
Aside from the obligation to respect and ensure Covenant rights the Committee has 
also referred to the duty to ‘give effect’ to the rights in the Covenant pursuant to Article 2(2) 
as a legal basis for its call for prosecution. For example, in its Comments on Colombia of 
1997 the Government was urged to adopt punitive measures against acts of child murder to 
ensure full implementation of Article 24 (relating to child rights).19 Similarly, the Committee 
recommended in the case of Yemen ‘that the State party endeavour to bring to justice 
perpetrators of human rights abuses, in accordance with article 2(2) of the Covenant.’20  
The obligation to prosecute has consequently been interpreted as an instrument of 
deterrence and general protection of human rights which is not only related to the victims of 
the violation but rather to society as a whole. Accordingly, no corresponding individual right 
to prosecution has been derived from the provisions mentioned above. 
2.1.2 The European Court of Human Rights 
 
Like its universal counterpart the practice of the European Court of Human Rights is based on 
the concept that the protection of human rights requires that perpetrators of serious human 
rights violations be brought to justice. A review of the Court’s case law reveals that the 
enactment and enforcement of criminal law are currently seen as measures designed to ensure 
the right to life and the effective enjoyment of other human rights. An obligation to prosecute 
as such is, however, confined to the most serious violations of human rights, notably the right 
to life and the prohibition of torture. As such, criminal prosecution is considered to be a 
matter of implementing the right to life or the right to physical integrity required by Articles 2 
and 3 of the Convention respectively, read in conjunction with the obligation to secure human 
rights under Article 1.  
The Court has specified in a number of judgments the reasons why criminal 
prosecution is necessary for human rights protection. First, as it has affirmed in a number of 
cases, deterrence is a primary reason for the duty to criminalise and prosecute serious abuses.  
The preventive aspect of criminal law thus not only demands the criminalisation of certain 
conduct, but also ‘a law enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and 
                                                 
18 HRC, Comments on Burundi, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.41, 3 August 1994, § 4. 
19 HRC, Concluding Observations on Colombia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.75, 5 May 1997, § 42.  
20 HRC, Comments on Yemen, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.51, 3 October 1995, § 19.  
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punishment’21 of such conduct. By prosecuting serious human rights violations States parties 
seek to prevent the commission of further crimes. On the contrary, a climate of impunity 
would give rise to further violations. In other words, if perpetrators are able to commit abuses 
without being held accountable the protection of rights is rendered ineffective. 
Second, the Court has considered criminal prosecution as a necessary measure to 
protect the rule of law. In a recent case, Öneryildiz v. Turkey, a Grand Chamber held that: 
[T]he national courts should not under any circumstances be prepared to allow life-endangering offences to go 
unpunished. This is essential for maintaining public confidence and ensuring adherence to the rule of law and for 
preventing any appearance of tolerance of or collusion in unlawful acts […].22 
Apart from restoring rule of law, criminal prosecution also re-establishes public confidence in 
the use of force by the state.23 All these reasons show that the obligation to prosecute is 
generally concerned with general human rights protection as a shared interest of society and 
not as an individual right of the victim even though these statements have been made in the 
context of individual complaints. In this respect, it has been argued that in recent cases the 
Court has increasingly called on states to adopt not only measures concerning the individual 
victim but also general measures of human rights protection with a view to managing its 
increasing caseload.24 From a different perspective, however, the fact that the Court has called 
upon state parties to ensure criminal justice when dealing with individual complaints (and not 
only in inter-state cases) may also be read as a first step towards a general affirmation of an 
individual right to justice.  
 
 
2.1.3 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has developed an ample jurisprudence on how 
States parties to the American Convention ought to react to serious human rights violations 
and which form of accountability is required. In particular, the Inter-American Court has long 
                                                 
21 ECtHR, Kontrová v. Slovakia (App. No. 7510/04), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 31 May 2007, § 
49 (relating to breaches of Art. 2 ECHR (right to life)); in relation to breaches of Art. 3 ECHR (Prohibition of 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatments), see Okkali v. Turkey (App. No. 52067/99), Judgment (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction), 17 October 2006, § 65. 
22 ECtHR, Öneryildiz v. Turkey (App. No. 48939/99), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 30 November 
2004, §§ 95-96. 
23 ECtHR, Ramsahai and Others v. The Netherlands (App. No. 52391/99), Judgment (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction), 15 May 2007, § 325. 
24 A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 
119. 
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established that states are under a duty to prosecute those responsible for gross violations of 
human rights and, to that end, it has traditionally indicated as the legal basis for such an 
obligation the provision on the need to ‘respect and ensure’ rights, stipulated in Article 1(1) of 
the American Convention of Human Rights.  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights elaborated on the content of this provision 
in the 1988 Velásquez Rodríguez decision.25 The case concerned the arrest, torture, and 
execution of a Honduran student activist by the Honduran military. The Court found 
Honduras responsible for violating a number of substantive rights including the rights to life, 
physical integrity and personal liberty. Most importantly, it found that Honduras had also 
breached the general obligation of Article 1(1) of the ACHR to ensure these rights. In this 
respect, the Court asserted that the obligation of article 1 to ‘ensure’ rights places a positive 
obligation on the states parties to ‘organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the 
structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically 
ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights.’26 Accordingly, the Court added:  
The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its 
disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those 
responsible, impose the appropriate punishment and ensure the victim adequate compensation.27 
The Court has repeatedly emphasised the seriousness of the obligation to prosecute human 
rights violations. In the case of Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, concerning the forced 
disappearance of two children, the Court held that ‘[w]henever there has been a human rights 
violation, the State has a duty to investigate the facts and punish those responsible … and this 
obligation must be complied with in a serious manner and not as a mere formality.’28 
This approach has been further elaborated in subsequent cases in which the Court has 
emphasised that by complying with the duty to investigate, prosecute and punish, states 
combat impunity and deter future repetition. For example, in Paniagua Morales the Court 
held that the situation of impunity in Guatemala violated the general obligation to protect and 
to ensure the exercise of rights. In particular, the Court found that:  
[T]he total lack of investigation, prosecution, capture, trial and conviction of those responsible for violations of 
the rights protected by the American Convention, in view of the fact that the State has the obligation to use all 
                                                 
25 IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (Merits), 29 July 1988. 
26 Ibid., § 166. 
27 Ibid., § 174. 
28 IACtHR, Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 1 March 2005, § 
168. 
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the legal means at its disposal to combat that situation … fosters chronic recidivism of human rights violations, 
and total defenselessness of victims and their relatives.29 
In a similar vein, the Court has also emphasised the connection between the duty to 
prosecute and the rehabilitation of the society which has been affected by mass atrocities. In 
the aforementioned Serrano case, the Court noted that by providing a full account of the 
events surrounding the violations, justice benefits ‘the society as a whole, because, by 
knowing the truth about such crimes, they can be prevented in the future.’30 Indeed, if the 
society is made aware of the heinous character of the atrocities that have occurred and of the 
fact that perpetrators did not escape justice there is little chance that these atrocities will occur 
again.  As has been correctly noted, ‘[b]y forcing society to confront these evils, the Court has 
helped prevent future human rights violations.’31 
Similarly, according to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
(‘IAComHR’), impunity and the commission of serious human rights abuses are deeply 
interconnected.32 Impunity, in the view of the Commission, causes a vicious circle that tends 
to be perpetuated, thereby increasing the number of violations. Not only does a climate of 
impunity not deter potential perpetrators, the lack of justice may in fact result in people taking 
justice into their own hands, giving rise to further human rights violations.33  
The reasoning of the Inter-American institutions shows that investigation and 
punishment are considered as measures to ensure that all persons are able to enjoy the rights 
of the Convention since prosecution is required in order to prevent the commission of further 
crimes. Such statements, considering prosecution as a means to ensure human rights pursuant 
to Article 1 of the Convention, resemble the Human Rights Committee’s and the European 
Court of Human Rights’ interpretation of the equivalent ‘respect and ensure’ provisions. This 
rationale has led the Inter-American institutions to criticise any large-scale impunity, as will 
be further analysed in Chapter IV.  
 
 
                                                 
29 IACtHR, Paniagua Morales et al. v. Guatemala, Judgment (Merits), 8 March 1998, § 173. 
30 IACtHR, Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, supra note no. 28, § 169. 
31 B. Mayeux and J. Mirabal, ‘Collective and Moral Reparations in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, 
Human Rights Clinic, The University of Texas School of Law, November 2009, at 18, available online at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/HRC_F09_CollectiveReparations.pdf (last visited on 10 
June 2013).  
32 IAComHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru, 2 June 2000, § 206. 
33 IAComHR, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Paraguay, 9 March 2001, Chapter III, 
‘Impunity’, § 9. 
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2.2 Prosecution as a Measure to Retrospectively Protect Substantive Human Rights 
 
Apart from having a preventative aim, prosecution of human rights offenders has also been 
considered as a measure to protect the individual victim. From this perspective, prosecution is 
not (only) seen as an instrument to deter further violations but to avoid the retroactive 
complicity of the state. As Fletcher has argued:  
The relevant point today is that we see the failure to punish as a form of complicity that falls on those who 
abandon the victim to his or her ‘private’ tragedy. When society and its officials look the other way, their 
indifference exacerbates the original crime. The victim suffers twice, first from the crime itself and second from 
the sense of being abandoned by the society that is supposed to condemn the crime.34 
Indeed, the failure to sanction human rights violations could be considered as a form of 
retroactively aiding and abetting those responsible of the violations. In this way, the failure to 
take criminal measures may amount to a violation of a substantive individual right.35  
This rationale has been explained by the Human Rights Committee in its General 
Comment No. 31: 
There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Covenant rights as required by article 2 would give rise 
to violations by States Parties of those rights, as a result of States Parties’ permitting or failing to take 
appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused by 
such acts.36 
The retrospective protection rationale is also well established in the practice of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and of the European Court of Human Rights. In the 
Velásquez Rodríguez case, the IACtHR required Honduras to prosecute the offenders to 
ensure the victim ‘the free and full exercise of his human rights.’37 According to the Court’s 
reasoning, investigation and prosecution are measures aimed at securing victim’s rights. In 
other words, prosecution is considered, similar to the position taken by the Human Rights 
Committee, as a form of retrospective protection owed to the individual victim. This was 
made clear by the Court when it stressed that:  
                                                 
34 G.P. Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law: American Comparative and International, vol. I: Foundations 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 258.  
35 See on this issue, C.A.E. Bakker, Towards the Effective Prosecution of International Crimes: Evolving Norms 
and State Practice in Argentina, Chile and Peru (Florence: European University Institute, 2006). 
36 General Comment no. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the 
Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, § 8. 
37 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, supra note no. 25, § 166. 
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Where the acts of private parties that violate the Convention are not seriously investigated, those parties are 
aided in a sense by the government, thereby making the State responsible on the international plane.38  
Therefore, even if this failure is not the primary cause of the abuse suffered by the 
victim, it is considered as a form of retrospective acquiescence. Accordingly, prosecution and 
punishment are regarded as a measure to re-establish respect for the victims’ violated rights. 
From this point of view, the rationale of prosecution extends beyond prevention and general 
human rights protection, acquiring aspects which are more akin to the concept of remedy. As 
will be argued in the next section, the retrospective protection rationale has in fact been 
gradually substituted by reference to remedial rights of victims. 
As stated above, the European Court of Human Rights has also adopted the 
retrospective protection rationale. The assumption of a duty to investigate has been seen not 
only as a primary measure of general human rights protection but also as deriving from the 
infringed substantive right. In particular, the Court has referred to this duty as the ‘procedural 
limb’ of individual rights.39 Consequently, every victim of gross human rights violations is 
entitled to a criminal investigation. The Court explained this in the case Kaya v. Turkey:  
The obligation to protect the right to life under art. 2, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under art. 
1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms in Convention”, 
requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation.40  
Although this statement would appear to be limited to reaffirming the idea of deriving 
positive obligations from the duty to respect and ensure conventional rights, the Court goes 
beyond this. Indeed, positive obligations have been traditionally limited to measures of 
prevention. As a matter of fact, a criminal investigation is not preventative in the sense that ‘it 
cannot make the crime non-existent’.41 Therefore, call for investigation can only be explained 
by referring also to the need to retrospectively secure the right of the victim. As such an 
investigation is de facto ‘remedial in nature’.42 This legal reasoning has parallels with the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Committee.  
                                                 
38 Ibid., § 177.  
39 See e.g., ECtHR, Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy (App. No. 32967/96), Judgment (Merits), 17 January 2002, § 49; 
Šilih v. Slovenia (App. No. 71463/01), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 9 April 2009, §§ 192-196 and 
the case law cited therein.  
40 ECtHR, Kaya v. Turkey (App. No. 22729/93), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 19 February 1998, § 
86. 
41 A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations, supra note no. 24, at 128. 
42 Ibid.  
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On the whole, investigation and prosecution are consequently regarded as measures to 
secure the victims’ substantive rights and not only to ensure general human rights protection. 
Arguably, the retrospective protection rationale, which expanded primary protection of 
individual rights to remedial measures, has paved the way for the progressive affirmation of 
criminal prosecution as a form of remedy, as the next section shall illustrate.  
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3 THE AFFIRMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AS AN INTEGRAL COMPONENT OF THE 
RIGHT TO REMEDY FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 
3.1 Some Preliminary Remarks 
 
As the sections above have shown, the duty to prosecute serious human rights violations has 
been traditionally framed as an objective duty of general human rights protection. The 
fulcrum of the case for criminal prosecution is that it is the most effective insurance against 
future violations: the failure to prosecute and punish human rights violations may result in the 
insufficient protection of further abuses.43 Besides the preventative rationale, human rights 
supervisory bodies have also adopted the view that criminal law measures may serve as 
retrospective protection of substantial individual rights. From this perspective, in the previous 
sections it has been argued that if criminal measures are required to ensure an individual right, 
their rationale is not preventative, but rather remedial. However, until recently, these bodies 
have not set out an individual right to claim such measures. In other words, individuals have 
not been granted a right against the state to bring the perpetrators to justice based on the 
state’s obligation to prosecute gross violations of human rights.44  
For instance, in a number of views on individual communications, the Human Rights 
Committee has held that there is no individual right to see one’s abuser criminally 
prosecuted.45 In a similar vein, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, when ordering the 
remedy in the above-mentioned Velásquez Rodríguez case, was hesitant in ordering the 
measure that would seem to be implied by the language of its judgment. At the remedy stage 
the Court ordered only monetary compensation, while lawyers for the victims’ families, the 
Inter-American Commission, and a group of international law experts acting as amici curiae 
had asked the Court for much broader reparative measures including an injunction requiring 
Honduras to prosecute criminally those responsible for disappearances.46 
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the adoption of the retrospective protection 
rationale instead of the general human rights protection rationale has paved the way for the 
gradual affirmation of the remedial function of criminal measures. As the next sections will 
                                                 
43 M. C. Bassiouni, ‘Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Serious 
Violations of Human Rights’, in Idem (ed.) Post-Conflict Justice (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2002), 
3-54, at 52. 
44 A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations, supra note no. 24, at 190-193.   
45 HRC, H.C.M.A. v. the Netherlands (Comm. No. 213/1986), UN Doc. CCPR/C/35/D/213/1986, 30 March 
1989, § 11.6; S.E. v. Argentina (Comm. No. 275/1988), UN Doc. CCPR/C/WG/36/DR/275/1988, 26 March 
1990, § 5.5; R.A., V.N. et al. v. Argentina (Comm. Nos. 343, 344 and 345/1988), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/38/D/343/1988, 26 March 1990, § 5.5. 
46 IACtHR, Velázquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (Reparation and Costs), 21 July 1989, § 9.  
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attempt to demonstrate, this has led to the affirmation of criminal justice as an integral 
component of the right to remedy for victims of gross human rights violations.  
In particular, the decisions of treaty-based human rights tribunals and provisions in 
binding and non-binding international human rights documents highlight that for victims of 
violations of the right to life and personal integrity (such as in cases involving arbitrary 
detentions, forced disappearances, torture and extrajudicial executions) prosecution of the 
offenders is necessary to make the remedy effective.47 In this way, states not only have a duty 
to the public but also to the victims to prosecute grave human rights abuses. As such, the 
development of this practice supports the emergence of a victims’ right to justice for serious 
human rights violations which coexists with the relevant state’s duty to prosecute.  
It must be clarified at the outset that with the assumption of a right to justice as an 
integral component of victims’ right to remedy it is not suggested here that criminal justice 
alone can suture the lesions of individual and collective trauma. For survivors of gross 
violations of human rights, the idea of justice may encompass more than criminal trials. It 
means return of stolen property, locating and identifying the bodies of the missing, securing 
reparations and apologies and helping those traumatised by atrocities to recover.48 As 
evidenced in Chapter I, reparation for victims of gross human rights violations entails a 
number of measures both pecuniary and non-pecuniary. What is argued here is that criminal 
measures are emerging as a component of reparation, which is to be granted to victims 
cumulatively (i.e., not alternatively) with other measures, of pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
character. Nonetheless, it will also be argued that criminal justice cannot be replaced by 
alternative remedies in certain circumstances.  
Furthermore, although criminal prosecution is considered as a victims’ right, victims 
cannot renounce it by asking, for example, that no action is taken against the alleged 
offenders. This is so for three main reasons. First, in cases of serious human rights violations 
states are under a multidimensional obligation that entails not only the duty to provide 
reparation, but also the duty to prosecute those responsible for the violations. These duties are 
complementary and not alternative. As the Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary and 
arbitrary executions wrote:  
                                                 
47 I expand on these ideas in V. Spiga, ‘No Redress without Justice: Victims and International Criminal Law’, 10 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2012) 1377-1394, at 1381-1384.  
48 E. Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005). 
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Granting compensation presupposes compliance with the obligation to carry out an investigation of human rights 
abuses with a view to identifying and prosecuting their perpetrators. Financial or other compensation before such 
investigations are initiated or concluded, however, does not exempt Governments from this obligation.49  
Second, certain obligations of the state, like the duty to prosecute, are unconditional, 
in the sense that they do not depend on an individual complaint and, consequently, they 
cannot be renounced by victims. Therefore, while victims can forfeit the reparation to which 
they have right, the state is not exempted from its duty to investigate gross human rights 
violations and bring to justice those responsible for them. As observed above, while criminal 
justice is emerging as an individual right, it is also a duty that states owe to the society as a 
whole.   
Finally, the different measures of reparation are not alternative but complementary. As 
indicated in Article 34 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, full reparation shall take 
the form of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction, ‘either singly or in combination’.50 As 
noted in Chapter I, reparation may vary according to the concrete circumstances of the case 
and the nature of the norm violated. However, when certain measures are deemed as adequate 
to afford relief for the harm suffered they cannot be replaced by other measures. For instance, 
as I shall demonstrate in this Chapter, if criminal prosecution is considered as an adequate 
remedy in cases of gross human rights violations, it cannot be replaced by administrative 
proceedings or disciplinary measures.  
The following sections will discuss how criminal prosecution has been progressively 
affirmed as an imperative component of the right to remedy in cases of gross violations of 
human rights, focusing on: (i) international legal instruments establishing a right to justice as 
a remedy for victims of gross human rights violations, and (ii) the practice of human rights 
supervisory bodies. Before doing so, it is necessary to address, however briefly, the 
relationship between criminal measures and the concept of reparation as traditionally used in 
international law. 
 
                                                 
49 Commission on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in 
Any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories: 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, 
submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1993/71, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7, 7 December 
1993, §§ 688 and 711. See also in this sense IACtHR, Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, Judgment 
(Reparations and Costs), 27 August 1998, § 72. 
50 International Law Commission (‘ILC’), Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts with Commentaries (‘ILC Draft Articles’), UN Doc. A/RES/56/83, 22 January 2002, Art. 34.  
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3.2 Criminal Justice and the Traditional Conception of Reparation 
 
Conceiving criminal prosecution as an integral component of victims’ right to remedy may 
potentially be at odds with the way in which the concept of reparation has been traditionally 
used in international law where it is considered to be non-punitive in character.51 As a matter 
of fact, prosecution cannot properly ‘wipe out’ the consequences of an illegal act; bringing to 
justice those responsible for the unlawful killing of an individual does not seem, at least at a 
first sight, to repair the injury caused by the wrongful act. Accordingly, some authors have 
objected to the notion of punitive damages. For instance, Jiménez de Aréchaga defined them 
‘incompatible with the basic idea of reparation’. 52 
This position, however, has been progressively abandoned by legal scholars, as well as 
by the practice of international bodies. This is mainly because the view has emerged, as 
shown in Chapter I, that certain wrongful acts cannot be adequately repaired by way of 
restitution or (only) compensation; rather, they also call for satisfaction. In this respect, 
García-Amador observed that the different forms of reparation pursue two different aims: 
restitution and compensation seek to properly repair the injury suffered, whilst satisfaction 
pursues punitive aims since its scope is determined primarily by the character of the wrongful 
act rather than by the harm caused.53  
In this manner, one may observe that international remedies do not only seek to repair 
the injury suffered as a consequence of the wrongful conduct but also to protect the public 
interest or legal order by punishing wrongdoers. As the next sub-section will explore, the 
affirmation of the criminal accountability of wrongdoers as a remedy for international 
wrongful acts has also been facilitated by the change of paradigm which has occurred 
throughout the last decades whereby the issue of responsibility for international wrongful acts 
is not any longer considered only an inter-state issue, but also concerns the interactions 
between states and individuals as a result of human rights law (amongst other factors). 
In international judicial practice states have often requested prosecution of wrongdoers 
as a measure of reparation, particularly in the traditional framework of the law of state 
responsibility for injury to aliens which is widely recognised as ‘a precursor to international 
                                                 
51 C. J. Tams, ‘Do Serious Breaches Give Rise to Any Specific Obligations of the Responsible State?’, 13 
European Journal of International Law (2002) 1161-1180, at 1166-1170; but see contra F.V. García-Amador, 
The Changing Law of International Claims, vol. 2 (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1984), at 575. 
52 E. Jiménez de Aréchaga,‘International Responsibility’, in M. Sørensen (ed.), Manual of Public International 
Law (London: Macmillan, 1968) 531-603, at 571. 
53 F.V. García-Amador, The Changing Law of International Claims, supra note no. 51, at 559. 
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human rights law’.54 Interestingly, judicial bodies linked the state’s failure to prosecute to the 
so-called ‘denial of justice’, a concept comparable to the right to an effective remedy as 
emerged in modern human rights.55  
This link is well exemplified in the famous dictum by Max Huber in the Spanish 
Moroccan case in which he stated that the responsibility of the state can be engaged for denial 
of justice when it lacked due diligence in the pursuit of criminals.56 Similarly, in the Janes 
case, the United States presented a claim on behalf of the relatives of Mr Janes, an American 
citizen, on the basis of the failure of Mexico to apprehend his murderer. The Claims 
Commission based its award of compensation on the damage caused to the relatives for the 
‘indignity’ caused by the non-punishment of the wrongdoer.57  
In the inter-State context, the existence of a link between the prosecution of 
wrongdoers and the obligation to provide reparation was apparent from the early stages of 
development of the law of state responsibility.  The punishment of individual perpetrators was 
recognised as an element of satisfaction in the work of the Preparatory Committee of the 
League of Nations Codification Conference in 1930. The Basis of Discussion Draft 29 
established that:  
Responsibility involves for the State concerned an obligation to make good the damage suffered … It may also, 
according to the circumstances, and when this consequence follows from the general principles of international 
law, involve the obligation to afford satisfaction to the State which has been injured … in the shape of an 
apology (given with the appropriate solemnity) and (in proper cases) the punishment of the guilty persons.58 
Similarly, in an early stage of the drafting of the ILC Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility for International Wrongful Acts, the prosecution of those responsible for the 
international violation was explicitly listed among the non-monetary measures of satisfaction, 
together with official apologies and the formal acknowledgment of the unlawful character of 
                                                 
54 D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 59. 
55 For an historical reconstruction of the intersection between these two braches of international law, see F. 
Francioni, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law’, 20 European Journal of 
International Law (2009) 729-748. 
56 Affaires des biens britanniques au Maroc Espagnol (Espagne c. Royaume-Uni), 1 March 1925, Recueil de 
sentences arbitrales, vol. II, 615-742, at 645. 
57 Laura M.B. Janes et al. (USA) v. the United Mexican States, 16 November 1925, Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards, vol. IV, 82-98, at 87. 
58 Conference on the Codification of International Law, ‘Basis of Discussion no. 29 (1929)’, cited in D. Shelton, 
Remedies in International Human Rights Law, supra note no. 54, at 54 (emphasis added). This draft reproduces 
the text of Art. 10 of a precedent draft prepared by the Institut de droit international, ‘Draft on “International 
Responsibility of States for Injuries on their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners” Prepared by the 
Institut de droit international (1927)’, reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1957), vol. 2, 
227-229. 
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an act.59 In the current version of the Articles punishment of the guilty officials is no longer 
explicitly mentioned in the provision on satisfaction, Article 37. Nevertheless, the ILC 
Commentary on Article 37 includes ‘disciplinary or penal action against the individuals 
whose conduct caused the internationally wrongful act’ within the various modalities of 
satisfaction.60 The ILC Commentary further specifies that ‘[t]he forms of satisfaction listed in 
the article are no more than examples’, and the appropriate modality of satisfaction will 
depend on the circumstances of the violation and as such cannot be prescribed a priori.61  
Therefore, in certain circumstances, the state responsibility regime admits that the 
criminal accountability of individual perpetrators may be an element of reparation and, more 
precisely, of satisfaction. The examples provided in the ILC Commentary where states 
claimed this kind of satisfaction – the killing in Palestine of Count Bernadotte in 1948 and the 
killing of two US officers in Tehran – further suggest that this form of reparation applies 
especially to those violations of international law which seriously violate the fundamental 
rights of individuals (such as the right to life). 
The inclusion of prosecution as a form of satisfaction for international wrongful acts 
has raised a number of theoretical questions. In particular, it has been argued that criminal 
prosecution is an element of a primary obligation of the state rather than a form of 
satisfaction, and as such it would not derive from a secondary obligation arising from the 
international wrongful act.62 This doubt has been clearly expressed by Crawford in his Third 
Report on State Responsibility, where he observed: ‘It may not always be clear whether 
prosecution of criminal conduct was sought by way of satisfaction or as an aspect of 
performance of some primary obligation’.63 No trace of this objection can, however, be found 
in the Commentary to Article 37, where punishment is listed among the examples of 
satisfaction. Domestic and international practice on the denial of justice mentioned above also 
confirms that criminal prosecution has been considered in certain circumstances as a 
secondary obligation owed to wronged states.  Moreover, as will be observed below with 
regard to the practice of human rights supervisory bodies, the fact that the duty to prosecute is 
conceived as a primary obligation of states does not preclude it from also being considered a 
measure of reparation for victims.  
                                                 
59 See Art. 45, Draft Articles on State Responsibility with Commentaries Thereto Adopted by the International 
Law Commission on First Reading, January 1997. 
60 Art. 37, ILC Draft Articles.  
61 Commentary to Art. 34 of the ILC Draft Articles, annexed to the ILC Draft Articles, at 106. 
62 See e.g., G. Bartolini, Riparazione per violazione dei diritti umani e ordinamento internazionale (Napoli: 
Jovene Editore, 2009), at 452-456; A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations, supra note 
no. 24, at 235-238. 
63 J. Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN-4/507/Add.4, 15 March 2000, § 192. 
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It is clear that the traditional framework of state responsibility limited the right to 
reparation, including the right to have wrongdoers prosecuted, to states. However, as observed 
in the previous Chapter, the ILC Articles leave the door open to an individual right to 
reparation, at least in those treaty systems where mechanisms for claiming reparation are 
provided for, referring for instance to the regime of human rights protection. Accordingly, in 
those contexts, Article 37 may be read as providing a legal basis for an individual right to 
prosecution and punishment of human rights offenders.  
 Taken together, the ILC Articles, as well as the practice on state responsibility for 
injury to aliens, indicate that reparation for international wrongful acts, particularly in the 
cases of serious violations, may include the punishment of those individuals responsible for 
the international wrongful act. Arguably, this is an instructive precedent on the theory and 
practice of individual remedies for gross violations of human rights.  
 
  
3.3 International Legal Instruments Establishing a Victims’ Right to (Criminal) 
Justice as an Element of Redress 
 
As noted in Chapter I, human rights instruments are often silent on the modalities of remedies 
that shall be awarded to victims of human rights violations, leaving in principle the decision 
as to how to fulfil their obligation to states. Accordingly, there is no international treaty 
explicitly demanding the right to justice as a form of reparation for victims of human rights 
violations. In spite of this, in the past two decades, a number of documents adopted within the 
United Nations have affirmed the idea that the accountability of perpetrators is one of the 
most important forms of redress for victims of gross violations of human rights. Although 
these documents have no binding value upon states, they have had a significant influence on 
the work of human rights supervisory bodies, as will be discussed below, and have provided 
an important contribution to the progressive development of international standards in this 
respect.  
In a 1993 report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions emphasised the duty to provide compensation 
to victims of violations of the right to life and linked it to other international legal duties.  
These other duties included the duty of governments to carry out exhaustive or impartial 
investigations into allegations of violations of the right to life, to identify, bring to justice and 
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punish their perpetrators.64 In 1998, the Working Group on Involuntary or Enforced 
Disappearances issued a General Comment to Article 19 of the Declaration on the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,65 which provides for the right to redress and 
adequate compensation for victims of acts of enforced disappearance and their family.66 In the 
General Comment, the Working Group noted that the primary duty imposed by the 
Declaration to establish the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared victim is in itself an 
important remedy.67 Moreover, the Group added that the right to redress referred in Article 19 
extends beyond judicial remedies and depends on the nature of the right violated. Specifically, 
the Committee affirmed that:  
Bearing in mind that impunity is one of the major root causes of the widespread practice of enforced 
disappearance, many victims of such acts and their families consider the prosecution and punishment of the 
perpetrators as important redress for their suffering.68  
The General Assembly has similarly emphasised the importance of criminal 
prosecution as remedy in its resolution on Khmer Rouge Trials of 2003, where it found that 
‘the accountability of individual perpetrators of grave human rights violations is one of the 
central elements of any effective remedy for victims of human rights violations’.69 In the 
‘‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law’,70 adopted by the General Assembly in 2005, the criminal accountability 
of human rights offenders is listed among the measures of satisfaction owed to victims.71  
More recently, efforts have been made to conceptualise victims’ right to justice as an 
independent right. Mention should be made the ‘Report on the Impunity of Perpetrators of 
                                                 
64 Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, 
supra note no. 49, §§ 688-699. 
65 Art. 19 of the Declaration provides: ‘The victims of acts of enforced disappearance and their family shall 
obtain redress and shall have the right to adequate compensation, including the means for as complete a 
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of enforced disappearance, 
their dependants shall also be entitled to compensation.’ 
66 Commission on Human Rights, General Comment on Article 19 of the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/43, 12 January 1998. 
67 Ibid., § 69 
68 Ibid., § 71. 
69 ‘Khmer Rouge Trials’, supra note no. 3, at 1.  
70 UN GA, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation, for 
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, UN 
Doc. A/RES/60/147, 16 December 2005. 
71 Art. 22(f) provides:  ‘Satisfaction should include, where applicable, any or all of the following: … (f) Judicial 
and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations.’ 
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Human Rights Violations’72 prepared by Louis Joinet the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. In his Report, 
Joinet held that the right to an effective remedy ‘implies that all victims shall have the 
opportunity to assert their rights and receive a fair and effective remedy, ensuring that their 
oppressors stand trial and that they obtain reparation.’73 The Special Rapporteur then 
introduced the concept of victims’ right to justice, which ‘entails obligations for the State: to 
investigate violations, to prosecute their perpetrators and, if their guilt is established, to 
punish them.’74 The Joint Report was upheld in substance in the independent study by Diane 
Orentlicher on best practices, including recommendations, to assist states in strengthening 
their domestic capacity to combat all aspects of impunity.75 This study included the ‘Updated 
set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat 
impunity’, which were endorsed by the former Commission of Human Rights in 2005.76 
Principle 19 of the Set, in particular, recognises victims’ right to justice as the rationale for 
states’ duty to: 
[U]ndertake prompt, thorough, independent and impartial investigations of violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law and take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the 
area of criminal justice, by ensuring that those responsible for serious crimes under international law are 
prosecuted, tried and duly punished.  
For the time being, elements in support of a right to justice as an independent right 
remain limited to few sources of non-binding nature. However, as shall be demonstrated in 
the next section, the practice of human rights supervisory bodies is increasingly affirming the 
idea that those responsible for gross human rights violations, including extra-judicial killings, 
enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment should be brought to justice in order to 
make the remedy granted to victims effective.  
 
 
                                                 
72 Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and Political), Revised Final 
Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet Pursuant to Sub-Commission Decision 1996/119, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, 2 October 1997. 
73 Ibid., § 26. 
74 Ibid., § 27.   
75 Commission on Human Rights, Independent Study on Best Practices, Including Recommendations, to Assist 
States in Strengthening their Domestic Capacity to Combat All Aspects of Impunity, by Professor Diane 
Orentlicher, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/88, 27 February 2004, §§ 33-42. 
76 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat 
Impunity, Diane Orentlicher; Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005. 
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3.4 The Practice of Human Rights Supervisory Bodies 
 
 
As observed in Chapter I, since there are not many instruments dealing specifically with the 
right to reparation for victims of gross human rights violations (and since those existing have 
no binding value upon states) the practice of human rights supervisory bodies has been 
decisive as to the affirmation of a distinct redress regime for this category of victims.  This 
regime is based primarily on the concept that immaterial harm suffered by victims of gross 
violations of human rights has to be repaired by way of symbolic measures. Among these 
measures, as this section will discuss, these bodies have progressively included the criminal 
accountability of those responsible for the violations. 
The framing of criminal justice as a victims’ right has thus emerged primarily from the 
interpretation of human rights supervisory bodies of provisions that establish the right to an 
effective remedy. As observed by Aldana-Pindell, this is unsurprising, as often victims file 
complaints before those bodies only when the state has refused to prosecute or anyhow denied 
justice to them.77 These complaints have hence revealed the anguish suffered by the victims 
resulting from the lack of accountability of wrongdoers. Accordingly, they have influenced 
the decisions by human rights bodies that have gradually considered criminal measures not 
only for their deterrent aspect, but also as a remedy.  
 
3.4.1 The Practice of United Nations Treaty Bodies 
 
In the course of the last two decades the practice of the Human Rights Committee on 
individual communications has clarified considerably the status and components of the 
victims’ rights to seek and obtain redress under Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. In particular, the Committee’s practice on individual complaints for 
serious human rights violations has contributed significantly to the progressive expansion of 
the victims’ right to redress.  
As observed above, the traditional approach of the Committee has been that of 
considering punishment as a measure to protect and implement human rights.78 Most 
prominently, the Committee held that impunity weakens respect for human rights and 
                                                 
77 R. Aldana-Pindell, ‘In Vindication of Justiciable Victims’ Right to Truth and Justice for State-sponsored 
Crimes’, 35 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law (2002) 1399-1502, at 1414.  
78 This duty is set out at Article 2(1) and (2) of the ICCPR.  
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encourages further violations of Covenant rights.79 From this perspective, criminal 
prosecution was required mainly in view of its deterrent effect, as well as a precondition for 
the enjoyment of human rights. 
Gradually, however, the view that the failure to take criminal measures may amount to 
a violation of an individual right has emerged. Indeed, in a second phase, the Committee 
developed the view according to which there is a strong ‘interrelationship between the 
positive obligations imposed under article 2 and the need to provide effective remedies in the 
event of breach under article 2, paragraph 3.’80 However, criminal punishment was not yet 
required as a matter of an individual right; rather, criminal investigation was considered as a 
right only where, in its absence, there would have been no hope of initiating successful civil 
proceedings.81 For instance, in the case Rodríguez v. Uruguay, the Committee held that the 
victim had the right, under Article 2(3)(a) to an effective remedy and accordingly urged the 
state to carry out official investigation into the claimant’s allegations, in order to identify 
those responsible for the violations and enable the claimant to seek civil redress.82 Under this 
approach, the Committee considered that the absence of an investigation constituted ‘a 
considerable impediment to the pursuit of civil remedies, e.g. for compensation’.83  
It has been observed that, considering the drafting history of Art. 2(3) of the ICCPR, it 
is doubtful whether this provision guarantees criminal prosecution as a remedy.84 The travaux 
préparatoires of the Covenant indicates that the proposal to include criminal prosecution 
among the remedies which victims are entitled to was eventually rejected.85 Nonetheless, 
whereas in its early pronouncements the Committee considered prosecution primarily as a 
measure of general human rights protection, and held in a number of views on individual 
communications that ‘the Covenant does not provide for the right to see another person 
prosecuted’,86 a new trend is emerging in the Committee’s interpretation of Art. 2(3). Indeed, 
                                                 
79 See e.g. HRC, ‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Sri Lanka’, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.56, 27 July 1995, § 15; in its General Comment on Art. 2 of the ICCPR, the Committee 
acknowledged that impunity ‘may well be an important contributing element in the recurrence’ of human rights 
violations. General Comment no. 31, supra note no. 36, § 18. 
80 Ibid., § 8. 
81 See supra Section 3.1.1. 
82 Rodríguez v. Uruguay, supra note no. 17, § 14. 
83 Ibid., § 6.4. 
84 A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations, supra note no. 24, at 20. 
85 UN ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, Compilation of the Comments of Governments on the Draft 
International Covenant on Human Rights and on the Proposed Additional Articles, UN Docs. E/CN.4/365 
(Philippines) and A/C.3/L.1166 (Japan), cited in A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations, 
supra note no. 24, at 20. 
86 HRC, H.C.M.A. v. The Netherlands, supra note no. 45, § 11.6; Rodríguez v. Uruguay, supra note no. 17, § 6.4; 
S.E. v. Argentina, supra note no. 45, § 5.5. 
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recent pronouncements suggest that the right to an effective remedy requires states to carry 
out prosecutions to bring to justice those responsible.  
This view is confirmed by General Comment 31, which considers punishment both as 
a measure of prevention and as a form of reparation.87 The main argument supporting this 
view in the HRC practice is that non-criminal remedies are inadequate to repair the harm 
suffered by victims of serious violations of human rights. In the landmark case Bautista v. 
Colombia the Committee rejected Colombia’s view that compensation awarded by the 
Administrative Tribunal constituted an effective remedy for the family of the victim and 
observed that: 
 [P]urely disciplinary and administrative remedies cannot be deemed to constitute adequate and effective 
remedies within the meaning of article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, in the event of particularly serious 
violations of human rights, notably in the event of an alleged violation of the right to life.’88  
The Committee also restated the duty of Colombia to ‘investigate thoroughly alleged 
violations of human rights, and in particular forced disappearances of persons and violations 
of the right to life, and to prosecute criminally, try and punish those held responsible for such 
responsible.’89 Similarly, in Coronel v. Colombia the Committee found that in cases of 
serious violations ‘as in the case with violations of basic human rights’ remedies of a ‘purely 
disciplinary and administrative nature could not be considered sufficient or effective’.90 
Generally speaking, the UN Committee has found that effective prosecution is required as a 
remedy in a number of cases involving serious violations of human rights. In particular, a 
review of the case law of the HRC involving violations of Articles 6 and 8 of the ICCPR 
indicates that for victims of violations of the right to life and personal integrity respectively 
(such as in cases involving arbitrary detentions,91 enforced disappearances,92 torture and 
                                                 
87 General Comment No. 31, supra note no. 36, at §§ 8, 18. In addition the Committee observes at § 16:’[W]here 
appropriate, reparation can involve restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public 
apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as 
bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.’ (emphasis added). 
88 Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia (Comm. No. 563/1993), UN Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, 27 October 
1995, § 8.2. 
89 Ibid., at § 8.6. 
90 José Antonio Coronel et al. v Colombia (Comm. No. 778/1997), UN Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/778/1997, 24 
October 2002, § 6(2). 
91 Chiti v. Zambia (Comm. No. 1303/2004), UN Doc. CCPR/C/105/D/1303/2004, 26 July 2012, § 14. 
92 See, amongst others, the cases Bautista v. Colombia, supra note no. 88, §§ 8.2 and 10; Laureano v. Peru 
(Comm. No. 540/1993), UN Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993, 25 March 1996, § 10; Jegatheeswara Sarma v. Sri 
Lanka (Comm. No. 950/2000), UN Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000 (2003), 16 July 2003, § 11. 
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extrajudicial executions),93 prosecution of the offenders is an obligation necessary to ensure 
the remedy is effective. 
A similar interpretation of victims’ right to remedy has also been advanced by other 
UN treaty bodies. As with the HRC, the Committee against Torture has also considered 
criminal prosecution not only as a general obligation of states but also as an integral element 
of the right to remedy for victims of torture or ill treatment. Notably, Article 14 the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(‘CAT’), which establishes a right to remedy for victims of torture, does not explicitly 
provide for a right of victims to criminal prosecution of the offender. However, the fact that 
Article 14 calls for redress,94 in addition to compensation, has been understood as showing 
that victims are entitled to more than mere economic compensation of the harm suffered and 
that their rights also includes criminal sanctions against the offenders.95  
The Torture Committee has confirmed this position in its quasi-judicial practice. In 
Kepa Urra Guridi v. Spain, for instance, it held that victims of torture are entitled to 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. In this case, the payment of compensation was 
considered insufficient and, most importantly, the granting of a pardon to the perpetrators of 
torture was deemed in violation of Article 14(1).96 In a similar vein, the Committee criticised 
the Argentine Punto Final legislation which dictated the end of investigation and prosecution 
against people accused of political violence during the dictatorship, finding that such 
legislation violated the right to remedy of victims.97 
The same connection between criminal measures and victims’ right to remedy has 
been elaborated in the context of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD’). Article 6 of the Convention requires that states 
parties assure effective remedies against acts of racial discrimination and that victims have the 
right to seek just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for the damage suffered. In the case 
of L.K. v. The Netherlands, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
                                                 
93 HRC, José Vicente and Amado Villafañe Chaparro et al. v. Colombia (Comm. No. 612/1995), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, 29 July 1997, §§ 5.2 and 10; Chongwe v. Zambia (Comm. No. 821/1998), UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/70/D/821/1998, 25 October 2000, § 7. 
94 In particular, pursuant to Art. 14(1) CAT, ‘[e]ach State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he 
has been subjected to torture in any territory under its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains 
redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full 
rehabilitation as possible.’  
95 N. Roth-Arriaza, ‘State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in 
International Law’, 78 California Law Review (1990) 449-513, , at 466. 
96 CAT Committee, Kepa Urra Guridi v. Spain (Comm. No. 212/2002), UN Doc. CAT/C/34/D/212/2002, 17 
May 2005, § 6.8. 
97 CAT Committee, O.R., M.M. and M.S. v. Argentina (Comm. Nos. 1, 2, & 3/1988), UN Doc. 
CAT/C/WG/3/DR/1, 2 and 3/1988, 23 November 1989, § 9. 
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condemned the state authorities for rushing to the conclusion that no racial discrimination was 
at issue and stated that the authorities had not properly investigated or gathered the necessary 
testimony.98 The Committee elaborated that the right to effective protection and remedies 
pursuant to Article 6 requires that the states parties promptly investigate with due diligence 
threats of racial violence.99 Since the state authorities had failed to investigate properly the 
Committee held that ‘in view of the inadequate response to the incidents, the police and 
judicial proceedings in this case did not afford the applicant effective protection and 
remedies.’100  
 In relation to this case, it has been objected that resort to criminal sanctions as a 
remedy ‘should not be overemphasized’.101 In particular, it has been remarked that the main 
point of criticism of the Committee was not the lack of criminal punishment but rather the 
failure to conduct an investigation in order to establish whether the complainant had been the 
victim of racial discrimination. Nonetheless, it is telling that the Committee itself, in its 
General Recommendation on Article 6, explained that ‘the right to seek just and adequate 
reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination, which is 
embodied in Art. 6 of the Convention, is not necessarily secured solely by the punishment of 
the perpetrator of the discrimination’. Arguably, this suggests that criminal measures are 
considered an element of victims’ right to remedy, although they may need to be 
accompanied by complementary (not alternative) reparation measures.102 
This hypothesis seems to be confirmed by recent communications brought before the 
Committee, where there is a clear indication that investigation must be part of criminal 
proceedings in order to provide victims with an adequate remedy. Specifically, this issue has 
become relevant in the admissibility stage, where complainants are required to demonstrate 
that they have exhausted local remedies before bringing their cases before the Committee. In 
Habassi v. Denmark, for example, the respondent state asked the Committee to declare the 
complaint inadmissible because the complainant still had the opportunity to seek damages in 
civil litigation. Ultimately, the Committee held that civil remedies were not adequate avenues 
                                                 
98 CERD Committee, L.K. v. The Netherlands (Comm. No. 4/1991), UN Doc. CERD/C/42/D/4/1991, 16 March 
1993, § 6.2. 
99 Ibid., §. 6.6. 
100 Ibid., § 6.7. 
101 A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations, supra note no. 24, at 174. 
102 CERD, General Recommendation no. 26, The Right to Seek Just and Adequate Reparation or Satisfaction, 
UN Doc. A/55/18, annex V at 153 (2000), 24 March 2000, § 2; see also Comm. No. 17/1999, B.J. v. Denmark, 
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of redress.103 Indeed, the objective of the victim in seeking a criminal conviction of the 
offender could not be achieved by instituting a civil action which would only lead to 
compensation for damages. Accordingly, the Committee concluded that the recurrent had 
exhausted local remedies.104 
 
3.4.2 The Practice of the European Court of Human Rights 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has long denied the existence of an individual right to 
criminal prosecution of human rights offenders. In the case Perez v. France, for instance, it 
noted that ‘the Convention does not confer any right… to “private revenge”’105 and that, 
accordingly, victims did not have the right to have offenders prosecuted under the 
Convention. Despite the fact that the Court has not recognised an individual right to 
prosecution, during the last decade it has repeatedly affirmed that victims have a right to an 
investigation. This claim has been justified by the right of victims to an effective remedy, 
pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention. 
As noted in Chapter I, the Court has often limited the discretion that states have in 
regard to the choice of the remedy in relation to the nature and the gravity of the violation in 
question. With regard to gross violations of human rights, including violations of the right to 
life, freedom from torture or unlawful deprivation of liberty, the Court has found that the right 
to remedy not only requires compensation for the harm suffered but also an investigation 
‘capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible’ for the 
violation.106  
In the Kaya case, for example, the applicant claimed that his brother had been killed 
by the Turkish security forces. The Court found that the absence of an effective and 
independent investigation into the death violated not only Article 2 (right to life), but also 
Article 13: 
In particular, where those relatives have an arguable claim that the victim has been unlawfully killed by agents 
of the State, the notion of an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 entails, in addition to the payment 
of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the 
                                                 
103 CERD Committee, Ziad Ben Ahmed Habassi v. Denmark (Comm. No. 10/1997), UN Doc. 
CERD/C/54/D/10/1997, 6 April 1999, § 6.1. 
104 Ibid. 
105 ECtHR, Perez v. France (App. No. 47287/99), Judgment (Merits), 12 February 2004, at § 70.  
106 ECtHR, Kaya v. Turkey (App. No. 22729/93), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 19 February 1998, § 
107; Bitiyeva and x. v. Russia (App. Nos 57953/00 and 37392/03), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 21 
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identification and punishment of those responsible and including effective access for the relatives to the 
investigatory procedure. Seen in these terms the requirements of Article 13 are broader than a Contracting 
State’s procedural obligation under Article 2 to conduct an effective investigation.107 
Recent developments in the Court’s jurisprudence on criminal matters signal a notable 
development in accordance with the parallel developments within universal and regional 
bodies. Indeed, the case law of the Court has progressively affirmed that, in certain 
circumstances, the criminal prosecution of human rights offenders is necessary to make the 
remedy granted to victims effective. It can be argued that this entails that criminal punishment 
is considered an integral element of victims’ right to remedy.  
For instance, in Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria the respondent state contested 
the competence of the victim to challenge the inadequacy of criminal proceedings against his 
perpetrator, on the basis that the applicants had already received compensation for breach of 
their rights.108 According to the Court, however, ‘in cases of wilful ill-treatment resulting in 
death the breach of Art. 2 cannot be remedied exclusively through an award of 
compensation.’109 The inadequacy of the proceedings against the police officers and the 
suspension of the sentences were considered to be in violation of the procedural obligations of 
the right to life. This has led the Court to conclude that the victim of the crime had not been 
provided with appropriate ‘redress’.110 
This pronouncement represents a major change in the case law of the European Court. 
Whereas traditionally only investigation was considered in terms of remedial measures for the 
victim, the Court now holds that the failure to resort to criminal measures, or their 
inadequacy, violates per se the rights of the individual victim. Therefore, while accountability 
had been considered a matter of human rights protection, the current approach is to also seek 
criminal proceedings in the interests of the victims. As a matter of fact, this approach does not 
entail a complete shift of the rationale of criminal punishment. The Court still maintains that 
criminal proceedings are necessary to deter future violations and to preserve public 
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confidence in the rule of law.111 However, it also reads concepts of criminal punishment into 
the victim’s rights and considers criminal sanctions to be a necessary measure of redress.  
As mentioned above, criminal prosecution is not imposed as a remedy in any 
circumstances in which a violation of a conventional right has taken place. Rather, the 
character of the violation and the identity of the author are relevant in this regard. The Court 
has ruled on this issue in the case Calvelli and Ciglio relating to the absence of criminal 
proceedings in cases of death resulting from medical negligence. In this case, the Court did 
not consider it necessary to verify the compatibility of the absence of criminal proceedings 
(due to the application of statutes of limitations) with conventional obligations, as the 
applicants could still access a form of compensation for damage suffered in a civil 
proceeding.112 In other words, in the opinion of the Court, the Italian legislation offered an 
alternative remedy to the victims to the criminal conviction, no longer available due to the 
expiry of limitation periods, which could be sufficient to remedy the damage. Of course, it is 
important to take into account the limited scope of the decision in the case Calvelli and 
Ciglio.  As the Court specified: 
[I]f the infringement of the right to life or to personal integrity is not caused intentionally, the positive obligation 
imposed by Article 2 to set up an effective judicial system does not necessarily require the provision of a 
criminal-law remedy in every case. In the specific sphere of medical negligence the obligation may for instance 
also be satisfied if the legal system affords victims a remedy in the civil courts […].113  
The same approach has been adopted by the Court with respect to violations of Article 
2 deriving from negligent acts by state authorities. For example, in the Öneryildiz case, 
relating to a methane-gas explosion in a municipal landfill site which caused the death of 
thirteen people, the Court established that: 
The administrative courts dealing with his case were indisputably empowered to assess the facts established thus 
far, to apportion liability for the events in issue and to deliver an enforceable decision. The administrative-law 
remedy used by the applicant was, on the face of it, sufficient for him to enforce the substance of his complaint 
regarding the death of his relatives and was capable of affording him adequate redress for the violation of Article 
2 found above.114 
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Although in these cases the Court did not find that the failure to resort to criminal 
sanctions violated individual rights, it is nonetheless remarkable that it held that it must 
‘examine, from the standpoint of the effectiveness of existing remedies, the protection which 
the applicant was afforded in seeking to establish the liability of the accused.’115 The Court 
also questioned whether only a ‘criminal remedy’ would have been capable of satisfying the 
requirements imposed by the primary right violated.116 In so doing, the judges indicated their 
willingness to consider criminal accountability as an element of victim’ right to remedy. For 
the time being, however, as the above analysis has demonstrated, this is true only in cases of 
gross violations of human rights.  
 
3.4.3 The Practice of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights 
 
The activities of the Inter-American institutions for the promotion and protection of human 
rights are particularly relevant to the determination of standards for victims’ redress in cases 
of serious violations of human rights. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter I, the Inter-American 
human rights system has frequently dealt with human rights violations of a serious character 
and has often directed states to undertake specific actions to remedy those violations.117 In 
practice Inter-American institutions have promoted an unprecedented interpretation of 
victims’ right to remedy, articulating a mandatory interaction between criminal and civil 
redress. In their practice on serious human rights violations the Inter-American institutions 
have consistently argued that the right to reparation is linked to the duty of the state to 
prevent, investigate and punish violations.  
Both the Commission and the Court have found that for a state to provide effective 
recourse for individuals seeking redress for serious human rights violations pursuant to 
Article 25 of the ACHR it must initiate procedures to identify, prosecute and punish those 
responsible for the violations. For instance, the Inter-American Commission has held that 
when the state fails to prosecute serious crimes it violates the right to judicial protection of the 
victims and their relatives. This reasoning was employed in Carmelo Soria Espinoza v. Chile, 
where the Commission criticised an amnesty law passed in Chile which left the victim and his 
family ‘without any judicial recourse that might have permitted those responsible for the 
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human rights violations… to be duly judges and punished.’118 Judicial recourse is not as such 
limited to civil proceedings for compensation; in cases of serious violations, the Commission 
also requires that criminal proceedings be initiated with a view to punishing those 
responsible. In other words, in the view of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
the right to judicial protection entails the obligation to prosecute and punish those responsible 
for serious violations of human rights.119  
The same approach has been adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
According to its interpretation of Article 25, judicial protection requires access to the courts in 
order that ‘those responsible for human rights violations may be tried and reparations 
obtained.’120 Through a combined reading of Article 8 (right to a fair trial) and Article 25 
(right to judicial protection), the Inter-American institutions have now firmly established a 
victim’s right to justice in cases of serious violations of human rights. As observed by the 
Court in Durand and Ugarte: 
Article 8(1) of the American Convention, in connection with article 25(1) thereof, confers to victims’ relatives 
the right to investigate their disappearance and death by State authorities, to carry out a process against the liable 
parties of unlawful acts, to impose the corresponding sanctions, and to compensate damages suffered by their 
relatives.121 
The right to justice for victims of gross human rights violations has been refined as the Court 
has tackled more cases. First of all, the Court has emphasised the connection between 
criminal justice and victims. In Goiburú et al v. Paraguay, a case concerning the 
disappearance of four men opposing the ruling regime, the Court observed that ‘[t]he absence 
of a complete and effective investigation into the facts and the impunity constitute a source of 
additional suffering and anguish for the next of kin.’122 From this perspective, investigations 
and prosecutions act as reparations because they restore the dignity of the deceased and grant 
consolation and closure to the survivors of the tragedy.  
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Secondly, the Court has set out that the investigation and prosecution process must be 
timely and effective. In Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, concerning the mass murder 
of more than two hundred persons of a Mayan indigenous community, the Court noted that 
the substantial period of time (more than twenty-two years) that had passed without any 
prosecution over the massacre, ‘constitutes a situation of impunity [which] harms the victims, 
and encourages the chronic repetition of the human rights violations’.123 
Thirdly, the Court has specified who must be the subject of investigation and 
punishment. In Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, an extra-judicial killing case, the Court 
affirmed that: 
To completely redress this aspect of the’ violations committed, the State must effectively investigate the facts in 
the instant case, so as to identify, try, and punish all the direct perpetrators and accessories, and the other persons 
responsible for [the victim’s extra-legal execution], and for the cover-up of the extra-legal execution and of the 
other facts.124 
All in all, in recent years the Inter-American institutions have progressively 
emphasised the remedial function of criminal punishment. The Court has even considered the 
duty to investigate and prosecute for serious human rights violations and the corresponding 
right to judicial protection as jus cogens.125 The view of the Commission, as well as that of 
the Court, is that for a state to provide for appropriate judicial recourse to remedy serious 
human rights violations, such as torture and homicide, it must open the relevant procedural 
process and conduct the criminal prosecution to its conclusion. If the accused is found to be 
responsible, victims’ right to justice demands that he or she be punished according to the 
criminal sanctions applicable under the domestic law of the state.126  
The remedial nature of criminal prosecution and punishment is confirmed also by the 
fact that in recent years the Court has ordered such measures as part of its remedial mandate 
pursuant to Article 63. Whereas in the early jurisprudence, criminal investigation and 
punishment were found to fall outside the scope of the Court’s remedial jurisdiction,127 in 
more recent judgments the Court has ruled that states parties as a matter of reparation must 
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conduct ‘a genuine and effective investigation to determine the persons responsible for the 
human rights violations and to punish the liable parties.’128  
Of course, the right to criminal investigation and prosecution is not framed as a right 
to punishment at all costs. The rights of the accused under the American Convention must 
also be respected. And indeed victims’ right to justice and the rights of the accused can be in 
conflict. In La Cantuta case, the Court recognised the potential conflict and indicated that in 
such cases the rights of the accused may need to be compromised. In particular, if rules in 
favour of the accused aim or have the effect of shielding perpetrators from criminal 
responsibility, the Court held that victims’ right to justice ought to prevail.129  
 
3.4.4 The Practice of the African Commission of Human and People’s Rights  
 
As noted in Chapter I, the African Commission of Human and People’s Rights has only 
recently started making specific recommendations on remedies in several cases. On a number 
of occasions, upon finding violations of human rights, the Commission has recommended that 
the respondent state investigate the circumstances of the violations with a view to identifying 
the persons responsible. For instance, in a disappearance case, the African Commission 
recommended the state ‘arrange for the commencement of an independent enquiry in order to 
clarify the fate of the persons considered as disappeared, identify and bring to book the 
authors of the violations perpetrated at the time of the facts arraigned.’130 Similarly, in another 
case concerning violations of the right to life and enforced disappearances, the Commission 
recommended that the respondent state identify the perpetrators of the human rights violations 
at stake and to bring them to justice.131 Interestingly, a similar recommendation has been 
made in one of the most innovative pronouncements of the Commission, namely the 
Ogoniland case,132 concerning violations of economic, social and cultural rights as a result of 
concessions by Nigeria to foreign oil companies. In that case, the Commission recommended 
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the state ensure the protection of the environment, health and livelihood of the victims by 
‘permitting independent investigators free access to the territory; conducting an investigation 
into the human rights violations.’133 
 
 
                                                 
133 Ibid., recommendations lit. 1, 2, 4. 
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4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
This Chapter has shown that certain human rights violations are deemed so serious that states 
are under an obligation to criminalise them. The duty to take adequate measures in response 
to serious violations of human rights has two rationales. On the one hand, prosecution and 
punishment of serious human rights violations serves the general interest in human rights 
protection. By prosecuting and punishing past violations, a state shows that human rights have 
to be respected and thereby reaffirms the rule of law. At the same time, by doing so, the state 
seeks to prevent future violations; indeed, if human rights breaches are ignored, the validity of 
human rights itself is put in danger, thus endangering their future protection.  
On the other hand, the growing affirmation of the idea that victims have legitimate 
interests in the prosecution of human rights offenders has undoubtedly influenced the 
interpretation of international human rights instruments. Human rights supervisory bodies 
increasingly call for a victims’ right to have the violations investigated and the perpetrators 
prosecuted as redress for the harm suffered on the basis that civil remedies can never 
adequately address the type of suffering they have been inflicted. This means that criminal 
measures not only re-establish the validity of a right in principle but also acknowledge the 
suffering of victims and condemn the injustice they suffered. Criminal accountability of the 
offender is thus not only important in the interests of general prevention but also in the 
interest of the individual victim. 
The idea of a victims’ right to justice is firmly established in the jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American institutions which first elaborated this concept. In the view of the Inter-
American Commission and Court, victims’ redress in cases of serious violations of human not 
only demands an investigation into the circumstances of the violations but also the effective 
prosecution and punishment of those responsible for them. A remedial conception of criminal 
prosecution is also emerging, albeit more slowly, before other judicial and quasi-judicial 
human rights supervisory bodies, namely the Human Rights Committee, the European Court 
of Human Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
The gradual development of a victims’ right to the criminal accountability of those 
responsible of serious violations of human rights has two important consequences. First, if the 
idea of a right to justice were pursued, a fundamental change would occur with regard to the 
scope of the duty to prosecute human rights violations. Second, since prosecution and 
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punishment are increasingly considered integral components of the individual right to 
remedy, the role of victims in the criminal process should also be reconsidered. 
With regard to the scope of the duty to prosecute it is important to observe that 
conceiving such a duty in the general pursuit of the overall protection of human rights, as it 
was traditionally done by human rights bodies, subjects the duty itself to an inherent 
limitation. This limitation, especially relevant in post-conflict situations, is that the duty to 
prosecute should not be read as an obstacle to the restoration of peace and social security in 
the community affected by serious violations of human rights. Accordingly, while the state 
remains under the obligation to criminalise serious violations of human rights, as well as to 
establish effective law-enforcement machinery, a deviation from the duty to prosecute may be 
allowed if this would better serve the general enjoyment of human rights. In this respect, as 
will be observed in Chapter IV, it is remarkable that human rights bodies have consistently 
rejected the argument that exempting criminal liability of offenders would contribute to 
restore the respect for human rights. Consequently, they have progressively rejected amnesty 
laws and other measures preventing punishment of those responsible of gross violations of 
human rights. 
This approach supports the affirmation of the view that prosecution and punishment of 
human rights offenders not only serves general human rights protection, but is also integral 
elements of victims’ right to remedy. Indeed, if criminal accountability of human rights 
offenders is considered a remedial measure for victims, there is no room to argue that it can 
be compromised in favour of the general protection of human rights. Furthermore, alternative 
mechanisms of redress (such as truth and reconciliation commissions) and the option of 
performing a balancing act (accountability v. peace) are necessarily precluded. Arguably, the 
emergence of remedy as a rationale for prosecution and punishment potentially offers a better 
contribution to the fight against impunity. As will be discussed in Chapter IV, the traditional 
obstacles arising out of state sovereignty, such as immunities, are increasingly set aside and 
justice is in turn allowed to run its course, both to meet the demands of the victims and to 
reaffirm universal values.  
Reading criminal justice into victims’ rights also demands a reconsideration of the role 
and the rights of victims in criminal proceedings. In contrast to the development of human 
rights norms protecting the rights of the defendant, little attention was traditionally given to 
the rights of victims in criminal proceedings. This is now changing as a result of the emerging 
view that justice cannot be achieved if the voices of victims are not heard and their suffering 
is not addressed. In particular, the gradual affirmation of a right to justice entails the 
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reconsideration of the role that victims ought to play in the criminal process. If prosecution is 
demanded as a remedy for victims, then victims should be able to claim such right and to 
enforce it. Chapters V and VI will discuss to what extent the affirmation of a victims’ right to 
justice has influenced the role and the rights of victims in criminal proceedings before 
domestic and international criminal courts respectively.  
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Chapter IV 
 
Obstacles to the Exercise of the Right to Justice 
 
1 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
Until recently, states’ responses to mass atrocities have not always been faithful to the 
emerging norm demanding prosecution of perpetrators of international crimes and gross 
human rights violations. One only has to think, for instance, of Southern Europe’s transition 
from dictatorship in the 1970s, Eastern Europe’s transition from Communism in the 1980s 
and 1990s and the bloody democratisation process in Latin America: in all these situations 
prosecution has been ‘the exception rather than the norm’.1 During such periods it has been 
said, ‘accountability was often unimaginable’.2 As Aguilar reported, for instance, members of 
the Franco’s regime in Spain never considered the possibility of being held accountable.3 In 
some countries, the state’s lack of political will to impose accountability for past abuses has 
led to the adoption of amnesty laws and pardons for those responsible for such abuses. In 
other cases, prosecution for past abuses has been thwarted or limited by other impediments 
arising from national and international law.  
The biggest hurdle in terms of prosecuting past abuses is the passage of time. In the 
immediate aftermath of mass atrocities states are often unable to take action against 
perpetrators of human rights abuses. In most cases criminal trials only start many years after 
the facts (one may think, for example, of the recent cases brought before Italian military 
courts against Nazi war criminals).4 Nonetheless, prosecution occurring after a certain period 
of time has passed is subject to two procedural obstacles. The first is the application of 
statutory limitations. Statutory limitations are rules that bar criminal prosecution after the 
expiry of a certain time period and are generally designed to provide closure for defendants 
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and witnesses and ensure that evidence is not unreasonably stale.5 Plainly, such statutes may 
constitute a bar to reparation for victims or punishment for perpetrators.   
Another obstacle to prosecution for past abuses is the claim of retroactive justice. 
When trials occur many years after the fact one may object that at the time the events took 
place, such conduct was not criminal.  As such, applying contemporary criminal law to past 
events would amount to a breach of the basic principle of nulla poena sine lege and the 
prohibition of ex post facto laws.6  Finally, the prosecution of state-sponsored mass atrocities 
is subject to an obstacle that lies in the traditional framework of international law, namely the 
functional and personal immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter III, recent years have seen the progressive 
affirmation of an international norm in favour of a state’s duty to prosecute those allegedly 
responsible for certain serious violations of human rights, particularly those amounting to 
international crimes. At the same time an increase in prosecutions for these types of violations 
can be observed in the last two decades, a phenomenon which has been described as ‘the 
justice cascade’7 or, as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon recently described it, the ‘new 
age of accountability’.8 
The development of a state’s obligation to investigate and prosecute serious human 
rights violations has been paralleled, as discussed in Chapter III, by the emergence of a 
corresponding right to justice for victims of such violations, understood as the right to the 
identification and prosecution of wrongdoers.  
In light of these developments, it is important to question whether the validity of the 
obstacles to prosecution described above has also been progressively reduced, in order to 
comply with international obligations and to allow victims to effectively exercise their right to 
justice. To this end, this Chapter will present the main obstacles to national and international 
prosecutions of international crimes – namely immunities, amnesties, statutory limitations and 
the principle of legality – and for each of them it will seek to discern: (i) whether rules of 
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6 Prohibition of ex post facto laws can be found in a number of international instruments, including Art. 15 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), Art. 7 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (‘ECHR’). See also Art. 99(1) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Art. 67 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, and Art. 75(4)(c) Additional Protocol 
I to the Geneva Conventions. 
7 K. Sikkink, ‘The Age of Accountability’, supra note no. 2, at 19.  
8 ‘Kampala, Uganda, 31 May 2010 - Secretary-General s ‘An Age of Accountability’ address to the Review 
Conference on the International Criminal Court’, available online at http://www.un.org/sg/statements/?nid=4585 
(last visited on 12 June 2013). 
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international law exist or are emerging that erode the validity of the obstacle, and (ii) whether 
this evolution has been influenced by the progressive affirmation of a victim’s right to justice 
in cases of gross violations of human rights.  
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2 IMMUNITIES OF STATE OFFICIALS FROM FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
 
The immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction is probably one of the most 
problematic legal obstacles to the effective exercise of victim’s right to justice since, by 
definition, immunity entails the exemption of foreign state officials from the criminal 
jurisdiction in the forum state. State officials may enjoy two different types of immunity in 
respect to criminal jurisdiction: functional and personal. Functional immunity is an immunity 
ratione materiae and is generally recognised by legal scholars as covering the official acts of 
all state officials as determined by the nature of the acts in question rather than by the position 
of the state agent who performed them.9 Accordingly, former state officials can be covered by 
such immunity even after leaving office. Personal immunity is an immunity ratione personae 
and potentially covers both public and private acts derived from the position of the state agent 
concerned.10 Personal immunity is enjoyed by diplomats and, according to the International 
Court of Justice, heads of state, heads of government and foreign ministers.11 Although broad 
in scope, this type of immunity is limited temporally: once the state agent leaves the office, he 
or she is not any longer entitled to such immunity.12 
Broadly speaking, both types of immunity have their origin in the notion of sovereign 
equality of states and the idea that state agents should be free to carry out their official 
functions without the interference of another state. Despite the fact this rationale is deeply 
entrenched in fundamental notions of international law, over time immunities of state agents 
have been considerably restricted, especially where these agents have been accused of being 
responsible for perpetrating international crimes. A distinction, however, has to be drawn 
between functional immunities and personal immunities.  
 
                                                 
9 For a thorough analysis of the theories and practice on functional immunity, see P. De Sena, Diritto 
internazionale e immunità funzionale degli organi statali (Milano: Giuffré, 1996). An interesting thesis is the 
one argued by Micaela Frulli, according to whom an analysis of state practice reveals that there is not a general 
rule of functional immunity applicable to all state organs. According to Frulli, only high state officials are 
covered by functional immunity; furthermore, this rule has been interpreted in a restrictive manner, in the sense 
that it is generally accepted that it does not cover international crimes.  M. Frulli, Immunità e crimini 
internazionali. L’esercizio della giurisdizione penale e civile nei confronti degli organi di stati sospettati di 
gravi crimini internazionali (Torino: Giappichelli, 2007), at 57-60. 
10 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), at 309-313; B. Conforti, 
Diritto Internazionale, 8th ed. (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2010), 244-245. For a thorough analysis of 
personal immunities in international law, see A. Tanzi, L’immunità dalla giurisdizione degli agenti diplomatici 
(Padova: Cedam, 1992). 
11 ICJ, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 
ICJ Reports 2002, p. 3, 14 February 2002,  §§ 51-57.  
12 See references supra note no. 10. 
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2.1 Functional Immunity and International Crimes 
 
Functional immunity is considered to be ‘one of the oldest rules of international law’13 and is 
generally understood to apply to all state agents acting in their official capacity. Based on this 
rule, a state agent acting on behalf of a state cannot be prosecuted for any violation of 
international law perpetrated while performing an official function. As mentioned above, the 
rationale of this rule lies in the idea that states must not intervene in the internal matters of 
states and, as a consequence, on the relationship between states and their agents. Accordingly, 
state agents cannot be prosecuted by foreign states for international wrongful acts committed 
on behalf of their states; the latter can instead be held responsible for those acts at the 
international level.14  
The classic rule of functional immunity has been substantially limited since the 
Second World War, with international treaties and judicial decisions being adopted which 
deny the applicability of such rules to state officials accused of international crimes. A 
number of international treaties on the prevention and repression of international crimes 
adopted in the aftermath of the Second World War, for instance, include a provision expressly 
providing for the individual criminal responsibility of perpetrators, regardless of their status 
of state officials. Mention can be made of Article IV of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which establishes that ‘[p]ersons committing genocide 
or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are 
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals’. Similar provisions 
have been included in the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid
15 and in the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of the Mankind.16  
Other instruments adopted during this time have expressly established the individual 
criminal responsibility of perpetrators of international crimes, without specifying that state 
officials can be held responsible. In this respect, Frulli has rightly observed that no such 
provision was included as it was taken for granted that state officials could also be prosecuted 
for the violations at issue given that (i) it was already well-established that state agents could 
                                                 
13 A.V. Lowe, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), at 184. 
14 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note no. 10, at 302-303. 
15 Art. III of the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid establishes that: 
‘International criminal responsibility shall apply, irrespective of the motive involved, to individuals, members of 
organizations and institutions and representatives of the State, whether residing in the territory of the State in 
which the acts are perpetrated or in some other State.’ 
16 Art. 7 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of the Mankind provides as follows: ‘The 
official position of an individual who commits a crime against the peace and security of mankind, even if he 
acted as head of State or Government, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment.’ 
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be held accountable for the violation at issue,17 or (ii) the commission of the crime by a state 
agent is an essential element of the crime itself.18 
The practice of national courts and prosecuting authorities reveals a generally accepted 
exception to the functional immunity of officials: that this immunity does not apply to 
international crimes. A justification often given by domestic courts with regards to the 
restriction of immunity in this way is that international crimes can never be regarded as 
official acts and, therefore, are not covered by functional immunity.19 For instance, the 
Supreme Court of Israel in the Eichmann case rejected the defendant’s argument that he could 
not be responsible for the crimes he was accused of as these were ‘acts of states’ – ruling 
instead that functional immunity does not apply to perpetrators of international crimes: 
[E]specially when they are international crimes in the class of “Crimes against Humanity” (in the wide sense). 
Of such heinous acts it must be said that they are completely outside the ‘sovereign’ jurisdiction of the state that 
ordered or ratified their commission, and therefore those who participated in such acts must personally account 
for them and cannot seek shelter behind the official character of their task or mission, or behind the ‘Laws’ of 
the state by virtue of which they purported to act.20 
Following the Pinochet case, in which the UK House of Lords allowed an extradition 
application by Spain in respect of the former Chilean president to proceed,21 there has been 
significant activity involving prosecution of foreign state officials for international crimes.  
Even though most prosecutions have dealt with crimes committed by junior officials,22 it can 
                                                 
17 This is the case of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which provide for individual criminal responsibility for 
war crimes. As pointed out by Frulli, no provision was included in the Conventions specifying that state agents 
could also be held accountable, as this rule was already well-established in the state practice. (M. Frulli, 
Immunità e crimini internazionali, supra note no. 9, at 95-96). 
18 This is the case, for instance, of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, which includes among the elements of the crime of torture that of being committed ‘by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity’. (Art. 1(1)) 
19 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note no. 10, at 305-308.  Less convincing appears the thesis 
upheld by the International Court of Justice according to which international crimes cannot be considered 
official acts, but only private acts (ICJ, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant, supra note no. 11, § 61) As 
authoritatively held by legal scholars, not only international crimes perpetrated by state officials, particularly 
high-range agents, are hardly committed without recurring to their public functions; moreover, characterizing 
international crimes as mere private acts would result in the impossibility of invoking state responsibility for 
such crimes. M. Frulli, Immunità e crimini internazionali, supra note no. 9, at 129-132; A. Cassese, ‘When May 
Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case’, 13 
European Journal of International Law (2002) 853-875, at 866-870. 
20 Israel, Supreme Court, Eichmann Case, Judgment of 29 May 1962, § 14. 
21 UK, House of Lords, Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte 
Pinochet; R v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others, Ex Parte 
Pinochet, 24 March 1999. For a thorough review of the case against Augusto Pinochet, see N. Bhuta, ‘Justice 
Without Borders: Prosecuting General Pinochet’, 23 Melbourne University Law Review (1999) 499-532. 
22 See e.g. Belgium (case against former Chadian dictator Hissene Habré and the conviction of Rwandan army 
major Bernard Ntuyahaga for war crimes and crimes against humanity); France (the two convictions in absentia 
of Mauritanian general Ely Ould Dah and Tunisian official Khaled Ben Said for torture committed in their home 
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be argued that the fact that such prosecutions have taken place constitutes sufficient evidence 
that functional immunity should not bar the prosecution of such crimes. 
 The legal developments that have occurred since the Second World War have led 
scholars to argue that a customary rule has evolved ‘lifting functional immunities in the case 
of international crimes’.23 In particular, Cassese further explained that the rationale of such 
rule can be identified in the fact that:  
In the present international community respect for human rights and the demand that justice be done whenever 
human rights have been seriously and massively put in jeopardy, override the traditional principle of respect for 
State sovereignty. The new thrust towards protection of human dignity has shattered the shield that traditionally 
protected stats agents acting in their official capacity.24 
The position taken by Cassese represents the two major driving forces behind he development 
of an international norm lifting functional immunities in cases of international crimes: on the 
one hand, state sovereignty, and on the other the demands of justice coming from the victims 
who have increasingly brought claims before criminal courts against state agents allegedly 
responsible for international crimes.25 From this perspective, although no explicit link is made 
in the treaties and decisions mentioned above between the rule lifting of immunity and 
victim’s right to justice,26 we can observe that the need to bring justice to victims has been a 
decisive factor in the affirmation of such rule.  
 
 
2.2 Personal Immunities and International Crimes 
 
As mentioned above, personal immunities are granted to some categories of state officials in 
view of their functions and are aimed at rendering them inviolable while in office and 
                                                                                                                                                        
states); Netherlands (former military leader Dési Bouterse of Suriname investigated for torture but prosecution 
time barred; conviction of Congolese official Sebastian Nzapali for torture and conviction of two Afghan 
intelligence officers for torture); Denmark (prosecution of former chief of staff of the Iraqi Army for war crimes, 
although he fled the country before trial). Spain issued several arrest warrants in respect of several former heads 
of state, including two former presidents of Guatemala, Rios Montt and Oscar Mejia Victores, for genocide, 
torture and other related crimes. Spanish courts also convicted a former Argentinian naval officer, Adolfo 
Scilingo, for torture and crimes against humanity committed abroad; a second Argentinian naval officer, Ricardo 
Cavallo, was also prosecuted, although he was ultimately extradited to Argentina to face trial there. 
23 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note no. 10, at 305. 
24 Ibid., at 308. 
25 M. Frulli, Immunità e crimini internazionali, supra note no. 9, at 318. 
26 In this respect, it is interesting that a link between victim’s rights and immunity has been made by the Institut 
de droit international, in the Resolution on the Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act 
on Behalf of the State in Case of International Crimes, Napoli session (2009), art. 2(2): ‘Immunities should not 
constitute an obstacle to the appropriate reparation to which victims of crimes addressed by this Resolution are 
entitled.’ 
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protecting them from any interference, including in relation to exclusively private acts. The 
rationale of such a rule is to be found in the need to protect agents dealing with sovereign 
prerogative of states from abuses and illicit interferences, ultimately jeopardising the conduct 
of international relations.27 
Because of the importance of the objectives underlying this rule there is still much 
resistance to the development of a norm lifting personal immunities of certain categories of 
state officials accused of international crimes. As indicated by the International Court of 
Justice in the Arrest Warrant case, personal immunities of senior state officials as heads of 
state or government, foreign ministers and diplomatic agents must prevent any possible 
prejudice to the ‘effective performance’ of their functions’.28 In effect, these categories of 
state agents are immune from jurisdiction in any circumstance, both when engaged in public 
functions and when they are acting in private capacity. Most importantly, these categories of 
state agents are entitled to personal immunities even when accused of international crimes.  
It has been said above that there are some international treaties that either explicitly or 
implicitly prescribe that immunities (functional and personal) do not relieve state officials 
from individual criminal responsibility for the international crimes that form the subject 
matter of those treaties. Nonetheless, the proposition that senior state officials are entitled to 
personal immunities even when accused of international crimes is supported by abundant 
state practice. Reference can be made, for instance, to the two often-cited decisions of 
Pinochet in the UK29 and Fidel Castro in Spain.30 Furthermore, following the authoritative 
decision by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case, which supported the position that serving 
heads of state, heads of government and foreign ministers enjoy a broad personal immunity 
from the jurisdiction of foreign domestic courts, including immunity from prosecution for 
international crimes,31 a number of national courts have dismissed cases alleging the 
commission of international crimes by heads of state and heads of government on the ground 
that immunity ratione personae bars proceedings.32 As Frulli has stated, the ICJ Decision 
                                                 
27 R. Cryer, A. Friman, D. Robinson and E. Wilmshurst, International Criminal Law and Procedure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 533-534.  
28 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note no. 11, § 53. 
29 Ex parte Pinochet, supra note no. 21, §§ 171-191 (Lord Millet) (‘Senator Pinochet is not a serving head of 
state. If he were, he could not be extradited. It would be an intolerable affront to the Republic of Chile to arrest 
him or detain him’).  
30 Spain, Audiencia Nacional, Fidel Castro, Order of 4 March 1999, No. 1999/2723. 
31 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note no. 11, § 58. 
32 See e.g. Belgium, Cour de Cassation, Re Sharon & Yaron, 12 February 2003, reprinted in 42 International 
Legal Materials (2003) 596-604; UK, Judgment of Senior District Judge, Mugabe, 14 January 2004, reprinted in 
53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2004) 769-774; and Spain, Audiencia Nacional, Juzgado 
Central de instrucción No 4, Paul Kagame et al., 6 February 2008. 
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closed the debate too soon, substantially hindering the development of a rule lifting personal 
immunities, as was the case in relation to functional immunity for state agents accused of 
international crimes.33  
In any case, as stated previously, personal immunities only apply to incumbent state 
officials. As soon as the state official leaves office they no longer enjoy personal immunity 
and may, therefore, be held liable for any international crime they may have perpetrated while 
in office, pursuant to the customary rule mentioned above lifting functional immunities in 
case of international crimes. All in all, the current thrust of international law is to ensure as 
much as possible criminal accountability of those who engage in international crimes. 
Ultimately, the immunity of foreign state agent no longer constitutes a powerful obstacle to 
the exercise of victim’s right to justice.  
Instead, a different approach has been adopted in relation to the application of 
personal immunities in cases of international crimes when jurisdiction over these crimes is 
assigned to international criminal tribunals. This aspect will be dealt with in the next sub-
section. 
 
2.3 Immunities of State Officials and International Prosecution of International 
Crimes 
 
As discussed above, while it is generally accepted that functional immunity from foreign 
criminal jurisdiction does not apply to state agents who have allegedly committed 
international crimes, state practice indicates that high-ranking foreign officials suspected of 
such crimes may be covered by personal immunities when they are in office. In this respect, 
the practice of international criminal tribunals is radically different. Although the majority of 
international and internationalized criminal tribunals do not explicitly rule out the right to 
invoke personal immunities, the absence of a specific rule has not prevented them from 
indicting serving heads of state.  
Furthermore, statutes of international criminal tribunals have often included a 
provision expressly providing for the individual criminal responsibility of perpetrators, 
regardless of their status as state officials. In this respect, reference can be made to Articles 
7(2) and 6(2) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’) Statutes respectively, which hold 
                                                 
33 ‘La sentenza ha esercitato una forte influenza sulla prassi successiva e ha chiuso forse troppo bruscamente, e a 
nostro avviso anticipatamente, il dibattito in materia’. M. Frulli, Immunità e crimini internazionali, supra note 
no. 9, at 313. 
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that ‘[t]he official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or 
as responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility 
nor mitigate punishment’. These provisions have indeed been interpreted as ruling out the 
possibility of invoking personal immunities as a bar to prosecution by the tribunals.34 
Accordingly, for instance, the ICTY has indicted and prosecuted Slobodan Milošević, when 
he was serving president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Milutinuvić, when he 
was President of Serbia.35 Such practice has also been followed by mixed tribunals, such as 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which has indicted the Liberian President, Charles Taylor, 
when in office.36  
Plainly, the rationale for such a progressive approach lies in the fact that international 
and internationalized criminal tribunals have generally focused on those who bear the greatest 
criminal responsibility and in most cases that is those with the greatest power such as heads of 
state or other high-ranking military or governmental officials. This brings the objectives of 
international criminal justice into conflict with the classic international law on immunities. On 
the basis of the practice of international criminal tribunals, as well as on the rationale of 
international criminal justice, Cassese concluded that a customary rule has evolved ruling out 
personal immunities for senior state officials accused of international crimes when 
jurisdiction over such crimes is granted to international criminal tribunals.37  
At present, the only rule explicitly excluding the right to invoke personal immunities 
before international criminal tribunals has been set out by the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (‘ICC’), at Article 27(2), which establishes that ‘immunities or special 
procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national 
or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a 
person’. Nonetheless, Frulli has observed, a problem may arise with respect to third states, 
namely states that have not ratified the Rome Statute and, as such, are not bound by its 
provisions.38 In particular, in relation to those states, the rule prohibiting personal immunities 
should be read in conjunction with Article 98(1) of the Statute, which establishes that: 
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to 
act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of 
                                                 
34 On the ratio of such interpretation, see M. Frulli, Immunità e crimini internazionali, supra note no. 9, at 112-
114 and 248-249. 
35 ICTY, Indictment, Milošević, Milutinović, Sainović, Ojdanić and Stojilković (IT-99-37), 22 May 1999. 
36 SCSL, Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment, Charles Taylor (SCSL-03-01-PT), 29 May 2007. 
37 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note no. 14, at 311-312. 
38 M. Frulli, Immunità e crimini internazionali, supra note no. 9, at 255-256. 
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a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the 
waiver of the immunity. 
Accordingly, it has been argued that even though the ICC can lawfully issue an arrest 
warrant for a head of state of a third state, states would not be bound to comply with this 
request.39 A recent example of the problematic relationship between the rule lifting personal 
immunities and third states is the case of the arrest warrant issued by the ICC against the 
Sudanese president Bashir. Since Sudan is not a state party of the Rome Statute, the problem 
arises as to whether states parties are under an obligation to surrender Bashir to the Court, for 
instance, when the president finds himself on the territory of a contracting state. In this 
respect, some legal scholars have argued that the ICC’s request to states to surrender the 
Sudanese president Bashir is ultra vires.40 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that in several 
occasions the Court, in taking notice of the presence of Bashir in an African country has 
issued a decision finding that such a country had not complied with its duty to enforce the 
arrest warrant against the Sudanese president.41 As a matter of fact, the problem of immunity 
of third states’ officials remains an open issue. 
All in all, the law and practice of international and internationalized criminal tribunals 
have contributed significantly to the development of international law, by ‘broaden[ing] as 
much as possible the protection of human rights and, by the same token, to make those who 
engage in heinous breaches of such rights criminally accountable’.42 Arguably, international 
criminal tribunals, and particularly the ICC, which requires to states parties to adopt domestic 
legislation implementing the Rome Statute,43 may also potentially influence the development 
of domestic practice in favour of a rule lifting personal immunities in cases of international 
crimes. It is therefore foreseeable that, notwithstanding the persistent objections of certain 
                                                 
39 ICC, Request to All States Parties to the Rome Statute for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar al Bashir, Omar 
Hassan Ahmad al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-7), Pre-Trial Chamber (‘PTC’) I, 6 March 2009. P. Gaeta, ‘Does 
President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?’, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice (‘JICJ’) (2009) 
315-332; see contra D. Akande, ‘The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al 
Bashir s Immunities’, Ibid., 332-352. 
40 P. Gaeta, ‘Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?’, supra note no. 39, at 329. 
41 ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to 
Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-139), PTC I, 12 December 2011; 
Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the 
cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir, Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-140), PTC I, 13 December 2011. 
42 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note no. 10, at 312. 
43 Under the principle of complementarity, the ICC exercise jurisdiction only when states are unwilling or unable 
to prosecute (Art. 17 ICCSt.). For the principle of complementarity to become truly effective, following 
ratification, States must also implement all of the crimes under the Rome Statute into domestic legislation. 
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states to lifting the rule on personal immunities, significant developments may occur in the 
future, possibly leading to the emergence of a customary rule on the matter. 
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3 AMNESTIES  
 
 
Amnesties represent another obstacle to the prosecution of perpetrators of international crimes 
and, ultimately, to the effective exercise of the right to justice by victims of those crimes. An 
act of amnesty extinguishes the criminal nature of past offences, proscribing the prosecution 
of their authors. Amnesties are generally granted through a domestic law or a governmental 
decree, but have also been included in peace agreements between states or internal factions.44 
Despite being controversial in many aspects, amnesties have been extensively used 
throughout history in transitional context,45 for instance following armed conflicts, civil 
unrest and military dictatorships. This is because amnesties have often proved to be a decisive 
factor in negotiations that have brought to an end armed conflicts or restored the rule of law 
after a prolonged dictatorship. 
In present times, however, amnesty provisions have been defined as one of ‘the most 
controversial aspects of contemporary transitional justice.’46 As a matter of fact, amnesties are 
‘undeniably at odds with the demand of retribution, an affront to victims and survivors, and 
potentially a blow to the longer term prospects of establishing and strengthening legal 
institutions and the rule of law in transitional states.’47 Although the practice of granting 
amnesties remains commonplace, a trend can be observed in national and international 
practice towards the limitation of their scope. In particular, amnesties are increasingly 
considered incompatible with gross human rights violations and international crimes.  
A number of judicial decisions have been adopted by domestic courts finding amnesty 
laws to be in violation of the state’s obligations to prosecute and punish perpetrators of 
international crimes. For instance, in 2005 the Argentinean Supreme Court declared two 
amnesty laws adopted to shield from prosecution the authors of international crimes and 
serious violations of human rights, including enforced disappearances, to be unconstitutional 
                                                 
44 Amnesties have been included, for instance, in the Lomè Peace Accord between the Government of Sierra 
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, 7 July 1999 (Art. IX), and in the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, 9 January 2005 (Art. 2).  
45 R.G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 46-59; for a comparative analysis 
of amnesty laws, see various contributions in F. Lessa and L.A. Payne, Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights 
Accountability, supra note no. 2, at 69-358; L. Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: 
Bridging the Peace and Justice Divide (Oxford: Hart, 2008). 
46 M. Freeman and M. Pensky, ‘The Amnesty Controversy in International Law’, in F. Lessa and L.A. Payne, 
Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability, supra note no. 2, 42-65, at 42. 
47 Ibid. 
  
178
and void on the basis of international law.48 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Chile declared 
that amnesty laws do not bar the prosecution of those responsible for enforced 
disappearances.49 It is argued that both these decisions were influenced by the developments 
occurred at the international level and particularly by the findings of human rights supervisory 
bodies, including the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (‘IACtHR’) that only a few 
years earlier had established that amnesties violate the general duty to respect and ensure 
human rights.50  
Even though it is generally recognised that no customary rule has crystallised for the 
prohibition of amnesty in cases of international crimes,51 it is worthwhile analysing the 
elements of international practice supporting the emerging trend towards the acceptance of 
such a prohibition. In particular, the following sub-sections will focus on the practice of 
human rights supervisory bodies and of international and internationalized criminal tribunals. 
 
3.1 Amnesties and Emerging Trends in International Human Rights Law 
 
An explicit prohibition of amnesties cannot be found in international human rights treaties, 
nor in other specialised treaties demanding, for instance, the prosecution of international 
crimes or of gross human rights violations.52 Nevertheless, human rights supervisory bodies 
have consistently found that amnesties are incompatible with international crimes and gross 
violations of human rights and that, accordingly, amnesties adopted with the aim of shielding 
alleged perpetrators of such crimes from prosecution violate conventional obligations. In 
particular, a review of the practice of human rights supervisory bodies reveals that amnesties 
are considered to be in violation not only of the duty of states to investigate gross human 
rights violations and to respect and ensure human rights but also of the obligation of states to 
guarantee the right to an effective remedy.  
The Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’), for instance, has increasingly referred to the 
right of the victim to an effective remedy when condemning the adoption of amnesty laws. 
For example, in relation to amnesties that some states had granted to perpetrators of acts of 
                                                 
48 Supreme Court of Argentina, Simón, Julio Héctor y otros, causa 17.768, 14 June 2005. See also C. Bakker, ‘A 
Full Stop to Amnesty in Argentina: The Simón Case’, 3 JICJ (2005) 1106-1120. 
49 Supreme Court of Chile, Juan Manuel Guillermo Contreras Sepúlveda y Marcelo Luis Manuel Moren Brito, 
causa 571/2004, Res. No. 22267, 17 November 2004. See F. Lafontaine, ‘No Amnesty or Statute of Limitation 
for Enforced Disappearance: The Sandoval Case before the Supreme Court of Chile’, 3 JICJ (2005) 469-484. 
50 IACtHR, Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment (Merits), 14 March 2001, § 42. 
51 M. Freeman and M. Pensky, ‘The Amnesty Controversy in International Law’, supra note no. 46, at 51-57. 
52 Ibid., at 44-51; N. Roth-Arriaza, Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), at 58. 
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torture, the Committee has emphasised that such amnesties are incompatible with the duty of 
states to investigate violations and affect victims’ right to remedy: 
Amnesties are generally incompatible with the duty of States to investigate such acts; to guarantee freedoms 
from such acts within their jurisdiction and to ensure that they do not occur in the future. States may not deprive 
individuals of the right to an effective remedy, including compensation and such full rehabilitation as may be 
possible.53 
The reasoning of the Committee is as follows: amnesties have as a consequence the end of 
prosecution and, implicitly, of any official investigation of the crime. From this perspective, 
amnesty provisions not only violate the duty of states to prosecute human rights violations, 
but also the corresponding right of victims to justice, that is the right to the criminal 
prosecution of offenders, an integral component of victim’s right to an effective remedy, as 
has been set out in Chapter III.  
Notably, even though the recent General Comment on Article 2 does not completely 
rule out amnesties,54 no amnesty legislation in cases of international crimes and of gross 
violations of human rights has been found to be compatible with the ICCPR. The 
aforementioned pronouncement against amnesties was related to acts of torture.55 The 
Committee also extended such criticism to amnesties covering crimes against humanity and 
war crimes,56 and to serious human rights violations, including extra-judicial executions that 
should ‘in no case enjoy immunity, inter alia, through an amnesty law’,57 enforced 
disappearances, inhuman and degrading treatment.58 
The development of a comprehensive right to justice has also reinforced the position 
of Inter-American institutions towards the outlawing of amnesties. Initially, the Inter-
American bodies considered amnesty laws in violation of the right to fair trial to the extent 
that they had precluded victims from their right to initiate criminal proceedings provided by 
                                                 
53 HRC, General Comment No. 20: Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel 
Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7), 10 March 1992, § 15. 
54 The HRC outlaws only those amnesties that relieves perpetrators of serious human rights violations from 
‘personal responsibility’, see HRC, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation 
Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, § 18. 
55 See supra note no. 53. 
56 For instance, it its Concluding Observations on Colombia of 2004, the HRC urged the state not to grant 
impunity to persons who had committed those crimes (Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Colombia, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/80/COL, 25 March 2004, § 8); similarly, in its Concluding 
Observation on Cambodia of 1999, the Committee recommended the state to bring alleged perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity to justice (Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Cambodia, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add/08, 22 July 1999, § 13). 
57 HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Niger, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.17, 29 
April 1993, § 7 
58 HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Peru, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.72, 18 
November 1996, § 22; General Comment No. 31, supra note no. 54, § 17. 
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domestic law. In other words, amnesty laws were incompatible with victims’ rights only 
insofar as domestic law granted victims the right to bring charges in criminal proceedings.59 
However, an important step was made in 1996 by the Commission in the case of 
Garay Hermosilla v. Chile, where the amnesty brought into force for and by the previous 
military regime allegedly responsible for disappearances, summary and extrajudicial 
executions and torture was at stake. In that case, the Commission held that, irrespective of the 
rights of victims under domestic law, the state was obliged to pursue the various stages of 
criminal proceedings in order to guarantee the right to justice of the victim and his family.60 
The progressive development of the right to justice has had the effect of completely 
ruling out amnesties for serious violations of human rights. In the view of the Commission, 
amnesty laws leave the crimes without judicial effect and deprive ‘the victims and their 
families of any legal recourse through which they might identify those responsible for 
violating their human rights during the military dictatorship, and to bring them to justice.’61 
This has been considered contrary to both Article 8 and Article 25. The dismissal of criminal 
charges as a consequence of an amnesty provision has been thus considered in violation of the 
right to justice of the victims. Although emphasis was put on the duty to investigate and to 
ensure compensation, the Commission clarified that punishment is also an element of redress 
required by the American Convention and that the establishment of a truth commission cannot 
be regarded as a substitute for the judicial process required.62  
It is remarkable that the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (‘IACtHR’) has 
developed its jurisprudence in relation to the issue of amnesties in parallel with its 
jurisprudence on the right to justice. Initially, the Court did not rule on the admissibility of 
amnesties in general but nonetheless adopted a critical position. In the Castillo Pàez case, the 
Court, dealing with a crime which had been subject to the Peruvian amnesty, observed that 
this law ‘obstructs investigation and access to the courts and prevents the victim’s next of kin 
from learning the truth and receiving the reparations to which they are entitled.’63 The Court 
                                                 
59 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (‘IAComHR’), Case 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, 
10.311, Alicia Consuelo Herrera et al. v. Argentina, 2 October 1992, § 50; Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 
10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374 and 10.375, Mendoza et al. v. Uruguay, 2 October 1992, § 54. 
60 IAComHR, Case 10843, Garay Hermosilla v. Chile, 15 October 1996, § 64; see also Case 10.480, Lucio 
Parada Cea et al. v. El Salvador, 27 January 1999, § 119. 
61 IAComHR, Garay Hermosilla, supra note no. 60, § 71; IAComHR, Case 11.725, Carmelo Soria Espinoza 
(Chile), 19 November 1999, § 90. 
62 IAComHR, Garay Hermosilla, supra note no. 60, §§ 41, 58 and 77; Carmelo Soria Espinoza (Chile), supra 
note no. 61, § 105. 
63 IACtHR, Castillo Páez v. Peru, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 27 November 1998, § 105. 
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also reiterated that victims, pursuant to articles 8(1) and (25), must have judicial recourse so 
that those responsible for the violations could be tried and reparations obtained.’64  
The current position of the Court is that self-amnesty laws are generally incompatible 
with the American Convention. The failure to prosecute and the consequent violation of 
victims’ right to justice are central to the criticism of the amnesty laws. In cases of serious 
violations, such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and forced 
disappearances, an amnesty is inadmissible on two grounds: first, it violates the general duty 
to respect and ensure human rights.65 Self-amnesty laws are equated with blanked impunity 
and are banned because they erode public confidence in state institutions. Second, and most 
relevantly for the present analysis, amnesty laws violate the right to judicial protection against 
human rights violations (Art. 25).66 As the Court affirmed: ‘Self-amnesty laws lead to the 
defenselessness of victims and perpetuate impunity; therefore they are manifestly 
incompatible with the aims and spirit of the Convention.’67 In particular, the Court criticised 
the fact that amnesty laws obstruct investigation and access to justice and prevent the victims 
and their relatives from knowing the truth and receiving reparation.68  
In the same vein, there is now a consensus on the absolute ban not only of self-
amnesty laws, but also of amnesties for crimes against humanity. The Court took this view in 
Masacre de Mapiripán v. Colombia, Almonicid-Arellano v. Chile, and La Cantuta v. Peru.69 
The view that crimes against humanity cannot be amnestied reflects the growing conviction 
that serious violations of human rights amounting to international crimes should not go 
unpunished. It is likely that the Court’s ban on amnesties will gradually broaden to include 
other serious human rights violations. Indeed, as said above, the Court has recently 
characterised the right to access to justice in cases of serious human rights violations as jus 
cogens.70 This would suggest that in these cases the rights of victims to have human rights 
offenders prosecuted may not be compromised (such as for the need for national 
reconciliation and consolidation of democracy), thus leaving no room for amnesties.  
                                                 
64 Ibid., § 106. 
65 IACtHR, Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note no. 50, § 42. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., § 43. 
68 Ibid. 
69 IACtHR, Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 15 September 2005, § 
304; Almonicid-Arellano et al. v. Chile, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 26 
September 2006, § 105; La Cantuta v. Peru, Judgment (Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 29 November 2006, § 
168. 
70 IACtHR, Goiburú et al v. Paraguay, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 22 September 2006 §§ 84, 
131; La Cantuta v. Peru, supra note no. 69, § 157. 
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This position is also shared by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (‘AfrComHPR’), which has declared that ‘an amnesty law adopted with the aim of 
nullifying suits or other actions seeking redress that may be filed by the victims or their 
beneficiaries […] cannot shield that country from fulfilling its international obligations under 
the Charter.’71 In addition, the Commission has also established that ‘[t]he granting of 
amnesty to absolve perpetrators of human rights violations from accountability violates the 
right of victims to an effective remedy.’72 
In contrast to other human rights bodies, the European human rights system has not 
had an opportunity to develop a detailed jurisprudence on amnesties. The case law in this 
respect is scarce and out-dated. For example, mention can be made to the Dujardin v. France 
case,73 where the European Commission of Human Rights (‘EComHR’) was called to deal 
with an amnesty enacted in New Caledonia. Notably, the Commission did not find a violation 
of the Convention, stressing the exceptional character of the amnesty, and left to the state with 
a margin of appreciation to determine the measures to resolve conflicts between the various 
communities of the islands.  In that case, the Commission considered that reconciliation was a 
legitimate aim that justified certain restrictions regarding the punishment of the offenders. 
The Commission thereby found that:  
As with any criminal offence, the crime of murder may be covered by an amnesty. That in itself does not 
contravene the Convention unless it can be seen to form part of a general practice aimed at the systematic 
prevention of prosecution of the perpetrators of such crimes.74 
In sum, individual rights of the victims were not regarded as obstacles to the 
proclamation of amnesty. It should be noted that the amnesty in Dujardin was evaluated only 
under Art. 2 of the Convention. The right to an effective remedy was not considered to be at 
issue. Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that, at the time of that decision, the doctrine on 
victims’ rights to justice had not yet developed. For this reason, it is doubtful whether the 
same decision would currently be taken, now that the right to an official investigation and 
criminal prosecution for serious violations are firmly established as integral elements of the 
right to remedy.  
                                                 
71 AfrComHPR, Malawi African Association, Amnesty International, Ms Sarr Diop, Union interafricaine des 
droits de l'Homme and RADDHO, Collectif des veuves et ayants-Droit, Association mauritanienne des droits de 
l'Homme v. Mauritania (Comm. Nos. 54/91-61/91-96/93-98/93-164/97-196/97-210/98), 11 May 2000, § 83. 
72 AfrComHPR, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance, 2001, Principle C 
(d). 
73 EComHR, Dujardin et al. v. France (App. No. 16734/90), Decision, 2 September 1991. 
74 Ibid., at 4. 
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Though the Court has not had to deal with the issue of amnesty, this presumption can 
be derived from cases where criminal authorities have been criticised for being reluctant to 
examine cases of alleged life-endangering behaviour. Presumably, the more the concept of 
criminal accountability are read into the victim’s right to remedy, the greater the prospect that 
the proclamation of an amnesty covering serious human rights violations will diminish. 
Though the Commission allowed for exceptions from criminal prosecution in the interest of 
general human rights violations it is doubtful whether the Court would be prepared to make 
similar concessions in the context of victims’ rights. 
 
3.2 Amnesties and International Criminal Tribunals 
 
The law and practice of international and internationalized criminal tribunals appears 
consistent with the trend emerged under international human rights law prohibiting amnesties 
in cases of international crimes and gross human rights violations.  Indeed, several elements 
indicate that an amnesty provision cannot bar criminal prosecutions before international 
criminal tribunals.75 
This principle has been set out explicitly in Article 10 of the Statute of the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone (‘SCSL’), which establishes: ‘An amnesty granted to any person falling 
within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 
4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution’. The SCSL reiterated the non-
applicability of amnesties to crimes under its jurisdiction in the Kallon et al. case and in the 
Kondewa case in which it ruled that amnesties granted by the Lomé Peace Agreement could 
not be considered as a bar to prosecution before it.76  
Explicit provisions establishing that amnesties do not bar criminal prosecutions before 
international criminal tribunals are also present in the Law for the Establishment of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’), which provides that there 
should be no amnesty for the crimes committed in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge between 
1975 and 1979,77 and in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’).78  
                                                 
75 M. Frulli, ‘Amnesty,’ in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), 243-244. 
76 SCSL, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, Kallon, Norman and Kamara (SCSL-
2004-15-16-17), Appeals Chamber (‘AC’), 13 March 2004, § 71; Decision on Lack of Jurisdiction / Abuse of 
Process: Amnesty Provided by the Lomé Accord, Kondewa (SCSL-2004-14 AR 72), AC, 25 May 2004. For a 
comment on the Kallon decision, see A. Cassese, ‘The Special Court and International Law: The Decision 
Concerning the Lomé Agreement Amnesty’, 2 JICJ (2004) 1130-1140. 
77 Art. 40, ECCC Law; see also Decision on Ieng Sary’s Rule 89 Preliminary Objection (Ne bis in idem and 
Amnesty and Pardon), Ieng Sary, Trial Chamber, 3 November 2011.  
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It is therefore noteworthy that the ICC Statute does not contain an explicit provision 
ruling out amnesties for crimes under its jurisdiction. Accordingly, it has been observed that it 
remains unclear whether an amnesty law barring the prosecution of persons accused of crimes 
falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC would be recognised by the Court or whether the 
Prosecutor could disregard such an amnesty law and continue with an investigation and 
prosecution of a person subject to the amnesty. It is submitted that the ICC statutory 
framework contains several elements precluding amnesties from barring prosecution. First, in 
principle, national amnesty laws would be incompatible with the primary objective of the 
Court, that is ending impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community by ensuring their effective prosecution.79  
Furthermore, based on Article 17 of the Rome Statute, the Court may declare a state as 
unwilling to prosecute, and hence acquire jurisdiction over the case, if an amnesty was 
granted with the purpose of shielding a person from criminal responsibility.80 In that case, the 
Court will have to establish whether the decision to grant an amnesty is in reality a signal of 
the unwillingness of the State genuinely to prosecute.81 In other words, only amnesties that 
have not been adopted with the purpose of granting impunity to certain individuals would be 
compatible with Article 17 of the ICC Statute.  
It has been argued, however, that the Court would still retain a margin of discretion to 
allow amnesties for crimes under its jurisdiction.82 The first possibility to recognise an 
amnesty under the ICC Statute may be derived from the discretional power of the Prosecutor 
to determine that there is no reasonable basis to proceed to an investigation under Article 53, 
when such an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. In particular, it remains 
unclear whether prosecuting an individual subject to an amnesty law could be considered in 
the interest of justice, especially in the context of countries in transition.  
Moreover, a possibility of the ICC recognising an amnesty law can be implied from 
Article 16, which gives the Security Council the power to stay a prosecution if it considers 
that such a prosecution would threaten international peace and security.  Since amnesty laws 
                                                                                                                                                        
78 Art. 6 STLSt. 
79 Preamble, ICCSt. 
80 In particular, Art. 17(2)(a) ICCSt. establishes that ‘In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the 
Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one 
or more of the following exist, as applicable: (a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national 
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5’. 
81 Y. Navqi, ‘Amnesties and the ICC’, available online at 
http://www.peaceandjusticeinitiative.org/implementation-resources/amnesties-and-the-icc (last visited on 26 
June 2013). 
82 Ibid.  
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are often used to end conflicts and assist countries in transition, it has been suggested that 
Article 16 would allow the ICC to give recognition to amnesty laws.83  All in all, until the 
ICC has considered the matter, the possible recognition of amnesties law remains open to 
question.  However, given the primary objective of the ICC to prosecute perpetrators of 
international crimes, and considering the emerging trend at the international level analysed 
above, negotiating impunity for crimes in the ICC subject-matter jurisdiction would no longer 
seem a viable option. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Idem, ‘Amnesty for War Crimes: Defining the Limits of International Recognition’, 85 International Review 
of the Red Cross (2003) 583-626, at 592-593. 
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4 STATUTORY LIMITATIONS 
 
As mentioned above, statutory limitations, a common feature in the criminal procedure of 
many states, are procedural rules that prescribe that after a certain time period has passed 
from the alleged offence, no prosecution may be initiated. The rationale for such rules is 
threefold: first, gathering evidence after that a considerable number of years has passed from 
the alleged offenses could prove an arduous task, hindering not only prosecution, but also the 
defence of the accused; second, the preventative objective of criminal prosecutions would be 
considerably reduced; and finally, the interest of the society in criminal prosecution is thought 
to diminish over time.84  
Nevertheless, a trend is emerging holding that these rationales do not apply in the case 
of international crimes and that, therefore, statutory limitations should not bar prosecutions of 
such crimes. This is so for two main reasons, as pointed out by a number of legal scholars: 
first, the abhorrent nature of international crimes demands that perpetrators are brought to 
justice, regardless of the time that has passed from the committed crime;85 moreover, as stated 
in the introduction to this Chapter, in the aftermath of mass atrocities, it is often difficult to 
initiate criminal prosecutions, either for logistical, political or other factors, which may be 
taken away by the passage of time.86  
A number of international documents and decisions have explicitly ruled out 
applicability of statutory limitations to serious violations of human rights amounting to 
international crimes referring to the need to ensure victims’ right to reparation.87 The principle 
of imprescriptibility of international crimes has also been affirmed in three international 
treaties: the UN Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity, the European Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes, and the Inter-American 
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (Art. 7).  Furthermore, this principle has 
                                                 
84 M. Delmas-Marty, ‘La responsabilité pénale en échec (prescription, amnistie, immunités)’, in A. Cassese and 
Id. (eds), Jurisdictions nationales et crimes internationaux (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002) 613-
652, at 617. 
85 A. Cassese, Cassese’s International Criminal Law (revised by A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, L. Baig, M. Fan, C. 
Gosnell and A. Whiting) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), at 313-315. 
86 M. Delmas-Marty, ‘La responsabilité pénale en échec (prescription, amnistie, immunités)’, supra note no. 84, 
at 617-618. 
87 In this respect, a distinct legal scholar has observed that the imprescriptibility of international crimes, provided 
for a vast number of domestic legislations and supported by a consistent practice, shall be considered as a 
general principle of law. See B. Conforti, Diritto internazionale, supra note no. 10, at 212. Cf. V. Starita, ‘La 
questione della prescrittibilità dei crimini contro l’umanità: in margine al caso Priebke’, 81 Rivista di diritto 
internazionale (1998) 86-109, at 96 ff.; R.A. Kok, Statutory Limitations in International Criminal Law (The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007), at 345 ff.  
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been affirmed in a number of soft-law documents. For instance, in his final report to the 
Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Theo van Boven, observed that: 
 It is sometimes contended that as a result of passage of time the need for reparations is outdated and therefore 
no longer pertinent. […] the application of statutory limitations often deprives victims of gross violations of 
human rights of the reparations that are due to them. The principles should prevail that claims relating to 
reparations for gross violations of human rights shall not be subject to a statute of limitations. In this 
connection, it should be taken into account that the effects of gross violations of human rights are linked to the 
most serious crimes to which, according to authoritative legal opinion, statutory limitations shall not apply. 
Moreover, it is well established that for many victims of gross violations of human rights, the passage of time 
has no attenuating effect; on the contrary, there is an increase in post-traumatic stress, requiring all necessary 
material, medical, psychological and social assistance and support over a long period of time.88 
A review of the practice of human rights bodies reveals the growing awareness that 
the application of statutes of limitation legislations in cases of international crimes and gross 
violations of human rights may be in violation of conventional rights and, in particular, of 
victim’s right to an effective remedy.  
 In recent years the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has repeatedly stressed its 
opposition to legislation that bars the prosecution of human rights offenders, such as statutes 
of limitation.89 In the Trujillo Case, the Court held that: 
[P]rovisions regarding statutes of limitations and the establishment of measures designed to eliminate 
responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those 
responsible for serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and 
forced disappearance.90  
In addition, the application of statutes has been considered to be in violation of the 
right to justice if the criminal case has ultimately extinguished as a result of long delays due 
to reluctance to investigate and prosecute or obstruction of justice.91 More recently, the Court 
has progressively moved towards the complete ban of statutes of limitation and any time-bar 
for the prosecution of grave human rights violations, regardless of their intent.92 
                                                 
88 Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Final report submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, 2 July 1993, § 135 (emphasis added). 
89 IACtHR, Barrios Altos v. Peru, supra note no. 50, § 41; El Caracazo v. Venezuela, Judgment (Reparations 
and Costs), 29 August 2002, § 119.  
90 IACtHR, Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 27 February 2002, § 106. 
91 IACtHR, Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Judgment (Reparations and Costs),  26 November 2002, §§ 69-70. 
92 IACtHR, Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 11 May 2007, § 292. 
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Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has criticised the 
suspension of criminal sentences, not only because it renders the protection of the rights 
violated ineffective,93 but also because it violates victims’ right to an effective remedy. In the 
Abdülsamet case, regarding allegations of torture of a local political leader by agents of the 
Turkish police, the Court held that  
[W]here a State agent has been charged with crimes involving torture or ill-treatment, it is of the utmost 
importance for the purposes of an “effective remedy” that criminal proceedings and sentencing are not time-
barred and that the granting of an amnesty or pardon should not be permissible.94  
In particular, the Court reiterated that when an agent of the state is responsible of an 
act torture, the obligation to provide an effective remedy to the victim in question requires the 
state to identify and prosecute those responsible for criminal violations. In those 
circumstances, civil compensation as an alternative to the criminal conviction could not serve 
as an adequate remedy for the damage suffered by the victim. Accordingly, the application of 
measures that impede the imposition of a criminal sanction to those responsible for the human 
rights breaches violates the right to effective remedy under Article 13 of the European 
Convention. 95 
It is submitted that these findings, like those made in relation to amnesties, support the 
argument put forward in Chapter III according to which prosecution of offenders is an integral 
element of the right to an effective remedy.  
As far as the prosecution of international crimes by international criminal tribunals is 
concerned it is generally agreed that statutes of limitations do not apply since there is no 
provision in customary international law establishing a limitation period. Accordingly, it has 
been argued that provisions prohibiting statutes of limitations within the legal framework of 
international criminal tribunals are redundant.96  
An explicit provision ruling out statutes of limitation for the prosecution of 
international crimes by international criminal courts can be, however, found in the ICC and 
the ECCC legal framework. Article 29 of the ICC Statute establishes that crimes within the 
Court’s jurisdiction are not subject to any statute of limitation. Moreover, pursuant to Article 
17 of the Statute, the Court will be granted jurisdiction, under the principle of 
                                                 
93 See e.g. ECtHR, Mastromatteo v. Italy (App. No. 37703/97), Judgment (Merits), 24 October 2002, § 72. 
94 ECtHR, Abdülsamet Yaman v. Turkey (App. No. 32446/96), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 2 
November 2004, § 55. 
95 See also ECtHR, Serdar Güzel v. Turkey (App. No. 39414/06), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 15 
March 2001.  
96 H. Kreicker, ‘Statute of Limitations’, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal 
Justice, supra note no. 75, 522-524, at 522.  
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complementarity, if a state is unable to initiate a prosecution due to a statute of limitations 
applicable to the crimes in question under domestic law.  Similarly, Articles 4 and 5 of the 
Cambodian Law on the Establishment of the ECCC provide that statutes of limitations do not 
apply to the international crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Chambers.  
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5 THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-RETROACTIVITY OF CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
As noted above, often trials for gross human rights violations and international crimes only 
start many years, even decades, after the offences have taken place. This is so because these 
violations are often associated with armed conflicts or civil disorders which may jeopardize 
the activities of judicial bodies and it may take some time to re-establish the legal order 
within a country which has been affected by mass atrocities. Criminal trials for past violations 
may require a determination of the law applicable to events that commenced or were 
concluded long ago. Indeed, the nullum crimen sine lege principle, a general principle of 
criminal law, prohibits the criminalisation of acts committed prior to the entry into force of a 
rule banning such conduct as a crime.97 A derivative of this principle is the principle of non-
retroactivity of criminal law, which prohibits the prosecution and punishment of an individual 
for an act which did not constitute a criminal offence at the time when it was committed.  
The principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law may thus constitute a major hurdle 
in the realisation of victim’s right to justice. Neverthless, the scope of this principle has been 
progressively reduced thanks to the development of international law, potentially broadening 
the possibility to bring criminals to justice. In particular, international criminal law has 
expanded and become a more precise and certain area of law due to both the ratification by a 
growing number of states of international treaties criminalising the conduct of individuals98 
and to international case law interpreting specific elements of the crimes or contributing to the 
gradual crystallisation of crimes under customary international law. Under these 
circumstances, the principle of non-retroactivity has evolved in such a way as to admit two 
major exceptions, reflected in most human rights instruments: the principle is not violated 
when an act, even though it was not punishable under national criminal law at the time when 
it was performed, was nevertheless criminalised either (i) under international law, or (ii) 
according to the general principles of law recognised by the community of the nations.99 
                                                 
97 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, supra note no. 10, at 43-47. 
98 E.g., Art. 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide states: ‘The Contracting Parties 
confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law 
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It remains true that, due to the vague content of these two exceptions, particular 
attention should be paid to the degree of accessibility and foreseeability100 of the criminal 
rules they allow to be applied retrospectively.101 This position has also been confirmed by the 
practice of human rights supervisory bodies. For instance, the European Court of Human 
Rights, in the case of Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany – concerning the conviction of 
former senior East German officials and a border guard for the shooting of people who tried 
to cross the Berlin Wall – held that the prohibition of such conduct was well established under 
international law when the facts occurred. Accordingly, although not criminalised under the 
criminal code of the German Democratic Republic at the material time, the European Court 
found that these acts constituted offences defined with sufficient accessibility and 
foreseeability under international law.102 
Reference to international law, especially when international customary rules are at 
stake, as well as to general principles of law, may easily become a dangerous Pandora’s box 
in the hands of a tyrannical judicial power. However, the growing affirmation of a norm in 
support of criminal accountability for international crimes has increasingly lead domestic 
courts to resort to these exceptions.  
In particular, it is interesting to note that throughout the last decades, a number of 
criminal statutes have been adopted in domestic systems incorporating international crimes. 
The prevalent view is that these statutes can be applied retrospectively without raising issues 
of retroactivity, because the conducts at issue were already criminalized under international 
law. Accordingly, when new incorporating legislation is passed concerning conduct 
previously criminalised in international law, allowing courts to exercise jurisdiction over such 
conduct, this legislation does not have the function of creating new crimes. Rather, it has a 
                                                 
100 In cases dealing with the nullum crimen principle, the European Court has applied the test of accessibility and 
foreseeability when determining whether the conduct in question falls within the scope of a criminal statute. For 
an elaboration of these principles, see e.g. ECtHR, The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Judgment (Merits), 26 
April 1979, at § 49. 
101 See in this respect the analysis carried out by the ECtHR in a number of cases dealing with the retroactive 
application of criminal law incorporating certain conduct which was already criminal under international law. 
E.g., in Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia (App. No. 23052/04, 24018/04), Decision (Admissibility), 17 January 2006, 
the Court held, at p. 9: ‘… [E]ven if the acts committed by the applicants could have been regarded as lawful 
under the Soviet law at the material time, they were nevertheless found by the Estonian courts to constitute 
crimes against humanity under international law at the time of their commission. … The Court thus considers 
groundless the applicants’ allegations that their acts had not constituted crimes against humanity at the time of 
their commission and that they could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of that.’ For a comment on 
this decision, see A. Cassese, ‘Balancing the Prosecution of Crimes Against Humanity and Non-Retroactivity of 
Criminal Law: The Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia Case Before the ECHR’, 4 JICJ (2006) 410-418. 
102 ECtHR, Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany (App. Nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98), Judgment 
(Merits), 22 March 2001, § 89. 
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‘jurisdictional function’.103 In other words, the incorporating legislation is only a tool which 
enables national courts to apply the relevant rule of international law criminalizing the 
conduct.104 From this perspective, the incorporating legislation does not raise issues of 
foreseeability under human rights law, as the alleged perpetrator should have been aware of 
the international prohibition.105 Accordingly, it is increasingly accepted that an incorporating 
law could be applied retrospectively without violating the principle of non-retroactivity, 
provided that the acts at issue were already prohibited by international law, at least in a 
general way (such as being based on the general principles of law), at the time the offence 
was committed.106  
Since certain conduct have long been recognised as criminal under international law, 
and since states are increasingly adopting legislation incorporating such crimes in their 
criminal codes, the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law is likely to prove less and 
less successful as a defence in the next years. Consequently, even though the current 
interpretation of the principle non-retroactivity of criminal law has not been grounded on the 
affirmation of a victim’s right to justice, but rather on the willingness not to leave the most 
heinous atrocities unpunished, it can be reasonably assumed that this principle is not going to 
be a major obstacle to victim’s justice in the forthcoming years. 
 
  
                                                 
103 In this sense, see e.g., Re Extradition of Demjanjuk: a case concerning an Israeli extradition request of an 
alleged guard at the Treblinka concentration camp during World War II. The appellant argued that, inter alia, the 
Israeli criminal statute under which the accused was sought was retroactive, since Israel did not come into 
existence until 1948. The Court stated that: ‘The Israeli statute does not declare unlawful what had been lawful 
before; rather, it provides a new forum in which to bring to trial persons for conduct previously recognized as 
criminal. … Respondent is charged with offenses that were criminal at the time they were carried out. … The 
statute is not retroactive because it is jurisdictional and does not create a new crime. Thus, Israel has not violated 
any prohibition against the ex post facto application of criminal laws which may exist in international law.’ 
United States District Court North Dakota – Ohio, Eastern Division, Re Extradition of Demjanjuk [1985] 612 
F.Supp. 544, at 567.  
104 Without such legislation, the state would face two obstacles: (i) there would be no specification of the 
applicable penalty; and (ii) the courts could not assert their extraterritorial jurisdiction over such crimes. 
105 On this point it has been observed that ‘[t]he perpetrator of an international crime need not know when 
committing a crime that he is breaching international law for him to be convicted for a breach of that body of 
law, but “the principle of legality requires that the crime charged be set out in a law that is accessible and that it 
be foreseeable that the conduct in question may be criminally sanctioned at the time when the crime was 
allegedly committed.”’ G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), at 17, citing ICTY, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to 
Command Responsibility, Hadžihasanović (IT-01-47-AR72), AC, 16 July 2003, § 34. 
106 I expand on this issue in V. Spiga, ‘Non Retroactivity of Criminal Law: A New Chapter in the Hissène Habré 
Saga’, 9 JICJ (2011) 5-23.  
  
193 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This Chapter has attempted to analyse the main obstacles to the prosecution of offences, and 
ultimately to victim’s right to justice. In particular, it has been demonstrated that a trend 
seems to be emerging according to which these obstacles do not apply to prosecutions of 
international crimes and gross human rights violations. In other words, the application of 
measures barring prosecution has been progressively found to be inconsistent with state’s 
obligations under international law when serious violations of rights are at stake.  
Both domestic and international practice indicates that in cases of international crimes 
and gross human rights violations bars to prosecution have been either limited in scope or 
removed altogether. Immunity for state officials has been gradually restricted and it is a 
widely shared view that functional immunities should not bar prosecutions of state officials 
accused of international crimes. Amnesties, despite remaining in place in many systems, have 
been increasingly outlawed in cases of gross violations of human rights and international 
crimes. In view of the abhorrent nature of these violations and of the difficulties that states 
may encounter in initiating a criminal action in the immediate aftermath of the events, it is 
also increasingly the case that perpetrators of international crimes are being prosecuted even 
after a lapse of time, with statutory limitations being found to be inapplicable.  In the same 
vein, it has been shown that a restrictive interpretation is emerging in relation to the principle 
of non-retroactivity of criminal law, allowing for prosecutions of crimes that were not 
criminalised under national law at the time of the events, provided that they were already 
prohibited under international law.  
It is argued that the emerging trends highlighted in this Chapter are consistent with the 
affirmation of a state’s obligation to prosecute international crimes and gross violations of 
human rights, as discussed in Chapter III. Most importantly, for the purposes of the analysis 
carried out in this thesis, it is interesting to observe that the validity of obstacles to 
prosecution has also been progressively reduced in view of the fact that they have been found 
in violation of the right to an effective remedy for victims. From this perspective, the 
emerging trends analysed in this Chapter can also be viewed as supporting the argument 
advanced in Chapter III according to which a right to justice, understood as a right to the 
prosecution of offenders, is emerging as an integral component of a victim’s right to an 
effective remedy, at least in cases of gross violations of human rights and international 
crimes.  
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It is true, however, that certain obstacles to the prosecution of perpetrators of 
international crimes remain. In particular, we have seen in this Chapter that the fight against 
impunity and the demands of justice coming from the victims may be set aside when 
traditional prerogative of states are at stake, such as personal immunities of senior state 
officials, or when mechanisms shielding perpetrators from accountability, such as amnesties, 
are necessary to bring an armed conflict to an end. Nonetheless, it has also been shown that 
these obstacles are not considered a bar to prosecutions of international crimes by 
international and internationalized courts and tribunals. It is submitted that the practice of 
these bodies, as well as their legal framework, may come to influence decisions taken at the 
domestic level. Consequently, in the long run one can expect that international courts and 
tribunals will offer a valid contribution to the development of a norm which prohibits any 
obstacles to prosecution of international crimes and, eventually, to the effective exercise of 
the right to justice for victims of such crimes.   
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Chapter V 
 
Victims’ Right to Justice and Participation in Criminal 
Proceedings 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The analysis carried out in the previous chapters on the scope of redress reveals a strong 
convergence in principles and standards applicable to victims of gross human rights 
violations. In particular, reparative approaches that only include compensation and declarative 
relief have been increasingly considered inadequate in many cases of human rights violations. 
The spectrum of remedies recommended by human rights supervisory bodies suggests that the 
current international legal standards demand the right to justice, understood as the right of the 
victims to the determination of the criminal liability of those responsible for such violations, 
as an integral element of victims’ redress in the case of serious human rights violations. 
Reading criminal justice into victims’ rights also necessitates a reconsideration of the 
role and the rights of victims in criminal proceedings. Arguably, the prosecution and 
punishment of wrongdoers can only have a remedial function if victims are not treated as 
objects, but rather as subjects of these proceedings.1 Indeed, if victims have a right to the 
prosecution of human rights offenders as an integral component of their right to remedy, it 
would seem legitimate to assert that they should be granted corresponding procedural rights in 
the criminal process.  
 This position has been increasingly confirmed in the last three decades. A number of 
documents have been adopted at the international and regional levels acknowledging the 
importance of considering victims’ concerns in the criminal process. Starting with the UN 
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power in 19852 and the Council 
of Europe Recommendation of the same year,3 international legal norms began to reflect the 
idea that victims need to be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity, and that 
they are entitled to redress for their suffering in terms of access to justice and reparation. 
Furthermore, a number of international instruments, as well as the practice of human rights 
                                                 
1 International Commission of Jurist, The Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Gross Human Rights Violations 
(Geneva: International Commission of Jurist, 2006), at 169. 
2 UN General Assembly (‘UN GA’), Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse 
of Power, UN Doc. A/RES/40/34, 29 November 1985.  
3 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (85) 11 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure, 28 June 1985. 
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supervisory bodies, have consistently supported the view that victims should be granted some 
participatory rights in criminal proceedings in order to promote and protect their right to 
justice.  
Consequently, it is necessary to question whether participation can be considered an 
essential component of victims’ right to justice, and if so, to what extent. As this Chapter will 
discuss, this issue is not straightforward. The role that victims play in criminal proceeding has 
been generally left to states’ discretion. Whereas victims’ rights in criminal proceedings have 
been traditionally recognised in civil law countries,
4
 it is a largely unfamiliar concept to 
common law countries like the United States where victims may be called to testify as 
witnesses but play no further role in the proceedings and must bring a separate civil action if 
they wish to claim damages or another remedy for harm related to the crime.
5
  
The aim of this Chapter is therefore that of identifying the emerging trends in the 
matter of victim participation in criminal justice proceedings. With this aim in mind, this 
Chapter focuses on two main issues: first, it examines United Nations and regional human 
rights instruments, as well as the practice of human rights bodies, with the view to 
determining the current state of the emerging trends relating to victims’ participatory rights in 
criminal proceedings. Second, it analyses the current practice in several domestic jurisdictions 
in relation to victim participation in criminal proceedings, with a particular emphasis on 
jurisdictions belonging to the common law and civil law traditions. In particular, special 
attention will be devoted to those mechanisms that allow victims to start penal action against 
the alleged offenders or to challenge prosecutorial decisions not to initiate or to continue 
investigation or prosecution, as these rights are directly relevant to the concrete enforcement 
of the victim’s right to justice.  
 
  
                                                 
4 M. Chiavario, ‘Private Parties: The Rights of the Defendant and the Victim’, in M. Delmas-Marty and J. R. 
Spencer (eds), European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 541-593, at 542-
547. 
5 See generally D.E. Beloof, P.G. Cassel, and S.J. Twist, Victims in Criminal Procedure, 3Rd ed. (Durham: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2010); G.P. Fletcher, With Justice for Some: Protecting Victims’ Rights in Criminal 
Trials (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1996); but see also W.T. Pizzi, ‘Victims’ Rights: Rethinking Our Adversarial 
System’, Utah Law Review (1999) 349-368. 
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2 VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: A THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Before assessing the international and comparative legal framework on the role and the rights 
of victims in criminal proceedings, it seems necessary to briefly address some theoretical 
aspects of victims and criminal justice models. Most criminal justice models do not protect 
and promote the specific needs and interests of victims, with the exception of when they 
appear in the proceedings as witnesses. This means, inter alia, that, in the predominant 
criminal justice model, victims cannot initiate criminal proceedings, as the decision to open a 
case rests with a public authority, nor do they have a right to participate in criminal trials or to 
claim compensation for the loss suffered. Victims, it has been argued, ‘in many ways… have 
been the silent partners in the legal process’.6 
The exclusion of victims from most criminal justice models can be mainly attributed 
to the predominant paradigm of criminal justice, namely retribution, the primary goal of 
which is the prosecution and punishment of wrongdoers.7  The rationale underlying such an 
approach is based on the idea that punishing those who break the law restores and promotes 
the rule of law as well as satisfies society’s needs for retribution. According to some 
commentators, the retributive rationale is not completely ‘anti-victim’. In their view, 
retributive justice can ‘annul or counter the appearance of the wrongdoer’s superiority and 
thus affirm the victim’s real value’.8 In this way, the punishment of individuals who break the 
law is thought to provide victims with some sense of satisfaction.  
However, it must be acknowledged that the retributive model only accommodates 
victims’ needs and interests to a limited extent. Retributive justice emphasises impartiality. 
This means, in effect, as Cragg as argued ‘that the victim loses his central role in the drama 
whose focus is the wrong committed and not the person wronged’.9 Furthermore, since 
criminal justice systems mainly focus on ascertaining the criminal responsibility of 
wrongdoers victims are generally assigned, at best, a supporting role.  
As such, the consequences of such a focus on the accountability of offenders are 
twofold: on the one hand, the need to assign the control of the proceedings to a state authority 
                                                 
6 R.S. Clark and D. Tolbert, ‘Towards an International Criminal Court’, in Y. Danieli and E. Stamatopoulou 
(eds) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Fifty Years and Beyond (Amytiville: Baywood, 1999) 99-113 
at 110. 
7 A. McDonald, ‘The Development of a Victim-Centered Approach to International Criminal Justice for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, in J. Carey, W.V. Dunlap, R.J. Pritchard (eds), International 
Humanitarian Law: Prospects (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2006) 237-276, at 242-243. 
8 G.P. Fletcher, With Justice for Some: Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, 1995), at 203. 
9 W. Cragg, The Practice of Punishment: Towards a Theory of Restorative Justice (London: Routledge, 1992), at 
19. 
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with the power to defend the public’s interest (such as a public prosecutor) and, on the other 
hand, the need to protect the rights of the accused persons.10 Both these needs, together with 
the idea that justice should be impartial and not constitute a form of legalised vengeance, have 
lead to the progressive exclusion of victims and their subjective experiences from criminal 
proceedings.  
As the following sections will analyse, despite the prevailing view on the nature and 
purpose of criminal trials, the position of the victim in criminal justice systems has been 
progressively ameliorated in the last few decades. In order to better appreciate these changes, 
it is helpful to analyse the traditional position of victims in criminal proceedings within the 
two main procedural systems, the adversarial and the inquisitorial, and the main arguments in 
favour and against victims’ participation in criminal trials.  
 
2.1  The Role and Rights of Victims in Criminal Proceedings 
 
The position of the victim varies significantly between national criminal justice owing largely 
to the legal tradition that has influenced their development. This study will focus on the 
common law and the civil law traditions since these traditions have been the main influence 
on the domestic criminal procedural models in the international community (as well as on the 
norms governing the functioning of international criminal tribunals as will be discussed in 
Chapter VI). Traditionally, comparativists have viewed criminal procedural models as 
characterised by a fundamental dichotomy between civil law procedure as inquisitorial, and 
common law procedure as adversarial.11  
In the various systems of different states, domestic criminal procedures have never 
been as clear as the presentation of these archetypes would suggest – a point emphasised by 
Damaška many years ago.12  Nonetheless, for the purposes of this section, I shall refer to the 
main characteristics of the common law and the civil law traditions in relation to victims’ 
rights, emphasising the major differences between them, while a more detailed analysis of 
selected national systems will be offered in the next sections of this Chapter.    
                                                 
10 M. Heikkilå, International Criminal Tribunals and Victims of Crime: A Study of the Status of Victims before 
International Criminal Tribunals and of Factors affecting this Status (Turku, Åbo: Institute for Human Rights, 
Åbo Akademi University, 2004), at 28. 
11 See e.g., P.J. van Koppen and S.F. Penrod, ‘Adversarial or Inquisitorial: Comparing Systems’, in Id. (eds), 
Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Justice: Psychological Perspectives on Criminal Justice Systems (New York: 
Springer, 2003), 1-19. 
12 M. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). See C.M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, 2d ed. 
(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2007), at xvii, xvii- xxvii (introducing the division in criminal law between 
the common and civil law world). 
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2.1.1 The Common Law Tradition and Victims 
 
The Anglo-American criminal justice system is said to be ‘adversarial’ in nature. The focal 
point of the adversarial model is the confrontation between the public prosecutor and the 
accused before an impartial judge.13 Such a contest, as will bee discussed further in this 
Chapter, inherently excludes the rights and interests of victims. The contemporary structure of 
the common law criminal justice system reflects its historical origins which traditionally 
separated the functions of criminal law and tort law, the former dealing with public wrongs 
(crimes) and the latter with private wrongs.14 Accordingly, the criminal law and its penal 
sanctions are widely conceptualised as aiming to promote the public interest in denouncing 
and punishing unacceptable behaviour rather than furthering the interests of private parties.15  
The common law system’s conception of the criminal process as a means of punishing 
conduct harmful to society requires the prosecutor to consider the public interest of initiating 
a criminal prosecution. Whilst victims of course form part of this collective interest, it has 
long been considered that the subjective interests of victims should not enter into the equation 
as they risk negatively influencing the objectivity of the trial.16 Therefore, although many 
victims may feel that they are owed a right to make their voice heard in relation to the issues 
of prosecution, reparation and sentencing, the common law criminal justice system places 
such rights or interests in a subordinate position to the collective interests of society in 
prosecuting the crime and punishing the perpetrator.  
Furthermore, the traditional common law position is that in a trial strictly based on the 
contest between two actors, namely the prosecution and the defence, the addition of a third 
                                                 
13 M. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority, supra note no. 12, at 3; M.H. Freedman, ‘Our 
Constitutionalized Adversary System’, 1 Chapman Law Review (1998) 57-90, at 57; A. Orie, ‘Accusatorial v. 
Inquisitorial in International Criminal Proceedings Prior to the Establishment of the ICC and in the Proceedings 
before the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 1439-1495. 
14 See J. Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of Third Parties 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), at 2.  
15 Ibid., at 5-7. Ashworth describes the objective of criminal law as ‘to penalise those forms of wrongdoing 
which … touch public rather than merely private interests.’ A. Ashworth, ‘What Victims of Crime Deserve’, 
paper presented to the Fulbright Commission on Penal Theory and Penal Practice, September 1992, cited in M. 
Cavadino and J. Dignan, ‘Reparation, Retribution and Rights’, 4 International Review of Victimology (1997) 
233-253, at 237.   
16 A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 50. 
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‘party’ would risk disrupting the balance of the criminal process, considerably delaying 
proceedings, and ultimately jeopardising the right of the accused to a fair trial.17  
The exclusion of private interests from the criminal process is reflected in the rights 
afforded to victims and their role in the criminal process. Generally the victim’s role is limited 
to serving as a witness in trial.  This in turn means that the victim’s role is very much 
dependent on the strategy of the prosecution and the defence – their concerns being taken into 
consideration only if parties decide to do so. In this respect, it has been observed that victims 
have no role to play in adversarial criminal systems other than to act as ‘evidentiary cannon 
fodder’.18 In order to address this criticism, some common law jurisdictions allow victims to 
provide an impact statement to the court at the sentencing stage of the proceedings.19 This 
statement documents any pain and suffering endured following the commission of the crime 
and may assist the judge in deciding on a fitting sentence.   
Traditionally, under the common law system victims could not generally claim 
reparation through criminal proceedings. Rather, in order to obtain an award for reparations 
against the perpetrator, victims have to initiate entirely separate civil proceedings, thereby 
exposing themselves to potential liability for legal costs. Today, however, certain common 
law criminal courts provide victims with some compensation through so-called ‘restitution 
orders’, in which the offenders are required to pay victims for the losses they have suffered as 
a result of the offense.20  
 
2.1.2 The Civil Law Tradition and Victims  
 
Civil law jurisdictions have traditionally preferred an inquisitorial criminal procedure with the 
judge at the heart of the procedure. In the inquisitorial process the judge is expected to play a 
central and active part in the establishment of the truth which is the central goal of such 
                                                 
17 See e.g. D.E. Beloof, ‘The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model’ Utah Law 
Review (2000) 289-330, arguing that the introduction of victim’s rights in criminal proceedings requires a ‘third 
model’ that does not fit with the existing adversarial model.  
18 J. Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice, supra note no. 14, at 35, citing J. Braithwaite 
and K. Daly, ‘Masculities, Violence, and Communitarian Control’, in S.L. Miller (ed), Crime Control and 
Women: Feminist Implications of Criminal Justice Policy (Newbury Park: Sage, 1998).  
19 See generally, R.B. Schlesinger, U. Mattei, T. Ruskola and A. Gidi, Schlesinger's Comparative Law: Cases, 
Text, Materials, 7th ed. (Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 2009) 858-62; B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? 
Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2011), at 84-86.  
20 M.E.I. Brienen and E.H. Hoegen, Victims of Crime in 22 European Criminal Justice Systems (Nijmegen: Wolf 
Legal Productions, 2000), at 1072-1075. 
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process.21 Unlike the common law process, the trial is not based on a competition between the 
parties but is based rather on continued investigation as directed by the judge.22  
Despite traditionally adopting an inquisitorial approach to the judicial process, civil 
law jurisdictions are taking an increasingly adversarial approach in many cases.23 Civil law 
adversarial trials are not, however, characterised by the idea that the process should be a duel 
between the prosecutor and the defence only. Rather, they are intimately related to the idea 
that all sides need to be heard in the process so that the court is able to reach an accurate 
judgment. Accordingly, the civil law system’s focus on uncovering the truth allows—if not 
prioritises— victims’ interventions in the proceedings.24  
As such, civil law systems generally allow victims to play a much more active role in 
proceedings, accommodating their counsel as an independent party who plays the role of 
protecting the victim’s interests in the course of proceedings while at the same time pursuing 
a reparative claim. This model is commonly referred to as the ‘adhesion’ or ‘partie civile’ 
procedure. This procedure is widely utilised in France and Belgium and confers three 
important rights upon victims of crime.25 First, as we will see further in this chapter, victims 
can use the procedure to initiate prosecution of an alleged offender. Second, victims are 
entitled to participate in their own right and to be heard as a party in the criminal trial. 
Participating in this way ensures that the victim is a fully-fledged contributor to the 
proceedings, on equal footing with both the prosecution and the defence. As a civil party to 
the action, the victim is endowed with important procedural rights including the rights to be 
regularly informed of the progress of the case, to challenge decisions taken during the process 
that threaten the victim’s interests, to make additional observations and to be heard as a 
plaintiff (without oath, differently from witnesses) regarding the injury suffered.  Finally, 
through this procedure, victims have a right to pursue a claim for civil damages in the 
criminal action.   
                                                 
21 M. Heikkilå, International Criminal Tribunals and Victims of Crime, supra note no. 10, at 51; P.L. Reichel, 
Comparative Criminal Justice Systems: A Topical Approach, 3rd ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002), 
at 133. 
22 M. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority, supra note no. 12, at 3.  
23 M. Chiavario, ‘Private Parties: The Rights of the Defendant and the Victim’, supra note no. 4, at 548. See e.g., 
in relation to Italy, M. Caianiello, ‘The Italian Public Prosecutor: An Inquisitorial Figure in Adversarial 
Proceedings?’, in E. Luna and M. Wade (eds), The Prosecutor in Transnational Perspective (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), available online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1976204 (last 
visited on 24 June 2013).  
24 B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice?, supra note no. 19, at 71-74. 
25 M. Chiavario, ‘Private Parties: The Rights of the Defendant and the Victim’, supra note no. 4, at 542-547; V. 
Dervieux, ‘The French System’, in M. Delmas-Marty and J. R. Spencer (eds), European Criminal Procedures, 
supra note no. 4, 218-291, at 226-227. 
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Some inquisitorial jurisdictions also permit the victim to assist the prosecutor as a 
subsidiary prosecutor. For instance, Germany, Austria, Malta, Norway, Sweden and various 
eastern European countries operate some form of subsidiary prosecutor scheme which allow 
victims an active role in both the pre-trial decision-making process and the trial itself.26 The 
procedure generally allows victims to submit evidence, comment on representations made by 
the prosecution and the defence and express their opinions on key decisions taken. In this 
sense, the victim’s lawyer can be an important ally of the public prosecutor, who nonetheless 
retains the burden of arguing the prosecution’s case.  
All in all, the rights attributed to victims in the civil and the common law procedural 
models reflect the various goals of the criminal process within those two systems.  On the one 
hand, common law criminal procedures focus primarily on the ‘duel’ between the prosecution 
and the defence based on strict procedural rules aimed at ensuring the fairness of the trial; on 
the other, civil law criminal procedures primarily aim at the establishment of the truth, and as 
such the involvement of victims not only seems opportune but in fact necessary to obtain a 
broader picture of the crimes at issue.  
Despite the traditional differences between these two models, in relation to the 
recognition of victims’ rights to participate in the criminal process at least, the gap between 
the two models has been narrowing.  
The rise of the victims’ rights movement in the 1960s produced significant changes 
within common law systems, making them more sensitive to victims’ concerns. This 
movement for the first time recognised that victims have a compelling interest in the trial 
process and that his or her participation at trial ought to be guaranteed.27 At the same time, the 
emergence of international legal standards on the rights of victims, as will be illustrated in 
sections 3 and 4 of this Chapter, has influenced the adoption of legislative amendments at the 
domestic level incorporating victims’ interests and rights in relation to criminal proceedings.   
 
2.2 Victims’ Rights in Criminal Proceedings: Arguments in Favour and Against 
 
There is a vast amount of literature debating the arguments in favour or against victims’ 
participation in criminal proceedings.28 Whilst consideration of the effects of victims’ 
                                                 
26 B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice?, supra note no. 19, at 81-84; C. Safferling,  ‘The Role of the Victim 
in the Criminal Process – A Paradigm Shift in National German and International Law?’, 11 International 
Criminal Law Review (2011) 191-194; M.E.I. Brienen and E.H. Hoegen, Victims of Crime in 22 European 
Criminal Justice Systems, supra note no. 20, at 363-364. 
27 C.M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure, supra note no. 12, at xxi. 
28 See infra notes nos. 29-39.  
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participation on the criminal process itself are certainly relevant, it is also necessary to 
analyse both legal and non-legal arguments in order to assess whether victims actually want 
specific participatory rights. 
The arguments in favour of victims’ participation focus on two main elements, 
namely: (i) the beneficial effects on victims’ suffering; and (ii) the enhancement of the 
legitimacy of the criminal system.  
In relation to the beneficial effects on victims’ suffering, it has been long argued that 
victims’ involvement in proceedings would do more harm than good for survivors, due to the 
danger that participation may reopen ‘healed wounds’ that would be best forgotten.29 
However, recent studies (especially in the context of gross violations of human rights) tend to 
confirm that even if victims do not actually seek decision-making power, they do seem to 
desire recognition, acknowledgment and some form of participation in the criminal process.30 
A range of empirical studies suggest that victim participation in the criminal justice process 
enhances satisfaction with the justice system by giving victims a sense of empowerment and 
official, albeit symbolic, acknowledgment.31 Indeed, as argued in Chapter III, if trials 
symbolise society’s acknowledgment and condemnation of what survivors suffered, those 
who participate as complainants or plaintiffs may feel their suffering recognised in some way. 
From a moral standpoint, it has been suggested that it is only right that victims have an 
                                                 
29 A. Boraine, ‘Introduction’, in Id., J. Levy, R. Scheffer and D.M. Tutu (eds) Dealing with the Past: Truth and 
Reconciliation in South Africa, 2nd ed. (Pretoria: Idasa Publications, 1997), at xiv, stating: ‘The focus on past 
violations runs the risk of being counterproductive and, instead of healing, can actually cause fresh wounds and 
cleavages in an already deeply divided society’. But see contra J. Méndez, ‘Comments on Prosecution: Who and 
For What?’, Ibid., 87-93, at 90, arguing that ‘prosecution in itself will provide a measure of healing and show the 
victims that their plight has not been forgotten by the states and society’. See also D. Kaminer et al., ‘The Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: Relation to Psychiatric Status and Forgiveness Among 
Survivors of Human Rights Abuses’, 178 The British Journal of Psychiatry (2001) 373-377, at 375 (‘If justice is 
done, and seen to be done, psychological healing may be facilitated’); N. J. Kritz, ‘Coming to Terms with 
Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights’, 59 Law and 
Contemporary Problems (1996) 127-152, at 129 (‘[T]otal impunity, in the form of comprehensive amnesties or 
the absence of any accountability for past atrocities, is immoral, injurious to victims, and in violation of 
international legal norms.’); Human Rights Watch, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (1999) 
(‘Without justice, there is no relief-psychological and material-for the victims and there is no hope of 
reconciliation for the society.’) 
30 E. Kiza, C. Rathgeber, H-C. Rohne, Victims of War: An Empirical Study on War-Victimization and Victims’ 
Attitudes towards Addressing Atrocities (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006), at 102-106; J. Doak, ‘Victims 
and the Sentencing Process: Developing Participatory Rights?’, 29 Legal Studies (2009) 651-677, at 652-653; J. 
Wemmers and K. Cyr ‘Victims’ Perspectives on Restorative Justice: How Much Involvement Are Victims 
Looking for?’, 11 International Review of Victimology (2004) 1-16. 
31 See e.g. H. Kury and M. Kaiser, ‘The Victim’s Position within the Criminal Proceedings – An Empirical 
Study’, in G. Kaiser, H. Kury and H.-J. Albrecht (eds) Victims and Criminal Justice: Legal Protection, 
Restitution and Support (Freiburg: Max Planck Institute, 1991); J. O’Connell, ‘Gambling with the Psyche: Does 
Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their Victims?’, 46 Harvard International Law Journal (2005) 
295-345, at 328-330.  
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opportunity to play a role in the criminal proceedings since this can provide some measure of 
reassurance to them that they have public recognition and support.32  
Of course, one may object that participating as a witness may have the same beneficial 
effects and that, accordingly, there is no need for victims to act as parties to the proceedings 
to receive acknowledgment of their sufferings from the state.  Evidence would, in principle, 
seem to confirm such objections. For instance, Stover reports that for many of the ICTY 
witnesses he interviewed ‘merely being in the courtroom with the accused while he was under 
guard helped to restore their confidence in the order of things.’33 
 However, evidence also supports the view that a significant proportion of the victims 
who testify at trials suffer psychological distress. O’Connell has rightly observed that ‘legal 
proceedings are not designed to help survivors cope: they aim to determine legal liability that 
could impose serious penalties.’34 A number of aspects of testifying in a criminal court can 
cause victims’ suffering.  This process, also known as ‘secondary victimization’35 includes 
the process of recalling the trauma, ordering memories coherently, and having to stick to the 
facts of the case which could frustrate victims who have waited years to tell their story 
publicly. Dembour and Haslam, in their study of the transcripts of victim-witnesses who 
testified in the trial of Radislav Krstić, dispute ‘the claim that victim-witnesses benefit from 
participating in war crimes trials’. 36 While focusing only on the Krstić case, they contend that 
‘any other ICTY case would illustrate our thesis that the international criminal justice process 
instrumentalises individual memory for its own collective ends with unsuspected (or at least 
unexplored) costs for the individuals and possibly collectivities concerned.’37  
It is submitted that secondary victimisation may be more common in legal systems 
that adopt an adversarial, party-driven process, rather than in civil law systems where judges 
rather than parties control the fact-finding process and the questioning of witnesses.38 Indeed, 
lacking an interest in proving one side of the case, civil law judges may be less likely that 
                                                 
32 J. Doak, ‘Victims and the Sentencing Process: Developing Participatory Rights?’, supra note no. 30, at 653; 
M. Cavadino and J. Dignan ‘Reparation, Retribution and Rights’, supra note no. 15, at 235-236. 
33 E. Stover, The Witness: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005), at 118-119.  
34 Ibid., at 331. 
35 Secondary victimization refers to the victimization which occurs through the response of institutions and 
individuals to the victim. See U. Orth, ‘Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by Criminal Proceedings’, 15 
Social Justice Research (2002) 313-325. 
36 M.-B. Dembour and E. Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials’, 15 European 
Journal of International Law (2004) 151-177, at 154. 
37 Ibid. 
38 A. Cassese, ‘Reflections on International Criminal Justice’, 60 Modern Law Review (1998) 1-10, at 10. 
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common law defence lawyers to treat testifying victims in an antagonistic manner.39 It 
remains the case, however, that whatever the criminal system in place, victims’ participation 
as witnesses only grants limited recognition to victims’ interests and concerns.  As such, the 
restorative power of such participation, in other words the cathartic/psychological benefit 
victims receive from such participation, remains doubtful, in contrast to the recognition of 
participatory rights to victims that would enable them to participate on their own right. 
Calls for enhanced participatory rights for victims have also relied on the argument 
that more meaningful participation contributes to overall levels of victim satisfaction and 
thereby bolsters the legitimacy of the criminal justice system as a whole.40 This may be 
particularly important in post-conflict situations where mass atrocities have occurred and 
there is a need to rebuild trust in state institutions and the rule of law. 
As observed above, victims’ participation is excluded from certain systems because it 
is feared that the introduction of private interests may disrupt the objectivity of the criminal 
process. In particular, opponents of victims’ participation in criminal proceedings point out 
that it may jeopardise the prioritisation of public interests and the accused’s right to a fair 
trial. Such arguments are often grounded in the assumption that victims are in some way 
motivated by vengeance and will accordingly pursue this motive in seeking to secure a harsh 
sentence for the accused.41 In this sense, it is feared that victim participation could introduce a 
new and unpredictable variable into the penalty equation, jeopardising core principles such as 
objectivity and proportionality.  
It is certainly true that any legitimate criminal justice system should ensure that its 
decisions are rooted in consistency and objectivity.  As such, offering the victim some form of 
‘veto’ in pre-trial decision-making would endanger both the public interest in punishing the 
crime and the accused’s right to be treated in a fair and consistent manner. However, as stated 
above, victim participation can also ensure that courts have a fuller picture of the crime and 
consequently that they are better placed to issue a correct sentence to the offender and order 
reparation to the victims. 
Moreover, the arguments against victim participation tend to exaggerate the extent to 
which the consequences of such participation are likely to be unforeseen. Judges are, after all, 
trained to disregard evidence that is irrelevant. The interests of the victims are but one factor 
                                                 
39 J. O’Connell, ‘Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights Violators Console Their 
Victims?’, supra note no. 31, at 334. 
40 J. Doak, ‘Victims and the Sentencing Process: Developing Participatory Rights?’, supra note no. 30, at 653. 
41 As Erez et al. acknowledged, some commentators fear a ‘reversion to the retributive, repressive and vengeful 
punishment of an earlier age’. E. Erez, L. Roeger and F. Morgan ‘Victim Harm, Impact Statements and Victim 
Satisfaction with Justice: An Australian Experience’, 5 International Review of Victimology (1997) 37-60, at 40. 
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that ought to be taken into account alongside a range of other factors, including the 
seriousness of the offence, the threat posed to the public and any mitigating circumstances.42  
As this Chapter will discuss, whilst there are a variety of structural and normative 
reasons why victims have traditionally been unable to participate in common law criminal 
justice systems, recent years have witnessed a major shift in attitude regarding the merits of 
victim participation at both the domestic and international level.  
 
                                                 
42 See J. Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of Third Parties, 
supra note no. 14, at 151-156. 
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3 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON VICTIMS’ PARTICIPATION IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, throughout the last three decades a number 
of documents have been adopted at the international and regional level acknowledging the 
importance of considering victims’ concerns in the criminal process. Starting with the UN 
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power in 1985,43 and the 
Council of Europe Recommendation in the same year,44 international legal norms began to 
recognise that victims need to be treated with compassion, dignity and that they are entitled to 
redress for their suffering in terms of access to justice and reparation. Through a thorough 
analysis of the law and practice of international human rights law, this section poses the 
following question: should criminal tribunals provide victims with certain rights and 
entitlements? And if so, what should they cover? 
 
3.1 Global Instruments 
 
As noted in the introduction to this Chapter, the matter of victims’ participation in criminal 
proceedings before domestic courts has been traditionally left to the discretion of states 
because of the substantially different approaches that these states have taken to this subject. 
Accordingly, only a small number of international conventions explicitly refer to a right of the 
victim to participate in criminal proceedings. As will be discussed in Section 4, human rights 
supervisory bodies have derived victims’ rights from other rights, including the right to an 
effective remedy. In recent years, however, a number of non-conventional documents have 
been adopted by the United Nations in relation to the rights of victims.  
 
3.1.1 International Conventions 
 
As mentioned above, only a limited number of international conventions deal with the rights 
of victims of human rights violations in criminal proceedings. In particular, mention should 
be made of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children.  
                                                 
43 See supra note no. 2.  
44 See supra note no. 3. 
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The Convention on Enforced Disappearance sets out the right of victims to report any 
instance of enforced disappearance and to be informed of ‘the progress and results of the 
investigation’.45 Article 25(3) of the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
establishes that ‘each State Party shall, subject to its domestic law, enable views and concerns 
of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of criminal proceedings.’ 
Using similar wording, Article 6 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons requires that victims are ‘assisted to express their views and concerns at 
appropriate stages of criminal proceedings in a manner not prejudicial to the rights of the 
defense.’ 
As will be discussed in Chapter VI, victims’ participation in criminal proceedings has 
also been recognised in the context of international criminal trials in the Rome Statute for the 
International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), an international treaty ratified by the vast majority of 
the states of the international community.46  
 
3.1.2 Non-Binding Legal Instruments 
 
In recent year, a large number of documents of non-binding nature prescribing victims’ 
participatory rights in criminal proceedings have been adopted. These include general 
recommendations by UN treaty bodies, resolutions and declarations adopted by the General 
Assembly. As far as general recommendations by UN treaty bodies are concerned, reference 
can made, for instance, to General Recommendation No. 19 on the Violence against Women 
adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (‘CEDAW 
Committee’) in 1992 whereby the Committee encouraged states to provide victims ‘effective 
complaints procedures and remedies’.47  
General Recommendation No. XXXI on the Prevention of Racial Discrimination in the 
Administration and Functioning of the Criminal Justice System, adopted by the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD Committee’) in 2005, goes even further by 
detailing the rights that victims should be granted in the course of criminal proceedings. 
Referring to Article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, on victims’ right to an effective remedy, the Committee invites states to: 
                                                 
45 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Arts. 12 and 24(2). 
46 As of June 2013, the ICC Statute has been ratified by 122 states.  
47 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 19 on the Violence against Women, 1992, UN Doc. 
A/47/38 at 1 (1993), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 243 (2003), § 24(i). 
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Grant[…] a proper place to victims and their families, as well as witnesses, throughout the proceedings, by 
enabling complainants to be heard by the judges during the examination proceedings and the court hearing, to 
have access to information, to confront hostile witnesses, to challenge evidence and to be informed of the 
progress of proceedings.48 
Mention can also be made of the Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation 
of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted by the 
General Assembly in 2000, which establish that victims have right both to be informed and to 
have access to any hearing or relevant information about the investigation, including the right 
to present additional evidence (Article 4).49 In a similar vein, Paragraph 8 of the UN 
Resolution on Children as Victims and Perpetrators of Crime holds that states: 
[I]n a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law and the administration of justice … should 
enable children to participate as appropriate, in criminal justice proceedings, including the investigative stage 
and throughout the trial and post-trial process period, to be heard and given information about their status and 
any proceedings that might subsequently take place.50  
A number of instruments have also been adopted specifically dealing with the rights of 
victims of human rights violations. Although not legally binding, these instruments have 
profoundly influenced the emergence of international standards on this matter. Particular 
mention should be made to the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power of 1985, the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law of 2005, and the Set of Principles for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity of 2005.  
 
A. THE 1985 DECLARATION FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME 
 
The 1985 Declaration for Victims of Crime, also referred to as the ‘Magna Carta for 
Victims’51, marked an important step in introducing a new awareness of the need for justice 
for victims. The Declaration, partly based on Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
                                                 
48 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. XXXI on the Prevention of Racial Discrimination in the 
Administration and Functioning of the Criminal Justice System, 2005, UN Doc. A/60/18, at § 19(a). 
49 UN GA, Principles on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN Doc. A/RES/55/89, 4 December 2000. 
50 Resolution on Children as Victims and Perpetrators, adopted by the Ninth UN Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, UN Doc. A/CONF.169/16 (1995), 12 May 1995, § 8. 
51 See supra note no. 2. Y. Danieli, ‘Reappraising the Nuremberg Trials and Their Legacy: The Role of Victims 
in International Law’, 27 Cardozo Law Review (2006) 1633-1649, at 1645. 
  
210
Rights52, is the first international instrument that provides for the right of victims to have 
access to justice and receive reparation for the injuries suffered.53 A review of the travaux 
préparatoires of the Declaration evidences how, although the drafters generally agreed on its 
contents, divergences remained as to the scope of the document itself. Particularly, the 
‘question of to what extent the complainant should be allowed to express his views and 
concerns in the criminal justice process caused considerable debate in the drafting of the 
United Nations Declaration’ and remained very much controversial until the very end.54 After 
much discussion, this Declaration provides, in Article 4, that victims ‘are entitled to access to 
the mechanisms of justice and prompt redress, as provided for by the national legislation’. 
Moreover, the Declaration includes a provision specifically dealing with victim participation, 
Article 6(b), found under the heading ‘Access to Justice and Fair Treatment’, which reads as 
follows: 
The responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the needs of victims should be facilitated by: 
allowing the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the 
proceedings where their personal interests are affected, without prejudice to the accused and consistent with the 
relevant national criminal justice system. 
The language of this provision does not explicitly set out participatory rights for 
victims, but rather limits itself to recommending that states allow for some inclusion of 
victims in the criminal process. In view of what we observed above in relation to the drafting 
process, the vague and non-prescriptive language of this article may be explained with the 
necessity to safeguard states’ discretion in adjusting their own criminal systems to the 
Declaration. The fact that the Declaration was eventually adopted by consensus reflects, 
however, a widespread opinion, among different national jurisdictions, that victims should be 
entitled to play some role in the criminal process.55  
This view has been confirmed by two factual elements following the adoption of the 
Declaration. First, publications elaborating best practices on how states can implement the 
Declaration have interpreted it as providing for victims’ participation early in the criminal 
process. For example, the Handbook on Justice for Victims interprets the Declaration as 
                                                 
52 UN GA, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217A (III) (UN Doc. A/810 at 71), 10 December 
1948. 
53 Some scholars, however, have argued that the standards proclaimed in the 1985 UN Declaration are based on 
‘well-established precedents’; e.g., L. L. Lamborn, ‘The United Nations Declaration on Victims: The Scope of 
Coverage’, in M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Protection of Victims (Érès: Association Internationale de 
Droit Pénale, 1988) 105-126, at 105. 
54 M. Joutsen, The Role of the Victim of Crime in European Criminal Justice Systems: A Cross National Study of 
the Role of the Victim (Helsinki: Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, 1987), at 179. 
55 Ibid., at 66. 
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requiring states to provide for some sort of review mechanism for challenging decisions not to 
prosecute.56 Accordingly, the Declaration has also been interpreted as providing for victims’ 
right to influence the prosecutorial decision-making process throughout the proceedings; in 
particular, many states have put in force procedures whereby victims can seek a review of 
decisions that adversely affect their interests concerning investigation, identification and 
prosecution.57 
Furthermore, although the Declaration as such is not legally binding, during the 
negotiations of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court it was considered as a 
reference text for the issue of victim participation, by virtue of its adoption by consensus and 
the wide acceptance of its provisions.58 As will be discussed in Chapter VI, the provisions of 
the ICC Statute establishing a victim’s participation scheme are largely formulated along the 
lines of the 1985 Declaration. From this perspective, the Declaration has paved the way to the 
setting of international standards on victims’ rights in criminal proceedings before domestic 
and international courts. 
 
B. BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND 
REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
The 1985 Declaration was followed in the 1990s by a raft of academic literature and studies 
on the rights of victims of crime, such as the study on the right to reparation for victims of 
human rights entrusted to Van Boven by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights.59 This study culminated with the drafting of the Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law which represent one of the most 
notable attempts to codify rules and principles on the enforcement of human rights protection 
                                                 
56  United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Handbook on Justice for Victims: On the Use 
and Application of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (New 
York: UNODCCP, 1999), at 39. 
57 Ibid. 
58 This happened as a response to the request contained in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/14, Use and Application of 
the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, UN Doc. 
E/CN.15/1996/16/Add.15, 23 July 1996, at § 6, which recommended the incorporation of the 1985 Declaration 
in the ICC Statute. See also United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of 
an International Criminal Court, Report of Working Group on Procedural Matters, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGPM/L.2/Add.8, 16 July 1998, at 7. 
59 Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Final report submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, 2 July 1993, 2 July 1993. 
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from the perspective of the victim. The work by Van Boven was then continued and finalised 
by Bassiouni, who submitted a revised version of the Principles, incorporating the criminal 
dimension of remedies for gross violations. The Principles were concluded and adopted by 
the GA in December 2005.60 
Despite not specifically calling for victim participation, the Basic Principles focus on 
three overarching rights, considered to be integral components of victims’ right to remedy, 
that can be interpreted as implying a victim’ right to participation in the criminal process.61 
These are:  (i) the right to equal and effective access to justice (Principle VIII); (ii) the right to 
adequate, effective and prompt reparation for the harm suffered (Principle IX); and (iii) the 
right of access to the relevant information concerning the violations and reparation 
mechanisms (Principle X).  
Indeed, as pointed out by Theo Van Boven in an earlier study of the Basic Principles:  
[G]ross violations of human rights are by their very nature irreparable and any remedy would fail to repair the 
grave injury inflicted to the victims, especially when the violations have been committed on a massive scale. 
Remedies must thus focus on the restoration of rights and the accountability of wrongdoers’.62  
As observed in Chapter III, the view has emerged that reparation for victims of gross 
violations of human rights entails an obligation of the state to investigate, prosecute and 
punish those responsible for the violations. This view is also confirmed by Principle 22 (f) of 
the Basic Principles, which provides that satisfaction of victims includes ‘judicial and 
administrative sanctions against persons liable for the violations’. 
Accordingly, it can be argued that if prosecution of perpetrators is understood as a 
form of reparation which victims have a right to, victims should be able to claim such a right, 
by being entitled to exercise certain rights in criminal proceedings. Victims’ right to have 
access to information about the violations, or right to truth, is also interconnected with the 
right of victims to be heard in the criminal process.  
Various modalities can be used to safeguard and implement the right to truth. It is 
remarkable that the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights has stressed the role 
played by criminal proceedings in ensuring the right to truth as well as the role played by 
                                                 
60 UN GA, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation, for 
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, UN 
Doc. A/RES/60/147, 16 December 2005; D. Shelton, ‘United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Reparations: 
Context and Contents’, in K. de Feyter, S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt, and P. Lemmens (eds), Out of the Ashes: 
Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations (Antwerpen: Intersentia & Institute for 
Human Rights, 2006) 11-33, at 14 ff.  
61 B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice?, supra note no. 19, at 100-104. 
62 Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note no. 59, at 53. 
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victims in that context.63 Victims, having first-hand knowledge of the facts surrounding the 
violations, may provide an important contribution to the establishment of the truth. 
Accordingly, the recognition of victims’ right to truth may well be read as implying their right 
to be heard in the criminal process.64 
In sum, the right to access to justice, the right to reparation and the right to truth, set 
out in the Basic Principles as integral components of victim’s right to remedy, are all 
associated with the recognition of victim’s rights in criminal proceedings. Although the Basic 
Principles do not explicitly call for victim participatory rights in judicial processes they 
implicitly support the notion of victims having some form of participation in criminal justice 
processes in order to ensure the respect of their right to remedy. 
 
 
C. THE SET OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS THROUGH ACTION TO COMBAT IMPUNITY 
 
In 2005, another instrument explicitly dealing with the rights of victims of human rights 
violations was adopted, namely the Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of 
Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (‘Principles on Impunity’), first drafted by 
Louis Joinet and later updated by Diane Orentlicher, the then UN independent expert on this 
subject.65 In contrast to the two UN Declarations examined above which use vague and non-
prescriptive language, ultimately leaving to states the decision on how victims’ concerns 
should be incorporated in the criminal process, more specific terms are used in the Principles 
on Impunity.  
In particular, Principle 19 of the Principles on Impunity links in an explicit manner 
victims’ right to justice with the recognition of procedural rights in the criminal process, 
affirming that:  
The right to justice entails obligations for the State: to investigate violations, to prosecute the perpetrators and, if 
their guilt is established, to punish them. Although the decision to prosecute is initially a State responsibility, 
                                                 
63 UN Commission on Human Rights, Study on the Right to the Truth, Report of the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91, 8 February 2006, § 61; Commission on 
Human Rights, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Diane 
Orentlicher; Addendum: Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through 
Action to Combat Impunity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, Principle 19; R. Aldana-
Pindell, ‘In Vindication of Justiciable Victims’ Right to Truth and Justice for State-Sponsored Crimes’, 35 
(2002) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1399-1501, at 1442. 
64 B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice?, supra note no. 19, at 98-104. 
65 See supra note no. 63; Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (Civil and 
Political), Revised Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet Pursuant to Sub-Commission Decision 1996/119, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, 2 October 1997. 
  
214
supplementary procedural rules should allow victims to be admitted as civil plaintiffs in criminal proceedings or, 
if the public authorities fail to do so, to institute proceedings themselves.  
The language used in the Principles on Impunity differs from the documents analysed 
above in the sense that for the first time it establishes a clear link between the right to justice 
and the exercise of rights in the criminal process. Whereas earlier documents only referred to 
the need to hear victims’ concerns, these Principles indicate that victims should be enabled to 
concretely enforce their right to justice, by having the ability to initiate a criminal prosecution, 
even when state authorities have not done so. As such, for the first time, recognition is given 
to the private interests of the victims, not only as an element that should be considered in the 
criminal process, but as one that may eventually have an impact on the decision-making 
process.  
Despite the fact that the Principles on Impunity are not binding on states, they have 
already had a profound impact on efforts to combat impunity by becoming a key reference in 
decisions by the supervisory bodies for the American Convention on Human Rights66 and 
other national authorities in support of measures to combat impunity.67 Therefore, it can be 
asserted that these Principles make a genuine contribution to the emergence of international 
standards on the matter,68 having an equally important impact upon the position of victims in 
criminal proceedings especially since, as we shall see in the following sections, similar 
provisions have been included in subsequent documents adopted at the regional level, as well 
as in the practice of human rights supervisory bodies.  
 
3.2 Regional Instruments on Victims’ Rights in Criminal Proceedings 
 
In recent years, there has been a clear increase in the recognition of victims’ rights at a 
regional level. Without aiming to be exhaustive, this section presents some of the most 
significant instruments adopted on this issue.  
 
                                                 
66 See e.g. IACtHR, Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Order (Monitoring Compliance with Judgment), 18 
November 2010, § 44 
67 In her introduction to the Independent Study on Best Practices, Including Recommendations, to Assist States in 
Strengthening their Domestic Capacity to Combat All Aspects of Impunity, Diane Orentlicher observed that since 
1997 the Set of Principles ‘have played an influential role in strengthening domestic efforts to combat impunity’ 
and that ‘[d]uring the same period, the Principles as a whole have received strong affirmation in decisions by 
international criminal tribunals and human rights treaty bodies’. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/88, 27 February 2004, at 
1.  
68 See Chapter I, Section 4.2.1. 
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3.2.1 Council of Europe 
 
Since the early 1980s, the Council of Europe has integrated the victim’s perspective in its 
work in the field of the fight against crime. This is all the more relevant since the European 
Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has acknowledged the ‘need to safeguard victims’ rights 
and their proper place in criminal proceedings’69 and the need to protect vulnerable victims, 
as will be further illustrated in this Chapter.  
In 1985 the Committee of Ministers issued Recommendation No. R(85)11 titled ‘On 
the position of the victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure’,70 with a view of 
changing the traditional approach of criminal law which until that moment had focused on the 
relationship between the state and the offender and tended to ignore the interests of victims. 
The Recommendation invites states to take into account the needs of the victims ‘to a greater 
degree throughout all stages of the criminal process’71 and includes guidelines aimed at 
protecting victims of crime and safeguarding their interests at each stage of the criminal 
procedure. No right to participation in the proceedings is provided as such, but the document 
emphasises the need to inform victims about the development of the case and, in particular, of 
the final decision concerning prosecution as well as of the final outcome of the case.72 
Moreover, the Recommendation establishes that victims should have the right to seek review 
of a decision not to prosecute or the right to institute private proceedings.73 
Following Recommendation 85(11), the Council of Europe continued to emphasise the 
need to support victims’ rights in criminal proceedings. In Recommendation 87(21),74 the 
Committee of Ministers called for greater awareness of the need to inform and assist victims 
during the criminal process.75 In a more recent recommendation on the role of the public 
prosecutor, the Committee recommended that victims be able to challenge the decision of 
public prosecutors not to prosecute, either by way of judicial review or by authorising parties 
to engage in private prosecutions.76 In so doing, the Committee seems to uphold the emerging 
international standard according to which prosecution is a right that victims should be able to 
claim. 
                                                 
69 ECtHR, Perez v. France (App. No. 47287/99), Judgment (Merits), 12 February 2004, § 72. 
70 Recommendation No. R (85) 11, supra note no. 3. 
71 Ibid., at 1. 
72 Ibid., at 2. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (87) 21 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on Assistance to Victims and the Prevention of Victimization, 17 September 1987. 
75 Ibid., at 2. 
76 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R. (2000) 19 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on the Role of Public Prosecution in the Criminal Justice System, 6 October 2000, § 34. 
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More recently, in 2006, the Committee issued a detailed recommendation ‘on 
assistance to crime victims’.77 The recommendation, in particular, sets forth a number of 
measures directing states to ‘respect the security, dignity, private and family life of victims 
and recognise the negative effects of crime on victims.’78 Although not explicitly demanding 
specific participatory rights for victims in the criminal process, several provisions of the 
recommendation suggest that victims should be able to defend their interests during the 
criminal trial. For instance, Article 7(2) sets out that ‘States should institute procedures for 
victims to claim compensation from the offender in the context of criminal proceedings.’  
3.2.2 European Union 
 
The European Union has also contributed to strengthening the role afforded to victims in 
European criminal justice systems. Through a series of legislative measures, the European 
Union has attempted to introduce common European standards while respecting national 
sovereignty through the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. The need for the 
harmonisation of victims’ rights, in particular, ensues from the concept of European 
citizenship which requires that citizens of the Union be guaranteed the same rights across the 
member states without discrimination on the basis of nationality.79 
The most significant EU legislative instrument concerning victims of crime is the 
Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings, 
adopted by the Council of the European Union.80 The decision, which is binding on all 
member states, urges states to ensure that victims ‘have a real and appropriate role’81 in their 
criminal legal system. Despite the notable differences in the criminal procedures of the 
various EU states, the document calls on member states to ‘recognize the rights and legitimate 
interests of victims with particular reference to criminal proceedings’82 and requires them to 
provide for the possibility of victims to be heard and to provide evidence. In addition, 
                                                 
77 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R. (2006) 8 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on Assistance to Crime Victims, 14 June 2006. 
78 Ibid., § 2.1. 
79 P. Bárd, A.Borbíró, ‘Local and Regional Good Practices on Victims’ Rights’, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2011, at 2, available online at http://cor.europa.eu/en/documentation/studies/Documents/local-regional-
good-practices-victims.pdf (last visited on 26 June 2013).  
80 Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the Standing of Victims in 
Criminal Proceedings (2001/220/JHA), 15 March 2001. In Pupino, the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) held 
that even though the EU Framework decisions have no direct effect (pursuant to art. 34(2)(b) sentence 2 of the 
Maastricht Treaty), they may indirectly influence the criminal process since national courts are under an 
obligation to interpret criminal procedural law in conformity with them. ECJ, Maria Pupino C-105/03, 16 June 
2005, European Court Reports 2005, page I-05285. 
81 Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001, supra note no. 80, Art. 2(1). 
82 Ibid. 
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member states are asked to ensure that victims have access to all relevant information for the 
protection of their interests, including the outcome of their complaint and the court’s 
sentence.83 
On 25 October 2012, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 
adopted a Directive ‘setting minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of 
victims of crime’, replacing the Framework Decision mentioned above.84 The document 
establishes common minimum rules on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime. 
In particular, recognising that ‘[c]rime is a wrong against society as well as a violation of the 
individual rights of victims’, the Directive asks states to ensure that victims are treated with 
respect and that their needs are taken into account.85 In doing so, the Directive substantially 
subverts the traditional retributive rationale that has been adopted in most criminal justice 
systems, particularly common law systems, as observed above. Most importantly for the 
purposes of the present discussion the proposed Directive recommends that states provide 
victims with adequate support and information and ensure that they are involved in 
proceedings:  
Justice cannot be effectively achieved unless the victim can properly explain the circumstances of the crime they 
have suffered and provide their evidence in a manner understandable to the competent authorities. It is equally 
important to ensure the respectful treatment of the victim and to ensure they are able to access their rights.86 
As explained by the Commission in a document circulated prepared during the 
drafting of the Directive: 
 Victims have a legitimate interest in seeing that justice is done. They should be given effective access to justice, 
which can be an important element in their recovery. Information for victims on their rights and on key dates and 
decisions is an essential aspect of participating in the proceedings, and it should be given in a way that victims 
understand. Victims should also be able to attend the trial and follow their case through.87 
Although the Directive does not specifically mandate that victims play an active role 
in criminal proceedings (as parties or participants, for example), the adoption of this 
instrument which is legally binding upon EU member states is significant as, similar to other 
                                                 
83 Ibid., Art. 4. 
84 European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council Establishing Minimum Standards on the Rights, Support and Protection of Victims of Crime, 
25 October 2012.  
85 Ibid., § 9.  
86 Ibid., § 34. 
87 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strengthening Victims’ Rights in the EU, 
COM (2011) 274, 18 May 2011, § 3.4. 
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documents adopted at the international and at the regional level, it explicitly affirms that the 
prosecution of crimes directly matters to victims of those wrongs. In other words, this 
instrument supports the view that victims have legitimate interests in the outcome of criminal 
proceedings and that they should be granted procedural rights in order to protect such 
interests. EU countries will have three years to transpose the provisions of the Directive into 
their national laws. It is remarkable that the UK and Ireland which, as we will see below, have 
traditionally not recognised victim standing in criminal proceedings, have declared that they 
will  take part in the adoption and application of the Directive.88  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 Directive 2012/29/EU, supra note no. 87, § 70.  
  
219 
4 THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS SUPERVISORY BODIES 
 
As noted above, a number of (mainly non-binding) international instruments have been 
recently adopted in relation to victims’ rights in criminal proceedings. The majority of human 
rights treaties do not make explicit reference to the right of victims to have standing or to be 
heard in criminal proceedings. This is most probably due to the fact that, in order to have the 
wide support of states, these documents were drafted so as not to interfere with the margin of 
appreciation for the domestic practices of states. As will be noted below, however, bodies 
interpreting international human rights treaties have increasingly interpreted certain 
provisions as providing victims with rights within the criminal process, in part through a 
greater participatory role.  
 
4.1 The Human Rights Committee 
 
As examined in Chapter III, an emerging trend in the Human Rights Committee’s (‘HRC’) 
interpretation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights increasingly requires criminal 
prosecution and punishment as a remedy for serious human rights violations. In contrast, the 
HRC has not, however, taken the position that victims ought to be granted rights in criminal 
proceedings as integral components of their right to remedy.89 This question has been 
discussed in a number of cases after the Committee has found that merely disciplinary 
measures were insufficient to remedy the harm suffered by the complainants. Authors of 
individual communications referred to the new trend in the jurisprudence of the Committee 
and argued that there was a corresponding right for victims to call for criminal prosecution.90 
Nonetheless, the Committee maintained its traditional view that the Covenant does not 
provide for such a right, nor consequently any right to participate in some form in the criminal 
process.91  
Similarly, in those cases where the Committee urged the state to expedite criminal 
proceedings against those responsible for serious violations of human rights, no reference has 
been made to a corresponding individual right for victims of such violations. For example, in 
                                                 
89 HRC, Sundara A.L. Rajapakse v. Sri Lanka (Comm. No. 1250/2004), UN Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1250/2004, 14 
July 2006, § 9.3. 
90 HRC, José Antonio Coronel et al. v Colombia (Comm. No. 778/1997), UN Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/778/1997, 24 
October 2002, § 3.5. 
91 See e.g. HRC, José Vicente and Amado Villafañe Chaparro et al. v. Colombia (Comm. No. 612/1995), UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995, 29 July 1997, § 8.8; see also R. Aldana-Pindell, ‘An Emerging Universality of 
Justiciable Victims’ Rights in the Criminal Process to Curtail Impunity for State-Sponsored Crimes’, 26 Human 
Rights Quarterly (2004) 605-686, at 645-646. 
  
220
Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia the Committee specified that, although there is no right for 
individuals to require that the State prosecute the crimes of another person, the state party is 
under a duty to prosecute, try and punish those responsible for gross human rights 
violations.92  
These pronouncements are difficult to rationalise. Is it possible to affirm that criminal 
prosecution is necessary as a remedy without acknowledging an individual right to claim it? 
In principle, once a measure is considered to be a remedy pursuant to Article 2(3) of the 
ICCPR, it is essential to acknowledge a corresponding right of the victim.93 Therefore, the 
recognition of victims’ rights in criminal proceedings would be a logical extension of the 
position of the HRC, extensively analysed in Chapter III, according to which victims’ right to 
an effective remedy is a legal basis for the state’s duty to prosecute and bring to justice those 
responsible for the violation.94  
 It has been observed that the current contradiction in the Committee’s case law is 
most probably due to the fact that this body has not settled yet the issue.95 In particular, the 
Committee needs to clarify what the aim of criminal measures is. If prosecution is considered 
as a general means of protection against future human rights violations, then there is no need 
to recognise any individual right. But since, as Chapter III has shown, the practice of the HRC 
also demands criminal prosecution and punishment in the interests of the individual victim, it 
would seem logical to assume that the Committee shall elaborate corresponding rights for 
individuals in the criminal process.   
 
4.2 The European Court of Human Rights 
 
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights shows a growing 
acknowledgement of the symbolic nature of victims’ participation in criminal proceedings. 
The Court has never recognised that under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘ECHR’) the victim has an absolute right to participate in domestic criminal proceedings if 
the domestic law does not provide for such a right. Nevertheless, although the degree of 
                                                 
92 HRC, Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia (Comm. No. 563/1993), UN Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993, 27 
October 1995, § 8(6). 
93 A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 
25-27; but see A. O’Shea, Amnesty for Crime in International Law and Practice (New York: Springer, 2002), at 
172-176: this author denies a right to demand punishment, but recognises its remedial function. 
94 See also J.C. Ochoa S., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings for Serious Human Rights 
Violations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), at 101-103. 
95 A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations, supra note no. 93, at 26. 
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participation may vary, the Court has established that the victim and his next of kin must be 
involved in the criminal process to the extent of securing their interests.  
The Court, after an initial period in which it had rejected victims applications for 
violations of Article 6 of the ECHR (right to a fair trial) as being inadmissible ratione 
personae,96 started relying on that provision in order to develop procedural rights for victims 
in criminal proceedings. The European Court, however, repeatedly held that in criminal 
proceedings it is not the right of the victim, such as the civil claim for compensation, which is 
at issue, but the State’s demands for punishment.97  
Pursuant to this line of interpretation, the right to fair trial can be asserted by victims 
only where civil remedies depend on criminal prosecution. This was the case in Perez v. 
France, where the victim joined the criminal proceedings as a civil party.98 However, in so 
doing, the European Court did not assume an individual right to justice. Even if a right to fair 
trial may be claimed by victims in those jurisdictions where civil claim depends on criminal 
prosecution, such a right derives from a victim’s right to compensation and not to the 
prosecution of the alleged offender. Accordingly, the Court determined that the right to a fair 
trial:  
[I]ncludes the right of the parties to the trial to submit any observations that they consider relevant to their case. 
The purpose of the Convention being to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are 
practical and effective … , this right can only be seen to be effective if the observations are actually heard.99 
 It further stated that ‘the decisive factor for the applicability of Article 6(1) is 
whether, from the moment when the applicant is joined as a civil party until the conclusion of 
those criminal proceedings, the civil component remains closely connected with the criminal 
component.’100 However, the Court did put restrictions on the right of victims to claim a 
violation under Article 6(1), clarifying that the Convention does not confer any right to 
private revenge and therefore ‘the right to have a third party prosecuted or sentenced for a 
criminal charge cannot be asserted independently.’101  
Throughout the last decade the Court’s approach has progressively evolved towards 
greater protection of victims’ rights in criminal proceedings with the parallel affirmation of 
                                                 
96 S. Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 35. 
97 ECtHR, Ramsahai and Others v. The Netherlands (App. No. 52391/99), Judgment (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction), 15 May 2007, §§ 359-360. 
98 ECtHR, Perez v. France, supra note no. 69. 
99 Ibid., at § 80. 
100 Ibid., at § 67, citing Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy (App. No. 32967/96), Judgment (Merits), 17 January 2002, § 
62. 
101 Ibid., at § 70. However, at § 65 the Court used less strong language, noting that ‘it is conceivable that Article 
6 may be applicable even in the absence of a claim for financial reparation’. 
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the state’s obligation to carry out effective official investigations that can lead to the 
identification and punishment of those found to be responsible in cases of gross violations of 
human rights. In particular, the Court has read Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (freedom from 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) and 13 (right to an effective remedy) as 
conferring upon victims certain participatory rights.  
The Court has held that the procedural aspect of the state obligation to protect the right 
to life or to physical integrity, under articles 2 and 3 respectively, entails the effective access 
of victims (or their next of kin) to the investigatory procedure. The requirement of victim 
involvement in the investigation over the alleged violations has been applied in respect to 
states which have both civil law and common law criminal justice systems. For instance, in 
Ogur v. Turkey, a case concerning the killing of a mining company’s guard by members of 
the Turkish security forces, the Court found that the respondent state had violated Article 2 on 
the basis, inter alia, of the lack of access by the victims’ next of kin to the case file during the 
investigation stage, as well as of the failure to notify their lawyers of the decision to 
discontinue the prosecution against those allegedly responsible for the death of their 
relative.102  
Similarly, in the Kelly and others v. United Kingdom case, concerning the killing of 
nine men by security forces during an operation in Northern Ireland, the Court included the 
involvement of victims’ relatives in the investigatory procedure among the criteria for an 
investigation to be effective: 
[T]here must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability 
in practice as well as in theory. The degree of public scrutiny required may well vary from case to case. In all 
cases, however, the next of kin of the victims must be involved in the procedure to the extent necessary to 
safeguard his or her legitimate interests.103 
                                                 
102 ECtHR, Ogur v. Turkey (App. No. 21594/93), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 20 May 1999, § 92: 
see also G le  v Turkey (App. No. 21593/93), Judment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 27 July 1998, § 82; Kaya 
v. Turkey (App. Nos. 168/1996/777/978), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 19 February 1998, § 107; 
Bitiyeva and x. v. Russia (App. Nos 57953/00 and 37392/03), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 21 June 
2007, § 156; Anguelova v. Bulgaria (App. No. 38361/97), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 13 June 
2002, § 140; Slimani v. France (App. No. 57671/00) Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 27 July 2004, §§ 
44-49; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (App. No. 25965/04), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 7 January 
2010, § 288. 
103 ECtHR, Kelly and Others v. United Kingdom (App. No. 30054/96), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 
4 May 2001, § 98; see also McKerr v. United Kingdom (App. No. 28883/95), Judgment (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction), 4 May 2001, § 109; Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom (App. No. 24746/94), Judgment (Merits and 
Just Satisfaction), 4 May 2001, § 115; Shanaghan v. United Kingdom (App. No. 37715/97), Judgment (Merits 
and Just Satisfaction), 4 May 2001, § 92; Finucane v. United Kingdom (App. No. 29178/95), Judgment (Merits 
and Just Satisfaction), 1 July 2003, § 71. 
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The Court has further elaborated on the involvement of victims in criminal 
proceedings in the case of Paul and Audrey Edwards v. United Kingdom, concerning the 
killing of a man detained in prison by another prisoner. The Court, in particular, determined 
that victims of serious violations of human rights have legitimate interests in criminal 
proceedings because of ‘their close and personal concern with the subject matter of the 
inquiry’.104 Accordingly, the Court found a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 
based, inter alia, on the fact that the applicants were excluded from criminal proceedings 
apart from merely providing testimony.105 
It should be noted that in a number of cases relating to states adopting civil law 
criminal procedure, the Court has found that the lack of the victim’s involvement in criminal 
proceedings not only violates the procedural aspect of the state’s obligation to protect the 
right to life or to physical integrity, but also violates the right to an effective remedy under 
Article 13 of the ECHR. This is so due to the fact that in most states which operate under civil 
law procedure compensation awards depend upon the outcome of the criminal case. 
Accordingly, the Court has found that, since the right to reparation depends on the outcome of 
the criminal process there is a close procedural relationship between the criminal proceedings 
and the remedies available to victims.106 Victims must consequently have access to criminal 
justice in order to claim compensation where appropriate. In Gül v. Turkey, concerning the 
killing of a man by Turkish police officers, the Court found that the respondent state had 
violated both the procedural obligations deriving from Article 2 and the right to an effective 
remedy based on the fact that victims had not been informed about the criminal proceedings 
against the person allegedly responsible for the killing and had been denied the opportunity to 
tell the court their version of events.107 
Conversely, the failure to recognise victims’ rights in criminal proceedings has been 
read as a violation of the procedural obligations deriving from Article 2 only, without being 
seen as a violation of the right to an effective remedy in cases where civil compensation does 
not depend on criminal proceedings, as is the case in most common law systems. For 
example, in cases relating to the UK, the Court has found that the denial of victims’ 
                                                 
104 ECtHR, Paul and Audrey Edwards v. United Kingdom (App. No. 46477/99), Judgment (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction), 14 March 2002, § 84. 
105 Ibid., § 87. 
106 E.g. Kaya v. Turkey, supra note no. 102, § 107. 
107 Gül v. Turkey (App. No. 22676/93), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 14 December 2000, §§ 95, 102; 
see also Orhan v. Turkey (App. no. 25656/94), Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), 18 June 2002, §§ 346, 
348, 387, 396. 
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participatory right in inquest proceedings violated Article 2, but has declined to find a 
violation of Article 13 since victims could still obtain a remedy from civil proceedings.108  
All in all, a review of the European Court’s jurisprudence shows increasing 
consideration of the need to ensure certain rights to victims in criminal proceedings, either as 
a form of primary protection or as a remedy. The above examination shows that victims’ 
rights in criminal proceedings are increasingly recognised even in those systems where no 
relation exists between criminal conviction and civil claims for compensation of damages. 
Arguably, this is an indication of the growing recognition of the fact that victims have a 
legitimate interest in seeing their perpetrator prosecuted and that the state should guarantee 
the promotion and protection of this interest in criminal proceedings.   
So far the Court has not, however, recognised that under the Convention, and more 
specifically, under Article 13, victims have an absolute right to participate in criminal 
proceedings. As observed above with reference to the Human Rights Committee, this 
approach is likely to change in the coming years as criminal accountability is increasingly 
read into victims’ right to an effective remedy. If the Court will confirm its position that the 
obligation of states to prosecute  serious violations of human rights is an integral component 
of victims’ right to effective remedy, as pointed out in Chapter III, then it will necessarily 
need to recognise that victims hold certain participatory rights in criminal proceedings in 
order to enforce such a right. The distinction between the procedural systems of the state in 
question is also likely to lose its relevance for the determination of the norm violated when 
victims are not granted participatory rights in criminal proceedings. Since prosecution and 
punishment are considered elements of the remedy themselves, it is correct to affirm that the 
failure to recognise victims’ rights in the criminal process violates the right to effective 
remedy, regardless of the procedural system of the state in question and of the availability of 
alternative means of redress from civil proceedings.  
 
4.3 The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights 
 
Both the Inter-American Commission (‘IAComHR’) and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (‘IACtHR’) have long emphasised the importance of the participation of victims in 
criminal proceedings. In the early 1990s the Commission held that in those jurisdictions 
where victims have the right to participate in criminal proceedings the denial of such a right is 
contrary to the right to fair trial under Article 8(1) of the American Convention on Human 
                                                 
108 E.g., Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, supra note no. 92, §§ 161-162. 
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Rights (‘ACHR’).109 In later pronouncements, the Commission even went so far as to find 
that this right does not depend on the existence of a right in domestic law entitling victims to 
file criminal charges, thus recognising the need to allow victims to participate in the 
proceedings regardless of the criminal model adopted.110  
Victims’ participation has been increasingly read as deriving not only from the right to 
fair trial, but also from the right to judicial guarantees (Article 25). More precisely, the 
Commission has found that this right implies that victims are capable of instigating criminal 
proceedings,111 having a case investigated and of participating in criminal proceedings.112 In 
more recent decisions the Commission has called on states to respect the victims’ ‘right to 
obtain justice’ through effective recourse against those responsible for the violations in 
question.113  
The Inter-American Court has also upheld this interpretation. Indeed, although it 
originally confined Article 8(1) to the rights of the accused in criminal trials, since 1998 the 
Court has recognised that fair trial rights also apply to the participation of victims in criminal 
proceedings.114 In the Street Children case the Court set out the prerequisites for a fair trial 
regarding the role of victims in criminal proceedings and explained that: 
 [It] is evident from Article 8 of the Convention that the victims of human rights violations and their next of kin 
should have substantial possibilities of being heard and acting in the respective proceedings, both in order to 
clarify the facts, and punish those responsible, and to seek due reparation.115  
Similarly, in the Caracazo v. Venezuela case, concerning the killing and disappearance 
of more than two hundred persons by Venezuelan security forces, the Court noted that victims 
and their relatives had been denied access to the case files and found accordingly that there 
had been a violation of the right to a fair trial and the right to judicial protection. In the 
reparation judgment, the Court ordered: 
[T]hat the next of kin of the victims and the surviving victims must have full access and the power to act at all 
stages and in all proceedings during said investigations, in accordance with domestic legislation and the 
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provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, and that the results of those investigation be made 
known to the public.116 
In substance, the Court recognised that victims have an essential stake in the criminal 
proceedings as a whole. This was further explained in the Blake case, where the Court 
established: 
Article 8(1) of the American Convention recognizes the right of Mr. Nicholas Blake’s relatives to have his 
disappearance and death effectively investigated by the Guatemalan authorities; to have those responsible 
prosecuted for committing said unlawful acts; to have the relevant punishment, where appropriate, meted out; 
and to be compensated for the damages and injuries they sustained.117 
The progressive expansion of the traditional meaning of the right to fair trial can be 
linked to the corresponding interpretation of prosecution and punishment of those responsible 
for serious violations of human rights as an individual right and, more precisely, as an integral 
element of the right to judicial protection in cases of serious human rights violations, as 
shown in Chapter III. Indeed, victims’ rights to access to and participation in criminal 
proceedings are directly based on the same provision on which the Court has based the right 
to criminal justice, namely Article 25, read in conjunction with the right to fair trial.118  
In this sense, it has been observed that the right to a fair trial, as interpreted by the 
Inter-American institutions, goes beyond purely procedural due process.119 The right to a fair 
trial is evaluated in the broader context of victims’ right to justice. A combined reading of 
Articles 25 and 8(1) shows that, in cases of serious violations of human rights, victims are 
entitled to a broad array of rights in criminal proceedings ranging from the right to have 
criminal proceedings instituted against perpetrators to the right to exercise certain 
participation rights in the proceedings in order to safeguard their interests in the prosecution 
of their abusers.   
In general terms, apart from holding that victims should play a role in the criminal 
process, with an emphasis on the investigation stage,120 the Court has not prescribed the exact 
form participation should take. Like its European counterpart, the Inter-American Court must 
take into account the specific procedural laws applicable in member states. The Court has 
                                                 
116 IACtHR, El Caracazo v. Venezuela, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 29 August 2002, § 118 and 143.1. 
117 IACtHR, Blake v. Guatemala, supra note no. 114, § 97. 
118 R. Aldana-Pindell, ‘An Emerging Universality of Justiciable Victims’ Rights in the Criminal Process to 
Curtail Impunity for State-Sponsored Crimes’, supra note no. 91, at 668. 
119 A. Seibert-Fohr, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations, supra note no. 93, at 62; D. Cassel, ‘The 
Expanding Scope and Impact of Reparations Awarded by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, in K. de 
Feyter, S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt, and P. Lemmens (eds), Out of the Ashes, supra note no. 60, 191-223, at 203-
204. 
120 IACtHR, Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Judgment (Merits), 16 August 2000, § 143. 
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specified that victims must be granted rights to participate in these proceedings, ‘in 
accordance with domestic laws’ and convention rights.121 However, in the view of the Court, 
victims must have access to courts and base such a right directly in the provisions of the 
ACHR. In other words, the Court has found a general principle of a victim’s right to have full 
access to proceedings, meaning that victims should be given standing to participate in all 
phases before courts investigating human rights violations.122 This also includes the capacity 
to take part in and present evidence at all stages of investigations and proceedings.  In 
addition, in at least two cases the Court has has even awarded costs for their future expenses 
of doing so.123 In cases of serious violations of human rights such as forced disappearances, 
the Court has considered the duty to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible and 
the corresponding right of victims of access to justice as jus cogens.124 
In conclusion, it can be observed that the Inter-American institutions have been more 
inclined towards the recognition of victims’ rights in criminal proceedings, compared to their 
global and regional counterparts. Admittedly, however, the willingness of these institutions 
can be attributed to some extent to the fact that most of the cases related to victims’ rights 
have arisen in jurisdictions which allow victims’ participation as civil parties in criminal 
proceedings and, as such, the Inter-American bodies found less obstacles to recognising 
victims a broad array of participatory rights. 
 
4.4 The African System for the Protection of Human Rights 
 
At the time of writing, the African Court of Human and People’s Rights has not considered 
the issue of the recognition of victims’ rights in criminal proceedings. As observed in Chapter 
1, while it can be argued that the right to remedy is implicit in every human right treaty, the 
African Charter does not mention the right to a remedy or the right of access to justice. 
Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the jurisprudence of the African Court will be similar to 
that of the ECtHR or the IACtHR. The most likely avenue for the African Court to do so 
would be to affirm victims’ rights in criminal proceedings through the interpretation of the 
                                                 
121 IACtHR, Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 22 February 2002, § 106; El 
Caracazo v. Venezuela, Judgment (Reparations and Costs), 29 August 2002, § 143; Juan Humberto Sánchez v. 
Honduras, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), 7 June 2003, § 186. 
122 R. Aldana-Pindell, ‘An Emerging Universality of Justiciable Victims’ Rights in the Criminal Process to 
Curtail Impunity for State-Sponsored Crimes’, supra note no. 91, at 668. 
123 IACtHR, Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 25 November 2003, 
§ 301. 
124 IACtHR, Goiburú et al v. Paraguay, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 22 September 2006, §§ 84, 
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228
right to a fair trial. Indeed, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘AfrCHPR’) 
contains a provision stating that ‘[e]very individual shall have the right to have his cause 
heard’,125 without limiting such a right to persons charged with a criminal offense (such as is 
the case under Article 6(1) of the ECHR).  
This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the practice of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights. While the Commission has not thus far had the opportunity to 
deal with victims’ rights in criminal proceedings explicitly, it is remarkable that in the 2001 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa, it 
included victims’ rights in criminal proceedings within the concept of fair trial rights.126 More 
precisely, the Principles establish that the right to an effective remedy is a fair trial right and 
that it includes access to justice, reparation for the harm suffered and access to information 
concerning the violations.127  
In addition, the document recognises that victims should be treated with respect and be 
entitled to mechanisms of justice and redress, and ought to be informed of their role as well as 
of any relevant development of the criminal case.128 Most importantly, the Principles include 
a provision which is phrased similarly to Article 6(b) of the 1985 Declaration and that 
requires judicial officers, prosecutors and lawyers to ‘facilitate the needs of the victims’ by: 
Allowing their views and concerns to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the proceedings where 
their personal interests are affected, without prejudice to the accused and consistent with the relevant national 
criminal justice system.129 
In sum, the African institutions potentially allow for a progressive affirmation of 
victims’ rights in criminal proceedings. However, the fact that victims’ participation is 
conceived as an element of the right to a fair trial and not as a component of the right to 
remedy may have two main consequences on the effective access of victims to the criminal 
process. Firstly, victims’ participatory rights may have to be balanced with the defendant’s 
fair trial rights, the two being placed on the same level; and secondly, victims’ fair trial rights 
may be balanced with other public interests. Conversely, the recognition of victims’ 
participation as a remedy not only contributes to strengthening the position that victims have 
a right to the prosecution of human rights offenders, but also ensures that such a right is not 
frustrated at the expenses of the protection of other interests. 
                                                 
125 Art. 7  AfrCHPR. 
126 AfrComHPR, Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance, 2001. 
127 Ibid., Part C(b). 
128 Ibid., Part P(a) and (f) 
129 Ibid., Part P(f)(ii). 
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5 DOMESTIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS AND VICTIMS’ RIGHT TO JUSTICE 
 
 
As has been discussed in the previous sections a number of instruments adopted at the 
international and regional level, as well as the practice of human rights supervisory bodies, 
consistently support the view that victims ought to be granted some participatory rights in 
criminal proceedings in order to promote and protect their right to justice. However, these 
documents and decisions have not established that the right to justice demands the recognition 
of victims as parties to the proceedings having full participatory rights. Rather, they have 
acknowledged that victims’ participation may vary considerably according to the criminal 
model adopted.  
Although human rights bodies remain reluctant in terms of elaborating a specific set of 
participatory rights corresponding to victim’s right to justice, some recent instruments 
adopted at the international and regional level mentioned above have established that victims 
should be empowered with certain procedural rights in order to exercise their right to justice. 
In particular, some of these instruments have set out that victims should have the right to 
challenge the decision of public prosecutors not to prosecute, either by way of judicial review 
or by authorising parties to engage in private prosecutions.130 
Arguably, both of these rights to initiate prosecutions and challenge decisions not to 
prosecute lie at the very core of victims’ right to justice. Indeed, affirming that a victim has a 
right to justice, that is to the prosecution of perpetrators in other words, is not simply a 
question of providing the victim with the power to report an offence. Nor is it simply a 
question of the significance of the complaint or similar procedure as a precondition for 
instituting proceedings, the initiative of which is in the hands of others. As a matter of fact, if 
the decision is taken not to initiate or to terminate the prosecution of an alleged offender, the 
victim potentially loses his chances of achieving justice.  
As such, the final determination of whether or not to prosecute lying with the public 
prosecutor only is not compatible with the victim’s right to justice. Therefore, what matters is 
that the victim can have a role analogous to that of a person entitled to bring a civil case, 
being able to initiate a criminal action either as complementary, or a complete alternative, to a 
public prosecution. 
                                                 
130 Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (85) 11, supra note no. 3, Art. 7; Id., Recommendation R. (2000) 
19, supra note no. 76, Art. 34; Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
through Action to Combat Impunity, supra note no. 63, Principle 19. 
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Providing a complete comparative analysis of victims’ rights in domestic criminal 
systems of course falls outside the scope of the present thesis. However, the following section 
provides an overview of how the right to initiate criminal prosecution and to challenge 
decisions not to prosecute have been implemented in domestic systems with a view to 
verifying whether any common practice between jurisdictions is emerging.  After analysing 
these rights, the following section will also discuss the progressive affirmation of victims’ 
participatory rights in criminal proceedings of various domestic systems, including in those 
systems where victims have not been traditionally considered parties to proceedings. 
Although, as stated above, victims’ participation cannot be considered as a component of the 
right to justice as such, it is argued that the progressive introduction of victims’ rights in 
criminal proceedings highlights the need to take into account the views of victims and, 
eventually, to acknowledge that victims have, at a minimum, a legitimate interest in the 
outcome of the proceedings.  
 
5.1 The Right to Initiate a Criminal Prosecution 
 
In modern societies, the enforcement of criminal law is generally entrusted to public 
authorities such as a public prosecutor or a magistrate. Historically, however, most crimes 
were prosecuted privately. For instance, in Classical Athens judicial proceedings could be 
initiated by any citizen, including the victims of the crime, as no public prosecutor existed.131 
Under Roman law, a criminal prosecution could be initiated by the victim of the crime or by 
any Roman citizen.132 In most cases, a person injured by the conduct of another could bring 
either a criminal action against the wrongdoer or, alternatively, a private action, known as a 
delictual action, seeking the punishment of the wrongdoer. 
Prosecution of crime remained in the hands of private individuals until recent times in 
many legal systems. For instance, in England until the middle of the nineteenth century the 
responsibility for the initiation of criminal prosecution in the courts rested on the victim.133 
Indeed, criminal offences were conceptualised as a private matter to be settled between the 
victim and the offender and outside the state’s immediate interests.134  
                                                 
131 D.M. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987) 53-66; A. Lanni, 
‘Publicity and the Courts in Classical Athens’, 24 Yale Journal of Law and Umanities (2012) 119-135. 
132 H.F. Jolowicz and B. Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1972), at 305 ff. 
133 This is discussed in some detail in a classic article by M. Ploscowe, ‘The Development of Present-Day 
Criminal Procedures in Europe and America’, 48 Harvard Law Review 433 (1935) 433-473, at 437-441. 
134 J. Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice: Reconceiving the Role of Third Parties, supra 
note no. 14, at 2-4.  
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By the end of the nineteenth century, however, in almost all legal systems public 
authorities had assumed almost exclusive responsibility for prosecuting criminal cases. The 
development of criminal law was a corresponding instrument through which the state 
promoted the security of the nation and the idea that crime is a wrong against the public order 
and not only against the interests of an individual.135  
That said, the right to private prosecution, in one form or another still exists in many 
legal systems around the world.136 With the development of criminal law as a form of public 
law enforceable by the state, the raison d’ être of the right to private prosecution can be read, 
nowadays, as a safeguard for the victim against arbitrary decisions of public authorities to 
dismiss his case or to refuse to initiate any action against the alleged offender.137 
First of all, a distinction has to be made between the right to exclusive private 
prosecution and the right to subsidiary private prosecution. The right to exclusive private 
prosecution gives to the victim only, and not to the public prosecutor, the right to prosecute 
the offence in question. This type of private prosecution is normally associated with minor 
offences where there is relatively less public interest in prosecution such as in the case of libel 
and defamation. The right to subsidiary private prosecution refers, instead, to those situations 
where, the public prosecutor having refrained from prosecution, a private prosecution may be 
initiated by the victim. This section will focus on subsidiary private prosecution as this is the 
form of private prosecution which is relevant in relation to the types of violations examined in 
the present thesis, namely gross violations of human rights.  
A common aspect of the various models of the right to subsidiary private prosecution 
is that such a right is never conceived as absolute; rather, it is subject to different forms of 
control. As will be discussed further in the following sections, in some systems the court may 
refuse to allow a private prosecution to continue whilst in other systems the prosecutor is 
entitled or obliged to take over a private prosecution and, subsequently, may have the power 
to discontinue it. Furthermore, certain systems require the victim to constitute himself as a 
civil claimant to act as private prosecutor. Three main models of initiating criminal 
proceedings by way of private prosecution can be identified: (i) the ‘private prosecutor’ 
model, (ii) the ‘civil claimant model’, and (iii) the ‘direct summons’ model. 
 
                                                 
135 P. Rock, ‘Victims, Prosecutors and the State in Nineteenth Century England and Wales’, 4 Criminology and 
Criminal Justice (2004) 331-354. 
136 For a comparative analysis of the various private prosecution models in Europe, see M.E.I. Brienen and E.H. 
Hoegen, Victims of Crime in 22 European Criminal Justice Systems, supra note no. 20, at 1062-1065. 
137 Ibid., at 1063. 
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5.1.1 The ‘Private Prosecutor’ Model 
 
The practice of using private counsel to prosecute criminal offenses is well established in 
English common law. As stated previously, until the late nineteenth century English criminal 
procedure relied heavily on a system of private prosecution even for serious offences. 
Although the idea of the privately-retained prosecutor is largely an historical one, remnants of 
the private prosecution model remain today. In fact, a small number of jurisdictions still 
permit private individuals, such as victims, to initiate criminal proceedings.138 
The most notable example of private prosecution is certainly that applied in England 
and Wales, where all members of the public, including victims, may exercise their historical 
right to bring a private prosecution in view of their shared interest in enforcing criminal 
law.139 As with public prosecutions, a private prosecution is initiated by making a formal 
complaint to the Magistrates’ courts, a procedure known as ‘laying an information’.140 This 
procedure involves ‘giving a magistrate a concise statement (an information), verbally or in 
writing, of an alleged offence and the suspected offender, so that he can take steps to obtain 
the appearance of the suspect in court.’141 
In practice, however, this right is limited to such an extent that is only rarely used.142 
The main obstacles to such action are two. Firstly, individuals initiating private prosecutions 
do not receive any legal aid and as such the costs of such an action may be an obstacle to the 
exercise of the right.143 Secondly, and most importantly, the Attorney General, the Director of 
Public Prosecution or the magistrate issuing the initial summons may withhold consent to the 
private prosecution or order that the proceedings be discontinued if their continuation would 
be contrary to public interest.144 For instance, private prosecutions can be discontinued in 
cases where the prosecution interferes with the investigation of another criminal offence or of 
another criminal charge, where it can be said that the prosecution is vexatious,145 or malicious 
(where the public prosecutor is satisfied that the prosecution is being undertaken on malicious 
                                                 
138 See supra note no. 136.  
139 UK, Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, section 6(1). 
140 P. Hungerfold Welch, Criminal Procedure and Sentencing, 6th ed. (London: Cavendish, 2004), at 2. 
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grounds) and where the prosecuting authorities have promised the defendant that he will not 
be prosecuted at all (a promise of immunity from prosecution).146  
Finally, the Crown Prosecution Service may decide to take over the prosecution if 
there is sufficient evidence and it appears to be a case that merits the prosecution being 
conducted by a public prosecuting authority rather than by a private individual. This may be 
because, for example, the offence is serious, there are detailed disclosure issues to resolve, the 
prosecution requires the disclosure of highly sensitive material or the conduct of the 
prosecution involves applications for special measures or for witness anonymity.147  
 
 
5.1.2 The ‘Civil Claimant’ Model 
 
In certain jurisdictions of civil law origin, such as in France and Belgium, the victim may 
initiate criminal proceedings by constituting him or herself as a civil claimant (plainte avec 
constitution de partie civile).148 A prerequisite for such action is that the victim has to be 
prejudiced by a serious misdemeanour or a felony that has not been brought before the court. 
The effect of the action is the seizure of the examining magistrate, who is then under the 
obligation to investigate the case as presented in the plainte.149 After the investigation, the 
public prosecutor may, however, still decide to discontinue the prosecution.  
The right of the victim to initiate a criminal prosecution – despite the absence of a 
decision of the public prosecutor, or contrary to his decision – was first elaborated in the 
famous Laurent-Atthalin case of 1906 in the following terms, which remained unchanged 
until present: 
[L]e droit pour partie civile de mettre en mouvement, à ses risques et périls, l’action publique devant le juge 
d’instruction, s’accorde et se coordonne avec toutes les autres dispositions qui, notamment dans les textes 
précités, établissent, pour cette partie, un droit parallèle à celui du ministère public … Le juge d’instruction, 
saisi, conformément à l’article 63 [current article 85 of the Code de Procédure Pénale] d’une plainte avec 
constitution de partie civile a la devoir d’informer sur la plainte dans telle mesure qu’il appartiendra.150 
While there is evidence to suggest that parties do exercise their right to be heard and to 
pursue civil claims, it appears that victim-initiated prosecutions in France are in progressive 
                                                 
146 UK, Queen’s Bench Division, Turner v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1979] 68 Criminal Appeals Reports 
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decline.151 This may be attributed to the increase in the number of public prosecutions 
following a report.152  Moreover, a recent amendment to the Code de procédure pénale has 
considerably limited the right to initiate a prosecution, establishing that civil parties may 
initiate a criminal action only if, after having reported the crime, the prosecutor decides not to 
bring a public prosecution or does not respond within three months of the report.153  
 
5.1.3 The ‘Direct Summons’ Model 
 
A third model by which criminal proceedings could be initiated is by issuing a direct 
summons. This option allows the victim, under certain conditions, to summon the offender 
directly before the competent judge and is generally limited to less serious offences.  As such, 
it is only in part relevant to the analysis carried out in this thesis. 
The ‘direct summons’ model operates in many civil law countries and certain common 
characteristics can be identified.154  In particular, victims may summon the offender directly 
to court, subject to three main conditions: (i) that the offence at issue is a misdemeanour and 
not a felony, (ii) that no writ of summons has been presented by the public prosecutor, and 
(iii) that no decision has been taken by the examining magistrate to bring the case to court.155 
A practical condition is that the victim needs to know the offender’s identity in order to 
summon him.  
Issuing a direct summons allows victims to bypass the decision of the public 
prosecutor not to prosecute. In this sense, victims can make sure that the competent court 
decides on their case. Several measures have been adopted, however, with a view to 
discouraging frivolous private actions, in addition to the conditions mentioned above.156 If the 
victim summons the alleged offender to court, he may be asked to pay a deposit to cover the 
potential costs of the action, unless they are entitled to legal aid. Furthermore, the victim may 
be held liable for legal cost if the accused is found not guilty. Finally, if the accused is 
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acquitted, he may claim damages in criminal or civil courts from the victim who brought the 
case.  
 
 
5.1.4 Some Reflections on the Right of Private Prosecution  
 
From the analysis carried out it appears that the practical value of the right to private 
prosecution does not correspond with the substantial support for it that is voiced in 
international documents. Studies on private prosecution in practice report that such a right is 
only rarely used.157 Even if in some jurisdictions private prosecution is utilised with some 
regularity, it is often in relation to minor offences, where public prosecution was not initiated 
for on account of a lack of public interest. Regarding serious offences, considerable obstacles 
have been put in place designed to deter actions of private prosecutors, such as the risk of 
being ordered to pay full costs if the case is unsuccessful. 
It is submitted that the existence of these obstacles on the effective exercise of the 
right of private prosecution reflects a widely-shared objection to such institution. Indeed, in 
recent years, private prosecution arrangements have come under serious criticism on due 
process grounds.158 It has been argued that, in effect, in allowing such private prosecutions the 
legal system permits a private party to pursue private revenge utilising criminal law and that 
this in turn jeopardises the principle of prosecutorial independence. The fact that this practice 
is not widely recognised at the international level and it is generally subjected to considerable 
limitations suggests that there may be a better way of conferring upon victims means to 
enforce their right to justice, such as enhancing victims’ rights within the public model of 
prosecution.159  
 
5.2 The Right to a Review of the Decision not to Investigate or Prosecute 
 
One way to enhance victims’ rights within the public model of prosecution is by providing 
them the right to review decisions not to initiate or proceed with prosecution. Indeed, through 
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the exercise of this right, victims are granted a special status in criminal action whilst 
acknowledging at the same time the normative role of the state in prosecuting crime. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, this right is very important for the 
concrete enforcement of victim’s right to justice. As a matter of fact, an absolute power of the 
public prosecutor to decide over criminal action would be in contradiction with the gradual 
affirmation of a victim’s right to justice. For this reason, it seems legitimate to grant victims 
some control on prosecutorial decision-making by way of access to review mechanisms with 
a view to checking the appropriateness of a prosecutor’s decision not to go forward. 
The number of states which do not grant opportunities for review of a decision not to 
prosecute has considerably declined in recent years under the influence of documents adopted 
at the international and regional level setting out such a right. Arguments put forward by 
states that do not provide victims with opportunities for review are various. In certain 
jurisdictions, such as Scotland, it is argued that once the accused has been informed that no 
action will be taken against him it would be unlawful to review that decision.160 In other 
systems, such as in France prior to the 2004 reform that will be addressed below, the decision 
of the public prosecutor not to prosecute was a decision of an administrative nature which, as 
such, could not be appealed.161  
Certain other systems such as Belgium, although not allowing for a right to a review, 
nonetheless provide victims with the right to initiate a criminal prosecution if the prosecutor 
has declined to do so, as discussed above.  
Like the right to private prosecution, the right to a review of the decision not to 
prosecute may assume different forms. The simplest option is the non-institutionalised review 
where, despite the fact a right to review is not established by law, the practice has developed 
that any complaint addressed to the public prosecutor about the dismissal of a case is accepted 
and the initial decision is reconsidered. For instance, a non-institutionalised practice of review 
has been developed by the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in Ireland. Victims 
who send a letter to the Office asking for reconsideration of the decisions not to prosecute 
generally succeed in having the case reviewed.162 
Institutionalised forms of review are, on the other hand, explicitly provided for in law. 
The following sub-sections focus on this latter form of review since non-institutionalized 
practices cannot be correctly considered as a right accruing to victims of crime. Within the 
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formal right to a review, two different forms can be distinguished on the basis of the authority 
competent to review the decision: (i) the right to a review made by a higher ranking official 
within the same authority who issued the decision not to prosecute; and (ii) the right to a 
review made by a judicial authority.   
5.2.1 Review by a Higher Ranking Official  
 
In certain jurisdictions, victims may ask for a review of the decision not to prosecute to a 
higher ranking official within the same authority which issued the decision not to prosecute. 
For instance, in Greece, if the public prosecutor decides to dismiss the prosecution, the victim 
may apply to the prosecutor of the court of appeal for a review.163 Likewise, in Germany, the 
complainant who is also the aggrieved party may appeal against the decision of the prosecutor 
not to open an investigation or to initiate a prosecution on account of the lack of sufficient 
suspicion of an offence. The request for appeal is made to the highest-ranking prosecutor in 
the prosecutor’s office at issue.164 Differently from Greece, where there is a right to a review 
in one instance only, in Germany a further request for a review can be made in second 
instance to a court of law, as I will discuss further.  
A recent amendment to the French Code de Procédure Pénale has introduced the right 
of victims to appeal the public prosecutor’s decision to drop proceedings (classement sans 
suit) by writing a letter to the Prosecutor General of the Court of Appeal. The Prosecutor 
General, seized of the matter, may reverse the decision of the public prosecutor and order to 
the latter to initiate criminal proceedings.165  
 
5.2.2 Judicial Review  
 
In jurisdictions that provide victims with judicial review, the review of the decision not to 
prosecute is carried out by an examining magistrate or a court of law. This is the most 
stringent form of review and it can be found in an increasing number of states.  
As mentioned above, in Germany, if the chief prosecutor upholds the decision of the 
public prosecutor to terminate proceedings, the victim can appeal such decision and ask for a 
review in second instance to a court of law. Through this procedure, known as 
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Klageerzwingungsverfahren, victims have a right to obtain an order of the court in the case of 
persistent inaction of the public prosecutor.166 This mechanism has inspired similar 
procedures in other countries to give more weight to victims even when the prosecutor 
decides to drop charges.   
For instance, in Italy, the decision not to proceed with a criminal action 
(archiviazione) lies with the pre-trial judge overseeing the inquiry (giudice delle indagini 
preliminari) upon request of the public prosecutor.167 The victim, provided that he has asked 
to be kept informed of the developments of the case, will be notified of the request of the 
prosecutor168 and can state his objection to the motion to drop charges.169 This may result in a 
hearing, instigated by the victim, debating the outcome of the investigation. Following the 
hearing, the judge can decide either to uphold the request of the prosecutor or to order the 
prosecutor to proceed with the case.170 Similarly, in The Netherlands, the victim can appeal 
the decision of the public prosecutor not to prosecute by asking for a review of the decision in 
the court of appeal.171 It is interesting that the victim can also appeal the decision of the 
prosecutor to initiate the case if he believes that the offender should be prosecuted for a more 
serious crime that the one chosen by the prosecutor.172  
A noteworthy case relating to the development of a right to a review of the decision 
not to prosecute is that of the United Kingdom. For many years prosecutors were reluctant to 
reopen decisions not to prosecute and as a result victims found it difficult to persuade 
prosecutors to reconsider their decision. This was the case since the only avenue for a review 
of the decision not to prosecute available to victims was a request to the High Court. Such a 
request has traditionally had little chance of success since the Court would only make a ruling 
against the decision of the prosecutor if this decision appeared to be completely 
unreasonable.173 Furthermore, even if the High Court found that the decision was 
                                                 
166  M. Chiavario, ‘Private Parties: The Rights of the Defendant and the Victim’, supra note no. 4, at 544. 
167 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, Art. 408. 
168 Ibid., Art. 408(2). 
169 Ibid., Art. 410. 
170 Ibid., Art. 409. 
171 European Commission, ‘Rights of Victims of Crime in Criminal Proceedings: The Netherlands’, available 
online at https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_rights_of_victims_of_crime_in_criminal_proceedings-171-NL-
en.do?clang=en&idSubpage=1&member=1#n12 (last visited on 26 June 2013).  
172 Ibid. 
173 European Commission, ‘Rights of Victims of Crime in Criminal Proceedings: England and Wales’, available 
online at https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_rights_of_victims_of_crime_in_criminal_proceedings-171-EW-
en.do?clang=en&idSubpage=1&member=1#n12 (last visited on 26 June 2013). The relevant case law on judicial 
review of decisions not to prosecute is available online at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/appeals_judicial_review_of_prosecution_decisions/ (last visited on 26 June 
2013). 
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unreasonable, it did not have the power to order the prosecution to go ahead. Rather, it could 
only order the prosecutor to review its decision in light of the court’s findings.  
However, after a recent Court of Appeal ruling an announcement has been made by 
the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Keir Starmer that the Crown Prosecution Service is 
set to change its approach and allow victims to make an appeal in the case no charges are 
brought.174 The ruling in question concerned the case of R. v. Killick, in which a man was 
convicted and jailed for three-and-a-half years for sexual assault after the CPS reversed its 
earlier decision in 2007 not to prosecute following numerous complaints and threats of 
judicial review.175 The significance of the Killick case is that the Court of Appeal identified 
and gave effect to a victim’s right to seek a review of a decision not to prosecute. It was 
decided that although the original decision not to prosecute was not unreasonable (hence, 
there would have been no ground for a reversal by the High Court), it was wrong and there 
was a realistic prospect of a conviction which was in the public interest. The Court of Appeal 
stated ‘as a decision not to prosecute is in reality a final decision for a victim, there must be a 
right to seek review of such a decision’.176  
The Director of Public Prosecution, announcing that victims of crime will now have a 
right to a review of the decision not to prosecute, has also affirmed that such reviews should 
be available to all victims in line with Article 10 of the European Directive discussed 
above.177 Although no guidance is available yet it appears that victims will be entitled to a 
review in every instance where the CPS decides not to bring charges without the requirement 
for any special circumstances to exist.  
As such, victims need no longer meet the high standards required for a decision to be 
judicially reviewed, a right to a review is theirs automatically. As observed by Starmer: 
[This change was] perhaps inevitable once it was recognised that victims are not mere observers in the criminal 
justice process, but real participants with both interests to protect and rights to enforce.178 
 
                                                 
174 BBC News UK, ‘Victims to get right to challenge ‘no charge’ decisions’, 27 July 2012, available online at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19008958 (last visited on 26 June 2013).  
175 England and Wales Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, R. v. Killick, [2011] EWCA Crim 1608, 29 June 
2011. 
176 Ibid., § 48.  
177 Directive 2012/29/EU, supra note no. 84.   
178 K. Starmer, ‘Finality in Criminal Justice: When Should the CPS Reopen a Case?’, 7 Criminal Law Review 
(2012) 526-534, at 534. 
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5.3 The Gradual Affirmation of Victims’ Participatory Rights in Criminal 
Proceedings 
 
As has already been discussed above, victim participation in criminal proceedings varies 
considerably between different criminal systems. In civil law systems, victims are generally 
accorded a relatively large role in criminal trials. If victims constitute themselves as partie 
civile, for instance, they acquire greater powers of intervention (often almost the same as 
those of the accused). Conversely, in criminal systems of common law jurisdictions, the 
recognition of an active role of the victim in the initiation of criminal proceedings (through 
the institution of private prosecution) is not reflected in the parallel recognition of rights once 
the trial has started; in those systems victims’ participation is generally limited to that of 
witness.  
Despite the intrinsic differences between these legal traditions, recent years have 
witnessed the progressive affirmation of victims’ procedural rights in criminal proceedings, 
even in adversarial systems, under the influence of the emerging international standards 
analysed above. In particular, within adversarial systems, three main criticisms have 
developed in relation to the role afforded to victims in criminal trials.   
The first criticism is that adversarial criminal proceedings instrumentalise victims, 
allowing them to participate only as witnesses. As William Pizzi has remarked, the 
adversarial system ‘turns witnesses into weapons to be used against the other side’.179 Indeed, 
victim-witnesses have no opportunity to tell their own story before the court, because their 
testimony is limited to answering questions that are carefully framed by the parties in order to 
emphasise the issues most relevant to their strategies. 
The second criticism is related to a common misconception within common law 
systems, namely that the prosecutor will represent the interests of the victims.180 This 
interpretation is mistaken because prosecutors are neither obligated nor empowered to act on 
behalf of victims. Indeed, in the adversarial trial, the prosecutor is not supposed to act as a 
legal representative of any witness since this would conflict with the duty to represent the 
public interest. This is explicitly indicated in the Code for Crown Prosecutors of England and 
Wales in the following terms: 
                                                 
179 W. Pizzi, Trials Without Truth (New York: New York University Press, 1999), at 197. 
180 See e.g. J. De Hemptinne, ‘Victims’ Participation in International Proceedings’, in A. Cassese (ed.), The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 562-564, at 563 
(referring to the role of the prosecutor of the ad hoc Tribunals). 
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The CPS does not act directly on behalf of individual victims, or represent them in court in criminal proceedings 
because it has to take decisions reflecting the overall public interest rather than the interests of one person.181  
The third criticism is related to the growing consensus that that is ‘intuitively strange’ 
to give victims the same locus standi as any other member of society.182 This view is similar 
to that of the longstanding view supported by criminal law purists according to whom ‘[t]he 
victim’s personal view should be no more relevant… that the personal view of any other 
individual’.183  
 A review of recent legislative amendments adopted in systems of common law signal 
that victims’ voices are increasingly considered in the criminal process both at the trial phase 
and at the sentencing phase. Arguably, this phenomenon may be interpreted as an indication 
of the growing acknowledgment that victims’ interests should be protected and promoted in 
criminal proceedings.  
 
5.3.1 Victims’ Representation During the Trial Phase 
 
One significant area of legal development in relation to victims’ rights in criminal 
proceedings has been the issue of victims’ representation in the trial. Victims’ representation 
is an important means for ensuring the effective participation of victims in criminal 
proceedings. Indeed, victims’ representatives have an important role in protecting victims’ 
interests, for instance while they are cross-examined, as well as in making submissions to the 
court in relation to issues which may be relevant to victims (such as protective measures, 
forms of questioning and means for giving evidence, and offering practical support to 
victims). However, as seen above, victims’ representation has not traditionally been a feature 
of adversarial criminal trials, where only parties can make submissions to the court.  
It is noteworthy that in recent years two common law jurisdictions, the US and 
Ireland, have established a system of court-based victim advocacy which entitles victims to 
make representations in criminal cases. In the United States, the legal foundation for a 
victims’ right legislation is generally attributed to the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court Decision in 
Linda R.S. v. Richard D.
184 In that case, the Supreme Court supported the then-prevailing 
view that a victim of crime cannot compel a criminal prosecution because ‘a private citizen 
                                                 
181 Crown Prosecution Service, Statement on the Treatment of Victims and Witnesses (1993), cited in J. Doak, 
Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice, supra note no. 14, at 139. 
182 M. Cavadino and J. Dignan, ‘Reparation, Retribution and Rights’, supra note no. 32, at 237. 
183 A. Ashworth and M. Redmayne, The Criminal Process, supra note no. 16, at 50 (‘The victim’s personal view 
should be no more relevant… than the personal view of any other individual.’)  
184 US Supreme Court, Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), 5 March 1973. 
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lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.’185 
Even though the Linda R.S. ruling was a clear representation of the victim exclusion in 
criminal trials, it also suggested a solution to that issue. The Court stated that Congress could 
‘enact statutes creating victims’ rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no 
injury would exist without the statute.’186 
The first piece of federal crime victims’ legislation, the Victim and Witness Protection 
Act, was enacted in 1982. This act gave victims certain rights in federal trials, including the 
right to be consulted by the prosecutor as to the disposition of the case (relating to such issues 
as plea bargains, among others), but their representation in court was limited to providing 
impact statements at the sentencing stage.187 Despite its limited scope, the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act, which followed the Final Report of President Reagan’s Task Force on 
Victims of Crime,188 served as a springboard towards a more victim-centric approach to 
criminal justice. Since then, thirty-three states of the US have amended their constitution to 
address crime victims’ rights (through the so-called ‘victims right amendment’), and the 
remaining states have passed crime victims’ rights legislation.189 
A number of individual states have also adopted amendments to their constitutions and 
created a special office of the ‘victim advocate’ to enforce the provisions included in the 
amended constitutions. For instance, following a constitutional amendment, a victims’ service 
advocate has been added to the New Mexico Office of the Attorney General to provide 
assistance to victims of violent crimes and their families.190 A number of states also provide 
for victims’ right to have a legal representative in court. Washington State, for example, 
provides that victims of violence and sex crimes have the right to have an advocate to assist 
them during prosecutorial or defence interviews and judicial proceedings.191 Illinois similarly 
establishes a constitutional right of the victims to have the presence of an advocate in court.192 
However, in both cases, this right is limited to the presence of a lawyer, and not to victims’ 
involvement in the proceedings.  
                                                 
185 Ibid., at § 8. 
186 Ibid., footnote 3.  
187 Victim and Witness Protection Act, Public Law No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248. 
188 President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, Final Report, December 1982, available online at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/front.pdf (last visited on 26 June 2013).  
189 The full list of state constitutional amendments can be consulted online at 
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Other US states have taken a more progressive approach and have allowed victims to 
have attorneys to represent them at various stages of the proceedings, mostly during parole 
hearings, plea negotiations and sentencing. Certain states also permit victims’ counsel to 
intervene in rape and sexual assault cases. Wisconsin, West Virginia and New Hampshire 
allow victims’ representative to make representations to the court when questions governing 
the admissibility of sexual history evidence are considered.193 In South Carolina victims’ 
representatives are allowed to intervene anytime that the defence counsel refers to the 
victim’s conduct as part of his defence.194 Arguably, the growing number of state 
amendments reflects an emerging national consensus that victims belong inside the criminal 
justice process with a voice in decision-making.  
Recently, calls for victims’ legal representation in federal courts have increased. It is 
argued that without constitutional recognition of their rights, victims inevitably become 
second-class citizens with judges often giving automatic precedence to the claims of 
defendants rather than searching for reasonable alternatives that can accommodate the 
interests of both sides. A debate is currently being held in Congress regarding a constitutional 
amendment which, if ratified, would provide victims of violent crimes with constitutionally 
guaranteed rights. In particular, the Victims’ Rights Amendment, as proposed in Congress 
provide for the rights of a crime victims to:  
[F]airness, respect, and dignity … to be heard at any release, plea, sentencing, or other such proceeding 
involving any right established by this article, to proceedings free from unreasonable delay, to reasonable notice 
of the release or esscape of the accused, to due consideration of the crime victim’s safety, and to restitution.195 
In order to assert and enforce such rights, the Amendment sets out that the victims’ legal 
representative must have standing in court. At the moment of writing, debates are still 
ongoing in relation to the adoption of this Amendment. 
Formal victims’ legal representation is also provided for in Ireland. Like in most of the 
US schemes, the Irish system is only available to victims of rape and serious sexual offences. 
Recent legislation allows victims of these crimes to be represented by their own counsel 
where the defence seeks to introduce previous sexual history evidence.196 Under these 
provisions, victims do not have to make a financial contribution to the cost of their legal 
                                                 
193 J. Doak, Victims’ Rights, Human Rights and Criminal Justice, supra note no. 14, at 141.  
194 South Carolina Statute 16-3-1510, section 3f(2).  
195 House Joint Resolution 106 (112th): Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to 
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representation; the Legal Aid Board will provide them with a lawyer to represent them free of 
charge.  
It is worthwhile noting that the rights of victims in criminal proceedings are also being 
strengthened in systems where the enforcement of such rights has traditionally been rather 
weak. For instance, in the Netherlands, where a watered down version of the partie civile 
system is provided for in the criminal system, before the 1980s victims of crime were largely 
ignored.197  However, from the 1980s onwards the lot of victims has significantly improved, 
through a series of legislative amendments which have improved the enforcement of victims’ 
rights in criminal proceedings. For instance, the Victims’ Status (Legal Proceedings) Act, 
which entered into effect on 1 January 2011, gives victims the right to the assistance of an 
interpreter and/or lawyer, to access the case file and, in certain circumstances, to present their 
views to the Court.198  
 Victim standing in criminal proceedings remains, however, virtually non-existent in 
the United Kingdom, where victims have no right to be present at trial, no right to legal 
representation and no right to question witnesses nor present evidence. The idea of 
introducing some forms of formal representation of victims has been considered in the United 
Kingdom on a number of occasions since the mid-1980s,199 but has always been rejected in 
view of the fact that it would constitute a substantial change to accepted procedures and that 
criminal proceedings are ‘a substitute for vengeance not an expression of it’.200  
It is therefore surprising that in 2005 the Government issued a consultation paper 
proposing a scheme for victims’ representatives to assist relatives of homicide victims during 
the trial and at the sentencing stage.201 Following this paper, a pilot scheme was established in 
2006 at five Crown Court centres.202 At the moment of writing it does not appear that this 
scheme will be rolled out nationally in the near future. However, under the pilot schemes 
victims of the selected centres can exercise some form of participation with the potential 
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effect of invigorating further discussion as to whether it would be possible to extend 
procedural rights to other victims. This is all the more relevant given the emerging 
international legal standards on victims’ rights in criminal proceedings, which are likely to 
lead the United Kingdom to consider, in the coming years, how to actively involve victims in 
the trials. In particular, documents adopted in the context of the European Union, which are 
binding on the UK, and to which, as mentioned above, UK has already declared that it will 
adhere will necessarily require the state in question to abandon its traditional reluctance 
towards third parties in adversarial proceedings.  
 
 
5.3.2 Victims’ Rights at the Sentencing Phase 
 
In recent years many jurisdictions have made provisions for victims to make known their 
views to the court at the sentencing stage. Usually, these views are known as ‘victim impact 
statements’ and their objective is to inform the court of the physical emotional or financial 
harm suffered as the result of an offence. Accordingly these statements allow the court to take 
a reasoned decision when deciding upon the appropriate sentence which also takes into 
account the suffering of the victims resulting from the crimes at issue. Victim impact 
statements are also an important tool from the victims’ perspective as they provide victims 
with the opportunity to focus the court’s attention on the human cost of the crime and to 
become a part of the criminal justice process.  
Laws regarding victim impact statements vary from state to state. Generally, the 
person making the statement can discuss the harm suffered and all the consequences resulting 
from the crime, such as economic damages.203 In addition, the victim, or their relatives, can 
also discuss the impact of the crime on their ambitions or life plans, or on their family 
members.204 Some jurisdictions even allow victims to lay down specific penal demands.205 In 
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other jurisdictions, however, victims are expressly forbidden to put forward any proposal or 
suggestion on punishment or sentencing.206 This is primarily because the sentencing process 
is seen as the domain of the judge who considers a multitude of factors other than harm to 
victims, including public interest. 
Most states allow either oral or written statements, or both, from the victim at the 
sentencing hearing, and require victim impact information to be included in the pre-sentence 
report, given to the judge prior to imposing sentence. In some states, victim impact statements 
are even allowed in bail hearings, pre-trial release hearings, plea bargain hearings and parole 
hearings.207 In cases of serious crimes, victims are generally allowed to present their 
statement in person before the court.208  
The right to present victim impact statement is today recognised in a considerable 
number of states of common law origin where victims have not been traditionally granted any 
role in criminal proceedings. All fifty US states allow victim impact statement.209  Other 
countries of common law origin that allow victims to present an impact statement include 
United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and South Australia.   
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6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
Thirty years ago, the US criminologist W.F. McDonald described victims of crime as the 
forgotten men.210 This Chapter has attempted to demonstrate that in the last few decades the 
role of victims and the rights they possess in criminal proceedings has considerably expanded. 
In particular, emerging trends in both international human rights law and domestic law 
suggest that victim participation is increasingly considered a desirable feature of the criminal 
process.  
From the analysis undertaken in this Chapter it appears that the practice of human 
rights bodies and a number of legal instruments adopted at the international level, of both 
binding and non-binding nature, have begun to recognise that victims should be entitled to 
exercise a series of rights in criminal proceedings before domestic courts, especially in cases 
of gross human rights violations. Similarly, measures have been adopted in several domestic 
jurisdictions aimed at enhancing the protection of victims’ interests in criminal proceedings.  
It is argued that the process of gradual affirmation of victim’s rights in criminal 
proceedings can be defined as a ‘top-down’ process in the sense that international norms and 
standards, as well as the practice of human rights treaty bodies, have influenced the adoption 
of correspondent norms at the domestic level.  This influence has been the result of either the 
force of law (in the case of international treaties, or of binding decisions of human rights 
supervisory bodies), or through more diffuse mechanisms, such as that of reputation in 
international relations (in the case of soft law instruments, or of non-binding pronouncements 
of human rights bodies, such as those of the Human Rights Committee). The top-down 
character of this process is manifest, for instance, if we think of the recent introduction of a 
victim’s right to a review of the decision not to prosecute in the UK. As observed above, this 
amendment was introduced following to the adoption of the EU Framework Decision on 
Victims of Crime demanding, inter alia, that victims be entitled to the review of a decision 
not to prosecute.  
Although the primary driving force behind the affirmation of victim’s rights in 
criminal proceedings has certainly been the adoption of international standards and norms on 
this matter, it is also true that these developments would not have been possible without 
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parallel debates and changes taking place at the domestic level increasingly demanding the 
protection of victim’s interests in criminal trials.  
Nevertheless, the affirmation of a victim’s ‘right to participation’ in criminal 
proceedings remains, at present, extremely vague. Although international instruments now 
require the interests of victims to be taken into account in a variety of ways, such standards 
tend to eschew stipulating specific requirements concerning the role they ought to play in 
criminal proceedings.  
The preceding sections have argued that, because of the intrinsic differences between 
the various criminal law systems international instruments on victims’ rights have not laid 
down explicit requirements on victims’ participation in criminal proceedings. Most of these 
instruments are formulated in a vague or non-prescriptive manner. Neither do these 
instruments detail how victims’ rights are to be realised in practice, nor in what stage of the 
process they are to be applied. Rather, they tend to centre around the idea that some 
mechanisms have to be set up to allow the views and concerns of victims to be heard - none 
require victims to be considered parties to the proceedings. Similarly, pronouncements by 
human rights supervisory bodies have refrained from recognising that victims shall be granted 
a specific set of participatory rights in criminal proceedings.  
Therefore, in light of the analysis carried in this Chapter, it is not possible to determine 
that a set of procedural rights is attached to victims’ right to justice, as elaborated in Chapter 
III. However, the fact that a victim’s participation is enshrined as a value in a number of 
international documents and decisions, and given the progressive introduction of victims’ 
participatory rights in domestic criminal systems (particularly in case of serious crimes), there 
is undoubtedly increasing acceptance of the need to take into account victims’ views and 
concerns.  Furthermore, such developments acknowledge that, at the very least, victims have 
legitimate interests in the outcome of the proceedings. Victim participation is seen today not 
only as helpful to rehabilitation of victims but also as capable of enhancing the legitimacy of 
criminal trials. This position reflects the emerging view that criminal justice should not only 
be conceptualised as a measure of general human rights protection but also as a remedial 
measure for victims, as indicated in Chapter III. 
In the longer term, it is equally conceivable that some form of participation in criminal 
proceedings may be affirmed as an international legal standard. This is so for three main 
reasons. First, the growing affirmation at the international level of documents viewing victims 
participation as a desirable value may lead, in time, to a point of consensus; this is even more 
true if we consider that some of the international instruments affirming victims’ participatory 
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rights in criminal proceedings are binding on states parties, such as the Framework Decisions 
adopted by the European Union.211 Second, the brief review of domestic practices outlined in 
this Chapter supports the view that victim participation is emerging as a desirable value even 
in those systems where victims have not traditionally been granted any right in criminal 
proceedings. Finally, the current approach of human rights supervisory bodies is inconsistent 
with their practice affirming a right to justice as a component of the right to remedy for 
victims of gross violations of human rights. Whereas these bodies have argued that victim 
may have a right to see those responsible for the violation are prosecuted and punished, they 
have not recognised victims corresponding procedural rights in the criminal process. 
Arguably, this may raise an issue under the provisions on the right to remedy, as discussed in 
Chapter III.212 
In short, what we can therefore observe in relation to victims’ rights in criminal 
proceedings is a clear trend towards their realisation. Just as international and human rights 
standards have acted to elevate the position of the victim, so too domestic systems seems to 
be responding, albeit slowly. However, as stated above, even on the domestic level there has 
been a growing recognition that the outright exclusion of victims is unlikely to be sustainable 
in the longer term. Although at present the extent to which the adversarial paradigm can 
effectively accommodate victims rights remains inherently limited, due to the predominantly 
bipolar structure of adversarial trials, there is a movement signalling that the private interests 
of victims should be considered together with public interest in criminal trials. Most 
importantly, the practice indicates that it is possible and indeed necessary to ensure effective 
enforcement of the right to justice.  
It remains to be seen whether in the coming years these emerging legal standards will 
be translated into participatory rights. In this respect, as will be illustrated in the next chapter, 
the practice of international and internationalized criminal tribunals is significant because it 
illustrates that it is possible to include victim participation in largely adversarial procedures 
without infringing the rights of the accused and the efficiency of the trials. Moreover, in 
affirming that international courts must balance the interests of the accused, not only with 
those of the prosecution but also with those of the victim, the message has been sent to other 
fora, including domestic criminal courts, to adopt new procedures that depart from 
progressively out-dated theories on the nature of criminal offences and the objectives of 
criminal trials.
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Chapter VI 
 
Victims’ Right to Justice before International and 
Internationalized Criminal Tribunals 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea of contributing to ‘justice for victims’ is now commonly cited as a driving force for 
the role of international criminal tribunals.1 For their part, international criminal justice 
institutions have also often referred to the pursuit of justice for victims as their prime 
objective. In opening the prosecutor’s case in the Katanga case, the Deputy Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) declared: ‘Our mandate is justice, justice for the victims: 
the victims of Bogoro; the victims of crimes in Ituri; and the victims in the DRC.’2  
Most importantly for our purposes, however, is the fact that recently established international 
and internationalized criminal tribunals including the ICC, the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’) have introduced 
procedures aimed at providing redress to victims of crimes within their jurisdiction.  Although 
                                                 
1 In recent years, a vast literature has explored the role of international criminal tribunals from the perspective of 
victims. Monographs on the topic include: M. Heikkilå, International Criminal Tribunals and Victims of Crime: 
A Study of the Status of Victims before International Criminal Tribunals and of Factors affecting this Status 
(Turku, Åbo: Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, 2004); T.M. Funk, Victims’ Rights and 
Advocacy at the International Criminal Court (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); B. 
McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings (Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2011); C. McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); and J.C. Ochoa S., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice 
Proceedings for Serious Human Rights Violations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013). A large number 
of scholarly papers have also been published on the topic. The most recent ones include: H. Olásolo, ‘Victims’ 
Participation According to the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court’, in Idem, Essays on 
International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Hart, 2012); C. Van Den Wyngaert, ‘Victims Before International 
Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge’ 44 Case Western Reserve University School 
of Law (2012) 475-496; L. Catani, ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: Some Lessons 
Learned from the Lubanga Case’, 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice (‘JICJ’) (2012) 905-922. See also 
the contributions to the victims’ symposia in 8 JICJ (2010), at 75 ff, and 91 International Review of the Red 
Cross (2009), at 215 ff.  
2 ‘ICC Cases an Opportunity for Communities in Ituri to Come Together and Move Forward’, Press Release, 27 
June 2008, IDD-OTP-20080627-PR332, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20(2008)/Pages/icc%20case
s%20an%20opportunity%20for%20communities%20in%20ituri%20to%20come%20together%20and%20move
%20forward.aspx. Following the decision to stay the proceedings in the Lubanga case, the ICC Prosecutor 
declared: ‘There will be justice for Lubanga’s victims’, see ‘ICC - The Office of the Prosecutor supports the 
need for a fair trial and promises justice will be done for Lubanga’s victims’, Press Release, 24 June 2008, ICC-
CPI-20080624-PR329, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20(2008)/Pages/the%20offic
e%20of%20the%20prosecutor%20supports%20the%20need%20for%20a%20fair%20trial%20and%20promises
%20jus.aspx (both last visited on 26 June 2013).  
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they provide for such redress through different procedural mechanisms, these courts enable 
victims to participate in their own right in proceedings against the alleged perpetrators of the 
crimes from which they have suffered.3 The ICC and the ECCC may also award reparation to 
the victims of international crimes.4  
Although central to the current international criminal justice discourse, the idea of 
bringing justice to victims was not of central concern to international criminal law at the 
initial stages of its development. Instead, international criminal law developed at a time when 
the position of individuals within the classical framework of international law was very 
limited.5 Historically, questions of redress for victims have not been dealt with in the context 
of international criminal law where victims have traditionally played a very limited role. On 
the whole, international criminal justice has been primarily concerned with the criminal 
responsibility of individual perpetrators, their prosecution and punishment.  
The recognition of victims’ rights before recently established international criminal 
tribunals is not an isolated phenomenon. It is, in fact, in keeping with significant 
developments in the last few decades, mainly in international human rights law, regarding 
redress for victims of serious violations of human rights.  As we have seen in the preceding 
chapters, a number of international legal institutions and regimes have provided a context 
within which victim redress has been addressed.  International rules relating to the treatment 
of aliens, international humanitarian law and international human rights law have all dealt 
with questions of redress, as have the rules on state responsibility. In particular, while 
affirming the existence of an individual right to remedy, it has been observed in Chapters I 
and III that a substantial amount of international legal instruments and practice have 
challenged the traditional categories of restitution and monetary compensation as adequate 
remedies in cases of gross human rights breaches.  Instead, these legal instruments have 
affirmed that ‘the accountability of individual perpetrators of grave human rights violations is 
one of the central elements of any effective remedy for victims of human rights violations.’6 
In other words, in cases of gross violations of human rights the relevant rules on redress have 
been interpreted as entailing a right to justice, understood as the right to have those allegedly 
responsible for the violation prosecuted.   
                                                 
3 See Art. 68(3) ICC Statute (‘ICCSt.).; Art. 17 STL Statute (‘STLSt.’); Rule 23 ECCC Internal Rules (ECCC 
IR). 
4 Art. 75 ICCSt.; Rule 23(11) ECCC IRs. 
5 See supra Chapter I, Section 2.1. 
6 UN General Assembly (‘UN GA’), Khmer Rouge Trials, UN Doc. A/Res/57/228, 27 February 2003. 
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In light of the above, it may be advanced that the incorporation of a regime of victim 
redress within the framework of international criminal tribunals does not represent an 
extension of international criminal justice’s mandate, but rather confirms a shift in the way in 
which redress is conceptualised. The procedure of international criminal trials – originally 
based on the ‘duel’ between the prosecution and the defence – has been adapted with the aim 
of taking into account the affirmation of a victims’ right to justice in cases of gross violations 
of human rights. This has meant that, in addition to the criminal accountability of wrongdoers, 
the need to incorporate victims’ voices in the criminal process through some form of 
participation has emerged as a component of the courts’ mandate.  
This Chapter therefore critically examines whether the creation of a regime of redress 
for victims within international and internationalized criminal tribunals is consistent with the 
principle of a right to justice as has emerged under international law for victims of gross 
human rights violations. In order to test such a hypothesis two elements will be considered: (i) 
the character of victims’ participation and its legal rationale; and (ii) the implementation of 
the victims’ participation schemes by international and internationalized criminal tribunals. 
Before doing that, however, it appears necessary to analyse, however briefly, the traditional 
position of victims in international criminal law and the main characters of the regimes of 
victims’ participation adopted within recently established international and internationalized 
criminal tribunals. 
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2 THE TRADITIONAL POSITION OF VICTIMS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
2.1 The Role of Victims in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals 
 
The traditional limited legal status of victims of violations of international crimes, discussed 
in Chapter I, was reflected in the proceedings of international military tribunals established in 
the aftermath of World War II with the aim of prosecuting and punishing German and 
Japanese war criminals, the International Military Tribunal (IMT, or Nuremberg Tribunal) 
and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, or Tokyo Tribunal).  
Victims were largely excluded from the proceedings carried out by the IMT as a result 
of the mainly adversarial procedure it adopted. Victims were only allowed to participate in 
criminal trials as witnesses and it is reported that the idea of including victims as civil parties 
was not even advanced by those civil law states present.7 Similarly, the IMTFE adopted a 
largely adversarial approach and as such no provision for victim participation other than as 
witnesses was made.8 Therefore, even though the establishment of the international military 
tribunals certainly marked a significant achievement in the development of international 
criminal law, they did not provide an appropriate forum for victims of the crimes under their 
jurisdiction.  
A further reason victims played a minor role before the IMT is that most cases before 
the Nuremberg Tribunal were conducted almost entirely on the basis of documentary 
evidence.  Stover reports that Justice Jackson, the chief United States prosecutor at the 
Nuremberg Trials, favoured documentary evidence instead of eyewitness and survivor 
testimony because he was convinced that this strategy would demonstrate the vast scale of the 
crime and the bureaucracy that enabled them.9 In a report to President Truman of June 1945, 
Jackson wrote ‘[w]e must establish incredible events by credible evidence’.10 Jackson feared 
that victims’ testimony could be viewed as too heinous to believe and also feared that some 
victims could undermine the prosecutor’s case if they discussed the cooperation that some 
Jews gave to the Nazi administration. For this reason, Jackson focused mostly on the actions 
of the defendants and on the criminality of the Nazi system rather than on the suffering of 
victims. Consequently the prosecution only called 94 witnesses to testify, most of whom were 
                                                 
7 B. McGonigle Leyh, Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings 
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2011), at 135. 
8 Ibid. 
9 E. Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005), at 19. 
10 R.H. Jackson, The Nürnberg Case (New York: Knopf, 1947), at 10. 
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former SS members, camp guards and Nazi party members.11 And indeed, even those victims 
who did appear before the Tribunal for the prosecution were not called to testify about 
individual instances of war crimes.  Rather, they were called on to speak to the ‘collective, 
systematic, and bureaucratic activities of massive and complex organizations that executed 
criminal policies from the highest levels of government.’12 In contrast to the Nuremberg 
experience, the IMTFE was unable to rely on a large amount of documentary evidence since 
the Japanese had destroyed most of their military records before surrendering.  As such the 
IMTFE was forced into relying on a greater number of victim-witnesses.13  
Further, the selection of victims to testify as witnesses did not necessarily reflect the 
realities of the crimes committed. The Nuremberg trial manly focused on the question of 
whether the defendants took part in a conspiracy to wage aggressive war against various 
European states rather than on the crimes committed against the civilian population. 
Moreover, it has been noted that despite the wide occurrence of gender crimes in both Nazi 
and Japanese controlled areas, victims of rape were mot called to testify before the respective 
courts.14 
Finally, in relation to the issue of redress for victims, although the Nuremberg 
Tribunal had the power to order fines and forfeitures which could have been used to 
contribute to redressing the harm suffered by victims, no such order was made.15 Neither the 
IMT nor the military tribunals operating under Control Council 10 or under the Royal 
Warrant of 1946 were given the power to award compensation to victims. For most victims, if 
they received reparation, it was necessary to take part in a long process of domestic litigation  
before they were able to obtain compensation in respect, for example, of their treatment as 
slave labourers or forced deportees.16 Considering the position of victims in the trials 
following the second world war, Prosecutor Ferencz observed that ‘[t]rials under the auspices 
                                                 
11 M.C. Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2003), at 
411. 
12 D. Cohen, ‘Beyond Nuremberg: Individual Responsibility for War Crimes’, in C. Hesse and R. Post (eds), 
Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia (New York: Zone Books, 1999), cited in E. Stover, 
The Witnesses, supra note no. 9, at 19.  
13 B. McGonigle, Procedural Justice?, supra note no. 7, at 136. 
14 H. Nicola, ‘Witness to Rape: The Limits and Potential of International War Crimes Trials for Victims of 
Wartime Sexual Violence’, 3 International Journal of Transitional Justice (2009) 114-134, at 115. 
15 C. McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court, supra note no. 1, at 44-45.  
16 E.g., Italian Court of Cassation (Sezioni Unite civili), Ferrini c. Repubblica Federale di Germania, Decision 
No. 5044/2004, 11 March 2004, reprinted in 87 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2004) 539-551; Greek Supreme 
Court (Areios Pagos), Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, case No. 11/2000, 4 May 2000, 
reprinted in 129 International Law Reports (2007) 513-524. But see International Court of Justice, Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), (not yet reported), 3 February 2012. 
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of the Allied armies were an entity unto themselves. They played no significant role in the 
lives of the victims. The survivors were not even in the audience.’17 
 
2.2 The Role of Victims in the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
 
In the decades following WWII, and in particular since the 1980s, increasing attention has 
been paid to the interests of victims in national criminal justice.  However, in practice this has 
had limited impact on international criminal justice procedure, at least initially. Like the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo military tribunals, the ad hoc Tribunals established in the early 1990s, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’), adopted a largely adversarial procedural approach.18 
Neither the Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY or ICTR 
provide for the participation of victims in the proceedings other than as witnesses. Notably, a 
proposal for the appointment of separate counsel for victims was submitted during the 
negotiations for the ICTY Statute and later rejected for three main reasons.19 First, it was 
believed that the victims’ interests would be adequately represented by the prosecutor who 
was entrusted with the mandate of representing the interests of the international community in 
ensuring the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators.20 This was later reaffirmed in the 
case law: ‘[T]he Prosecutor acts on behalf of and in the interest of the community, including 
the interests of the victims of the offence charged’.21  
Secondly, it was feared that the participation of victims as third party to the 
proceedings could possibly interfere with prosecutorial strategy and eventually jeopardise the 
                                                 
17 Cited in Y. Danieli, ‘Reappraising the Nuremberg Trials and Their Legacy: The Role of Victims in 
International Law’ 27 Cardozo Law Review (2006) 1633-1649, at 1642. 
18 A. Orie, ‘Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial in International Criminal Proceedings Prior to the Establishment of the 
ICC and in the Proceedings before the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
1439-1495.   
19 V. Tochilovsky, ‘Victims’ Procedural Rights at Trial: Approach of Continental Europe and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, in J.J.M. Van Dijk, R.G.H. van Kaam and J.M. Wemmers (eds), 
Caring for Crime Victims: Selected Proceedings of the 9
th
 International Symposium on Victimology (city: 
Criminal Justice Press, 1999) XX-XX, at 287-289. 
20 V. Morris and M.P. Sharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, vol. 1, (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1995), at 167. For a critical appraisal of the 
representation of victims’ concerns by the ICTY prosecutor, see e.g. M.-B. Dembour and E. Haslam, ‘Silencing 
Hearings? Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials’, 15 European Journal of International Law (2004) 151-177. 
21 ICTY, Decision on Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, Aleksovski (IT-95-14/1-A), Appeals 
Chamber (‘AC’), 16 February 1999, § 25. 
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interests of the international community.22 Lastly, the drafters of these tribunals’ legal 
framework were reluctant to set out victim participatory rights because the introduction of a 
third party in a predominantly adversarial procedure was considered incompatible with the 
basic principle of equality of arms between the prosecution and the defence, which could 
equally be seen as jeopardising the fair trial rights of the accused.23  
 As such, despite the developments occurring in the meantime in relation to the rights 
of victims in domestic criminal proceedings,24 no independent role in the proceedings was 
assigned to those harmed by the crimes under the scrutiny of the ad hoc Tribunals, other than 
witnesses. Due to the procedural approach adopted, victims’ testimony has been generally 
controlled by the questions asked by the parties. In other words, victims have not been 
provided an opportunity to tell their stories in a narrative form. The fact that victims have not 
being allowed to tell their stories, coupled with the tendency of judges to interrupt victims 
when their testimony deviates from the purpose of assessing the guilt or innocence of the 
accused,25 prompted many criticisms from victims’ groups which began to campaign for 
greater victim acknowledgment, rights and representation in international courts established 
subsequently. 
Nonetheless, in a number of ways the ad hoc Tribunals paved the way for the 
inclusion of victims in the narrative and, most importantly, in the procedure of international 
criminal justice. In May 1997, in a lecture delivered to the British Institute of Human Rights, 
the then ICTY President Antonio Cassese emphasised the difference between the ICTY and 
the precedents of Nuremberg and Tokyo in respect to victims of crimes:  
[I]t can be truly said of the Tribunal that it was essentially set up for the victims of crimes, i.e. the individual 
rape or torture victim or the relative of a murder victim, whereas the Nuremberg Tribunal was created primarily 
to try Axis war criminals for the crimes committed against the Allied Nations and their nationals.26 
And he further underlined:  
To protect victims is the very “raison d’ être” of the ICTY, which was established to halt and redress the crimes 
being committed against defenceless persons. Among the various enforcement mechanisms of human rights, an 
                                                 
22 V. Morris and M.P. Sharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, supra note no. 20, at 167. 
23 C. Jorda and J. de Hemptinne, ‘The Status and the Role of Victims’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J.R.W.D. 
Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) 1387-1419, at 1393. 
24 See supra Chapter V, Section V. 
25 M.-B. Dembour and E. Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings?’, supra note no. 20.  
26 A. Cassese, ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Human Rights’, lecture 
delivered to the British Institute of Human Rights on 1 May 1997, published in 4 European Human Rights Law 
Review (1997) 329-352, at 330. 
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international criminal tribunal is undoubtedly the most directly effective and radical, because it aims at 
prosecuting and punishing the very authors of serious offences against human dignity.27 
A dedicated unit with the mandate of assisting victims and witnesses, and a body of 
case law particularly attentive to the protection and support of the most vulnerable categories 
of victims28 undoubtedly indicated that the ad hoc Tribunals had a more victim-oriented 
attitude than the post-WWII tribunals.  
Moreover, at least in principle, victims have been entitled to two forms of 
participations in the criminal process, other than as witnesses. The first is through amicus 
curiae submissions. Rule 74 of the ICTY and ICTR RPEs establishes that ‘[a] Chamber may, 
if it considers it desirable for the proper determination of the case, invite or grant leave to a 
State, organization or person to appear before it and make submissions on any issue specified 
by the Chamber.’  In theory, this provisions offers an opportunity to victims to participate in 
the proceedings. In at least two occasions those acting on behalf of victims’ interests sought 
to intervene in the proceedings through the amicus curiae provisions. For instance, in the 
Bagosora case before the ICTR, the Belgian government requested to intervene as amicus on 
‘[t]he right of Belgians or their rightful claimants … to appear before the Tribunal as 
plaintiffs and not as mere witnesses’.29 Similarly, the Rwandan government sought to 
intervene in order to help prove the guilt of the accused and seek damages for the unlawful 
taking of property.30 However, the Tribunal rejected both requests,31 indicating perhaps that 
whilst victims’ participation through amicus curiae provisions is not prohibited, the judges 
were nevertheless reluctant to turn victims and those acting on their behalf into plaintiffs. In 
another case, a women’s rights group representing the interests of victims requested to submit 
an amicus brief in seeking to amend the charges against the accused so as to include charges 
of sexual violence. The Tribunal, however, rejected the request, finding that the role to 
prosecute belongs to the prosecutor only, and not to the Chamber nor to amici.32  
                                                 
27 Ibid., at 331. 
28 See e.g. Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 
Tadić (IT-94-1-T), Trial Chamber (‘TC’), 10 August 1995; Decision on the Application of the Prosecutor Dated 
17 October 1996 Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Blaškić (IT-95-14-T), TC, 5 
November 1996; Judgment, Delalić et al. (IT-96-21-T), TC, 16 November 1998, §§ 49-59. 
29 ICTR, Decision on the Amicus Curiae Application by the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, Bagosora 
et al. (ICTR-96-7-T), TC II, 6 June 1998, at 2.  
30 ICTR, Decision on the Amicus Curiae Request by the Rwandan Government, Bagosora et al. (ICTR-98-41-
T), TC II, 13 October 2004. 
31 ICTR, Decision on the Amicus Curiae Application by the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium, supra note 
no. 29, at 2-3; Decision on the Amicus Curiae Request by the Rwandan Government, supra note no. 30. 
32 ICTR, Decision on the Application to File an Amicus Curiae Brief According to Rule 74 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence Filed on Behalf of the NGO Coalition for Women’s Human Rights in Conflict 
Situations, Ntagerura et al. (ICTR-99-46-T), TC III, 24 May 2001.  
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Another opportunity for the victims to have their voice heard in the proceedings of ad 
hoc Tribunals is through victim impact statements. Although the right to submit victim impact 
statements is not foreseen in the statute or rules of the ad hoc Tribunals, both the ICTY and 
ICTR have allowed, for the purposes of sentencing, the submission of victim impact 
statements provided by the prosecution.33 In addition, pursuant to Rule 92bis, the Prosecution 
may submit written statements by witnesses that concern the impact of crimes upon 
witnesses. Victims have also occasionally been called to testify about the impact of crimes on 
their lives.34  
Finally, even if victims cannot be awarded reparation by the ad hoc Tribunals, the 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes provide that ‘[i]n addition to imprisonment, the Trial Chambers may 
order the return of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct.’35 Moreover, the 
ad hoc Tribunals RPEs stipulate that, in case of conviction of the accused, national courts 
competent to award compensation to victims are bound to the findings of the ad hoc tribunals 
as to the criminal liability of the convicted person.36 However, national courts in the former 
Yugoslavia or Rwanda have been unable to deal with these cases. Moreover, neither the ICTY 
nor the ICTR have ever put into effect the restitution provisions.37  
In reaction to this failure, in 2000, by request of the Office of the Prosecutor, the 
proposal of entrusting the Tribunal with the mandate of awarding compensation to victims 
was considered by the ICTY judges.38 Although supporting the proposal in principle, the 
Judges rejected it in view of the many problems that the incorporation of victim’s 
participation and compensation in the Statute and Rules would raise. In particular, the Judges 
noted the impact of victims’ rights on the workload of the Tribunal, on the effectiveness of 
the prosecutor’s work, the length of proceedings and, eventually, on the rights of the 
defendant.39 Similarly, the ICTR Judges rejected proposals to amend the Statute so as to 
include victims’ right to redress.40  
                                                 
33 Several judgments of the ICTY and the ICTR cited victims’ impact statements submitted by the prosecution: 
see e.g., ICTY, Judgment, Mucić et al. (IT-96-21), TC, 16 November 1998, § 1263; Sentencing Judgment, Tadić 
(IT-94-1), TC II, 11 November 1999, § 4.  
34 E.g., Sentencing Judgment, Nikolić (IT-94-2-S), TC II, 18 December 2003, §§ 41-43. 
35 See Articles 24(1) and 23(1) of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes respectively. 
36 Rule 106 ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence (‘RPE’). 
37 On the implementation of the ad hoc Tribunals redress provisions, see I. Bottigliero, Redress for Victims of 
Crimes under International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) at 202-209.  
38 See ICTY, Victims’ Compensation and Participation, Appendix to UN Doc. S/2000/1063, Judges’ Report of 
13 September 2000. 
39 Ibid., §§ 23-41. 
40 ICTR, Letter of the President of the ICTR to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, annex to Letter of 
14 December 2000 from the Secretary-General Addressed to President of the Security Council, UN Doc. 
S/2000/1198 (2000). 
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All in all, it is evident from the legal context in which international criminal justice 
developed that it was not traditionally conceived as a means of providing justice for victims.  
It was only with the negotiations of the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court 
which culminated in 1998 that the first steps made by the ad hoc Tribunals would result in a 
‘Copernican revolution’ in international criminal procedure. While Security Council 
Resolution 827 explained that the ICTY was established ‘for the sole purpose of prosecuting 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law’,41 Kofi Annan 
(then UN Secretary General) stated at the inaugural meeting of the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court that 
‘the overriding interest must be that of the victims, and of the international community as a 
whole ... It [the Court] must be an instrument of justice, not expediency. It must be able to 
protect the weak from the strong’.42 
This was not a revolution in words only. As will be illustrated in the following 
sections, the ICC, and other internationalized criminal tribunals established in the same 
period, substantially changed the law and procedure of international criminal justice in 
relation to victims.  
 
                                                 
41 UN Security Council (‘UN SC’), Resolution 827, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), 25 May 1993, § 2. 
42 UN Press Release, ‘UN Secretary General Declares Overriding Interest of International Criminal Court 
Conference Must Be that of Victims and World Community as a Whole’ (SG/SM/6597 L/2871), 15 June 1998, 
available online at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980615.sgsm6597.html (last visited on 26 June 
2013).  
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3 VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AT THE ICC 
 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is the first international treaty that sets 
out victims’ rights in international criminal proceedings. As observed above, the inclusion of 
victims’ rights in the procedure of the ICC originated from the progressive affirmation of 
victims’ rights at the international level as well as from the dissatisfaction towards the 
experience of the ad hoc Tribunals which in many ways ignored victims’ needs and 
concerns.43 When the negotiations for the Rome Statute of the ICC started, it was widely 
thought that not recognising victims’ rights would have amounted to an unsustainable 
position. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan, described victims’ concerns as the 
‘overriding interest’ that should drive the Rome Conference,44 and many delegates heeded his 
call. The decision to include victims’ rights in the ICC procedural system, particularly the 
right to participate in the proceedings and to claim reparation for the harm allegedly suffered 
was strongly supported by civil society including a number of influential academic circles, 
NGOs and some powerful national delegations.45  
Fernández de Gurmendi, who took part in the Working Group for the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence relating to Part 4 of the Statute, observed that ‘the crafting of the 
regime on victims was probably the most challenging task undertaken by the Preparatory 
Commission’,46 in view of the different legal traditions which the delegates came from. As a 
result, the ICC Statute and Rules adopt a hybrid system that draws on both civil and common 
law traditions.47 As will be illustrated further below, victims’ rights were conceived in such a 
way as not to jeopardise the primary function of the Court, that is to prosecute perpetrators of 
international crimes and the fairness of the trials.  
With the establishment of the Court, the promise was made that victims would no 
longer be anonymous silent faces in the background of international trials; they would be 
                                                 
43 L. Walleyn, ‘Victimes et témoins de crimes internationaux: du droit à une protection au droit à la parole’, 84 
International Review of the Red Cross (2002) 51-77. 
44 United Nations Press Release, ‘UN Secretary General Declares Overriding Interest of International Criminal 
Court Conference must be that of Victims and World Community as a Whole’, 15 June 1998, available at 
http://www.un.org/icc/pressrel/lrom6r1.htm (last visited on 26 June 2013). 
45 S. Zappalà, ‘The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused’, 8 JICJ (2010) 137-164, at 159.  
46 S. Fernández de Gurmendi, ‘Elaboration of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, in R.S. Lee et al. (eds) The 
International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Ardsley, NY: 
Transnational Publishers, 2001), 235-257, at 256. See also C. Kress, ‘The Procedural Law of the International 
Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of Unique Compromises’, 1 JICJ (2003) 603-617. 
47 M. Caianiello, G. Illuminati, ‘From the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to the 
International Criminal Court’, 26 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 
(2000-2001) 407-455; J. Jackson, ‘Finding the Best Epistemic Fit for International Criminal Tribunals: Beyond 
the Adversarial-Inquisitorial Dichotomy’, 7 JICJ (2009) 17-39; A. Orie, ‘Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial 
Approach’, supra note no. 18, at 1475-1491. 
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entitled to rights including participation in the proceedings and reparation for the harm 
suffered. 
 
3.1 The Right to Participation in the Proceedings 
 
The victim participation scheme set out in the ICC Statute and RPE is probably one of the 
most innovative features of the ICC legal framework. This scheme is completely 
unprecedented in the world of international criminal justice; indeed, as seen above, 
traditionally victims had only been allowed to interact with the courts as witnesses called on 
to serve the evidentiary needs of a party in a given case.  Conversely, the ICC Statute and 
Rules fully acknowledge the role of victim in the criminal process, providing for victim 
participation at each stage of the proceedings, at all stages of the trial process. Other than as 
witnesses, victims can participate in criminal trials in two ways: victims may (i) submit 
complaints about an offence to the Court; (ii) participate in the proceedings, including for the 
purposes of seeking reparation following the conviction of the accused.  
 
3.1.1 Victim Complainant 
 
 
Victims, like other individuals and organizations, may submit communications to the Office 
of the Prosecutor regarding potential cases falling within the Court’s jurisdiction.48 The 
prosecutor is then obligated to evaluate the materials received. Based on these complaints, the 
prosecutor may also decide to seek authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber for the 
commencement of an investigation.49 Although the right to submit a communication is not a 
specific right of victims, but rather is available to all individuals, it is remarkable that the 
Court characterises this possibility as the first instance in which victims can be involved in the 
proceedings before the Court.50  
 
 
                                                 
48 Art. 15, ICCSt. By the end of 2012, the Office of the Prosecutor had considered a total of 9,717 
“communications” received pursuant to Article 15 of the Statute, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref
/Pages/communications%20and%20referrals.aspx#1 (last visited on 26 June 2013).  
49 Art. 15(3), ICCSt. 
50 See Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Court on the Strategy in Relation to Victims, ICC-ASP/8/45, 18-
26 November 2009, at 2, 4. 
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3.1.2 Victim Participant 
 
The provisions addressing the role of victims in ICC proceedings can be classified according 
to the stage of the proceedings in which they are applicable. A preliminary distinction may 
hence be made between participation under Part II and Part VI of the Statute, devoted 
respectively to ‘Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law’, and to ‘The Trial’.  
Under Part II of the Statute, two provisions potentially enable victims to have access 
in circumstances which are identified as particularly important to their interests. First, 
pursuant to Article 15(3), victims ‘may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber’ in the 
event the Prosecutor decides to initiate investigations proprio motu (Article 15(3)). Second, 
victims may ‘submit observations to the Court’ when challenges are made as to the 
jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case (Article 19(3)).51 The wording used by 
the two provisions indicates that the possibility for victims to intervene in these specific 
circumstances is not a right; rather, it remains a faculty under the control of the judges which, 
as such, may be limited, if not revoked, where it is found to prejudice other impeding 
objectives. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence also empower the chambers to seek the 
views of the victims ‘as appropriate’ (Rule 93) on any issue, including in relation to an 
amendment to the charges (Rule 128), joint and separate trials (Rule 136) and assurances 
made by the Court (Rule 191), although they do not translate such a possibility into a right of 
victims.52 What remains problematic, in this respect, is how victims will be selected, since no 
application seems to be required for the purpose of exercising these faculties; furthermore, the 
identification of victims prior to the opening of an investigation (as provided for by Article 
15(3)) may prove to be a challenging task for the judges.53 
                                                 
51 Note that the Court has no explicit obligation to act on the information provided by victims under Art. 19(3) 
ICCSt. See Decision inviting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Victims in the Case to Comment on 
the Proceedings pursuant to Article 19 of the Statute, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (‘Lubanga’) (ICC-01/04-01/06-
206), Pre-Trial Chamber (‘PTC’) I, 24 July 2006, in which PTC I invited the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and the victims of this case to make their submissions.  
52 In Decision on “Demande de déposition du représentant légal des demandeurs des victims”, Lubanga (ICC-
01/04-01/06-1004), TC I, 25 October 2007, the Chamber considered the requests of the legal representative of a 
number of victims to be allowed to make submissions regarding victims’ participation issues which have not 
been covered in the submissions of the current victims’ representatives, pursuant to Rules 103 and 93. The TC 
noted that it had not sought the views of other victims as is allowed for under Rule 93 of the Rules and rejected 
the application. 
53 For example, in the situation in Kenya, the PTC requested the Victims Participation and Reparations Section 
(‘VPRS’) to: ‘(1) [I]dentify, to the extent possible, the community leaders of the affected groups to act on behalf 
of those victims who may wish to make representations (collective representation); (2) receive victims’ 
representations (collective and/or individual); (3) conduct an assessment, in accordance with paragraph 8 of this 
order, whether the conditions set out in rule 85 of the Rules have been met; and (4) summarize victims’ 
representations into one consolidated report with the original representations annexed thereto.’ See Order to the 
Victims Participation and Reparations Section Concerning Victims’ Representations Pursuant to Article 15(3) of 
the Statute, Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09-4), PTC II, 10 December 2009, § 9. 
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  It is in Part VI of the Statute that the victim participation scheme, incorporating the 
victims’ right to present their views and concerns in the proceedings, is framed. The scope 
and the means of victims’ participation in the proceedings largely remain in the hands of the 
judges. Indeed, Article 68(3) explicitly provides that the judges have the faculty of 
determining the timing and the manner of victims’ participation, in consideration, 
respectively, of its appropriateness and its consistency with fair trial rights. Moreover, the 
vague wording used in Article 68(3)54 indisputably gives the judges further margin of 
discretion in the task of shaping the victims’ participation scheme.  Although victims’ 
participation is a statutory right, its conditioned exercise supports the position of victims as 
participants (implying a limited procedural position) in the criminal process, as opposed to 
parties (implying a more substantial role at trial and broader procedural rights, including the 
right to present evidence and witnesses).55  
In order to meaningfully participate in the proceedings, victims have the right to 
choose a legal representative. Article 68(3) gives victims the statutory right to present their 
views and concerns before the Court when their personal interests are affected. However, as 
also indicated in this Article, it is generally for their legal representatives to undertake this 
task on the victims’ behalf.56 Vicarious participation is preferable for two main reasons: on 
the one hand, if legal representatives appear for a group of victims, this reduces the number of 
voices before the Court, thus simplifying the procedure; and on the other hand, legal 
representatives are better skilled than victims themselves (at least, those without a legal 
training) to represent victims’ interests before the Court.57 
While the victim is in principle ‘free to choose a legal representative’,58 the competent 
chamber may, for the purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of the proceedings, request that 
victims or a group of victims choose a common legal representative. If the victims are unable 
to choose a common legal representative within the time limit set by the Court, the chamber 
can request that the registrar choose the representative for the victims. In assigning a common 
                                                 
54 The existence of so many grey areas is largely due to the so-called ‘constructive ambiguity’ of diplomatic 
negotiations. In this respect, see C. Kress, ‘The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: 
Anatomy of a Unique Compromise’ 1 JICJ (2003) 603-617, at 604-606. 
55 It is interesting to note that the ICCSt. and RPE use interchangeably the term ‘participant’ and ‘party’ when 
referring to victims. The drafting history suggests, however, that the intention of the drafters was to have victims 
as nothing more than participant. See M.C. Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims’ Rights’, 6 Human 
Rights Law Review (2006) 203-279, at 245. See also T.M. Funk, Victims’ Rights and Advocacy at the 
International Criminal Court, supra note no. 1, at 88-91. 
56 E.g., G.J Mekjian and M.C. Varughese. ‘Hearing the Victims: Analysis of Victims’ Advocate Participation in 
the Trial Proceedings of the International Criminal Court’, 17 Pace International Law Review (2005) 1-46, at 25. 
57 ICC, Decision on Victims’ Participation, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), TC I, 18 January 2008, at § 23. 
58 Rule 90(1) ICC RPE. 
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legal representative to a group of victims, it is important that the Court’s organs take all 
reasonable steps necessary to ensure that the selection of the common representative takes 
into account the distinct interests of the victims and avoids conflict of interests. Moreover, the 
Court has held that this selection must consider the views of the victims and respect local 
traditions.59  
Arguably, the right of victims to employ a legal representative of their choosing is 
particularly limited in the context of choosing a common legal representative among a group 
or where the victim has limited financial resources to pay the representative. It is, nonetheless, 
worthy of remark that the Court has put some effort into trying to elaborate a set of criteria for 
grouping victims and for ensuring a meaningful representation of the individual interests by 
common legal representatives.60 
As will be further analysed in Section 5 of this Chapter, victims’ legal representatives 
may hence attend and participate in proceedings (unless the Chamber decides that their 
presence should be confined to written observations), they may make opening and closing 
statements; present victims’ views and concerns; request protective measures and apply to the 
Court to question witnesses. 
 
3.2 The Right to Reparation 
 
In accordance with the developments that have occurred at the international level in relation 
to victims’ redress for violations of international law, the Rome Statute provides for the 
possibility for the Court to award reparation to victims. In the event the accused is found 
guilty, victims may claim reparation, or the Trial Chamber may proprio motu order that 
reparation be granted to them.61 From the perspective of victims’ rights, the reparation phase 
is envisaged as completely distinct from the trial; this means, inter alia, that victims who did 
                                                 
59 Regulation 79(2) of the ICC Regulations of the Court. See ICC, Decision on Common Legal Representation of 
Victims for the Purposes of Trial, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (‘Bemba’) (ICC-01/05-01/08), TC III, 10 
November 2010, § 11.  
60 For example, in ruling on the common legal representation of victims, the Trial Chamber in the Katanga case 
has considered the following elements: (i) whether between the victims there were tensions in terms of ethnicity, 
age, gender or the type of crimes they were allegedly victims of; and 2) whether some of the victims have 
perpetrated some of the crimes which victimized the others. In view of these elements, the Court divided the 
victims in two groups (previously to this decision, victims were represented by eight different common legal 
representatives): in one group the former child soldiers, in the other all the remaining victims wishing to 
participate in the case. ICC, Order on the Organization of Common Legal Representation of Victims, Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (‘Katanga’) (ICC-01/04/07-1328), TC II, 22 July 2009, at §§ 12-13. 
61 Art. 75 ICCSt. 
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not participate in the trial proceedings may still claim reparation and participate in the 
relevant proceedings held against a convicted person.  
Within this phase, Article 75 of the Rome Statute and the relevant rules grant victims 
the procedural status of a ‘party’, as opposed to ‘participant’. This means that victims may, at 
least in principle, participate to a higher degree in reparation proceedings and could possess 
all relevant procedural rights.62 For example, unlike in trial proceedings, victims’ right to 
question witnesses during the reparation hearing is more comprehensive and cannot be 
limited to written observations or submissions pursuant to Rule 91(4). Subject to leave by the 
Chamber, victims may also question experts and persons concerned. Furthermore, the legal 
representatives of victims adversely affected by the reparation order are allowed to appeal it, 
contrary to the final judgment, which is only appealable by the prosecution and the defence.   
As to the forms of reparations orders that can be made by the Court, an award can be 
made either directly against a convicted person, or through the Trust Fund for Victims, which 
acts as a depository for any assets seized from a suspect or accused for the eventual purposes 
of reparation, if for instance, at the moment of the award it is ‘impossible or impractical’ to 
make individual awards directly to each victim.63 Moreover, the Court can make an award of 
reparation through the Trust Fund ‘where the number of the victims and the scope, forms and 
modalities of reparations makes a collective award more appropriate.’64 
Pursuant to Article 75 of the ICC Statute, the principles upon which reparation awards 
will be based are to be established by the Court. Although it was initially thought that these 
principles would have been adopted by the Court prior to the first reparation proceedings,65 it 
was later clarified that these principles would be developed through the Court’s jurisprudence. 
It was indeed on 7 August 2012 that Trial Chamber I established, for the first time, principles 
on reparation in relation to the first individual convicted before the Court, Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, who was found guilty of the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under 
the age of fifteen years and using them to actively participate in hostilities.66 As Francioni 
                                                 
62 E.g., S. Zappalà, ‘The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused’, supra note no. 45, at 157; H. Friman, 
‘The International Criminal Court and Participation of Victims: A Third Party to the Proceedings?’ 22 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2009) 485-500, at 497. 
63 Rule 98(2) ICC RPE. 
64 Rule 98(3) ICC RPE. In addition, the Trust Fund may use resources obtained through voluntary contributions 
or fundraising to undertake specific activities and projects for the benefit of victims and their families (Art. 79 
ICCSt.)  
65 Redress Trust, ‘Justice for Victims: The ICC’s Reparation Mandate’, 20 May 2011, at 24, available online at 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/REDRESS_ICC_Reparations_May2011.pdf (last visited on 26 
June 2013). 
66 ICC, Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to Be Applied to Reparations, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-2904), TC I, 7 August 2012. 
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noted, Article 75 of the ICC Statute assigns to the Court a ‘limited law-making function’, as 
the development of principles on reparation may eventually lead to the establishment of ‘new 
law’ on the subject.67 As such, it is regrettable that the Court found that the principles 
established in the Lubanga decision ‘are limited to the circumstances of the case’68 and did 
not provide for wide reparation principles which could be used as a reference for future cases.  
Nonetheless, the Court has relied extensively on established law and practice relating 
to forms of reparation such as restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, reflecting both 
settled norms (‘the right to reparations is a well-established and basic human right’),69 as well 
as emerging ones.70 Framing the principles within existing international standards, the Court 
has certainly paved the way for the consolidation of general principles on reparation for 
victims of international crimes, particularly in cases of mass atrocities. At the time of writing, 
the Trust Fund has not yet designed and implemented a reparation programme based on the 
principles elaborated by the Court in the Lubanga case; as already suggested by the Court, 
however, it can be expected that it will favour collective and symbolic reparation, given that 
the accused has been found indigent.71  
 
                                                 
67 F. Francioni, ‘Reflections on Victims’ Reparations and on Universal Jurisdiction’, in M. Politi and F. Gioia 
(eds) The International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) 140-148, at 142. 
68 ICC, Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to Be Applied to Reparations, supra note no. 66, § 
181. 
69 Ibid., § 185. 
70 For instance, the Court stressed the need for a gender inclusive approach to reparations, see Ibid., § 202. 
71 Ibid., §§ 219-221 and 274. 
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4 VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
 
The introduction of a victim participation and reparation scheme at the ICC constitutes a 
significant advance in international criminal law. As mentioned in the introduction to this 
Chapter, the ICC model influenced, in the years following the adoption of the Rome Statute, 
the procedural models of two internationalized criminal tribunals, the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Although in 
different ways, both these tribunals allow victims to participate in the proceedings. The ECCC 
has also the power to award reparation to victims. 
 
4.1 Victims’ Rights at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
 
The rights or needs of victims were hardly addressed in either the ECCC Law72 or the 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia on the 
Establishment of the ECCC.73 This oversight most likely had to do with the fact that 
Cambodian criminal procedure already provided for victim’s participation, either as initiator 
of a complaint or as a civil party. It soon became apparent, however, that the domestic 
victims’ participation scheme would not work at the ECCC due to the large number of victims 
and the complexity of the crimes charged.74 The American Ambassador David Scheffer, who 
actively participated in the establishment of the Cambodian tribunal, explained that:  
[D]uring the 1990’s and the most intensive stage of negotiations for the law on the ECCC, there was almost no 
discussion about victims’ rights. While at first blush this may seem odd, one might nevertheless imply a right of 
civil parties to participate given the considerable body of rights for civil actions afforded victims in criminal 
trials under Cambodian criminal procedure law, which is heavily influenced by the French civil law system. But 
the heavy lifting on victims’ rights awaited the drafting of the Internal Rules by the judges, which was preceded 
by several intensive studies by experts and non-governmental organizations of what could and should be 
addressed in those rules for the victims.75 
                                                 
72 Law On The Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of 
Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, with inclusion of amendments as promulgated 
on 27 October 2004 (NS/RKM/1004/006). 
73 Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution 
under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, UN Doc. 
A/Res57/228B (Annex), 13 May 2003. 
74 B. McGonigle, ‘Two for the Price of One: Attempts by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia to Combine Retributive and Restorative Justice Principles’, 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 
(2009) 127-149, at 139. 
75 Cited in M Saliba, ‘Civil Party Participation at the ECCC: Overview’, The Trial Observer, 6 November 2009, 
available online at http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/blog/2009/11/civil-party-participation-eccc-overview (last 
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The statutory rights of victims are hence set out in the Internal Rules, which form the 
authoritative source of procedural law at the ECCC.76  
 
4.1.1 The Right to Participation 
 
As in Cambodian criminal procedure, victims may participate in the proceedings of the ECCC 
as complainants and parties civiles, other than as witnesses. Clearly, these roles have been 
necessarily adjusted with the aim of creating a workable approach to victims’ participation in 
cases of mass victimizations. Each role, as will be illustrated below, offers varying degrees of 
involvement in the proceedings. 
 
A. VICTIM COMPLAINANT 
 
Victims, like other individuals, may submit complaints to the Court in order to make the co-
prosecutors aware of particular crimes.77 In turn, the co-prosecutors may seek further 
information about the alleged crimes and may call the complainants to testify. In contrast to 
civil parties in domestic proceedings, victims complainants interviewed by the co-
investigating judges do not have right to have counsel present at these meetings.78 Moreover, 
unlike in domestic procedure, complainants cannot initiate prosecutions if the co-prosecutors 
decide not to take action regarding their complaints, nor can they force the co-prosecutors or 
the co-investigating judges to undertake a specific investigation. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
visited on 26 June 2013); see also Human Rights Now, Justice for Victims: Fundamental Issues for the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 13 September 2006, available online at 
http://hrn.or.jp/eng/JusticeforVictims%28HRN-Japan%29english.pdf (last visited on 26 June 2013). 
76 On 13 June 2007, the ECCC’s Judicial Committee on the Rules of Procedure, composed of both national and 
international judges serving in their capacity as rule makers, issued Internal Rules that provided for civil party 
action purporting to confer victims extensive participatory rights. The Committee explained the basis and scope 
of the civil party process as follows: ‘[A] complex issue has been how to ensure the rights and involvement of 
victims. While a familiar element of Cambodian law, this was not spelled out in detail in the ECCC Law and 
Agreement. […] We note that the ECCC is a court within the existing court structure of Cambodia. We 
interpreted this to mean that victims have the right to join as civil parties. However, due to the specific character 
of the ECCC, we have decided that only collective, non-financial reparation is possible.’ Joint Press Statement 
by the Committee, ‘Roundup: ECCC Overcomes Complexity, Adopts Internal Rules for DK Trials’, 13 June 
2007. The Internal Rules were last amended on 12 August 2011. 
77 ECCC, Practice Direction 02/2007/Rev.1, Victim Participation, Art. 2, 27 October 2008; Rule 49(2) ECCC IR. 
78 ECCC, Rule 55(5)(a) ECCC IR. 
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B. CIVIL PARTIES 
 
In addition to intervening as complainants, victims may constitute themselves as civil parties 
in the criminal case. As in domestic law, victims who are granted civil party status may 
participate throughout the criminal process and claim reparation. Victims applying to become 
civil parties may do so at any time during the investigation stage before the trial commences. 
Once their application is accepted, pursuant to Rule 23, civil parties are entitled to participate 
in the criminal proceedings against the accused person ‘by supporting the prosecution’ and 
seeking ‘collective and moral reparations.’  
Victims participating as civil parties are entitled to a number of rights, in contrast with 
victims acting as complainants. Indeed, civil parties are full parties to the proceedings; this 
means, inter alia, that they have in principle the same rights as are afforded to an accused 
person. Their participation includes a full presence during both the trial phase and the pre-trial 
phase when the case is being reviewed by the Co-Investigating Judges. During the pre-trial 
stage, civil parties may request investigations and may appeal decisions by the co-
investigating judges not to investigate.79 At trial, civil parties, like the accused, do not testify 
under oath80 and, through legal representatives are granted a series of rights, including the 
right to have full access to the case file,81 to make appeals,82 to make legal and factual 
submissions, to attend hearings, to call and question witnesses,83 to question the accused84 and 
to make closing arguments.85  
As with the ICC, legal representatives are crucial for the effective exercise of civil 
parties’ rights in the proceedings. The recently revised Internal Rules marked an important 
shift with respect to the legal representation of civil parties. First, after the issuing of the 
closing order,86 all civil parties are both required to have and are entitled to representation by 
a lawyer in order to participate in the proceedings (Rule 23ter(1)). In principle, civil parties 
are free to be represented by a lawyer of their own choosing; however, an individual civil 
party may be directed by the chamber to join an existing civil party group and share a 
common lawyer, provided that the interests of the distinct parties are represented and conflicts 
of interest are avoided.  
                                                 
79 Rule 55(10) ECCC IR. 
80 Rule 24(2) ECCC IR. 
81 Rule 86 ECCC IR. 
82 Rules 23(a) and 74(f) ECCC IR.  
83 Rules 139 and 91 ECCC IR. 
84 Rule 90 ECCC IR. 
85 Rule 94 ECCC IR. 
86 Pursuant to Rule 67(1) ECCC IR, the main purpose of the closing order is either to indict a charged person and 
send him or her to trial, or to dismiss the charges against him or her. 
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The second amendment requires all of the civil parties to consolidate into one group at 
the trial stage.87 The individual lawyers who represented the civil parties during the pre-trial 
phase are expected to continue to provide assistance to the new figure of ‘Civil Parties Lead 
Co-Lawyers’ during the proceedings. This new structure, comprising one consolidated civil 
party, which made its entry into the proceedings at the start of Case 002, is expected to 
address a variety of issues raised in the first trial before the Chambers (Duch case) where civil 
parties have been represented by four different groups, each with at least one national and one 
international attorney, both of whom had standing to appear before the Chamber.88 As a 
matter of fact, during the Duch trial it became clear that allowing each civil party group to 
intervene in the proceedings, and allowing them to pose unlimited questions to witnesses, 
including experts and the accused, could have a considerable impact on the length of the trial 
itself.89 In an attempt at reducing long and duplicate questioning by the parties, the Trial 
Chamber allocated specific time slots for each party, limiting the amount of time available for 
questioning. This system, however, was thought to be unsustainable in the second case before 
the Chambers, where an estimated 3,000 victims sought to apply for civil party status in a trial 
against four defendants. The revised IRs seek to maintain the group-system by allowing for 
the various civil party attorneys to provide specific advice to the Civil Party Lead Counsels, 
and even allow for them to participate in court on an ad hoc basis in agreement with the Lead 
Counsels.  
It remains, however, doubtful whether the Lead Co-Lawyers must attend to the views 
of civil party lawyers in undertaking their mandate. Consolidating all the victims in one group 
potentially poses issues as to the representation of individual interests before the court: as 
already observed by the ICC, victims may represent a wide range of ethnic, religious and 
national backgrounds, which may result in conflicting interests and strategies within the 
consolidated group. The risk is then that individual interests will be subjugated to the interest 
of the common consolidated group during trial. In these circumstances the role of the civil 
party lawyers becomes crucial, as they are those in charge of voicing these divergent interests 
of their clients to the Lead Counsel. 
 
                                                 
87 Rule 23(3) ECCC IR. 
88 The civil parties were not grouped together in any logical way (such as class of victim or type of injury). 
Instead the four different groups evolved from the fact that different intermediary organizations helped collect 
civil party applications and each wanted to represent their own group of victims separately. Not only did this 
create a problem of consistent representation, but it also had the unintended effect of unnecessarily prolonging 
the proceedings.  
89 A. Werner, D. Rudy, ‘Civil Party Representation at the ECCC: Sounding the Retreat in International Criminal 
Law?’, 8 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights (2010) 301-309, at 304. 
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4.1.2 The Right to Reparation 
 
Although seeking reparation is one of the primary objectives of civil parties, the ECCC 
Internal Rules give the Judges the power to award reparations to civil parties only in the form 
of ‘collective and moral reparations’.90 Collective and moral reparations may include, for 
instance, the publication of the judgment in news or other media or the financing of a not-for-
profit activity to benefit the victims. Notably, in the first case before the ECCC all the claims 
made by civil parties such as memorials or trust funds for victims were rejected because they 
either ‘lacked specificity’ or ‘were beyond the scope of available reparations before the 
ECCC’.91 Accordingly, the Court ordered reparations only in the form of (i) listing the names 
of all accepted civil parties and the name of any family member who died at Khmer Rouge S-
21 prison in the TC Judgment, and (ii) an order for a compilation of all statements of apology 
and acknowledgments of responsibility made by Duch during the course of the trial.92 
A 2010 amendment to the Internal Rules now requires the lead co-lawyers to make a 
single claim for collective and moral reparations on behalf of all civil parties.93 Moreover, the 
amendment indicates that collective and moral reparations have to (i) acknowledge the harm 
suffered by civil parties as a result of the commission of the crimes for which the accused has 
been found guilty, and (ii) provide benefits to the civil parties which address this harm.94 
Given that the accused before the Court have been found indigent, it does not appear that the 
Rules amendment will offer new avenues of reparation to victims, other than the bare 
minimum, such as the publication of the final judgment.  
4.2 Victims’ Rights at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
 
The STL victims’ participation scheme, while taking into account Lebanese criminal 
procedure, has been designed very much along the lines of that set out by the ICC. For 
instance, the participation of victims in the investigation stage, hotly contested at the ICC, has 
been explicitly ruled out. Unlike the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows a 
victim to act as a civil party and to initiate a public action, the STL RPE do not allow victims 
to participate until the formal accusations against the accused have been confirmed.95  In 
accordance with Article 11 of the Statute it is for the prosecutor, as a representative of the 
                                                 
90 Rule 23 quinquies ECCC IR. 
91 ECCC, Judgment, Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch (‘Duch’), TC, 26 July 2010, Section 4.4.3. 
92 Ibid., §§ 682-683. 
93 Rule 23 quinquies (2). 
94 Rule 23 quinquies (1). 
95 Art. 17 STLSt., Rule 86(A) STL RPE. 
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public interest, to decide proprio motu whether or not to bring a criminal action in accordance 
with his chosen prosecution strategy. At most, the victim may be allowed transmit to the 
prosecutor any information he considers useful to determine the truth. The prosecutor 
remains, however, free to decide how to use such information. Following the confirmation of 
the indictment victims are then entitled to a set of procedural rights. 
 
4.2.1 The Right to Participation  
 
The STL Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence grant victims wide-ranging rights 
to participate in the proceedings. Following the confirmation of the indictment, and prior to 
the start of the trial, the Pre-Trial judge may decide to hear victims or invite the legal 
representative to file written submissions.96 Moreover, the RPE provide that the Pre-Trial 
Judge shall order the legal representative to file the list of witnesses that they intend to call 
and provide the list of exhibits intended to be admitted as evidence.97  
During the trial, victims participating in the proceedings have significant powers to 
present their views and concerns.98 A victim participating in the proceedings may make an 
opening and closing statement in addition to, as observed above, requesting the Trial 
Chamber to authorise the legal representative to call witnesses and produce additional 
evidence.99 The Trial Chamber may also authorise the legal representative to examine or 
cross-examine witnesses and file motions and briefs, subject to its authorisation and 
control.100 Furthermore, unless the Pre-Trial Judge or the Trial Chamber determines any 
appropriate restriction in the interests of justice, a victim participating in the proceedings is 
entitled to have access to documents filed by the parties, excluding any confidential material 
and material which has been made available to the prosecutor the defence alone.101 
In order to exercise the aforementioned powers, a victim participating in the 
proceedings must be kept informed of the progress of the proceedings and, unless the Pre-
Trial Judge or the competent chamber decides otherwise in the interests of justice, the victim 
shall also be notified of the pre-trial case file.102 Despite this potentially broad procedural 
                                                 
96 Rule 89(D) STL RPE. 
97 Rule 91(H)(i) and (ii) STL RPE. 
98 Article 17 STLSt. No difference has been statutorily set between victims’ participatory rights in trials inter 
partes and trials in absentia.  
99 Rule 87(B) STL RPE. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Rule 87(A) STL RPE. 
102 Ibid. 
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status, victims’ participation is to be strictly regulated to ensure that it is not ‘prejudicial to or 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.’103 
To this end, the RPE sets out a range of measures to balance victims’ rights with the 
accused’s rights. First of all, a victim participating in the proceedings must be expressly 
authorised to exercise participatory rights by the Pre-Trial Judge or the chamber with the 
necessary jurisdiction.104 Furthermore, the number of victims invited to submit their ‘views 
and concerns’ may be limited and, in any event, unless otherwise decided, victims’ 
participation will be exercised through common legal representatives.105 In the first case 
before the STL, the Pre-Trial Judge found that the rules on victims’ legal representation 
‘suggest that unless there are valid reasons to justify not doing so, the VPPs are presumed to 
be treated as a single group’.106 All the victims participating in the proceedings are, at present, 
represented by a single legal representative. 
Contrary to the ECCC, which is also based on a civil law procedural system, a victim 
participating in the proceedings cannot directly question the accused but may do so only 
through a judge.107 Similarly, a victim participating in the proceedings shall not be permitted 
to testify, except from in those circumstances in which the chamber considers that this is in 
the best interests of justice.108 Finally, victims’ participation during the sentencing stage is 
limited to expressing, subject to the Trial Chamber’s authorisation, the impact the crime 
committed had on them personally.109 Indeed, in order to ensure that the rights of the accused 
are fully safeguarded and to avoid any sense of revenge, only the prosecutor in representing 
the public interest is authorised to argue for a particular sentence.110 Similarly, victims cannot 
appeal a judgment or a sentence. 
4.2.2 The Right to Reparation 
 
Unlike the ICC and the ECCC, victims are not entitled to claim reparation for the harm 
suffered before the Tribunal. As with the ad hoc Tribunals, victims are required to bring their 
                                                 
103 Rule 86(B)(iv) STL RPE. 
104 Art. 17 STLSt. 
105 Rule 86(C) STL RPE. 
106 STL, Decision on VPU’s Access to Materials and the Modalities of Victims’ Participation in Proceedings 
before the Pre-Trial Judge, Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Hussein Hassan Oneissi and Assad 
Hassan Sabra, Pre-Trial Judge, 8 May 2012, § 119. 
107 Rule 144(B) STL RPE. 
108 Rule 150(D) STL RPE. 
109 Rule 87(C) STL RPE. 
110 Rule 171(A) STL RPE. 
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claims before domestic courts or any other competent institutions to obtain some form of 
reparation. Pursuant to Article 25 of the STL Statute: 
Based on the decision of the Special Tribunal and pursuant to the relevant national legislation, a victim or 
persons claiming through the victim, whether or not such victim had been identified as such by the Tribunal 
under paragraph 1 of this article, may bring an action in a national court or other competent body to obtain 
compensation.’ 
Pursuant to recent amendments in the RPE, victims (or those considering themselves 
victims) may be issued a certified copy of the judgment in order to seek compensation before 
a competent tribunal (Rule 86(G)). This amendment was introduced in the hope of facilitating 
victims in their claims for compensation. Although the judgment of the Special Tribunal is to 
be considered final and binding with regard to the criminal responsibility of the convicted 
person (Art. 25(4) STL Statute), doubts remain as to whether the identification of victims 
made by the STL is also binding on other courts.  
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5 VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND THE RIGHT TO 
JUSTICE 
 
5.1 Some Preliminary Remarks 
 
At the beginning of this Chapter it was noted that the inclusion of a regime of victim redress 
in recently established international and internationalized criminal tribunals marks a departure 
from the classical framework of international criminal law. The question that the conferral of 
victims’ rights in the procedure of these tribunals raises is whether the creation of a regime of 
victim redress in the context of international criminal law can be seen as the affirmation of a 
right to justice for victims of international crimes.   
In Chapter III, it was argued that a right to justice is emerging as an integral 
component of remedy for victims of gross human rights violations. It was also noted that a 
number of obstacles remain, at the domestic level, with regards to the effective exercise of 
such a right. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter V, certain domestic criminal systems remain 
reluctant to recognise victims’ participatory rights in proceedings, impinging on victims’ 
attempts to enforce their right to justice.  
Furthermore, the concrete realisation of victims’ right to justice in cases of gross 
violations of human rights remains problematic. In post-conflict situations, for example, 
domestic courts often face systemic failures that prevent them from effectively investigating 
and prosecuting international crimes. From this perspective, the establishment of international 
or hybrid criminal tribunals becomes a means not only to fight impunity but also to provide 
justice for victims of atrocities. Notwithstanding the fact that it is primarily for states to 
implement the rights of victims (including in the area of investigation and prosecution of 
human rights offenders) often international criminal courts and tribunals are the only fora 
where victims can make their voice heard.  
In this regard, it can be argued that the procedure of international criminal trials – 
originally based on the ‘duel’ between the prosecution and the defence – has been adapted 
with the aim of taking into account the development of a victims’ right to justice in cases of 
gross violations of human rights. This entails that, alongside the criminal accountability of 
wrongdoers, the need to incorporate victims’ voices in the criminal process through some 
form of participation has emerged as a component of the mandate of international criminal 
tribunals.  
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Three elements of the law and practice of international criminal tribunals support this 
thesis: (i) victims have been granted certain participatory rights that contribute to the effective 
realisation of their right to justice; (ii) international criminal tribunals have indicated that the 
prosecution of offenders is an element of victim’s right to reparation; and (iv) an emerging 
trend in the practice of international criminal tribunals emphasises the need to ensure the 
effective exercise of victims’ participatory rights in the proceedings. In this section each 
element will be examined in turn. 
 
5.2 The Legal Character of and Rationale for Victims’ Participatory Rights in 
International Criminal Proceedings 
 
As discussed above, victim participation schemes in proceedings before international and 
internationalized criminal tribunals have distinct characteristics. While victims have the 
position of participants before the ICC and the STL (meaning that the timing and form of 
their participation is subject to the discretion of the competent chamber), before the ECCC 
victims may participate as civil parties, in conformity with the Cambodian criminal 
procedure. This means, inter alia, that they are full parties to the proceedings and do not need 
to seek prior permission of the chamber to participate in the proceedings (once their civil 
party applications have been admitted). Notwithstanding the intrinsic differences of these 
schemes, one common aspect must be highlighted at the outset. Participation in proceedings is 
conceived as a right accruing to victims and not as a mere privilege. This is clear from the 
wording of the statutory provisions detailing victims’ participation, which indicates that when 
the conditions for participation are met, the courts are duty-bound to enable victims to 
participate in their own right in the proceedings.111  
It is not only the legal character of, but also the rationale for victims’ participation that 
appears to be the same before the courts under examination. Indeed, a close inspection of the 
legal rationale associated with victims’ participation reveals that courts have read the exercise 
of this right as linked to the effective realisation of other victims’ rights, such as the right to 
justice and the right to truth, in conformity with human rights standards. 
                                                 
111 For instance, Art. 68(3) ICCSt. and Art. 17 STLSt. use the expression ‘shall permit their views and concerns 
to be presented and considered’ (emphasis added). Cf. Art. 15(3) ICCSt.: ‘Victims may make representations to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber’ (emphasis added). In this respect, one may also recall the oft-cited words by Judge René 
Blattman who, writing in dissent in the first decision on victims’ participation in trial proceedings before the 
ICC, held that ‘victims participation is not a concession of the Bench, but rather a right accorded to victims by 
the Statute.’ ICC, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge René Blattmann, Decision on Victims’ 
Participation, supra note no. 57, § 13. 
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An ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found that the participation of victims in the investigation 
stage ‘can serve to clarify the facts, to punish the perpetrators’.112 Similarly, in Lubanga, this 
Chamber held that victims may participate in the confirmation hearing by presenting their 
views and concerns in order to ‘contribute to the prosecution of the crimes… and to be able to 
obtain reparations for the harm suffered.’113 This view has been also upheld in subsequent 
decisions of other ICC Chambers. For instance, the Single Judge in Katanga stated that 
victims have a legitimate interest in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, 
as such a determination satisfies their right to truth and justice.114 In a similar vein, the Single 
Judge in Bemba held that victims’ personal interests in the proceedings result not only from 
their desire to obtain compensation but also to see justice being done.115 Similarly, the Single 
Judge in Abu Garda maintained that the personal interest of the victims in the proceedings 
‘flows from (i) their desire to have a declaration of truth by a competent body (right to truth); 
(ii) their wish to have those who victimized them identified and prosecuted (right to justice) 
and (iii) the right to reparation’.116  
This view has also been supported by the case law of the ICC Appeals Chamber. 
Reference could be made, for instance, to the decision concerning the participation of victims 
in appeals relating to the interim release of a person subject to a warrant of arrest. In this 
respect, the Chamber granted victims leave to participate in the proceedings, holding that their 
interests were affected because of ‘the nature of the appeal’.117 It has been argued that, in so 
doing, the Appeals Chamber indirectly recognised that victims have legitimate interests in the 
proceedings that go beyond the issue of reparation.118 
The law and practice of the other internationalized criminal tribunals under 
examination also support the idea that victims’ participation in criminal proceedings is linked 
to the realisation of their right to justice or, at least, to a legitimate interest in the identification 
                                                 
112 ICC, Decision on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, 
VPRS 5, and VPRS 6, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04-101/tEN-Corr), PTC I, 17 
January 2006, § 63. 
113 ICC, Decision on the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 in the 
Hearing of Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-462), PTC I, 22 September 2006, at 6. 
114 ICC, Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to the Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial 
Stage of a Case, Katanga (ICC-O1/04-01/07-474), PTC I, 13 May 2008, §§ 30-35, 39-42. 
115 ICC, Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-320), PTC III, 13 December 2008, 
§ 90.  
116 ICC, Decision on the 34 Applications for Participation at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, Idriss Abu Garda 
(ICC-02/05-02/09-121), PTC I, 25 September 2009, § 3. 
117 ICC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I 
entitled ‘Décision sur la demande de mise en liberté provisoire de Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’, Lubanga (ICC-
01/04-01/06-824), AC, 13 February 2007. 
118 J.C. Ochoa S., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings for Serious Human Rights Violations, 
supra note no. 1, at 254-255. 
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and accountability of those responsible for the crimes at issue. Internal Rule 23 of the ECCC, 
for instance, establishes that the purpose of civil party participation is not limited to the right 
to seek reparation, but also covers the right to ‘participate in criminal proceedings against 
those responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ECCC by supporting the 
prosecution.’119  
This view has also been supported in some decisions of the ECCC. For instance, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber observed that participation in the proceedings arise from two core rights, 
‘the right to truth and the right to justice.’120 Like the ICC Appeals Chamber, the ECCC Pre-
Trial Chamber has also held that victims have a legitimate interest in procedures relating to an 
appeal against a provisional detention order, confirming that victims’ interests go well beyond 
their claim for compensation.121 
The idea that victims’ participation is associated with the realisation of the right to 
justice and truth was also expressed by Antonio Cassese, as President of the STL, in his first 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence:  
Notwithstanding that the trial proceedings in the Tribunal are not aimed at determining compensation but rather 
at establishing whether an accused is guilty or innocent, the drafters of the RPE deemed it fair and appropriate to 
grant extensive participation in proceedings to victims.122 
Relying on the rationale of civil action in criminal proceedings, Cassese acknowledged that 
despite one of the purposes of the action – that of civil compensation – is absent in the STL 
procedure victims are still able to pursue another objective, namely ‘contributing to the 
determination of the guilt or the innocence of the accused.’123  
Victims’ participation in the proceedings is also linked to their claims for reparation. 
In this respect, the three courts under consideration adopt very different mechanisms. Within 
the ICC, the reparation regime is independent from victims’ participation in proceedings; that 
is, victims do not need to participate in pre-trial or trial stages in order to apply for reparation 
awards.124 On the contrary, participation in the proceedings is necessary in the ECCC as civil 
                                                 
119 Rule 23(1), ECCC IR. 
120 ECCC, Directions on Unrepresented Civil Parties’ Rights to Address the Pre-Trial Chamber in Person, Ieng 
Sary, PTC, 29 August 2009, § 8. 
121 ECCC, Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals, Nuon Chea, Pre-Trial 
Chamber, 20 March 2008, § 40. 
122 STL President’s Explanatory Memorandum of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 10 June 2009, § 15. 
123 Ibid., § 14, referring to V. Dervieux, ‘The French System’, in M. Delmas-Marty and J. R. Spencer (eds.), 
European Criminal Procedures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 218-291, at 227. 
124 See the ICC Application Form for Individuals, giving to applicants the possibility to apply for participation 
and reparation in two separate questions. The application form is available online at http://www.icc-
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claims are integrated into the criminal process.125 Whilst no regime for victims redress has 
been created instead within the statutory framework of the STL, the Tribunal’s Statute 
nevertheless establishes, using wording similar to that of the ad hoc Tribunals RPEs, that the 
judgment is ‘final and binding as to the criminal responsibility of the convicted person’ for 
the purposes of a claim for compensation brought before national courts or other competent 
bodies.126 All in all, it is clear that, regardless of the procedural system at stake, victims have 
an interest in the effective prosecution of those responsible for the crimes, as this is essential 
for their subsequent claim for reparation. Accordingly, as will be illustrated in the next sub-
section, by having a voice in the proceedings victims may make their contribution to securing 
the effective prosecution of the offender.  
 
 
5.3 Victims’ Participatory Rights as a Means to Enforce Their Right to Justice  
 
In the context of international and internationalized criminal trials victims have been granted 
a number of rights through which they can promote their interest in the prosecution of the 
offender. Arguably, the affirmation of such rights indicates that victims not only have a 
legitimate interest in the prosecution of perpetrators but a right to it (the right to justice), as 
indicated in principle by the courts examined.  
Despite the intrinsic differences between the procedural models adopted by these three 
courts, the choice has been made to consider them together in this section for two main 
reasons. The first is that the three tribunals share similar concerns, deriving from the need to 
strike a balance between a number of legitimate objectives such as the fair trial rights of the 
accused and the right of victims to have their say and to participate in proceedings where their 
personal interests are affected (as well as a workable procedure that will not be overwhelmed 
by the number of victims wishing to participate).127 As such it may prove interesting to 
observe whether different solutions have been provided for common problems and, if so, 
why. The second reason for this comparative analysis is the number of similarities between 
the victims’ participation schemes under examination and the way in which they are 
                                                                                                                                                        
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/48A75CF0-E38E-48A7-A9E0-026ADD32553D/0/SAFIndividualEng.pdf (last visited on 
26 June 2013).  
125 Pursuant to Rule 23 quinquies ECCC IR this right is recognised only to persons who have been recognised as 
civil parties and thus, as such, have participated in the proceedings.  
126 Arts. 25(3) and (4) STLSt. 
127 S. Garkawe, ‘Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three Major Issues’, 3 International Criminal 
Law Review (2003) 345-367, at 359-360. 
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implemented by the courts. The ultimate aim is to understand the extent to which, 
notwithstanding their distinct procedural characteristics, these similarities reflect the 
emergence of a set of core rights to which victims are entitled in the context of international 
criminal proceedings and which reflect the affirmation of a victim’s right to justice.  
In order to test this assertion, an analysis will be provided of the specific rights that 
victims have been granted in the course of proceedings before international and 
internationalized criminal tribunals. To that end, a distinction can be made between four 
different phases of the proceedings: (i) triggering proceedings; (ii) pre-trial stage; (iii) trial 
stage; and (iv) sentencing stage.  
 
5.3.1 Triggering Proceedings 
 
Traditionally, the decision of whether to initiate an investigation lay exclusively with the 
prosecutor of international criminal tribunals. Neither the judges nor the victims had any 
power to control the preliminary investigations over alleged international crimes. While the 
power to trigger an investigation remains solely with the prosecutor, this process has 
developed to the effect that other subjects may influence the prosecutorial strategy. In 
particular, victims have been granted certain rights that allow them, in a limited manner, to 
participate in this phase of the proceedings.  
First of all, as mentioned above, before all three courts under examination, victims can 
submit communications to the relevant court about alleged crimes. Even though the 
prosecutor, or the relevant court organ, is not obliged to initiate an investigation on the basis 
of such communications, it is nonetheless an important instrument through which victims can 
promote their right to justice. Other than as complainants, at the ICC victims have been 
granted the right to intervene in a number of instances during the phase of the proceedings 
that precedes the confirmation of charges. In particular, it is interesting to analyse the practice 
of the Court with respect to (i) the initiation of the investigation; and (ii) the participation of 
victims in the investigations into a particular situation.  
 
A. THE INITIATION OF INVESTIGATIONS 
 
Two different situations have to be distinguished in relation to the initiation of investigations: 
where the prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio motu and where the investigation is 
based on a referral by a state or by the Security Council. If the prosecutor seeks to initiate an 
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investigation proprio motu, he must seek authorisation from the Court and at this stage 
victims have an opportunity to participate in the relevant proceedings. In particular, pursuant 
to Article 15(3) victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber when the 
prosecutor requests authorisation to initiate an investigation. The Pre-Trial Chamber has also 
the power, pursuant to Rule 50(4), to request further information from the victims who made 
representations and to hold a hearing to hear their views and concerns. Conversely, if the 
investigation is based on a referral (by a state or by the Security Council), the prosecutor has 
the discretionary power to proceed without the authorisation of the Court. In that context, 
victims have no role to play in this phase of the proceedings.  
Victims’ participation in proceedings relating to authorisation for the initiation of 
investigation proprio motu has been, thus far, limited in scope. In the Kenya situation, for 
instance, the Pre-Trial Chamber requested that the VPRS identify community leaders of 
affected groups to act on behalf of victims, to receive victims’ representations and, after 
having evaluated the conditions set out in Rule 85 (on the definition of victim) to summarise 
victims’ representations in a consolidated report.128 Despite its limited scope, victims’ 
participation provided significant guidance to the Chamber in its assessment, particularly in 
relation to the gravity threshold, where the impact of the crimes and the harm suffered by 
victims was considered.  Their input was also useful to the Court in exercising its jurisdiction 
over a case.129 Based on the principle of complementarity, the ICC can only exercise its 
jurisdiction when a state concerned is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute the 
crimes.130 In the Situation of Kenya, the Court relied on the victims’ consolidated report 
stating that Kenyan authorities did not appear willing to investigate alleged crimes in order to 
assess the admissibility of the case.131  
Victims are also granted certain rights where the prosecutor decides not to initiate an 
investigation. Again, two situations must be distinguished. Firstly, if the prosecutor decides 
not to proceed with an investigation on the basis of a communication received by victims or 
other individuals, no review is provided for. This means that victims cannot force prosecution 
or ask for a review of a decision not to prosecute. This process is consistent with the fact that 
victims are not allowed to initiate investigations on their own right. As a matter of fact, this 
                                                 
128 ICC, Order to the Victims Participation and Reparations Section Concerning Victims’ Representations 
Pursuant to Article 15(3) of the Statute, supra note no. 53, §§ 5-9.  
129 Rule 59 ICC RPE.  
130 Art. 17 ICCSt. 
131 ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya (ICC-01/09-19), PTC II, 31 March 2010, 
§ 186, footnote 273. 
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form of involvement would likely prove to be unworkable due to the high number of victims 
and potential cases.  
Secondly, in the case that the prosecutor decides not to proceed with an investigation 
referred by a state or by the Security Council the Pre-Trial Chamber may review such a 
decision if it is based on the fact that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. 
In this situation, the Pre-Trial Chamber may take victims’ concerns into account when 
making that decision. Although Article 53(3) does not mention victims in the procedure of 
review of the prosecutor’s decision not to initiate a prosecution, the Court can rely on Rule 
93, which gives it the power to ‘seek the views of victims and their legal representatives … 
on any issue’ in relation to requests for review under Article 53.  
In the ICC practice the possibility of victims participating in proceedings relating to 
the review of the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation seems to be 
uncontested.132 The exercise of such a right ensures that proceedings are not terminated 
arbitrarily without victims’ concerns being taken into account. On the contrary, it does not 
seem that victims can seek to express their views and concerns on the decision not to 
investigate through amicus curiae submissions. In a January 2011 decision, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in Kenya held that ‘the core rationale underlying an amicus curiae submission is that 
the Chamber be assisted in the determination of the case by an independent and impartial 
intervener having no other standing in the proceedings’.133 
 
B. THE PARTICIPATION OF VICTIMS IN THE INVESTIGATIONS OVER A SITUATION 
 
The stage of investigating a situation follows the triggering procedure and precedes the 
initiation of a case through the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear. 
Victims’ participation in the investigation stage remains very much contested. Pre-Trial 
chambers have consistently argued in favour of victims’ participatory rights in this phase of 
the proceedings.134 Victims’ rights at this stage entail the right to present views and 
                                                 
132 For example, the decision not to investigate or prosecute has been alluded to by the prosecutor as a distinctive 
trigger-off for the ‘proceedings’ under the terms of Article 68(3) and for the exercise of participatory rights 
under this article. See ICC, Prosecution’s Reply on the Applications for Participation 01/04-1/dp to 01/04-6/dp, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04-84), Office of the Prosecutor (‘OTP’), 15 August 
2005, §§ 14-17.  
133 ICC, Decision on Application for Leave to Submit Amicus Curiae Observations’, Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya (ICC-01/09-35), PTC II, 18 January 2011, § 6.  
134 ICC, Decision on Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, 
VPRS 5, and VPRS 6’, supra note no. 112. The decision was made on the basis of a three-pronged argument: 
terminological, contextual and teleological. Firstly, PTC I considered that the term ‘proceedings’ ‘does not 
necessarily exclude the stage of investigation of a situation’ (at § 38). Secondly, the Chamber observed that, 
  
284
concerns,135 to file documents pertaining to on-going investigations, to participate in public 
proceedings unless otherwise decided by the relevant Chamber in view of fairness or 
effectiveness concerns,136 to request that the Pre-Trial Chamber order special measures (for 
instance, in relation to victims’ protection),137 and to be issued all the notifications.138 In the 
Uganda situation, Single Judge Politi also allowed victims to request special investigative 
measures.139  
 In order to safeguard the rights of the accused special measures such as appointing a 
special counsel to represent a potential defendant’s interests have been envisaged.140 It is, 
however, unlikely that this interpretation will be further followed given view of persistent 
objections of the OTP which has argued that victims’ participation during an investigation 
could jeopardise the integrity and objectivity of the investigation, as well as impact on its 
efficiency and security.141 Most importantly, the Appeals Chamber has on several occasions 
overruled the liberal approach of the Pre-Trial Chambers.142 This approach has also been also 
the object of numerous criticisms by legal scholars.143   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
whereas Article 68(1) of the Statute makes explicit reference to the investigation stage, such stage is not 
excluded from the scope of paragraph 3 of the same provision, which specifically addresses victims' 
participation. Finally, PTC I stressed that an interpretation of article 68(3) as encompassing the investigation 
stage of a situation is ‘consistent with the object and purpose of the victims participation regime established by 
the drafters of the Statute’, as well as with ‘the growing emphasis placed on the role of victims by the 
international body of human rights law and by international humanitarian law.’ (at § 50).  
135 Rule 93 ICC RPE. 
136 Rule 91(2) ICC RPE. 
137 Rule 88(1) ICC RPE.  
138 Rule 92 ICC RPE. 
139 The Prosecutor strongly opposed this decision, which in his view appeared to stretch too far the notion of 
‘views and concerns’. ICC, Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to 
a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-101), PTC II, 
10 August 2007, at §§ 100-101. However, the leave for appeal was rejected. See Decision on the Prosecution's 
Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims’ Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to 
a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, Situation in Uganda (ICC-02/04-112), PTC II, 
19 December 2007. 
140 Pursuant to Regulation 77(5) of the Regulations of the Court, the Chamber may designate the Office of Public 
Counsel for the Defense (‘OPCD’) as ad hoc Counsel. For example, the OPCD may submit observations in the 
context of victims’ participation in the investigation phase, when there has not yet been an arrest or appearance 
or when the person who has been arrested or appeared in response to a summons has not yet appointed Counsel.  
141 ICC, Prosecution’s Response to OPCD’s Appeal Brief on the “Decision on the Requests of the OPCD on the 
Production of Relevant Supporting Documentation Pursuant to Regulation 86(2)(e) of the Regulations of the 
Court and on the and Disclosure of Potentially Exculpatory Material”, Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (ICC-01/04-452), OTP, 15 February 2008, §§ 21-22. 
142 See e.g., ICC, Judgment on Victims Participation in the Investigation Stage of the Proceedings in the Appeal 
of the OPCD against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in the Appeals of the OPCD 
and the Prosecutor against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04-556), AC, 19 December 2008.  
143 E.g., J. de Hemptinne and F. Rindi, ‘ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Allows Victims to Participate in the 
Investigation Phase of Proceedings’, 4 JICJ (2006) 342-350; S. SáCouto and K. Cleary, ‘Victims’ Participation 
in the Investigations of the International Criminal Court’, 17 Transational Law & Contemporary Problems 
(2008) 73-105. 
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5.3.2 The Pre-Trial Stage 
 
 
At the pre-trial stage victims may be entitled to exercise a number of rights before the courts 
under examination, although with certain significant differences. The main distinction 
between the three procedural systems is that while, as indicated above, victims can participate 
in ICC proceedings before the confirmation of charges, at the ECCC and the STL victims can 
only exercise rights once an accused has been identified. Moreover, at least in principle, 
victims enjoy broader participatory rights at the ECCC because they are parties to the 
proceedings, and not simply participants as before the ICC and the STL.  
 
A. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AT THE ICC 
 
As we have already seen, victims can become involved in proceedings at an early stage before 
the ICC. As will be analysed in this section and in the following ones, a number of provisions 
of the ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence expressis verbis confer upon victims 
certain rights that they could exercise ex lege, through their Legal Representative.144 Beside 
them, other rights may be granted to the victims, either proprio motu by the Chamber or 
‘upon specific and motivated request submitted by the Legal Representative’.145  
Following preliminary investigations victims can participate in the hearing for the 
confirmation of charges. Article 61 of the ICC Statute which regulates the confirmation of 
charges hearing makes no explicit reference to victims. However, victims may have an 
interest in participating in this phase, inter alia, to influence the final formulation of the 
charges, or even to request measures regarding forfeiture. Moreover, Rule 92(3) explicitly 
provides for victims’ right to notification about the confirmation charges hearing, suggesting 
that they might be authorised to participate in this specific phase. 
According to the OTP, participation of victims in the confirmation hearing is the 
‘milestone in meaningful victim participation as anticipated in the Statute’.146 One should not, 
however, overstate the impact that victims’ participation may have on this particular stage of 
the proceedings. While victims are permitted to participate in confirmation hearing, the means 
                                                 
144 See Rules 89-92 and 121(10) ICC RPE and Regulation 24 of the Regulations of the Court. 
145 ICC, Decision on the Request for Access to Confidential Inter Partes Material, Francis Kirimimuthaura, 
Uhuru Mugai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (ICC-01/09-02/11-326), PTC II, 14 September 2011, §§ 7- 
13.  
146 ICC, Prosecution's Reply under Rule 89(1) to the Applications for Participation of Applicants a/0106/06 to 
a/0110/06, a/0128/06 to a/0162/06, a/0188/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06, a/0209/06, a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to 
a/0222/06 and a/0224/06 to a/0250/06, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/04-346), 
OTP, 25 June 2007, § 24. 
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of such participation depends on whether the victims are anonymous during the hearing, or if 
the identities of the victims are known by the accused.147  
The developing jurisprudence suggests that both anonymous and non-anonymous 
victims are entitled to a set of core rights, including (i) notification of public documents 
included in the summary of the evidence; (ii) attendance at public ‘status conferences’; (iii) 
making opening and closing statements in which victims may discuss legal aspects of the 
case, such as the characterization of modes of liability, or the character of the armed conflict 
in relation to which crimes have been committed; and (iv) asking leave to intervene during the 
public status conference or the confirmation hearing.148 In consideration of the principle 
prohibiting anonymous accusations, anonymous victims are not, however, permitted to add 
any point of fact, submit evidence or question witnesses.149  
Despite its relative importance, victims cannot extend the factual basis contained in 
the prosecution Charging Document, but may nonetheless attempt to extend the legal 
characterisation of the facts contained therein so that the prosecutor may be asked to amend 
it.150 It remains true that the party in charge of the investigation is the prosecutor and as such 
if the victims want to conduct certain investigations they must request the prosecutor to do so 
on their behalf. On top of this, within this procedural phase victims cannot ask for the 
introduction of additional evidence. In Katanga, Pre-Trial Chamber I held that ‘the statutory 
framework provided for by the Statute and the Rules for the pre-trial stage of a case leaves no 
room for the presentation of additional evidence by those granted the procedural status of 
victim’.151 
During pre-trial proceedings, victims may also be involved in procedures for interim 
release of a suspect or an accused person. In particular, when deciding on the conditional 
                                                 
147 On the contrary, Pre-Trial Chamber III rejected the distinction between the procedural status of anonymous 
and non-anonymous victims. According to PTC III, it would not be fair to ‘punish’ victims in view of the fact 
that they are granted measures of protection, such as the protection of their identity before the accused. See ICC, 
Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-320), PTC III, 12 December 2008, § 99. 
148 ICC, Decision on the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the 
Confirmation Hearing, supra note no. 113, at 6. Victims were entitled to the right to access public documents, to 
attend public status conferences and to attend the public sessions of the confirmation hearing. See also Decision 
on victims’ modalities of participation at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, Bahar Idriss Abu Garda (ICC-02/05-
02/09), PTC I, 6 October 2009. 
149 Decision on the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the 
Confirmation Hearing, supra note no. 113, at 7. 
150 See infra section 5.3.2 (VIII). 
151 Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre‐ Trial Stage of 
the Case’, supra note no. 114, § 113. The Chamber noted that according to Article 61(7) of the Statute, the 
power of the Pre‐ Trial Chamber is confined to ‘requesting the consideration by the Prosecution of the 
opportunity to provide additional evidence’ in contrast to Article 69(3) which gives the competent Chamber ‘the 
authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth.’ 
Ibid., §§ 107‐ 109. 
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release of a suspect or accused, the Pre-Trial Chamber is required, under Rule 119(3) to seek 
the views of victims who have communicated with the Court and whom the Chamber 
considers at risk as a result of conditional release.  
In Lubanga’s pre-trial detention appeal, a majority of the Appeals Chamber found that 
victims would be in principle permitted to participate in this type of appeal under Article 
82(1)(b) (which, notably, explicitly grants this right only to parties, and not to participants), 
but that they are nevertheless requested to seek leave for participation. In other words, victims 
do not have an automatic right to participate in pre-trial detention appeals, although the Pre-
Trial Chamber is required to seek the views of victims, as stated above. Arguably, victims’ 
participation in such proceedings is significant as it enables victims to inform the court about 
their concerns about interim release (for instance in relation to their safety, and also the 
effectiveness of the on-going investigations) without having to rely on the prosecutor.  
 
B. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AT THE ECCC 
 
Whereas no limitation seems to be attached to civil parties’ rights in the proceedings, their 
participation in the investigation stage may be subject to certain restrictions. Despite these 
restrictions, however, during the pre-trial stage civil parties retain a number of important 
participatory rights which, as expressed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, arise from two core rights, 
‘the right to truth and the right to justice.’152 At any time during an investigation, civil parties 
may request the Co-Investigating Judges (‘CIJs’) to make orders or undertake an examination 
the party considers useful for the investigation.153 This includes the right to request the Co-
Investigating Judges to appoint additional experts, to interview the civil parties themselves, to 
question witnesses, to order expertise, to visit sites or to collect other evidence on behalf of 
the civil parties. A civil party lawyer may also be present during an interview of a charged 
person, subject to the permission of the CIJ. Civil parties may appeal certain orders made 
during the investigation, including the CIJ’s refusal of a request to take a specific 
                                                 
152 ECCC, Directions on Unrepresented Civil Parties’ Rights to Address the Pre-Trial Chamber in Person, Ieng 
Sary, supra note no. 120, at § 8. 
153 Rule 55(10) ECCC IR. However, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that ‘while Civil Parties and Civil Party 
Applicants may request the CIJs to make such orders or undertake such investigative action as they consider 
necessary for the conduct of the investigation, the scope of the investigation is defined by the Introductory and 
Supplementary Submissions.’  See Decision on Appeal of Co-Lawyers for Civil Parties against Order Rejecting 
Request to Interview Persons Named in the Forced Marriage and Enforced Disappearance Requests for 
Investigative Action, Nuon Chea et al., PTC, 21 July 2010, at § 11. The Pre-Trial Chamber concluded that the 
IRs do not give Civil Parties the authority to expand and an investigation, as such power is vested in the Co-
Prosecutors alone. Ibid., at § 38. 
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investigative action, the declaration of a Civil Party application inadmissible and the refusal 
of requests for expert reports or further expert investigation allowed under the Internal 
Rules.154  
Despite an initial trend in the ECCC case law in favour of fairly broad participatory 
rights,155 more recently the Pre-Trial Chamber has considerably limited its approach. In 
particular, the Chamber’s change of attitude – dictated by the need to ensure expeditious 
proceedings, to avoid disruptions, and to safeguard defence rights – focused on the right of 
civil parties to participate in person in the proceedings. This means that although civil parties 
are, in principle, parties to the proceedings (in contrast to victims-participants at the ICC and 
at the STL), they may not have full-party rights equal to those of the prosecution and the 
defence.156   
First, the Chamber held that civil parties represented by counsel may not speak in 
person during pre-trial appeals apart from through their legal representatives, and following 
an amendment of the Internal Rules this decision has been converted into a statutory rule that 
applies throughout the proceedings.157 Furthermore, relying on ICC Pre-Trial Chambers’ 
decisions, the ECCC Chamber noted that ‘procedural rights can be limited if this is necessary 
to safeguard other competing interests, applying a principle of proportionality’.158 In this 
respect, the Pre-Trial Chamber also observed that, in certain circumstances, the ICC has 
granted victims’ legal representatives broader rights than the victims themselves, including 
access to the confidential record and closed session hearings.159 For this reason, the ECCC 
Chamber found that, in order to balance the rights of all parties, the participation of a 
legitimately unrepresented civil party may be more limited than that of represented civil 
parties. Accordingly, for instance, an unrepresented civil party claiming a right to address the 
                                                 
154 On its decision of 20 March 2008, the Chamber maintained that Rule 23(1)(a) ECCC IR grants civil parties 
the right to participate in all criminal proceedings, including the proceedings related to the appeal of provision 
detention during the Pre-Trial phase. Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional Detention Appeals, 
supra note no. 121, at §§ 35-36. On the other hand, pursuant to Rule 74(4)(f) ECCC IR, civil parties may only 
appeal a Dismissal Order where the Co-Prosecutors have also appealed it. 
155 The Pre-Trial Chamber emphasised that ‘civil parties have active rights to participate starting from the 
investigative stage of the procedure’. Ibid., § 36. 
156 In this respect, the Pre-Trial Chamber noted that ‘[t]he Parties have different positions in the criminal 
proceedings and these positions even vary in the different stages of the proceedings. The Internal Rules contain 
certain rules which reflect those different positions’. See Decision on Preliminary Matters Raised by the Lawyers 
for the Civil Parties in Ieng Sary’s Appeal Against Provisional Detention, Ieng Sary,  PTC, 1 July 2008, §§ 3-4. 
157 Rule 24(7) ECCC IR. 
158 ECCC, Directions on Unrepresented Civil Parties’ Rights to Address the Pre-Trial Chamber in Person, supra 
note no. 120, at § 8, citing ICC, Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of 
Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, supra note no. 114, at § 148. 
159 Ibid., at §§ 128-131. 
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court at a scheduled hearing may only do so after making a written request ten days prior to 
the hearing, explaining the content and relevance of his or her proposed submission.160  
 
C. VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AT THE STL 
 
The governing rules of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon take into account some of the 
problematic issues that have arisen before the other courts under examination. The 
participation of victims in the investigation stage, hotly contested at the ICC, has been 
explicitly ruled out. Unlike the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows a victim 
to act as a civil party and to initiate a public action, the STL RPE do not allow victims to 
participate until the formal accusations against the person(s) accused have been confirmed.161  
In accordance with Article 11 of the Statute, it is for the prosecutor, as a representative of the 
public interest, to decide proprio motu whether or not to start a criminal action in accordance 
with his chosen prosecution strategy. At most, victim may be allowed transmit to the 
prosecutor any information he considers useful to determine the truth. The prosecutor 
remains, however, free to decide how to use such information. 
Following the confirmation of the indictment and prior to the start of the trial, the Pre-
Trial Judge may decide to hear victims or invite the legal representative to file written 
submissions.162 Moreover, the RPE provide that the Pre-Trial Judge shall order the legal 
representative to file the list of witnesses that they intend to call and the list of exhibits they 
intend to submit as evidence.163   
 
5.3.3 The Trial Stage 
 
This subsection explores the scope of victims’ participatory rights at the trial phase of 
criminal proceedings carried out before the courts under examination. Whereas the governing 
rules of the ICC and the STL victims’ participation schemes, unlike to the ECCC scheme, 
appear at first glace to provide only for a limited procedural status to victims, the 
implementation of these schemes by the chambers has considerably broadened the original 
scope. Victims have often been entitled to exercise rights which are statutorily granted only to 
parties (namely the prosecution and the defence).  As such, it can be said that on a number of 
                                                 
160 Note that the Chamber had initially recognised that civil parties might address the court in person when 
providing evidence, whether or not represented by a lawyer. ECCC, Decision on Preliminary Matters Raised by 
the Lawyers for the Civil Parties in Ieng Sary’s Appeal Against Provisional Detention, supra note no. 156, § 5. 
161 Article 17 STLSt., Rule 86(A) STL RPE. 
162 Rule 89(D) STL RPE. 
163 Rule 91(H)(i) and (ii) STL RPE. 
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occasions the chambers have clearly sacrificed the rights of the accused (albeit, it can be 
argued, not to the level of seriously prejudicing them) in the name of a broader reading of 
victims’ participatory rights. Arguably, a broad interpretation of victims’ rights indicates, on 
the one hand, the recognition of the unique contribution that victims may provide to the 
establishment of the truth. On the other, such a broad interpretation may indicate that victims 
have a right to the prosecution of the offender (‘right to justice’). 
The following sub-sections present this emerging approach which establishes a link 
between victims’ participation and the realisation of truth and justice by analysing how the 
courts under examination have implemented the following rights: (i) the right to notification 
and access to filings; (ii) the right to present oral and written submissions; (iii) the right to 
question witnesses; (iv) the right to lead evidence; and (v) the right to ask for the amendment 
of the charges against the accused. References to the STL will be limited to the relevant legal 
provisions of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as no case law as been 
rendered yet on victim’s rights at the trial stage at the time of writing.  
A. THE RIGHT TO NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS TO FILINGS 
 
The right to notification and to access to filings is an essential element required to put victims 
in a position where they can fully exercise their rights at trial.  Indeed, the effectiveness of 
victims’ participation largely depends on the information to which they have access before the 
hearings. Such a right is recognised before all three courts under examination. Moreover, 
these courts have generally adopted a liberal approach in relation to victims’ access to 
confidential materials submitted by the other parties. ICC Trial Chamber I, for instance, 
deemed that if confidential filings are of material relevance to victims’ personal interests, 
consideration shall be given to providing relevant victims with access to them, subject to 
other protective measures that need to remain in place.164 Similarly, the Trial Chamber in 
Bemba determined that in order to facilitate full participation by victims, those who have been 
granted the right to participate should have access to confidential material in the case, subject 
to restrictions as a result of protective measures and the security of individuals and 
organizations.165 The Trial Chamber in Katanga also found that in order to promote effective 
participation, the legal representatives must be able to consult the confidential decisions and 
                                                 
164 ICC, Decision on Victims’ Participation, supra note  no. 57, § 108.  
165 ICC, Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Trial and on 86 Applications by Victims to Participate in 
the Proceedings, Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08-827), TC III, 30 June 2007, § 47. 
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documents in the record, with the exception of documents classified as ex parte, but restricted 
this right only to legal representatives and not to their clients.166 
A similar approach has been adopted by the Pre-Trial Judge of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon in his first decision on the forms of victims’ participation in the pre-trial stage of 
the proceedings.167 In that decision, the Judge granted victims’ legal representatives access to 
confidential materials, as well as to indictment supporting materials and other disclosure 
materials. Access to these materials is automatic and only subject to the conditions that ‘the 
security of individuals or organisations will not be adversely affected’,168 and that the legal 
representatives respect their ethical obligations by, inter alia, safeguarding the confidentiality 
of the materials.169 Arguably, a similar approach will be adopted in the context of the trial 
stage before the Tribunal.  
The access of victims to filings is potentially even broader before the ECCC. Indeed, 
once granted civil party status, victims at the ECCC have the same right to consult and 
examine the case file as all the other parties do, without the need to ask for the authorisation 
of the competent chamber. Such broad access, compatible with the civil law tradition which 
inspired the ECCC legal framework, has not been challenged until present.   
 
B. THE RIGHT TO PRESENT ORAL AND WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS 
 
All three courts under examination allow victims the opportunity to participate by way of 
both oral and written submissions. Through such submissions victims may comment on 
matters of admissibility and relevance of evidence170 as well as upon a wide range of 
procedural matters171 provided that they can show personal interest in the issue at stake and 
that the manner in which they intervene is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. Oral 
submissions may also include making opening and closing statements at trial.  
                                                 
166 Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG), TC II, 
22 January 2010, §§ 72-73.  
167 Decision on VPU’s Access to Materials and the Modalities of Victims’ Participation in Proceedings before 
the Pre-Trial Judge, supra note no. 106. 
168 Ibid., § 55; see also Rule 133 STL RPE. 
169 Ibid., § 56. 
170 Decision on Victims’ Participation, supra note no. 57, § 114; Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial’, supra note no. 166, § 104; Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Trial and on 86 
Applications by Victims to Participate in the Proceedings, supra note no. 165, §§ 29-31, citing Decision on 
Victims’ Participation, supra note no. 57, and Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence 
against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
1432), Appeals Chamber (‘AC’), 11 July 2008, §§ 93-98. 
171 For instance, in the Katanga case the Court authorised the victims to submit their views on issues such as the 
order of appearance of witnesses, hearsay, and the admissibility of evidence. See transcripts of 3 November 
2009, at 27; 27 November 2009, at 23; 8 July 2010, at 38-41; 23 August 2010, at 52-56. 
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As noted above, it is primarily for victims’ legal representatives to intervene in the 
course of the trial. When a significant number of victims participate in the proceedings 
allowing their direct intervention at hearings may unduly affect the efficiency and fairness of 
the trial. Trial Chamber I in Lubanga held that whereas Article 68(3) gives victims the 
statutory right to present their views and concerns when their personal interests are affected, it 
is generally for their legal representatives to undertake this task on their behalf.172 In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that many legal representatives have used the possibility to 
submit oral arguments, for instance in the form of opening statements, in order to emphasise 
the victims’ right to truth and justice as well as the cathartic effect of victims’ involvement in 
the proceedings.173 Some of the legal representatives also referred to the individual criminal 
responsibility of the accused174 in addition to referring to the harms suffered by the victims,175 
supporting in this way the arguments presented by the prosecution.  
The possibility of authorising victims to directly present their views and concerns has 
not, however, been completely ruled out.176 Trial Chamber II in Katanga stated that it would 
grant the legal representatives an opportunity to call victims to give evidence under oath at 
trial.177 Such opportunity, however, is subject to the following limitations: (i) the defendant’s 
right to be judged without undue delay is not prejudiced, (ii) victims must not in fact act as 
auxiliary prosecutors, and (iii) victims wishing to intervene in the hearings are not 
anonymous. Furthermore, victims’ intervention (iv) should not cover issues which have 
already been discussed by the parties, (v) should be related with the facts under debate, (vi) 
should be representative of what happened to a significant group of victims, or add new 
information to the facts.178 It is notable that when victims have been allowed to intervene in 
person in the hearings, rather than discussing the criteria for admission of evidence179 the 
Court has analysed in detail the manner in which victims may contribute to the determination 
                                                 
172 Decision on Victims’ Participation, supra note no. 57, §§ 115-116. 
173 Lubanga, transcripts of 26 January 2009, at 37-41 and 47-48; Bemba, transcripts of 22 November 2010, at 40-
41. 
174 For instance, in Lubanga, one of the legal representatives affirmed that ‘the responsibility of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo in particular should be recognized’, see transcripts of 26 January 2009, at 55. 
175 Ibid., at 45, 47, 49 and 52-54. 
176 ICC, Order Issuing Public Redacted Version of the “Decision on the Request by Victims a/0225/06, 
a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to Express their Views and Concerns in Person and to Present Evidence During the 
Trial”, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2032), TC I, 9 July 2009. 
177 Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, supra note no. 166, at §§ 85-88. 
178 Ibid., §§ 86-92. 
179 These criteria were set in the Decision on the Admissibility of Four Documents, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-
1339), TC I, 13 June 2008, §§ 27-31. 
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of the truth.180 Furthermore, victims have been called to testify as court witnesses and not as 
witnesses for the legal representatives of victims.181  
Following the last amendments of the Internal Rules of the ECCC it would appear that 
civil parties do not have the right to directly make submissions before the Chambers during 
trial proceedings. Civil parties are required to participate through a common legal 
representative182 and it is very unlikely that the Chambers will leave room for individual civil 
parties’ interventions. As such, the only option for civil parties to intervene in person remains 
that of testifying as witnesses. In this respect, the ECCC takes a completely different 
approach to the ICC. When a victim joins the proceedings as a civil party, he or she can no 
longer be questioned as a simple witness in the same case, and may only be interviewed under 
the same conditions as the accused.183  
This practice is in line with civil law criminal procedure. However, in most civil law 
jurisdictions a victim would testify first and then become a civil party.184 This is not possible 
at the ECCC since civil party applications are to required to be submitted before the start of 
the trial. Consequently, civil parties may only be interviewed during trial proceedings by the 
Lead Co-Counsel, if he or she decides to do so. In any case, civil parties are not enabled to 
provide sworn statements, as witnesses do, and the fact that they are authorised to attend all 
the hearings may somehow detract weight from their testimony.  
 
C. THE RIGHT TO LEAD AND CHALLENGE EVIDENCE 
 
 
Victims’ participation in the trial process is beneficial for it offers victims a chance to ensure 
that the Court has an opportunity to hear facts from all of those directly affected by the crime, 
                                                 
180 E.g., ICC, Decision on the Request by Victims a/0225/06, a/0229/06, and a/0270/07 to Express Their Views 
and Concerns in Person and to Present Evidence During the Trial, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx) TC I, 
26 June 2009. In the Chamber’s view, allowing the legal representatives of victims to propose the presentation of 
documentary evidence would indeed assist it in its implementation of Article 69(3) of the Statute, and by the 
same token in its search for the truth. Ibid., at §§ 29-30.  
181 Decision on Victims’ Participation, supra note no. 57, at § 108. 
182 Rule 23 ter ECCC IR. 
183 Rule 23(4) ECCC IR. 
184  See e.g. Art. 188 Draft Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (1978), which did not allow civil parties to testify. 
Note that, however, this provision was deleted in the last version of the Code (1988), since ‘renouncing to the 
evidentiary contribution of civil parties would amount to a huge sacrifice in the search for judicial truth’  (‘La 
rinuncia al contributo probatorio della parte civile costituisce un sacrificio troppo grande nella ricerca della 
verità processuale’). See Relazione al progetto preliminare e al testo definitivo del codice di procedura penale 
Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 250 del 24 ottobre 1988, supplemento ordinario n. 93, at 62. See also Ordinanza n. 
82/2004, Italian Constitutional Court, 23 February 2004. 
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not just from the defendant and the prosecution.185  This also affects the way in which 
testimony may be manipulated and historical events may be tailored to the version of events 
that the parties wish to present to the bench.186 For these reasons, the courts under 
examination have been unanimous in granting victims the possibility of leading and 
challenging evidence, even in the case, such as at the ICC, where such a right is statutorily 
granted only to parties (and not to participants).187  
In the context of the ICC, victims may lead evidence through the mediation of the 
judges. In its decision of 11 July 2008 in Lubanga, the Appeals Chamber underlined that ‘the 
right to lead evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the accused and to challenge the 
admissibility or relevance of evidence lays primarily with the parties, namely, the Prosecutor 
and the Defence’,188 and that the ‘regime for disclosure’ set forth in the ICC Rules is ‘directed 
towards the parties and not victims.’189 Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber found that victims 
could be authorised to lead evidence ‘where requested’ by the Chamber because the Rome 
Statute also empowers the Court to ‘request the submission of all evidence that it considers 
necessary for the determination of the truth.’190 Requests by legal representatives for the 
introduction of elements of evidence not directly related to the culpability of the accused have 
been treated in a similar way.191  
Accordingly, victims do not hold an absolute right to introduce evidence but may do 
so pursuant to Article 69(3) which gives the Chamber the power to ask for the introduction of 
evidence which it considers necessary for the determination of the truth.192 In this respect, it is 
noteworthy that on a number of occasions, victims have been able to tender and request 
                                                 
185 M. Cohen, ‘Victims’ Participation Rights Within the International Criminal Court: A Critical Overview’, 37 
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy (2009) 351-377, at 373; C. Jorda and J. de Hemptinne, ‘The 
Status and the Role of Victims’, supra note no. 23,  at 1397. 
186 C. Stahn, H. Olasolo and K. Gibson, ‘Participation of Victims in the Pre-Trial Proceedings of the ICC’, 4 
JICJ (2006) 219-238, at 224-226. 
187 Art. 69(3) ICCSt. 
188 Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ 
Participation of 18 January 2008, supra note no. 170, § 3. 
189 Ibid., § 93. 
190 Ibid., § 95.  
191 ICC, Decision on the Request by the Legal Representative of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06, a/0003/06, 
a/0049/06, a/0007/08, a/0149/08, a/0155/07, a/0156/07, a/0404/08, a/0405/08, a/0406/08, a/0407/08, a/0409/08, 
a/0149/07 and a/0162/07 for Admission of the Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of 
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as Evidence, Lubanga 
(ICC-01/04-01/06-2135), TC I, 22 September 2009, §§ 21-22. 
192 ICC, Directions for the Conduct of the Proceedings and Testimony in Accordance with Rule 140, Katanga 
(ICC-01/04-01/07-1665-Corr.), TC II, 20 November 2009, §§ 45-48; Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga 
against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 22 January 2010 Entitled ‘Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial’, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-2288), AC, 16 July 2010, §§ 37-41. 
  
295 
evidence not only contributing to the determination of the truth but also relating to the guilt of 
the accused. A majority of the Appeals Chamber found that:  
If victims were generally and under all circumstances precluded from tendering evidence relating to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused and from challenging the admissibility or relevance of evidence, their right to 
participate in the trial would potentially become ineffectual’.193  
Accordingly, the Court has regularly allowed victims’ legal representatives to question 
witnesses on the guilt of the accused, linking such a right with assisting the Court to 
determine the truth.194 Therefore, when questioning witnesses, victims’ legal representatives 
have not confined their questions to the crimes and the harm suffered by their victims but 
have often attempted to establish the guilt of the accused, supporting the attempts of the 
prosecution.195 
Despite being fully under the control of the judges, the exercise of the right to lead 
evidence may risk seriously undermining the fairness of the trial. Victims are not parties of 
the proceedings and as such are not subject to any disclosure obligation prior to the 
commencement of the proceedings. In this respect, the Court held that the right to a fair trial, 
as interpreted by human rights courts, requires that the parties receive the evidence which 
victims want to present ‘sufficiently in advance to allow them to prepare effectively’.196 This 
is clearly a compromise: delays in the process of disclosure necessarily prejudice the 
possibility for the defendant to know from the very beginning the case against them. It 
remains true, however, that victims’ right to introduce evidence has been conceptualised as a 
contribution towards the establishment of the truth, rather than as party-driven evidence.  
Consequently, its impact on the defendant’s right is somewhat limited.197  
The liberal approach adopted by the Court with respect to the admission of evidence 
presented by the victims should not come as a surprise. Indeed, the ICC follows a trend 
observed in other international tribunals of broadly favouring the admissibility of all virtually 
                                                 
193 Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ 
Participation of 18 January 2008, supra note no. 170, § 97.  
194 ICC, Decision on the Manner of Questioning Witnesses by the Legal Representatives of Victims, Lubanga 
(ICC-01/04-01/06-2127), TC I, 16 September 2009, § 27. 
195 For instance, legal representatives in Lubanga questioned witnesses on the funding of the UPC, in the attempt 
of linking Lubanga to such a financial support in order to help establish his role in the UPC structure. See e.g. 
Lubanga, transcripts of 12 February 2009, at 73. 
196 E.g., Decision on the Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial, supra note no. 166, §§ 105-107. 
197 The Appeals Chamber has recently ruled over the issue as to whether victims are under the same obligation as 
the parties to disclose exculpatory evidence. The answer has been negative. The obligation of the prosecution to 
disclose exculpatory evidence derives from his obligation to investigate in charge and in discharge. This 
obligation and its consequences cannot be extended to victims. Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga against 
the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 22 January 2010 Entitled ‘Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial, supra note no. 192, at § 7. 
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relevant evidence.198 This is so because international criminal tribunals operate on the 
assumption that professional judges, in contrast to a popular jury, are most capable of filtering 
out evidence which is not relevant, or not credible.199 It may be observed that, in so doing, 
despite the fact that the ICC procedural model is still mostly adversarial (that is, essentially 
based on the confrontation of two parties) there is a tendency towards a judge-driven fact 
finding to which victims, through an enhanced procedural position, may contribute. 
In principle, a similar procedure may arise before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 
Indeed, pursuant to Rule 87(B), victims participating in the proceedings may request the Trial 
Chamber to authorise the legal representative to call witnesses and tender additional evidence. 
Consistent with the Cambodian criminal system - in which the ECCC procedural law 
is deeply rooted - all evidence is in principle admissible, unless otherwise decided by the 
competent chamber.200 During the trial, any party, including the civil parties, may make a 
request to submit new evidence by reasoned submission, and the chamber can grant the 
request if it is satisfied that this evidence was unavailable before the opening of trial, and that 
‘it deems conducive to ascertaining the truth’.201   
 
D. THE RIGHT TO QUESTION WITNESSES 
 
 
The right to question witnesses gives victims the unique chance to ‘tell the story’ from their 
perspective, filling in the evidentiary gaps left by the prosecution, and promoting their 
interests. In the context of ICC proceedings, the recognition of victims’ right to question 
witnesses has been largely uncontested by the parties, especially since specific measures have 
been adopted in order to limit the impact of such right on the fairness of the trial. Most 
importantly, the judges retain complete control of the exercise of this right: victims are 
required to submit a request in writing, indicating the questions that they wish to formulate. 
After receiving comments from the prosecutor and the defence, the competent chamber may 
authorise victims to question a witness, only (i) when the proposed questions have not been 
already submitted by the Prosecution, (ii) if the victims’ personal interests are potentially 
affected by the answers of the witness, and (iii) if the rights of the accused are not 
                                                 
198 T.M. Funk, Victims’ Rights and Advocacy at the International Criminal Court, supra note no. 1, at 200-202. 
199 A. Orie, ‘Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial in International Criminal Proceedings Prior to the Establishment of the 
ICC and in the Proceedings before the ICC’, supra note no. 18, at 1485. 
200 The Chamber may reject evidence where it finds that the evidence is irrelevant or repetitious, impossible to 
obtain within a reasonable time, unsuitable to prove the facts it purports to prove, not allowed under the law, or 
intended to prolong the proceedings or is frivolous (Rule 87(3) ECCC IR).  
201 Rule 55(5) ECCC IR. 
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prejudiced.202 With regard to the last condition, the right to question witnesses has not been 
granted to anonymous victims, on the basis of the principle prohibiting anonymous 
accusation.203 
As with the right to lead evidence, victims’ right to question witnesses has been 
interpreted as contributing to the truth-finding process.204 This view has been explicitly 
supported by the chambers with respect to the manner of questioning of witnesses by legal 
representatives of victims pursuant to Rule 91(3). Trial Chamber I in Lubanga held that ‘[i]n 
the absence of any relevant provisions in the Rome Statute framework, the manner of 
questioning falls to be determined by the Chamber’,205
 
and concluded that there is ‘a 
presumption in favour of a neutral form of questioning, which may be displaced in favour of 
a more closed form of questioning, along with the use of leading or challenging questions, 
depending on the issues raised and the interests affected.’206
 
The Chamber held that if a legal 
representative of victims wishes to depart from a neutral type of questioning, an oral request 
should be made to the bench.207 Trial Chamber II in Katanga and Trial Chamber III in Bemba 
similarly held that a neutral style of questioning should be adopted, this being the best way to 
assist the judges in the search for the truth.208  
In the context of the ECCC proceedings, civil parties’ right to question witnesses has 
been interpreted in a rather ambivalent manner. On the one hand, the judges have found that 
civil parties are entitled to pose questions ‘in support of the prosecution’ (that is, as to 
contribute to the establishment of the guilt of the accused) as long as they are not repetitious, 
long-winded or outside the confines of the subject matter. On the other, the ECCC Trial 
Chamber found that civil parties are barred from questioning witnesses regarding the 
character of the accused.209 The Chamber, in particular, argued that victims do not have a 
                                                 
202  Decision on the Manner of Questioning Witnesses by the Legal Representatives of Victims, supra note no. 
194. 
203 Decision on the Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the 
Confirmation Hearing, supra note no. 113, at 8 and 9. 
204 ‘Under the scheme of the Statute, questioning by the victims' legal representatives has been linked in the 
jurisprudence of the Trial and the Appeals Chambers to a broader purpose, that of assisting the bench in its 
pursuit of the truth.’ See Decision on the Manner of Questioning Witnesses by the Legal Representatives of 
Victims, supra note no. 194, at § 27. 
205 Ibid., at § 21. 
206 Ibid., at § 29. 
207 Ibid., at § 23. 
208 Directions for the Conduct of the Proceedings and Testimony in Accordance with Rule 140, supra note no. 
192, §§ 89-91; Decision on the Participation of Victims in the Trial and on 86 Applications by Victims to 
Participate in the Proceedings, supra note no. 165, §§ 38-40.  
209 In his dissent, Judge Lavergne determined that Rule 23 ECCC IR allows victims to participate at all stages of 
the proceedings, and unless the IRs explicitly exclude Civil Parties from participating or places restrictions on 
their rights, it must be assumed that Civil Parties have the same rights and obligations as other parties. Specific 
restrictions, including the ones in rules 89bis and 82(3) are explicitly set out. See Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
  
298
right to question witnesses on issues related to the accused’s character because character 
evidence is only relevant to sentencing and has no relevance towards the guilt of the accused 
or reparations. The Chamber held, quite remarkably, that despite the fact civil parties are 
entitled to support the prosecution in establishing the guilt of the accused, since this creates 
the foundation for their successive claim for reparation, the rules of the Chambers do not 
‘confer a general right of equal participation with the Co-Prosecutors’.210 This is so also due 
to the fact that the accused’s right to a fair trial includes, according to the Chamber, the right 
to face only one prosecuting authority.211  
Although this last assertion may be questioned (it is a matter of fact that in criminal 
proceedings where civil parties join the prosecution the defendant faces multiple accusers) the 
reasoning of the Court appears reasonable in light of the crimes within its jurisdiction. Given 
that the ECCC was the first international tribunal to allow for such comprehensive 
participation of civil parties, it is hardly surprising that the court inevitably ran into several 
challenges in managing their presence. The pure form of civil party participation as found in 
the Cambodian and French civil law systems is inadequate to fully address the unique 
elements that occur in trials of international crimes. For example, a typical criminal trial 
involves no more than a few victims whereas trials of international crimes can have thousands 
of victims eligible for participation in the proceedings. This can place a heavy burden on the 
court as such, particularly on the defence, and has the unintended effect of unnecessarily 
prolonging the proceedings, making it more difficult to achieve fair and timely justice. The 
increasing limitation of civil parties’ rights thus appears to be a necessary compromise 
dictated by the unique character of the Cambodian tribunal. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Lavergne, Decision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ Joint Request for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party 
Lawyers to Make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions Concerning the Questioning of the Accused, 
Experts and Witnesses Testifying on Character, Duch, TC, 9 October 2009, at §§ 12-15. He further took issue 
with the inconsistency between this decision and practice during the hearings, and noted that ‘[i]n practice, the 
Civil Parties have indeed, on numerous occasions, been allowed, up to now, to put questions on character both to 
the Accused and to witnesses and experts, be they direct witnesses to the events included in the Indictment or 
witnesses who were expected to help put these events in their historical and personal context.’ Ibid., § 25. 
210 ECCC, Decision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ Joint Request for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party 
Lawyers to Make Submissions on Sentencing and Directions Concerning the Questioning of the Accused, 
Experts and Witnesses Testifying on Character, supra note no. 209, § 25.  
211 Ibid., § 26.  
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E. THE RIGHT TO ASK FOR THE AMENDMENT OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THE 
ACCUSED PERSON 
 
The right to ask for the amendment of charges against the accused is not provided for in the 
legal framework of the courts under examination. Nonetheless, this issue has generated 
interesting case law in the Lubanga case. Indeed in that case victims, through their common 
legal representatives, requested reconsideration of the legal characterization of facts charged 
against Lubanga as sexual slavery and cruel and/or inhuman treatment, and not just as 
enlisting or recruiting children for the purpose of using them to participate actively in 
hostilities.212 In a divided decision, Trial Chamber I notified the parties and the participants 
that the legal characterization of the facts may be subject to change in accordance with 
Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court,213 when the ‘“additional facts” … have 
come to light during the trial and build a unity, from the procedural point of view, with the 
course of events described in the charges’.214  
According to the majority, Trial Chamber I had come to know several elements of 
evidence that girls younger than fifteen belonging to the armed group allegedly under 
Lubanga’s command were subject to sexual abuse. Furthermore, the Chamber found that the 
training to which children were submitted could amount to cruel and inhuman treatment. The 
Appeals Chamber, however, unanimously reversed this decision, holding that, whereas a legal 
re-characterisation of the facts is not inconsistent with the Rome Statute, in line with general 
principles of international law or even the rights of the accused, a re-characterisation should 
not exceed the facts contained in the charges or amendments thereto.215  
Although the victims’ request was eventually rejected, this debate has the merits of 
showing that the exercise of victims’ procedural rights may give the judges elements to 
evaluate the validity of prosecutorial decisions, and permit victims to express their personal 
interests even when they do not correspond with those of the prosecution (in this case by 
                                                 
212 ICC, Demande conjointe des représentants légaux des victimes aux fins de mise en oeuvre de la procedure en 
vertu de la norme 55 du Règlement de la Cour, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1891), Legal Representatives of 
Victims, 22 May 2009. 
213 ICC, Decision Giving Notice to the Parties and Participants that the Legal Characterization of the Fact May 
Be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation 55(2), Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2049), TC I, 14 July 
2009. 
214 ICC, Clarification and Further Guidance to Parties and Participants to the ‘Decision Giving Notice to the 
Parties and Participants that the Legal Characterization of the Fact May Be Subject to Change in Accordance 
with Regulation 55(2)’, Lubanga  (ICC-01/04-01/06-2093), TC I, 27 August 2009, § 8. 
215 ICC, Judgment on the Appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial 
Chamber I Entitled “Decision Giving Notice to the Parties and Participants that the Legal Characterization of the 
Fact May Be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation 55(2)”, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2205), AC, 
8 December 2009. See also the subsequent TC’s reconsideration, Decision on the Legal Representatives’ Joint 
Submission Concerning the Appeals Chamber’s Decision on 8 December 2009 on Regulation 55 of the 
Regulations of the Court, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2223), TC I, 8 January 2010, § 28. 
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questioning the opportunity of the decision of the prosecutor to limit the charges against 
Lubanga to the crime of enlisting or recruiting child soldiers). On the other hand, despite the 
simmering frustration that victims’ groups have felt with the limited scope of the charges 
against Lubanga, the Appeals Chamber has made clear that Regulation 55 may not be used to 
circumvent the charging document. 
 
5.3.4 Victims’ Rights at the Sentencing Stage 
 
In determining the appropriate sentence for a person who has been found guilty two of the 
courts under examination, the ICC and the STL, provide victims with a right to address the 
court in writing or in person regarding the impact of the crime of which that person has been 
convicted. In accordance with Rule 143 of the ICC RPE victims may request an additional 
hearing on issues related to sentencing in which they can participate. In addition to oral 
interventions, victims’ legal representatives may submit victim impact statements to the court. 
At the discretion of the Court, victim impact statements may not only include the impact of 
the crime on the victims and their families but also their view on what should be done with 
regard to addressing the harm suffered, potentially including a sentencing recommendation. 
Similarly, Rule 87(c) of the STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence establishes that ‘a victim 
participating in the proceedings may be heard by the Trial Chamber or file written 
submissions relating to the personal impact of the crimes on them’. 
On the contrary, civil parties at the ECCC have no standing to make any submissions 
related to sentencing as sentencing is considered to be an exclusive prerogative of the 
prosecutor. In particular, the Trial Chamber has directed civil parties to refrain from making 
any submissions relating to sentencing or any factors underlying a decision on sentencing.216 
These decisions come as no surprise given the fact that the court, as observed above, has 
declined to hear testimony on the character of the accused.   
  
                                                 
216 ECCC, Duch, transcripts of 27 August 2009, at 41-42. 
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6 OTHER ELEMENTS SUPPORTING VICTIM’S RIGHT TO JUSTICE BEFORE 
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
 
The previous section has shown that victims have been empowered to exercise a number of 
procedural rights in the course of proceedings of international and internationalized criminal 
tribunals. Whilst somewhat limited in scope, these procedural rights give victims the 
possibility of influencing the decision-making process and are not limited to their claim for 
reparation. As such, victims’ participatory rights are linked to the protection and promotion of 
victim’s right to justice. This argument, as has been observed above, has been repeatedly 
recognised by the courts and tribunals under examination.  
As the following subsections will discuss, the recent practice of these bodies offers 
two further elements in support of a victim’s right to justice: (i) the prosecution and 
punishment of those responsible for international crimes have been read as an element of 
victims’ reparation; and (ii) the courts under examination are increasingly emphasising the 
need to effectively realise victims’ participatory rights in the proceedings.  
  
6.1 Victims’ Right to Justice as an Integral Element of Reparation  
 
Whereas victims’ redress is normally associated with restitution and material compensation, 
the thesis in Chapter III attempted to demonstrate that justice, in the sense of criminal 
prosecution and punishment of perpetrators, is paramount to victims’ right to remedy in cases 
of gross violations of human rights amounting to international crimes. The previous sections 
of this Chapter have shown how victims have been gradually endowed with procedural rights 
in criminal proceedings before international and internationalized criminal tribunals to protect 
and promote their right to justice. 
The fact that victims of international crimes have a right to justice, understood as the 
right to the determination of the individual responsibility for the crimes they suffered from, 
may also be derived from victim’s right to reparation, as has also been established under 
international human rights law. Notably, provisions on reparation under the ICC and the 
ECCC do not make explicit mention to the accountability of the offender as a form of 
reparation. Article 75 of the ICC Statute, for instance, does not list it as a form of reparation, 
referring only to ‘restitution, compensation and rehabilitation’ although this list is generally 
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recognised as not being exhaustive.217 A similar interpretation may be given to Rule 23 
quinquies (1) of the ECCC Internal Rules, which provides that the Chambers may award only 
‘collective and moral reparations’, leaving open the possibility of awarding satisfaction as a 
form of reparation, including the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators. This 
interpretation would also be supported by provisions of the ICC Statute and the ECCC 
Internal Rules which demand that these instruments be applied and interpreted in conformity 
with human rights standards.218  
The ICC confirmed that victims’ right to justice is an integral component of the right 
to reparation in its first decision on the principles of reparation in the Lubanga case. In this 
decision, the Trial Chamber substantially upheld the proposal submitted by the Registry for a 
‘moral reparation’ programme where the judgment constitutes a form of reparation in itself.219 
This proposal also had the support of the Office of the Prosecutor.220 Relying on the case law 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights the Chamber affirmed: ‘The conviction and the 
sentence of the Court are examples of reparations, given that they are likely to have 
significance for the victims, their families and communities.’221  
In this sense, the Court appears to confirm what has been increasingly demanded by 
international human rights bodies as an imperative remedy in cases of gross human rights 
violations, namely victims’ right to justice. Needless to say, this is a groundbreaking ruling in 
the context of international criminal justice and it is quite significant that the ICC judges 
chose to include it in the first, long-awaited, decision on reparations adopted by the Court. 
Although this decision is binding only in relation to the Lubanga case it will most likely 
influence similar decisions to be taken in the other cases before the Court.  
No such finding was made by the ECCC in its first judgment on reparation, issued in 
the Duch case,222 or in the appeal judgment.223 Nevertheless, at least indirectly, the Appeals 
Chamber recognised the importance of satisfaction as a measure of reparation for 
international crimes, in conformity with human rights standards, and in particular of the 
individual responsibility of perpetrators. Relying on the UN Basic Principles on Reparation of 
                                                 
217 Art. 75(1) ICCSt. provides that ‘The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, 
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.’ (emphasis added). This view has been confirmed 
by the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case, see Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to Be 
Applied to Reparations, supra note no. 66, § 222. 
218 See art. 21(3) ICCSt.; art. 20 of the Law On The Establishment of the ECCC. 
219 ICC, Second Report of the Registry on Reparations, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-2806), Registry, 1 
September 2011, §§ 76-81. 
220 Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to Be Applied to Reparations, supra note no. 66, § 110. 
221 Ibid., § 237. 
222 ECCC, Judgment, Duch, TC, 26 July 2010. 
223 ECCC, Appeal Judgment, Duch, AC, 3 February 2012. 
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2005, the Appeals Chamber acknowledged that ‘reparations encompass satisfaction measures 
such as public apologies, including acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of 
responsibility.’224 
 
6.2 A Shift in Focus: From Fairness to Effectiveness 
 
The idea that victims not only have a legitimate interest in the prosecution of perpetrators, but 
a right to it, is also supported by the fact that courts under examination are increasingly 
emphasising the need to effectively realise victims’ rights in the proceedings. Arguably, the 
‘effectiveness’ requirement (associated in international human rights law with the right to 
remedy)225 indicates that certain victims’ rights in the proceedings are more than simply ‘fair 
trial rights’ for victims which, as such, may be counterbalanced with the fair trial rights of the 
accused. Rather, as indicated in the practice analysed above, victims’ participation rights are 
linked to the realisation of the right to truth and justice which, in turn, are integral elements of 
the right to reparation.  
From the above analysis, it has emerged that the ideal model of victims’ participation 
remains at present a work in progress. This is so because a great deal of discretion is left to 
the judges to determine how and when victims may exercise their right to participate. Not 
unexpectedly, victims’ participatory rights have been the subject of a considerable amount of 
the jurisprudence of these courts. An analysis of the early case law reveals, in particular, that 
the need to ensure the fair trial rights of the defendants has been the primary consideration of 
these courts when considering the implementation of victims’ rights in the proceedings.226  
Concerns over fair trial rights have led these courts to adopt a restrictive interpretation 
of the participatory rights systems. For instance, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC has on 
several occasions overruled the liberal approach of the Pre-Trial Chambers on the 
participation of victims at the investigation stage on a situation.227 The ECCC have found that 
civil parties are not permitted to make submissions relevant to sentencing or to question 
                                                 
224 Ibid., § 675. 
225 See Chapter I, Section 3. 
226 The need to ensure the fair trial rights of the accused is explicitly set out in the statutory rules on victims’ 
participation. See on this issue S. Zappalà, ‘The Rights of Victims v. the Rights of the Accused’, supra note no. 
45. 
227 See e.g., Judgment on Victims Participation in the Investigation Stage of the Proceedings in the Appeal of the 
OPCD against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in the Appeals of the OPCD and the 
Prosecutor against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, supra note no. 142, §§ 45-59; 
Judgment on Victims Participation in the Investigation Stage of the Proceedings in the Appeal of the OPCD 
against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 3 December 2007 and in the Appeals of the OPCD and the 
Prosecutor against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 6 December 2007, Situation in Darfur (ICC-02/05-
177), AC, 2 February 2009, § 7. 
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witnesses regarding the character of the accused.228 The Chamber held in this respect that, 
despite the fact that civil parties are entitled to support the prosecution in establishing the guilt 
of the accused (since this creates the legal basis for their subsequent claim for reparation) the 
rules of the ECCC do ‘not confer a general right of equal participation with the Co-
Prosecutors’.229 This is so due to the fact the accused’s right to a fair trial includes, according 
to the Chamber, the right to face only one prosecuting authority. 
Notwithstanding the crucial importance of ensuring that the maximum standards of 
fair trial rights are applied by international criminal jurisdictions, a recent trend can be 
observed in favour of a shift in emphasis towards the need to guarantee the effectiveness of 
victims’ participation in the proceedings. A clear example of this shift in focus is the issue of 
the victims’ access to confidential material. This is a particularly sensitive matter in the pre-
trial phase as the majority of documents submitted by the parties at this stage of the 
proceedings are confidential, and as such, denying the access of victims would significantly 
impair their effective participation in the subsequent phases.  
This question has been much debated before the ICC and a consistent approach has 
not emerged so far. Rather, three positions can be identified: (i) victims are granted access to 
public filings only, hence they are automatically denied access to confidential materials;230 (ii) 
victims are granted limited access to confidential documents, as decided by the competent 
chamber on a case by case basis;231 or (iii) victims are granted unlimited access to 
confidential materials.232 With respect to the latter approach, namely that victims have access 
to all documents in the record of the case, including those of confidential nature, Single Judge 
Steiner observed that since ‘the bulk of the evidence filed by the Prosecution and the Defence 
in the record of the respective cases has been classified as confidential … if victims were to 
be denied access to confidential filings, they would essentially be prevented from effectively 
participating in the evidentiary debate held at the confirmation hearing.’233 
                                                 
228 ECCC, Decision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ Joint Request for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party 
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229 Ibid., § 25. 
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This line of argument was recently upheld by the STL Pre-Trial Judge in the first 
decision on the form of victims’ participation in the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.234 In 
that decision, the Judge granted victims’ legal representatives access to confidential materials 
as well as to indictment supporting materials and other disclosure materials. Access to these 
materials is automatic and only subject to the conditions that ‘the security of individuals or 
organisations will not be adversely affected’235 and that the legal representatives respect their 
ethical obligations by, inter alia, safeguarding the confidentiality of the materials.236 Like that 
of the ICC Single Judge, the STL Pre-Trial Judge’s decision focuses on the need to ensure 
that the legal representatives carry out their mandate and, more specifically, that they are able 
to perform their duties and ‘meaningfully participate on behalf of victims’.237  
Two aspects of this decision in particular are noteworthy. Firstly, this ruling weakens 
the significance of the distinction between parties and participants. While access to the 
indictment supporting materials is normally a prerogative of the parties (and not of the 
victims and their legal representatives) the STL Judge observed that such access is necessary 
for the participation of the victims to be effective.238 Secondly, with the objective of 
guaranteeing effective participation by victims (through their legal representatives), the Judge 
also established that access to these documents should take place before the case file is 
transmitted to the Trial Chamber, and not at the moment of the transmission, as instead set out 
in Rule 87(A) of the STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence.239  
In sum, a number of recent decisions of various international courts and tribunals 
show that victims’ participatory rights are increasingly being interpreted with a view to 
ensuring their effectiveness and not only their compatibility with the fair trial rights of the 
accused.  
However, the recent focus on the effectiveness of victims’ participation raises 
concerns with respect to the fair trial rights of the accused. Has the effectiveness of victims’ 
rights been affirmed at the expense of fairness of the trial?  Much has been written on the 
impact of victims’ participation on the fairness of trials before international criminal tribunals. 
It goes without saying that the introduction of an additional party in the trial necessarily 
creates extra costs and burdens on the proceedings which could directly impinge on the 
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efficiency of the trial itself. Furthermore, one may argue that full participation of victims in 
the proceedings may affect equality of arms and interfere with the accused’s presumption of 
innocence.  
It is a matter of fact, however, that victims’ participation is a statutory right which, as 
such, has not been considered by the drafters and by the judges as incompatible with fair trial 
rights. This does not mean that victims’ participation must be enforced at all costs. Rather, the 
provisions on victims’ participation before the courts at issue explicitly establish that this 
right shall not be exercised in a manner that is prejudicial to the fair trial rights of the accused. 
In this regard, it is worthwhile noting that the progressive deepening of victims’ participation, 
to the extent of ensuring its effectiveness, has corresponded with a substantive transformation 
of the forms of participation in order to safeguard both the efficiency of proceedings and, 
more generally, their fairness.  
First, victims’ participation before international criminal tribunals has been 
implemented predominantly in a vicarious way. Although victims’ participatory schemes 
established within these courts give victims the right to present their views and concerns, it is 
generally for their legal representatives to undertake this task on their behalf. Most 
importantly, certain rights, those most likely to affect the rights of the accused, are only 
granted to victims’ legal representatives in view of the fact that as professional counsel they 
have both the skills and the ethical obligations to duly exercise them. This has been the case, 
for example, in the STL decision mentioned above in relation to access to confidential 
documents. In the same vein, the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber found that, in order to balance the 
rights of all parties, the participation of a legitimately unrepresented civil party might be more 
limited than that of a represented civil party. 240  
Second, the widening of victims’ participation has been also paralleled by the 
increasing attempt to consider victims’ rights collectively. The process of considering 
victims’ rights collectively has two components. On the one hand, while victims are in 
principle free to choose a legal representative, all three courts under examination have 
assigned common legal representatives to groups of victims.241 On the other hand, recent 
pronouncements before the ICC suggest that the entire procedure of victims’ applications for 
participation may be collectivised. Two single judges have mandated the Victims 
                                                 
240 Decision on Preliminary Matters Raised by the Lawyers for the Civil Parties in Ieng Sary’s Appeal Against 
Provisional Detention, supra note no. 156, § 5. 
241 ICC, Second Decision on Issues Related to the Victims’ Application Process, Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11-86), 
PTC I, 5 April 2012. 
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Participation and Reparation Section with drafting a collective application form for victims in 
the Gbagbo case and in the proceedings related to the situation in Uganda.242  
The proposal for a collective application form is consistent with the practice requiring 
victims to participate through common legal representatives rather than through their own 
counsel,243 and it potentially contributes to the effective management of victims’ 
participation. Furthermore, the idea of a collective access to proceedings appears to be 
particularly apt in view of the forms of reparation available to victims. The ECCC Internal 
Rules, for example, only allow for collective and moral forms of reparation.244 Likewise, the 
abovementioned ICC decision on the principles and practices of reparation indicated that 
reparation to be made through the Trust Fund for Victims will ‘tend to be collective in nature 
… given the limited funds available and the fact that this approach does not require costly and 
resource-intensive verification procedures’.245   
 
 
 
  
                                                 
242 ICC, Decision on Victims’ Participation in Proceedings Related to the Situation of Uganda, Situation in 
Uganda (ICC-02/04-191), PTC II, 9 March 2012, § 22. 
243 Rule 90(2) ICC RPE. 
244 Article 23(1)(b) ECCC IR. 
245 Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to Be Applied to Reparations, supra note no. 66, § 274. 
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7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the preceding chapters it has been argued that justice, in the sense of criminal prosecution 
and punishment of perpetrators, is paramount to victims’ right to remedy in cases of gross 
violations of human rights. The progressive development of a victim’s right to justice has led 
to a reconsideration of the role of victims in criminal proceedings. Efforts to codify victims’ 
participatory rights in the criminal process have taken place throughout the last few decades at 
both the regional and international level. Notwithstanding the fact these instruments represent 
a compromise between the wide variance of procedural models of the states, a general 
consensus seems to have emerged that victims should be granted a minimum core of rights to 
participate in the proceedings in order to enforce their right to justice. 
 From this perspective, the incorporation of victim participatory regimes within 
recently established international criminal tribunals, described in this Chapter, appears to be 
consistent with human rights standards that have emerged in relation to victims’ redress for 
gross violations of human rights. In particular, this Chapter has shown that three main 
elements of these victims’ redress regime support this position: (i) victims’ participatory 
rights have been interpreted as being linked to the realisation of their right to justice; (ii) 
prosecution of perpetrators has been explicitly recognised as a form of reparation; and (iii) 
courts have progressively emphasised the need to effectively enforce victims’ participatory 
rights. 
Accordingly, international and internationalised criminal tribunals are moving away 
from their traditional mandate of solely adjudicating international crimes. Today they can also 
be considered as mechanisms to enforce human rights and in particular the rights of those 
who have been harmed by the crimes under their review. On the whole, the practice of 
international criminal tribunals contributes to the development, also at the international level, 
of a legal principle that a victim’s remedy encompasses the identification, prosecution and 
punishment of the wrongdoers as well as the access of victims to the procedure establishing 
criminal responsibility for the violations.  
However, the practice of international criminal tribunals has not only contributed to 
the emergence of a legal principle. It also potentially offers an indication of how to foster the 
realisation of victims’ right to justice at the domestic level. Indeed, the courts under 
examination provide for a defined system of victims’ participatory rights and have elaborated 
considerable practice on how to implement such rights whilst ensuring the fairness and 
effectiveness of the proceedings, also in adversarial proceedings, such as at the ICC. This 
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practice is all the more relevant if one considers that domestic criminal systems are 
increasingly being asked to set out procedures to accommodate victims’ rights in criminal 
trials, as observed in Chapter V. Furthermore, since international criminal tribunals only deal 
with a small portion of perpetrators of international crimes, it is crucial that domestic criminal 
tribunals are equally able to provide justice to victims.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
1 THE OBJECT OF THIS STUDY 
 
This thesis has examined whether a right to justice, understood as the right to the 
determination of the individual criminal responsibility of wrongdoers, is emerging in 
international law for victims of gross human rights violations and international crimes. The 
subject of this thesis has been chosen in view of the significant developments that have 
occurred in the past few decades at both the national and international level in relation to 
victims’ rights and in light of the growing attention that has been paid to the concept of 
‘bringing justice to victims’. The question arises as to whether the criminal prosecution of 
wrongdoers can be correctly conceptualised as an individual right and, if so, what the 
implications of the existence of such a right are, particularly in terms of victims’ rights in 
criminal proceedings.  
The starting point of this analysis was the gradual development of a distinct redress 
regime in cases of gross violations of human rights and international crimes.  Whereas 
traditionally restitution and monetary compensation have been the most common remedies 
granted to victims, the adequacy of such forms of reparation has been increasingly challenged 
in cases of gross human rights violations.  The perception of such remedies as inadequate is a 
result of the gravity, and in some cases of the irreparability, of the harm suffered as a 
consequence of these violations. In this regard a trend can be detected in the law and practice 
of international human rights law where a distinct redress regime for victims of gross human 
rights violations has emerged.  This distinct redress regime encompasses the performance of 
obligations which satisfy the needs and expectations of victims in the aftermath of gross 
violations.  
The growing awareness that justice matters to victims has brought about a gradual 
reconsideration of the types of remedies that victims of certain serious violations should be 
granted. Recent human rights practice and jurisprudence increasingly appear to support the 
view that the prosecution of alleged wrongdoers is an imperative remedy in the aftermath of 
gross violations of human rights. A crucial shift in rationale is implied in this emerging trend. 
Indeed, the prosecution of wrongdoers been long framed as an objective duty of general 
human rights protection. Nonetheless, the decisions of treaty-based human rights bodies and 
the provisions of binding and non-binding international human rights documents have 
evolved to consider effective prosecutions as a component of the remedy that states must 
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guarantee victims of gross human rights violations. States not only have a duty to the public 
but also to the victims to prosecute gross human rights abuses. The development of this 
practice seems to justify the emergence of a victim’s right to justice for serious human rights 
violations, which coexists with the relevant state’s duty to prosecute.  
The framing of criminal justice as a victim’s right raises a number of legal issues that 
have been addressed throughout this research project, particularly: (i) what the scope and 
content of victim’s right to justice are; (ii) what the impact of the development of victims’ 
right to justice on the duty to prosecute is; and (iii) whether the effective exercise of victim’s 
right to justice entails that victims be entitled to exercise certain rights in the criminal process.  
In order to answer these questions, this study has taken into account international 
human rights law and practice, comparative criminal law, as well as the theory, law and 
practice of international and internationalized criminal tribunals. The main findings of this 
study will be summarised in the following sections.  
 
 
2 THE PROSECUTION OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENDERS AS AN IMPERATIVE 
REMEDY FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 
The analysis carried out in this work has demonstrated that the contents of victim’s right to 
reparation may vary considerably according to the type the violation suffered. Although the 
principle of restitutio in integrum acts as a reference rule, in the context of gross violations of 
human rights it may often be impossible to undo the harm suffered by victims or restitution 
may even produce undesirable results. Furthermore, compensation alone has often been 
considered inadequate to repair the harm suffered. For these reasons, it has been argued that a 
distinct redress regime has developed for this type of violations (Chapter I).  
The types of reparation appropriate to remedy gross human rights violations will differ 
depending on the circumstances of the case, ranging from compensation for material and 
immaterial damage to symbolic measures such as the establishment of the truth, the public 
acknowledgment of the wrongfulness character of the fact or the memorialisation of the 
victims. This thesis has, however, shown that prosecution of alleged human rights offenders is 
increasingly considered as an imperative remedy in cases of serious breaches of human rights, 
including violations of the right to life and to physical integrity (Chapter III).  
In particular, in the event of serious breaches of human rights, the view of human 
rights supervisory bodies is that victims’ right to remedy cannot be adequately satisfied 
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through disciplinary and administrative measures alone. Similarly, the opportunity to seek 
damages in civil litigation alone, in the absence of the criminal conviction of the offender, has 
not been considered a sufficient avenue of redress. Accordingly, these bodies are unanimous 
in holding that victims’ right to remedy entails the right to have alleged human rights 
offenders brought to justice. In other words, victims’ right to justice is considered an integral 
component of the right to an effective remedy in cases of gross human rights violations. This 
view is also supported by provisions in binding and non-binding international human rights 
documents.  
Framing criminal justice as a victim’s right implies a crucial shift in rationale. Indeed, 
the prosecution of human rights offenders has traditionally been considered as a duty of states 
to ensure general human rights protection. Recent human rights law and practice indicates that 
the traditional concept of prosecution is broadening its scope: criminal measures not only re-
establish the validity of a right in principle and act as a deterrent against further abuses, but 
also acknowledge the suffering of victims and condemn the injustice they suffered. From this 
perspective, investigations and prosecutions act as a form of reparation because they restore 
the dignity of the deceased and grant consolation and closure to the survivors of the tragedy. 
As such, the development of this practice seems to justify the emergence of a victim’s right to 
justice for serious human rights violations which coexists with the relevant state’s duty to 
prosecute these violations.  
The analysis carried out in this thesis has demonstrated that reading criminal justice as 
a victim’s right has important consequences. A major consequence of the development of 
victim’s right to justice is its impact on the scope of the corresponding state’s duty to 
prosecute human rights violations. It has been argued that conceiving such a duty in the 
general pursuit of the overall protection of human rights, as it was traditionally done by 
human rights bodies, subjects the duty itself to an inherent limitation. This inherent limitation 
is that while the state remains under the obligation to criminalise serious violations of human 
rights, as well as to establish effective law-enforcement machinery, deviation from the duty to 
prosecute may be allowed if this would better serve the general enjoyment of human rights. 
Conversely, if criminal accountability of human rights offenders is also considered as a duty 
owed to victims, there is virtually no room to argue that it can be compromised in favour of 
the general protection of human rights.  
This argument has been supported by the analysis of both domestic and international 
law and practice which indicates that in cases of international crimes and gross human rights 
violations bars to prosecution, such as the immunity of state officials from foreign criminal 
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jurisdictions, amnesty laws, statutory limitations and the principle of non-retroactivity of 
criminal law, have been either limited in scope or removed altogether (Chapter IV). In 
particular, it has been shown that the validity of obstacles to prosecution has been 
progressively reduced in view of the fact that they have been found in violation of the right to 
an effective remedy for victims. From this perspective, the progressive outlawing of obstacles 
to prosecution can also be viewed as supporting the position that a right to justice, understood 
as a right to the prosecution of offenders, is emerging as an integral component of a victim’s 
right to an effective remedy. Furthermore, the emergence of remedy as a rationale for 
prosecution and punishment potentially contributes more effectively to the fight against 
impunity, as the traditional obstacles to prosecution are increasingly set aside and justice is in 
turn allowed to run its course, both to meet the demands of the victims and to reaffirm 
universal values. 
 
 
3 HALF-JUSTICE IS NO JUSTICE? THE LACK OF VICTIM’S PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS IN 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS  
 
Reading criminal justice into victims’ rights invites a reconsideration of the role and the rights 
of victims in criminal proceedings. It has been argued that if victims have a right to the 
prosecution of human rights offenders as an integral component of their right to remedy, it 
would seem legitimate to assert that they should also be granted corresponding procedural 
rights in the criminal process.  
Through an extensive review of international legal instruments and practice and a 
comparative analysis of domestic criminal justice systems, this study has demonstrated that in 
the last few decades the role of victims and the rights they possess in criminal proceedings 
has considerably expanded (Chapter V). From the analysis undertaken in this study it appears 
that the practice of human rights supervisory bodies and a number of legal instruments 
adopted at the international level have begun to recognise that victims should be entitled to 
exercise a series of rights in criminal proceedings before domestic courts, especially in cases 
of gross human rights violations. Similarly, the comparative study of a number of domestic 
criminal systems has indicated that measures have been adopted in several domestic 
jurisdictions aimed at enhancing the protection of victims’ interests in criminal proceedings.  
Nevertheless, the affirmation of a victim’s ‘right to participation’ in criminal 
proceedings remains, at present, extremely vague. Although international instruments now 
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require the interests of victims to be taken into account in a variety of ways, these documents 
do not stipulate specific requirements concerning the role victims ought to play in criminal 
proceedings. While centring around the idea that some mechanisms have to be set up to allow 
the views and concerns of victims to be heard, most of these instruments are formulated in a 
vague or non-prescriptive manner and do not detail how victims’ rights are to be realised in 
practice. Likewise, human rights supervisory bodies have refrained from recognising that 
victims should be granted a specific set of participatory rights in criminal proceedings. The 
review of these bodies’ practice revealed on the one hand increasing consideration of the need 
to ensure that victims are involved in criminal proceedings to the extent of securing their 
interests and on the other, that so far these bodies have not recognised that victims have an 
absolute right to participate in criminal proceedings, nor that their right to justice entitles them 
to specific participatory rights if the relevant domestic law does not provide for such rights.  
It has been argued that this cautious approach may be justified primarily in view of the 
intrinsic differences between the various criminal law systems of states in relation to the role 
of victims in the proceedings. In particular, this thesis has shown that even though there is a 
movement signalling that the private interests of victims should be considered together with 
public interest in criminal trials, the extent to which the adversarial paradigm can effectively 
accommodate victims’ rights remains inherently limited, due to the predominantly bipolar 
structure of adversarial trials. 
Therefore, in light of the analysis carried out in this thesis, it is not possible to 
determine that a set of procedural rights is attached to victims’ right to justice, as has been 
initially hypothesised. However, the fact that victim’s participation is enshrined as a value in 
a number of international documents and decisions, and given the progressive introduction of 
victims’ participatory rights in domestic criminal systems (particularly in case of serious 
crimes), shows that there is undoubtedly increasing acceptance of the need to take into 
account victims’ views and concerns.  Furthermore, such developments acknowledge that, at 
the very least, victims have legitimate interests in the outcome of the proceedings. Victim’ 
participation is seen today not only as helpful to rehabilitation of victims but also as capable 
of enhancing the legitimacy of criminal trials. This position reflects the emerging view that 
criminal justice should not be conceptualised solely as a measure of general human rights 
protection but also as a remedial measure for victims. 
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4 REALISING THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL: VICTIM’S 
PARTICIPATION IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL AND INTERNATIONALIZED 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS  
 
Despite the growing affirmation of a victim’s right to justice in cases of gross violations of 
human rights and international crimes, it remains true that the concrete realisation of such 
right remains problematic. In post-conflict situations, for instance, domestic courts often face 
systemic failures that impede them from effectively investigating and prosecuting 
international crimes. In other cases, states may be simply unwilling to initiate a criminal 
action against those allegedly responsible for the crimes. For this reason, the choice has been 
made in this thesis to consider the law and practice of international and internationalised 
criminal tribunals, as often these are the only fora where victims can obtain justice.  
This choice has also been made because the legal position of victims in international 
criminal law has been significantly transformed in the last few decades. Indeed, the idea of 
bringing justice to victims was not of central concern to international criminal law at the 
initial stages of its development, nor were victims granted any independent role in the 
procedure of international criminal tribunals. Recently established international and 
internationalised criminal tribunals have, however, introduced procedures aimed at providing 
redress to victims of crimes within their jurisdiction and have enabled them to participate in 
their own right in criminal proceedings. 
This study has argued that the incorporation of a regime of victim redress within the 
framework of international criminal tribunals does not only represent an extension of 
international criminal justice’s mandate, but rather confirms a shift in the way in which 
redress is increasingly conceptualised at the international level. A critical examination of the 
character of victims’ participation and its legal rationale, as well as of the implementation of 
the victims’ participation schemes by international and internationalised criminal tribunals 
has been thus carried out (Chapter VI). This analysis has demonstrated that the incorporation 
of victim participatory regimes within recently established international criminal tribunals 
appears to be consistent with human rights standards that have emerged in relation to victim 
redress for gross violations of human rights.  
Three main elements support this position. First, a close inspection of the legal 
rationale associated with victims’ participation reveals that international and internationalized 
courts have read the exercise of this right as linked to the effective realisation of other 
victims’ rights, such as the right to justice and the right to truth. Extensive analysis of the 
legal framework and practice of these courts has revealed that victims have been granted a 
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number of rights through which they can promote their interest in the prosecution of the 
offender, including the right to present their views and concerns to the courts, the right to 
introduce and challenge evidence and the right to question witnesses. Consequently, it was 
argued that the development of these participatory rights indicates that victims not only have a 
legitimate interest in the prosecution of perpetrators but a right to it (right to justice), as 
indicated in principle by the courts examined.  
Secondly, the thesis observed how the legal framework of these courts leaves open the 
possibility of awarding satisfaction, including the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators, 
as a form of reparation. In this sense, these bodies appear to confirm what has been 
increasingly demanded by international human rights bodies as an imperative remedy in cases 
of gross human rights violations, namely victims’ right to justice.  
Finally, the idea that victims not only have a legitimate interest in the prosecution of 
perpetrators, but a right to it, is also supported by the fact that courts under examination are 
increasingly emphasising the need to effectively realise victims’ participation in the 
proceedings. Arguably, the ‘effectiveness’ requirement (associated in international human 
rights law with the right to remedy) indicates that certain victims’ participatory rights in the 
proceedings are more than simply ‘fair trial rights’ for victims which, as such, may be 
counterbalanced with the fair trial rights of the accused. Rather, as indicated in the practice 
analysed above, victims’ participatory rights are linked to the realisation of the right to truth 
and justice which, in turn, are integral elements of the right to reparation.  
On the whole, international and internationalised criminal tribunals are moving away 
from their traditional mandate of solely adjudicating international crimes. Today they can also 
be considered as mechanisms to enforce human rights and in particular the rights of those 
who have been harmed by the crimes under their review. As such, the practice of international 
criminal tribunals contributes to the development, including at the international level, of a 
legal principle that a victim’s remedy encompasses the identification, prosecution and 
punishment of the wrongdoers as well as the access of victims to the procedure establishing 
criminal responsibility for the violations.  
 
5 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE WAYS OF REALISING VICTIMS’ RIGHT TO 
JUSTICE 
 
The analysis carried out in this study has demonstrated that a right to justice has emerged for 
victims of gross violations of human rights and international crimes. It has been submitted 
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that this right, which entails the identification and prosecution of alleged human rights 
offenders, constitutes an imperative element of redress when these violations are at stake. 
Nonetheless, the analysis has shown that it is not possible to determine that a set of procedural 
rights in criminal proceedings is attached to victims’ right to justice.  
It has been argued, however, that in the longer term it is conceivable that some form of 
participation in criminal proceedings may develop into an international legal standard. This 
would be extremely important for the effective exercise of victims’ right to justice. In 
principle, once a measure is considered to be a remedy, it is essential to acknowledge a 
corresponding right of the victim to claim such measure Therefore, victims’ participatory 
rights in criminal proceedings may be seen as a logical extension of the affirmation of 
prosecution as an integral element of their right to an effective remedy. The following 
subsections will discuss some possible ways to develop victim’s participatory rights in 
criminal proceedings and thus, ultimately, to ensure the exercise of their right to justice. 
  
5.1 The Practice of Human Rights Supervisory Bodies  
 
In light of the analysis carried out in this study, it has been argued that the practice of human 
rights bodies in relation to victims’ rights in criminal proceedings raises certain doubts as to 
its consistency with the development of a victims’ right to justice. Indeed, whereas these 
bodies have increasingly recognised that in cases of gross human rights violations victims 
have a right to the prosecution of those allegedly responsible for such violations as an element 
of their right to an effective remedy, they have refrained from elaborating corresponding 
victims’ participatory rights in criminal proceedings.  
As we have seen, the thesis has argued that the current practice of human rights 
supervisory bodies may raise an issue under the provisions on the right to an effective 
remedy. Indeed, in order to ensure that victims can actually exercise their right to remedy, it is 
necessary that victims be enabled to claim it. If the right to an effective remedy is understood, 
in certain circumstances, as including a right to the prosecution of the alleged wrongdoers, it 
has been advanced that the effective exercise of such right entails, at a minimum, that victims 
are able to have their say if decisions not to initiate or to terminate criminal prosecutions are 
taken. Indeed, it goes without saying that if such decisions are taken, victims potentially lose 
their chances of achieving justice.   
Plainly, victims do not (at least, not in every case) have an absolute right to pursue a 
criminal action. Rather, this decision may lie with a public authority and be subject to certain 
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conditions, including that of protecting public interests. What matters for ensuring the 
effective exercise of the right to justice, however, is that victims are able to promote their 
legitimate interests when decisions on the prosecutions of alleged wrongdoers are taken. This 
can be done by providing victims with a right to judicial review of decisions not to initiate or 
to terminate criminal prosecutions. As a matter of fact, an absolute power of the public 
prosecutor to decide whether criminal proceedings should be instituted or not would be in 
contradiction with the gradual development of a victims’ right to justice. For this reason, it 
seems legitimate to grant victims some control of prosecutorial decision-making by way of 
access to review mechanisms with a view to checking the appropriateness of a prosecutor’s 
decision not to go forward. Through the exercise of such a right victims can ensure that 
prosecutions are not terminated without their interests being taken into account.  
As this thesis has shown, the right to judicial review of the decision not to investigate 
or prosecute has been included in a number of legal instruments adopted both at the national 
and international levels, some of them of binding nature. Furthermore, under the influence of 
these documents, the number of states that do not grant opportunities for review of a decision 
not to prosecute has considerably declined in recent years. As such, in asking states to grant 
victims a right to judicial it can be said that nothing more will be asked of states than is not 
already provided for in the relevant domestic criminal system – a concern which has often 
prevented human rights supervisory bodies from elaborating on victims’ involvement in 
criminal proceedings.  And if this is the case, that is if the domestic legal framework does not 
provide for a right to the judicial review of decisions not to prosecute, human rights 
supervisory bodies may recommend states to amend their relevant domestic legislation by 
including such a right, at least in cases of serious crimes, in order to comply with the 
obligation to provide victims of gross violations of human rights with the right to an effective 
remedy.   
Similar reasoning can be applied with respect to victims’ participation in criminal 
proceedings. It has been argued that the development of a right to justice necessarily demands 
a reconsideration of the rights that victims are entitled to in the context of criminal 
proceedings. Indeed, if victims have a right to the determination of the criminal liability of 
human rights offenders, it is legitimate to assert that they, at the very least, should be 
informed of the proceedings leading to such determination and be enabled to contribute to 
them by having their voice heard, not merely as a witness but on their own right.  
Nonetheless, as observed above, human rights supervisory bodies have eschewed 
elaborating specific victim’s participatory rights in criminal proceedings, particularly when 
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these rights are not provided for in the domestic legal framework.  This is so despite the fact 
that they seem to agree that victims should be involved in the proceedings to the extent of 
protecting their legitimate interest to seeing justice done. Victims’ participation is also 
enshrined as a value in a number of international documents and the progressive introduction 
of victims’ representation in domestic criminal systems (particularly in case of serious crimes) 
indicates that there is undoubtedly increasing acceptance of the need to take into account 
victims’ interests in criminal trials. Therefore, human rights supervisory bodies may at the 
least recommend states to adopt procedures, where they are not already in place, to allow 
victims to express their views and concerns on their own right, thereby contributing to the 
final outcome of the trial and to the realisation of their right to justice.  
On the whole, it has been argued that a coherent interpretation of the provisions on the 
right to an effective remedy, particularly in light of the emergence of a right to justice as an 
integral component of the remedy owed to victims of gross human rights violations, would 
allow human rights supervisory bodies to elaborate corresponding victims’ participatory 
rights in criminal proceedings. In particular, regardless of the existing differences between the 
various domestic criminal systems, human rights supervisory bodies may demand states to 
grant victims of gross violations of human rights: (i) the right to the judicial review of 
decisions not to investigate or prosecute; and (ii) the right to express their views and concerns 
in criminal proceedings related to those allegedly responsible for the crimes in question.  
In so doing, human rights bodies may contribute significantly to the effective exercise 
of victims’ right to justice at the domestic level. Indeed, as observed above, pronouncements 
by human rights bodies may promote the adoption of legislative amendments introducing 
certain forms of  involvement of victims in criminal proceedings, particularly in those 
systems where such rights have not been traditionally recognised. Furthermore, if case law on 
victims’ rights in criminal proceedings will be developed, this may contribute, together with 
the existing international legal instruments, to the affirmation of relevant international legal 
standards which may, in turn, influence domestic law and practice. It remains to be seen 
whether, and if so how, in the coming years these emerging international legal standards will 
be translated into participatory rights. 
 
5.2 Domestic Criminal Procedures  
 
This thesis has shown how in recent years measures have been adopted in several domestic 
jurisdictions aimed at enhancing the protection of victims’ interests in criminal proceedings. 
  
321 
Such measures have recognised a victim’s right to judicial review of decisions not to 
investigate or prosecute and their right to participation and representation in the trial process, 
particularly in cases of serious crimes.  On the whole, the thesis has observed the growing 
recognition of victims’ rights in criminal proceedings as desirable even in those systems 
where victims have not traditionally been granted any rights in criminal proceedings. 
It has been argued that the gradual development of victims’ rights in criminal 
proceedings in domestic systems can be defined as a ‘top-down’ process in the sense that 
international norms and standards, as well as the practice of human rights treaty bodies, have 
influenced the adoption of corresponding norms at the domestic level.  Both binding 
international law (in the form of international treaties or binding decisions of human rights 
supervisory bodies) as well as more diffuse mechanisms such as that of reputation in 
international relations (in the case of soft law instruments or non-binding pronouncements of 
human rights bodies) have combined to influence the adoption of norms at the national level. 
Nonetheless, it remains true that significant differences continue to exist in relation to 
the degree and modalities of involvement of victims in criminal proceedings between the 
various domestic systems. Furthermore, there remains strong resistance from states, 
particularly those applying adversarial procedures, with regards to giving victims formal 
rights.  In such cases the introduction of a third party to proceedings is still seen as potentially 
endangering the effectiveness and fairness of proceedings. Therefore, it would be completely 
unrealistic to expect that in the coming years the development of a right to justice for victims 
of gross human rights violations would lead to the adoption of uniform procedures at the 
domestic level in respect to victims’ rights in criminal proceedings.  
Rather, what can reasonably be expected is that the outright exclusion of victims from 
criminal proceedings is unlikely to be sustainable in the longer term, in light of the emerging 
international legal standards on the matter. Indeed, recent developments, both at the 
international and at the domestic level, indicate that it is possible and indeed necessary to 
ensure effective enforcement of the right to justice through some form of involvement of 
victims in criminal proceedings. However, the extent to which victims will be allowed to 
participate in criminal proceedings and the forms of such participation will take remains to be 
seen and could be the object of further study in the next decade.  
Careful consideration must be given as to whether domestic legal systems will be able 
to ensure the effective realisation of victims’ right to justice, regardless of the procedural 
model adopted. As the thesis has observed, various obstacles may hinder the ability of 
domestic courts to realise such a right. Indeed, certain legal bars to prosecution remain in 
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place and the victims’ demands for justice may be set aside when traditional prerogative of 
states are at stake.  Such persistent traditional prerogatives include the personal immunities of 
senior state officials or mechanisms shielding perpetrators from accountability such as 
amnesties that are sometimes necessary to bring an armed conflict to an end. Additionally, 
practical obstacles may obstruct the realisation of victims’ right to justice, especially in cases 
of gross human rights violations. In particular, in some cases domestic institutions may 
simply be unable to deal with complex cases such as those characterised by this type of 
violation, or with the potentially high number of victims of these violations. The question thus 
arises as to whether such a right may be better enforced at the international level, namely in 
the context of international and internationalized criminal tribunals.  
 
 
5.3 International and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals: A Step Towards the 
Realisation of Victims’ Right to Justice  
 
The analysis carried out in this thesis has shown that international and internationalized 
criminal tribunals may contribute substantially to the effective realisation of the right to 
justice for victims of gross human rights violations amounting to international crimes. This is 
so for three main reasons. First, bars to prosecution do not apply in the context of 
international and internationalized courts and tribunals. These bodies have repeatedly 
indicated that prosecution of international crimes cannot be barred by any legal obstacle. 
Unlike domestic criminal tribunals, for instance, personal immunities are not considered to 
apply before international and internationalized criminal tribunals. As such, these bodies may 
bring perpetrators to justice even when domestic courts have failed to do so, thereby 
contributing to the effective realisation of victims’ right to justice.  
Second, in situations of political instability or systemic failure, which often follow or 
accompany international crimes or gross violations of human rights, international criminal 
tribunals may be the only fora capable of bringing perpetrators to justice, and in doing so 
ensuring the realisation of the corresponding victims’ right.  
Third, it has been shown that recently established international and internationalised 
criminal tribunals have introduced procedures aimed at enabling victims to participate in the 
proceedings in order to exercise their right to justice. At the same time, these bodies have 
elaborated considerable practice on how to implement such a right in a context of mass 
victimisation, usually involving high number of victims, whilst ensuring the fairness and 
effectiveness of the proceedings (and notably in the context of adversarial proceedings as is 
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the case with the ICC). In so doing, these bodies have not only reinforced the idea that victims 
have both a legitimate interest in prosecution and a real right to it, but that they also have 
corresponding participatory rights which derive from their right to justice.  
Plainly, this does not mean that international and internationalized criminal tribunals 
are the only fora where victims can enforce their right to justice. Rather, as argued in the 
thesis, it is primarily for domestic courts to enforce such right, by prosecuting those allegedly 
responsible for gross human rights violations and international crimes. Moreover, not all 
gross human rights violations amount to international crimes and, as such, do not fall within 
the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals. Furthermore, since international criminal 
tribunals only deal with a small portion of perpetrators of international crimes it is crucial that 
domestic criminal tribunals are equally able to provide justice to victims.  
However, the law and practice of international and internationalized criminal tribunals 
may also offer an important contribution in that regard. On the one hand, the practice of these 
bodies, as well as their legal framework, may come to influence decisions taken at the 
domestic level. Consequently, in the long run one can expect that international courts and 
tribunals will offer a valid contribution to the development of a norm which prohibits any 
obstacles to prosecution of international crimes and, eventually, to the effective exercise of 
the right to justice for victims of such crimes.  On the other hand, the practice of international 
criminal tribunals contributes to the development of a legal principle that a victim’s remedy 
encompasses the identification, prosecution and punishment of the wrongdoers as well as the 
access of victims to the procedure establishing criminal responsibility for the violations. This 
legal principle may, in turn, influence domestic law and practice.  
On the whole, the practice of international criminal tribunals has not only contributed 
to the emergence of a legal principle. It also potentially offers an indication of how to foster 
the realisation of victims’ right to justice at the domestic level. In affirming that criminal 
procedures must accommodate the interests and the rights of the victim the message has been 
sent to other fora, including domestic criminal courts, to adopt new procedures that depart 
from outdated theories on the nature of criminal offences and the objectives of criminal trials.  
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